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During the last few decades, there have been two dominant approaches to the 
study of John Locke, the contextualist school and the Straussian school. Both 
approaches have tended to foreclose fruitful possibilities of understanding and 
learning from Locke's thought. 
Within the dominant approaches, respectively, Locke tends either to be 
seen as an incoherent thinker or a thinker whose ideas conceal a dependence 
upon the thought of Thomas Hobbes. The aim of this thesis is to reconsider 
Locke by using the assumptions of holism, an approach that has been relatively 
sidelined in recent Locke scholarship. The thesis addresses five specific puzzles 
in Locke studies - spanning his political philosophy, epistemology, momls, and 
natural and revealed theology - which relate to and shed light upon two larger 
puzzles concerning the development and trajectory of Locke's mind: the 
coherence of the development of his thought and the intellectual relationships in 
which he stood to his contemporaries, especially Hobbes. The thesis shows via a 
holistic analysis of these puzzles that, contrary to the estimations offered by the 
dominant approaches, Locke was in fact a systematic thinker whose thought 
developed not towards but in structural opposition to the fabric of Hobbesian 
thought. By re-evaluating the portrait of Locke, this thesis allows us to 
appreciate the complexity and uniqueness of Locke's ideas. It encourages us not 
only to take Locke seriously, historically, as a distinctive thinker in his own 
right, but also, as one who may be helpful in considering and rethinking the 
foundations of contemporary liberal political philosophy. More generally, the 
thesis warns us against the negative implications of methodological exclusivity 
and opens up the possibility for a more pluralistic approach to the history of 
political thought and intellectual history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We shall therefore in vain go about to interpret their [sc. the Apostles] Words 
by the Notions of our Philosophy, and the Doctrines of Men deliverd in our 
Schools. This is to explain the Apostles meaning by what they never thought of 
whilst they were writing, which is not the way to find their Sense in what they 
deliver'd, but our own, and to take upfrom their Writings not what they leftfor 
us, but what we bring along with us in our selves. ' 
As long as there has been Locke scholarship, there have been debates about the 
2 
consistency and coherence of Locke's thought. In recent Locke scholarship, 
there are two dominant views related to two different approaches to the history 
of political thought and intellectual history. The first view, which is the 
Straussian approach, invites us to see a hidden coherence beneath the apparent 
inconsistencies in Locke's works and sees Locke as a follower of his 
predecessor Thomas Hobbes. 3 The second view, which is the contextualist 
approach, invites us to see little overall consistency in Locke's works, precisely 
because he was an ideologue rather than a philosopher, responding to specific 
problems in specific contexts. Also, because of a lack of direct engagement 
between the two thinkers, the contextualist approach invites us to believe that 
Locke had nothing substantial to say about Hobbes. 4 
1 PaN, 'Preface', 114. 
2 One of the first, and in many ways remains the best, accounts of the coherence of Locke's 
thought is John Milncr's An Account of Mr Lock's Religion (London, 1700). For a summary of 
Locke scholarship from the late nineteenth century, see Richard Ashcraft, 'A Critical Note on 
Locke Scholarship', in Locke's Two Treatises of Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
3 See especially, Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1953); 'Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law', in "at is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies 
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 202-51; Richard H. Cox, Locke on War and Peace (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1960); Robert Horwitz, 'Introduction', in Questions concerning the Law of 
Nature, eds. Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1990); Peter C. Myers, Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Strugglefor Political 
Rationality (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Steven Forde, 'Natural Law, Theology, 
and Morality in Locke', American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 396-409; Peter 
Josephson, The Great Art of Government. Locke's Use of Consent (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2002); Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); Samuel Zinaich, John Locke's Moral Revolution: 
From Natural Law to Moral Relativism (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2006); 
Henrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, and Rights (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2007). 
4 Most notably, Peter Laslett, 'Introduction', in 77G; David Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or 
Natural Law Theorist? ', in Religion, Secularization and Political Thought: Thomas Hobbes to 
J. S. Mill, ed. James E. Crimmins (London: Routledge, 1989), 39-67; John Marshall, John Locke: 
Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). One 
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One general aim of this thesis is to show how the strenuous application 
of these two approaches places limitations upon the ways that we can explore 
Locke's mind, and hence, what we can learn from him. This is obviously not 
what the proponents of the two approaches have intended to do. It is, however, 
5 the effect of what they do. This thesis therefore addresses a concern about the 
ways in which the history of political thought and intellectual history has been 
written and the implications that this has had for our understanding of the 
trajectory of Locke's mind. As a methodological alternative, the thesis 
reconsiders the holistic approach, adopted most notably by John Dunn and Ian 
Harris. This has been, to a certain extent, sidelined in recent discussions of 
Locke. The thesis attempts to demonstrate that this approach can help us to see 
the coherence of the development of Locke's thought in ways which have often 
been neglected in the existing literature. More specifically, it will re-examine 
two large puzzles in relation to Locke's development: its coherence and its 
relationship with Hobbes. The thesis will be comprised of five smaller puzzles 
concerning Locke's early political theory and natural jurisprudence, his turn to 
epistemology, his hedonistic ethics, his views on atheism, and his revealed 
theology. These smaller puzzles relate to the two larger puzzles, and by using 
the holistic approach, the thesis will reveal a different portrait of Locke than 
those of the two dominant approaches. It will show that Locke was in fact a 
systematic thinker and that his system developed not towards but in direct 
opposition to Hobbes. Through this reinterpretation, the thesis invites us to 
reappraise Locke as a distinctive thinker in his own right who can speak to our 
pressing political problems as well as to his own. 
An underlying argument of this thesis is that different assumptions 
brought to bear upon the evidence produce different views of the coherence of 
Locke's development. This is a claim about methodology and its implications. 
may argue that there is a third view, that of the coherentists. While there are obviously many 
commentators who claim that Locke was coherent, their focus tends to be only on Locke's 
'mature' works, i. e. his published works, which includes the Two Treatises of Government, An 
Essay concerning Human Understanding, the Letters on Toleration, and the Reasonableness of 
Christianity. See for example, Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 
5 As Michel Foucault once said: 'People know what they do; they frequently know why they do 
what they do; what they don't know is what what they do does'. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul 
Rainbow, Michel Foucault. ý Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1982), 187. 
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Thus, the thesis opens with some reflections upon this issue. It will begin by 
surveying Straussianism and Cambridge contextualism in turn, considering their 
advantages and disadvantages, and investigating their methodological 
implications. After showing the ways in which looking at Locke's thought 
through the lens of these two perspectives puts limitations on what we can see 
and learn from it, I will move on to consider the advantages of looking at Locke 
through the lens of the holistic perspective. I will then outline how the thesis 
will proceed. Finally, I will conclude with some general reflections on the 
proper role of methodology more generally. 
1. Strauss and Straussianism 
One of the dominant approaches to Locke's political philosophy is that of Leo 
6 Strauss and his followers, the 'Straussians' . 
Leo Strauss was a Jewish Gennan 
6migr6 to the United States at the time of Hitler's rise in the early 1930s. He 
initially settled in New York and eventually found a home at the University of 
Chicago in 1948 as Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor 
in the Department of Political Science. From there, Strauss disseminated his 
most influential works on the history of political philosophy. We shall see that 
on the Straussian approach, we are encouraged to see a hidden coherence lying 
beneath Locke's works, and a portrait of Locke as a covert follower of Hobbes, 
whether this is stated explicitly or implicitly. To see this clearly, I will start by 
explaining the conceptual origins of the Straussian approach. I will then move 
on to examine its advantages and disadvantages. Lastly, I will consider the 
portrait of Locke which is produced through this approach. 
Straussianism is often seen as a non-historical approach to the history of 
political thought and intellectual history. 7 However, it is better seen as an 
historical approach to intellectual history dictated by modem concerns. Strauss's 
motivation to understand the past was not derived from an antiquarian curiosity 
6 For excellent introductions to Strauss's approach, see John G. Gunnell, 'The Myth of the 
Tradition', The American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 122-34; Nathan Tarcov and 
Thomas Pangle, 'Epilogue', in History of Political Philosophy, 3 rd ed., eds. Leo Strauss and 
Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1987), 907-38; Catherine and Michael 
Zuckcrt, The Truth about Leo Strauss (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 2006). 7 Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', in Meaning and 
Context: Quentin Skinner andHis Critics, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). 
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but from what he diagnosed as 'the crisis of the West' and of modernity. 
8 This 
crisis was both intellectual and political. Politically, the West was threatened by 
'communism' and an 'Eastern despotism'. 9 But this threat was complemented 
by an internal crisis in the West, which, for Strauss, was the true crisis. This 
crisis, by contrast, was intellectual. The West, in Strauss's view, had lost 
certainty in its purpose or project, a 'purpose in which all men could be 
united'; 10 this was 'the construction of a universal society of free and equal 
nations of free and equal men and women enjoying universal affluence, and 
therefore universal justice and happiness'. " Modem liberalism, Strauss argued, 
was abandoning its universal and absolute basis in favour of relativism. It was 
abandoning any standard of right and wrong above the ideal of a particular 
society, and thus, any standard of judging legitimate and illegitimate societies. 
12 
This intellectual crisis created the political situation by which the West became 
susceptible to the burgeoning influence of the totalitarian regimes. For Strauss, 
according to Nasser Behnegar, the connection between 'relativism and National 
Socialism and other mass movements is not so much that relativism leads one to 
embrace such movements but that it disarms any principled opposition to 
13 them'. 
For Strauss, the insecurity of modem liberalism was a result of the 
insecurity of the modem project and modem political philosophy. On Strauss's 
account, political philosophy in general is 'the attempt truly to know both the 
nature of political things and the right, or the good, political order. 14 For Strauss, 
it was possible to speak of 'classical' and 'modem' solutions to political 
philosophy. Classical political philosophy was agreed that 'the goal of political 
life is virtue, and the order most conducive to virtue is the aristocratic republic, 
or else the mixed regime'. By contrast, modem political philosophy was 
characterized by its disunity. However, it was unified negatively in its 'rejection 
g Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 1. 
9 Ibid., 3-5. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 Tarcov and Pangle, 'Epilogue', 908. 
12 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 2-3. 
13 Nasser Behnegar, 'The Liberal Politics of Leo Strauss', in Political Philosophy and the 
Human Soul, eds. Michael Palmer and Thomas L. Pangle (Lanham, Md.: Rowan & Littlefield, 
1995), 253. 
14 Leo Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? ', in "at is Political Philosophy? and Other 
Studies (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 12. 
14 
of the classical scheme as unrealistic'. 15 Whereas classical political philosophy 
stressed 'the development and rule of what is best or highest in mankind', 
namely human reason, modem political philosophy stressed the passions. 
' 6 Thus, 
modem political philosophy lowered the aim of political philosophy, making its 
actualization more attainable. 
Modem political philosophy was unfolded in three stages or what Strauss 
called the 'three waves of modemity'. 
17 The first wave included the founders of 
modem political philosophy, Machiavelli and Hobbes, and others following in 
their footsteps such as Spinoza and Locke. 18 This wave was characterized as 
having reduced 'the moral and political problem to a technical problem, and the 
concept of nature as in need of being overlaid by civilization as mere artefact'. 
19 
Concerning the former point, whereas the ancients had emphasized the 
development of virtue through law as the core of politics, modems emphasized 
self-preservation and natural rights and the creating of institutions that 
guaranteed their protection. Concerning the second point, whereas ancients saw 
politics as natural to man, modems saw the movement into political society as a 
movement away from nature and favoured artificial and rational institutions over 
it. 20 
The second wave was initiated by Rousseau and followed by Kant, 
Hegel and Marx. This wave was characterized by its criticism of the first wave 
and its seeming movement back towards the pre-modem era, emphasizing the 
role of virtue. But virtue in the modem sense was distinguished from the 
classical sense where it was man's natural end. Virtue was replaced with 
freedom. 21 For the philosophers of the second wave, man was Hobbesian: he did 
not have an essential nature. Civil society was formed such that it was conducive 
to man's self-preservation and freedom. Natural man was, as it were, humanized 
through this historical process. Rousseau rejected a transcendent natural law, 
and emphasized the general will of the people as positive law. Thus, the rational 
15 Ibid., 40. 
16 Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 62. 
17 Leo Strauss, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', inAn Introduction to Political Philosophy, ed. 
Hilail Gildin (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989). 
"Strauss speaks of Machiavelli as the founder, but in other places, Hobbes as the founder of 
modem political philosophy. 
19 Strauss, 'The Three Waves of Modernity', 89. 
20 Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 62. 
21 Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? ', 53. 
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society was reached by a historical process which was not teleological. For the 
German philosophers following Rousseau, the actualization of the right order 
was the 'unintended by-product' of 'blind selfish passions' which were 'in no 
22 way directed toward the right order' . By making natural 
law superfluous and 
emphasizing the non-teleological nature of the historical process of actualizing 
the rational society, the second wave philosophers paved the way to relativism. 
The third wave was initiated by Nietzsche. In short, Nietzsche confirmed 
23 
that man was 'essentially historical' . The historical process, 
for Nietzsche, did 
not have its own rules for development but was the product of human agency 
and human creativity. The emphasis on human agency undermined any appeal to 
a trans-human source of authority. Values in history were man-made, the 
product of the 'highest will to power'. The concept of eternity was hereby 
denied. In Nietzsche, the route to relativism was opened, and with it, the crisis of 
modernity. 
Strauss believed that the end process of modem political philosophy was 
unfolding in his time with the rise and triumphing of 'positivism' and 
'historicism'. The rise of these 'isms' put a question mark against the very 
possibility of political philosophy. 24 For Strauss, positivism and historicism 
created the conditions leading on to 'nihilism' and 'fanatical obscurantism'. 
Strauss took positivism to be the basic stance of social sciences since the 
nineteenth century. On Strauss's account, positivism decreed that there was a 
'fundamental difference between facts and values'. Positivism maintained that 
'only factual judgments' were 'within the competence of science'. 25 That is to 
say, 'only facts or alleged facts can be true or not'. Value judgments were 
beyond the scope of 'rational inquiry, discourse, or validation'. 26 Therefore, 
positivism had to 'avoid value judgments altogether'. 27 
Historicism was more radical than positivism in that it denied the 
fact/value distinction itself It sees 'all claims to knowledge as relative to 
particular modes of culturally and historically conditioned experience and 
22 Ibid., 54. 
23 Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique ofReligion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), 12. 24 Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? ', 17. 
25 Ibid., 18. 
26 Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 72. 27 Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? ', 18. 
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incapable of ultimate justification'. 28 Historicist social science rules out the 
question about the good society because of 'the essentially historical character 
of society and of human thought. The value of a given society depends 
contingently on particular cultural and historical standards. Historicism was thus 
the 'serious antagonist' of political philosophy. 29 Historicism then culminated 
into nihilism, and the West thereby lost a grip on its purpose. 30 To sum up, 
Strauss believed that the decline of the West could be attributed to the decline of 
political philosophy, that is, the quest for the truth, the truth about the nature of 
political things. 31 
Strauss's response to the crisis of modernity was to turn to the history of 
political philosophy. The purpose of historical research was to look for the 
origins of the modem ills and to recover the character of political philosophy in 
its original form. There are two things to be said here. First, for Strauss, 
historical studies were of philosophic significance only in times of intellectual 
crises. 32 This distinctive agenda shaped the chamcteristics of Strauss's historical 
approach. Strauss took history seriously, but this was only insofar as it was 
useful to political philosophy. Thus he maintained: 'however important 
historical knowledge may be for political philosophy, it is only preliminary and 
auxiliary to political philosophy; it does not form an integral part of itq. 33 So in 
principle, once the task of history was completed, it could be 'eliminated and 
replaced by political philosophy itself. 34 
Secondly, as we have just seen, the modem solutions to politics were 
reductionist. The identification of the modem project as one leading to the 
decline of political philosophy was crucial for Strauss because it helped him to 
see the superiority of the ancients and justified his return to classical political 
philosophy to resuscitate political philosophy. Thus, we see here that Strauss 
needed an 'organic' history, that is, an evolving dramatic sequence in which the 
28 Gunnell, 'The Myth of the Tradition', 124. 
29 Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? ', 126. 
30 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 18. 
31 Leo Strauss, 'Political Philosophy and History', in "at is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 56-77. 
32 Strauss, The City and Man, 1; 'On Collingwood's Philosophy of History', in The History of Ideas: An Introduction to Method, ed. Preston King (London: Croom Helin, 1983), 153-76, esp. 175-6; Tarcov and Pangle, 'Epilogue', 911-12. 
33 Strauss, 'Political Philosophy and History', 57. 34 Gunnell, 'The Myth of the Tradition', 126. 
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modem period developed out of the classical period by the agency of certain key 
figures. He needed to show that there was a modem project in contradistinction 
to a classical one, and that the former was essentially unified by its reductionist 
movement. As we shall see below, this a prior! assumption had profound 
implications for Strauss's portrait of Locke. 
Notwithstanding the non-historical elements in his approach, Strauss 
stressed that we must try to understand past thinkers exactly as they understood 
themselves. 35 This involved the historian taking seriously the truth claims of a 
past thinker. Against the historicists, Strauss argued: 'we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a political philosophy which emerged many centuries ago is the 
true political philosophy, as true today as it was when it was first expounded 9.36 
Strauss left open the possibility that past thinkers were addressing 
timeless problems, and thus the possibility of learning from the past. It is in 
response to the historicists that Strauss developed his most controversial thesis 
of 'exoteric' and 'esoteric' writing. 37 Strauss observed that 'most historicists 
consider decisive the fact, which can be established by historical studies, that a 
close relation exists between each political philosophy and the historical 
situation in which it emerged'. But Strauss maintained that 'the historical 
evidence invoked in favour of historicism has a much more limited bearing than 
seems to be assumed'. For one, 'historicists do not make sufficient allowance for 
the deliberate adaptation, on the part of the political philosophers of the past, of 
their views to the prejudices of their contemporaries'. Many political 
philosophers of the past 'did not limit themselves to expounding what they 
considered the political truth': 
they combined with that exposition and exposition of what they considered 
desirable or feasible in the circumstances, or intelligible on the basis of the 
generally received opinions; they communicated their views in a manner which 
was not purely 'philosophical', but at the same time 'civil'. 
35 Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1968), 24; Strauss, 'Political 
Philosophy and History', 66. CE Gunnell, 'The Myth of the Tradition', 130. Gunnell observes 
that Strauss's emphasis on understanding the past authors remains 'at a level of a maxim or an 
enunciation of an attitude'. Apart from the esoteric and exoteric distinction, of which we shall 
see below, he has 'little to say about criteria of interpretation'. 
36 Strauss, 'Political Philosophy and History, 64. 
37 Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 123. 
is 
Thus, for Strauss, 'by proving that their political teaching as a whole is 
"historically conditioned", we do not at all prove that their political philosophy 
proper is "historically conditioned"'). 38 
Strauss observed that past thinkers often lived in times of persecution. 
This, he argued, gave birth to 'a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a 
peculiar type of literature, in which the truth about all crucial things is presented 
exclusively between the lines'. This literature is 'addressed, not to all readers, 
but to trustworthy and intelligent readers only'. 39 Strauss argued that thinkers 
living under persecution were often forced to distinguish between their 
'exoteric' teaching, i. e. their political teachings which were appropriate in their 
given circumstances, and their 'esoteric' teaching, i. e. their teachings which they 
considered to be universal truths. On this assumption, 'blunders' in a classical 
text can be seen as an indication of esoteric writing, in effect the concealment of 
the text's true teachings. The role of the historian (or more precisely, the 
political philosopher, who, for the time being, is a historian of political 
philosophy) is to decode the hidden doctrine from the clues contained in a text. 40 
Strauss and subsequent Straussians realized that their approach opened 
the door to potentially arbitrary readings. To deal with this problem, Strauss set 
down some general criteria as to when an esoteric reading (or 'reading between 
the lines') is justified . 
41 He stressed that one should first consider 'all reasonable 
possibilities' of understanding a particular utterance 'as it stands'. Here, contrary 
to what is often supposed, Strauss emphasized that knowledge of the relevant 
linguistic and historical context may be helpful in understanding a particular 
utterance. 42 Critics, however, have responded that Strauss's criteria for 
legitimizing esoteric readings are circular and have very little, if any, value as 
guidelineS. 43 Quentin Skinner asks for example: 'when should we stop trying to 
38 Strauss, 'Political Philosophy and History', 63-4. 
39 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing ffestportý Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 
25. 
40 Ibid., passim. 
41 Ibid., 30. 
42 Thus, the charge of textualism (one who postulates the self-sufficiency of the text) against 
Strauss may need revision. For Strauss's textualism, see Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding 
in the History of Ideas. 
43 Hans Aarsleff, 'Some Observations on Recent Locke Scholarship', in John Locke: Problems 
and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 262-7 1; 
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read between the lines? ' He notes that the only criterion Strauss gives us is this: 
'Reading between the lines is strictly prohibited in all cases where it would be 
less exact than not doing S09.44 Skinner asks fin-ther: 'what constitutes an era of 
persecution, such that we should expect to have to read between the lines? '. 
Strauss's response is this: 'that the book in question must have been composed 
in an era of persecution, that is, at a time when some political or other orthodoxy 
was enforced by law or custom'. Persecution, however, is defined more broadly 
as a period that compels 'all writers who hold heterodox views' to develop the 
45 techniques of esoteric writing. Yet Strauss does not tell us how we can know a 
prior! whether a given writer is heterodox or not. Thus, in the end, as the critics 
show, we can say that Strauss's criteria for legitimatizing the practice of reading 
between the lines comes down to a crude claim that one who sees the esoteric 
teaching is a 'thoughtful' and 'careful reader', and one who does not is an 
untrustworthy' and 'careless reader'. 46 
The more specific criterion that Strauss laid out may be more helpful: 'If 
a master of the art of writing commits such blunders as would shame an 
intelligent high school boy', then 'it is reasonable to assume that they are 
intentional'. This is particularly interesting when applied to Locke. The standard 
view of Locke before Strauss was that he was a confused thinker. 47 However, 
once we are given grounds to think that we are looking for Locke's esoteric 
teaching, we can argue for a hidden coherence underneath the superficial 
incoherence. In terms of the historiography of Locke, we may say that this was a 
significant contribution. But this approach is justified in purely pragmatic terms. 
Let us consider what Peter Josephson, a recent Straussian says: 'When faced 
with Locke's apparent contradiction', he states, 'we can make two hypotheses'. 
We can either suppose that Locke was 'a somewhat muddleheaded relic of the 
seventeenth century', or that he was 'a subtle, cautious, and timeless 
philosopher'; in other words, either Locke was confused or we are confused. 
John W. Yolton, 'Locke on the Law of Nature', Philosophical Review 67 (1958): 477-98; 
Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 42-3. 44 Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 30; Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas', 43. 45 Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 32,24; Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 146. 
46 Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 25. 47 Ashcrafý 'A Critical Note on Locke Scholarship', 300. 
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The former leads to the 'unhappy conclusion' that we are wasting our time, and 
so, we are 'better off, as readers, supposing the latter. 
48 
We may observe that both Strauss and Josephson are making two 
controversial assumptions. First, they make an a priori assumption that Locke 
was a 'master of writing' or a 'great thinker' rather than letting the evidence tell 
us whether this was so. As John Gunnell suggests, this was perhaps a necessary 
assumption given Strauss's project to search for the origins of the modem ills 
from a single 'organic' history of which Locke was a part (we shall see this in 
49 finther detail below). Secondly, they make an assumption that there were 
embarrassing contradictions in Locke. They do not entertain the possibility that 
this may simply be an indication of our own failure to see things exactly as 
Locke did, which does not necessarily commit us to read between the lines. 
What seems to us as an obvious logical contradiction may not have been one for 
50 Locke. 
Having looked at the conceptual origin of Straussianism and the basic 
methodological claims that Straussians make, I will now look at some of the 
advantages and the disadvantages of this approach. It is worth noting that I will 
be discussing the advantages of the Straussian approach. Since the rise of the 
Cambridge School, it has become standard practice for historically-minded 
commentators to dismiss of the Straussian approach in its entirety. 5 1 But I would 
suggest that there is always something we can learn from other approaches. Let 
us begin with the advantages of Straussianism. I will highlight three. 
The first advantage of Straussian approach is that it leaves open the 
possibility that past thinkers could have had long-term foci and the possibility 
that texts could carry 'genuinely philosophic significance, transcending the 
proximate circumstances of their production'. 52 In its strongest version, this 
assumption commits us to a thesis that all of the (so-called) great thinkers in the 
48 Josephson, The Great Art of Government, 19. 
49 Gunnell, 'The Myth of the Tradition', 13 1. 
50 Ruth Grant, John Locke's Liberalism (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1987), 9; Greg 
Forster, John Locke's Politics of Moral Consensus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 39. 
51 See for example Greg Forster's comments in 'A Glorious Revolution: Restoring Locke's 
Relevance', Political Theory 32 (2003): 709-12. For non-Straussian scholars, the Straussian 
interpretative method is 'supremely irritating' and 'grates like fingernails on a blackboard', 709, 
710. 
52 Myers, Our Only Star and Compass, 15-16. 
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canon of political philosophy were addressing the same set of philosophical 
questions. As I will point out below, this is a thesis perhaps difficult to maintain 
without invoking the controversial method of esoteric reading. In its weaker 
version, however, this assumption simply leaves open the possibility that 
thinkers could have had a wider philosophical project and a wider audience in 
mind that transcended the local context. This encourages us to be open to the 
possibility that the intentions of 'ambitious' authors 'may carry quite broad 
significance, perhaps even for humankind as such, in addition to their local and 
53 immediate significance' . This 
is especially significant in the context of the 
recent historiography of intellectual history where the Cambridge contextualists, 
as we shall see in the next section, have encouraged us to see thinkers as 
responding to particular political and polemical contexts. 
The second advantage of the Straussian approach is that it encourages us 
to make sense of silences. It is obviously a moot point as to what counts as a 
silence, but it is reasonable to assume that past thinkers do not always make 
their commitments explicit. 54 In the absence of further explicit evidence, we can 
either choose to reconstruct a plausible story from the available evidence or 
choose to suppress all curiosity for the lack of further explicit evidence. For 
practical reasons, many philosophically-minded historians will opt for the 
former. But the trouble, of course, with filling in the gap is that what seems to be 
'logically compelling (or even merely obvious) at one time and place is often not 
so at another'. 55 
The third and last advantage of the Straussian approach I take note of is 
that it encourages us to make an effort to think about incoherence more seriously. 
It helps us to realize that thinking is not an easy task: perhaps, as Michael 
Zuckert speculates, 'the great thinkers are more given to incoherence than most 
53 Ibid., 16. 
54 This explains my discomfort with the way that David Wootton, who believes that Locke was 
an incoherent thinker, approaches Locke's manuscripts. Wootton seems to think that once Locke 
has stopped writing about certain things in his manuscripts, it indicates that he is no longer 
committed to these views. See Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist? '. 55 Iain Hamspher-Monk, 'Evidence and Inference in the History of Political Thought: The Case 
of Locke's Theory of Property, in Evidence and Inference in History and Law: Interdisciplinary 
Dialogues, eds. William Twining and Iain Hampsher-Monk (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 2003), 348. 
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men precisely because they push hardest at the boundaries of thought'. 
56 
Straussian scholarship encourages us to try to understand why there is 
incoherence. There is no reason why we should limit ourselves to conclude, as 
the Straussians do, that there must be a hidden coherence or an inherent 
incoherence in the structure of thought. But thinking about incoherence 
seriously, as the Straussians do, can help us to reappraise a given thinker who 
we may have dismissed on account of his incoherence. A thinker may well have 
been incoherent, but it does not mean that we cannot learn from his incoherence. 
Incoherence may be a sign of a thinker's deeper intellectual struggles and his 
efforts to strive to render a coherent body of thought. 
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of the Straussian approach is that it 
leads to arbitrary reading practices, notwithstanding any stated intention to do 
otherwise. This problem arises because the approach is dependent upon a 
modem analysis of the problem of political philosophy that in turn licenses a 
certain form of reading of the history of political philosophy. Straussians are 
committed to showing that there are connections between the great philosophers 
which add up to a grand narrative about the crisis of modernity. To demonstrate 
this narrative and to demonstrate that the historicists are blind to these essential 
connections, Straussians appeal to esoteric readings of classical texts. To be sure, 
Strauss, pace some of his critics, does not say that esoteric reading is justified on 
every occasion. However, because Strauss and Straussians are preoccupied with 
showing that Hobbes was a founder of modem political philosophy, and that all 
subsequent political philosophy is based or derived from his thought, their 
illustration of the development of modem political philosophy tends to have a 
fixed pattern, notably, that Locke was a follower of Hobbes. 57 This a priori 
assumption compromises Strauss's stated intention to avoid arbitrary esoteric 
readings. The only test against which one can measure the soundness of an 
esoteric reading is whether it demonstrates the story of political philosophy's 
decline. Whether the evidence suggests otherwise is irrelevant. One who sees 
56 Michael P. Zuckert, 'Appropriation and Understanding in the History of Political Philosophy: 
On Quentin Skinner's Method', Interpretation 13 (1985): 410. 
57 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963), 1. For Strauss, Hobbes 'was the first who felt the necessity of seeking, and succeeded in 
finding, a nuova scienza of man and State', upon which 'all later moral and political thought is 
expressly of tacitly based'. 
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the esoteric teaching is thoughtful, one who does not is not. 
58 Applied like this, 
Straussianism can easily lead to a form of foundationlcss academic 
authoritarianism. 
We have looked at the advantages and disadvantages of Straussianism. 
We are now in a better position to consider, lastly, what kind of implications 
Straussianism has for the portrait of Locke. In general, explicitly or implicitly, 
Locke tends to be depicted as follower of Hobbes. On Strauss's account, 
according to the narrative of three waves of modemity, we are first encouraged 
to see Machiavelli and Hobbes as innovators of modem political philosophy. 
59 
As it had been Hobbes's role to mitigate the revolting character of Machiavelli's 
teachings, so it was Locke's role to appropriate the structure of Hobbes's 
thought and mitigate it in order to guarantee a wider acceptance. Locke, 
however, was a very cautious man and he was well aware of the dangers and 
penalties of embracing Hobbism. 60 A cautious writer, for Strauss, 'would state 
the case for the good cause in a manner which could be expected to create 
general good will toward the good cause': while he would 'scorn the appeal to 
prejudices', he would 'try to enlist all respectable prejudices in the service of the 
good cause'. 61 In other words, Locke engaged in exoteric and esoteric writing. 
For example, Locke appealed to the authority of Richard Hooker, a respectable 
theologian and natural law theorist, 'as frequently as he could'. Yet, what comes 
out of Strauss's analysis is the suggestion that Locke's apparent faith in God and 
natural law were best seen as a part of his exoteric teaching. At heart, Locke was 
a Hobbist. For Strauss, God played no effective role in Locke's natural law 
doctrine. Following Hobbes, Locke shifted the emphasis of natural law from the 
duty to the right of self-preservation. The desire for self-preservation turned into 
a desire for property and acquisition. Thus the right of self-preservation implied 
a natural right to property. This was the only point at which Locke diverged 
58 Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 30-1. Strauss seems to have been aware of such a 
criticism and defends his thesis by remarking that no other methodology has led to universal 
agreement. But the point at stake here is surely how historians can do their best to prevent 
historical writing from degenerating into an activity of mere guesswork. 
" Strauss, 'The Three Waves of Modernity, 84. 
60 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 206. See especially, Richard H. Cox, Locke on War and 
Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 1-44; Horwitz, 'Introduction', 1-28. For the reception of 
Hobbes in general, see Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
61 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 206-7. 
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from Hobbes's political philosophy. 62 But the implications were enormous. By 
offering an economic solution to a political question, Locke elegantly instituted 
the Hobbesian structure without its shocking implications: we have 'an utterly 
selfish passion whose satisfaction does not require the spilling of any blood and 
whose effect is the improvement of the lot of all'. 63 
Taking Hobbes's hedonism fiirther, the Straussian Locke argued that 
man was emancipated from the wretchedness of the state of nature by the 
emancipation of his 'productive acquisitiveness'. 64 The 'rational and 
industrious' induced the 'lazy and inconsiderate' to work harder for the common 
good of mankind. The role of the state or the 'mighty leviathan' was to protect 
and preserve property - the property of the rational and industrious from the 
lazy and quarrelsome. The state thereby offered a guarantee of the individual's 
self-preservation and helped increase the common stock of mankind. Life in a 
Lockean society was characterized by utilitarianism or political hedonism: the 
painful effort to obtain that which produced the greatest pleasures. Because the 
good life involved the quest for freedom from the miseries of the state of nature, 
there was no necessary tension with this quest and civil society as the mighty 
leviathan or 'coercive society'. 65 We are thus encouraged to see little difference 
between Locke's state and the Hobbesian state. 
Despite the criticism levelled at Strauss, Straussianism still comprises a 
major interpretative school in Locke scholarship today in the United States. 66 
Straussianism in general is popular in the United States because it concerns the 
identity and status of modernity and liberal democracy in America. In this 
context, we can see why Straussianism remains a major industry in Locke 
scholarship in the United States. For Straussians, Locke is a pivotal figure in the 
development of American liberaliSM. 67 
It is perhaps worth noting that subsequent Straussian interpreters of 
Locke are not in unison over the evaluation of Locke's achievements. Strauss's 
62 Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? ', 49. 
63 Ibid., 49. 
64 This view is compatible with the C. B. Macpherson's Marxist reading of Locke. Macpherson 
portrays Locke as an exponent of the rising bourgeoisie. See C. B. Macpherson, The Political 
Theory ofPossessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 65 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 202-5 1. 
66 For an extensive list of names of Straussian scholars, see Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 29. 
67 Zuckert, Launching Liberalism. 
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assessment of Locke can be read as an indictment. Locke was a follower of 
Hobbes and a part of the modem project. Given that the modem project was bad, 
Locke must be bad as well. Indeed, this is Behnegar's assessment of Strauss's 
Locke: 'By exposing the Hobbesian and hedonistic foundations of Locke's 
thought, Strauss's study may undermine the respectability of Locke and 
consequently put in question the status of the American founding fathers'. 
68 
Others Straussians, however, have maintained that Locke was the 'king' of 
philosophers and hold him in high respect as the founder of liberalism and 
liberal America . 
69This too is compatible with Strauss's own assessment of 
Locke. Although America was modem, Strauss had expressed his support for it. 
This can be explained by the fact that for Strauss, America was a derivative 
political society of the first wave, whereas the totalitarian Soviet regime was a 
derivative of the second wave. For Strauss, the superiority of liberal democracy 
over totalitarianism was clear. Given this backdrop, Locke qua the founder of 
liberalism can be seen as a good philosopher relative to those of the second and 
third wave. 70 
Yet despite the differences and disagreements in the Straussian schools, 71 
as a general conclusion, we may say that they see an organic history of political 
philosophy. This overwhelming preoccupation makes the Straussians susceptible 
to the interpretative problems observed in this section. 
2. Cambridge Contextualism. 
In this section, I will consider Cambridge contextualiSM. 72 This approach has 
become the dominant approach of historically-oriented studies of the history of 
68 Behnegar, 'The Liberal Politics of Leo Strauss', 258. 
69 See for example, R. A. Goldwin, 'John Locke 1632-1704, in History of Political Philosophy, 
Yd ed., eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1987), 510; 
Nathan Tarcov, Locke's Educationfor Liberty (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1984), 1. 
70 Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 74-9. 
71 Ibid., ch. 7. There are 'West Coast', 'Midwest', and 'East Coast' Straussians. Respectively, 
they reject the positions that America is modem, that modernity is bad, and that American is 
vod, 21-2. 
For useful introductions, see David Boucher, Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for 
Studying the History of1deas (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1985); Conal Condren, 
The Status andAppraisal of Classic Texts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); John G. 
Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop 
Publishers, 1979); James Tully, 'The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner's Analysis of 
Politics', in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Oltics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1988), 7-25; lain Hampsher-Monk, 'The History of Political Thought and the Political History of 
Thought', in The History of Political Thought in National Context, eds. Dario Castiglione and- 
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political thought. We shall see that on this approach Locke is often portrayed as 
a political ideologue with little overall consistency. The purpose of this section 
is to show how such a portrait can be a consequence of applying this approach 
too rigorously. But first, to help us to see this clearly, I will start by identifying 
the general methodological direction and claims of the contextualist approach, 
and then moving on to examine its advantages and disadvantages. 
It is a familiar story that in the 1960s, a number of intellectual historians, 
coincidently associated with Cambridge, published their reflections on 
methodology or studies with methodological significance, which, despite 
individual differences, were united by their emphasis on the historical identity of 
73 the study of the history of political thought. Their emphasis was on situating a 
past thinker within his appropriate intellectual context or contexts. Cambridge 
contextualism. primarily came out as a reaction to the non-historical writing of 
intellectual history, among those associated with this type of writing was Leo 
Strauss, of whom we have just seen. The Cambridge tradition is rich and diverse. 
But amongst others, there is no doubt that Quentin Skinner has attracted the 
most attention, not least because he has written extensively on methodology 
with incredible force and clarity. 
The central assumption that Skinner makes is that works of political 
theory are political acts. For Skinner, the central question an intellectual 
historian asks is thus: 'What was an author doing in writing what he did'? Here, 
Skinner distinguishes between an author's intention to do something and an 
author's intention in doing something. 74 The former refers to the author's 'plans 
or design to create a certain type of work' . 
75 Like an author's motives for 
lain Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 159-74; Quentin Skinner, 
'The Rise of, Challenge to and Prospects for a Collingwoodian Approach to the History of 
Political Thought, in The History of Political Thought in National Context, cds. Dario 
Castiglione and lain Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175 -88; 
Richard Tuck, 'The Contribution of History', in A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Petit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 72-89; 'History 
of Political Thought', in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 2 nd ed., ed. Peter Burke 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 218-32. 
73 Peter Laslctt, 'Introduction'; J. G. A. Pocock, 'The History of Political Thought: A 
Methodological Enquiry', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2 nd series, eds. Peter Laslett and 
W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 183 -202; John Dunn, 'The Identity of the History of 
Ideas', Philosophy 43 (1968): 85-104; Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas'. 
74 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 60-1. 
75 Quentin Skinner, 'Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts', in Meaning and 
Context., Quentin Skinner andHis Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 73. 
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writing something, it refers to a 'contingent antecedent condition of the 
appearance of the work'. An author may have various motives for writing a 
given work, and indeed, some may never successfully issue in an action. 76 Ifthat 
is the case, we can never hope to re-enter an author's mind and re-enact every 
thought that he has had. Moreover, an author's intention to do something may be 
irrelevant for the understanding of the meaning of the work, it being in a 
contingent relationship to the work, or, as it were, 'outside' it. By contrast, the 
author's intention in doing something presupposes that the relevant action has 
occurred, and thus, that it is 'inside' the work in the form of a statement: 
We may wish, that is, to ask not just about whether a given writer achieved 
what he intended and intended to achieve what he achieved, but rather about 
just what he may have been intending to do in writing what he wrote. 77 
Skinner refers to the author's intention in writing something as the author's 
'illocutionary' intentions. This tells us what an author was doing and through 
this what he may have meant by making a given statement. For Skinner, 
understanding a text meant not only understanding the literal meaning of a 
statement but also the illocutionary force of it. 
The next question an intellectual historian asks is then: 'How can we 
identify what an author was doing in writing or saying what he did'? Skinner 
claims that the crucial step is to reconstruct the 'linguistic' or 'ideological' 
context of the text . 
78 By doing so, we can make sense of what kind of 
significance a certain utterance had in a certain linguistic context: 
We can begin to see not merely what arguments [authors] were presenting, but 
also what questions they were addressing and trying to answer, and how far 
they were accepting and endorsing, or questioning and repudiating, or perhaps 
even polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and conventions of 
political debate. 79 
76 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 60. 
77 Skinner, 'Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts', 75. 
78 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 64. 
79 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 1, xiii. 
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Skinner argues that focusing our attention on the linguistic context can 
help us first to bypass the problem involved in postulating the self-sufficiency of 
the text. The problem with the textualist approach, as Skinner has suggested, is 
that it runs the risk of producing various 'mythologies', that is, the risk of 
attributing to a past thinkers views which they could not have reasonably been 
expected to hold . 
80 For example, in what Skinner calls the 'mythology of 
prolepsis', an historian is more interested in 'the retrospective significance of a 
given historical work or action than its meaning for the agent himself'. 
81 So 
while it is correct to say that Locke was 'one of the founders of the modem 
empirical and liberal school of political philosophy', this argument can be elided 
into the claim that Locke himself was a 'liberal'. For Skinner, 'this only serves 
to turn a remark about Locke's significance which might be true into a remark 
about the content of his works which could not be true'. 82 
Examining the linguistic context also helps us to bypass the problem 
involved in focusing on the social or historical context. Skinner concedes that 
the knowledge of the social and historical context can help in understanding a 
given text. Indeed, he believes that a 'knowledge of the social context of a given 
text seems at least to offer considerable help in avoiding the anachronistic 
mythologies' of the textualists. 83 However, the problem with the (social) 
contextualist approach is that the social and historical context may be 
mistakenly treated as the determinant of what the author said rather than serving 
as an `ultimate framework' for 'helping to decide what conventionally 
recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been 
possible for someone to have intended to communicate'. 84 For Skinner, the 
assumption that the ideas of a given text should be understood in terms of its 
social context is mistaken. 85 In its Namierite version, social contextualists see 
80 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 3649. However, Skinner has 
been criticized for misrepresenting his opponents as contextualists and textualists. See Boucher, 
Texts in Context, 231f; Preston King, 'The Theory of Context and the Case of Hobbes', in The 
History of1deas: An Introduction to Method (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 285-315, esp. 290-5; 
Kenneth Minogue, 'Method in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner's Foundations, in Meaning 
and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 
181. 
81 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 44. 
82 Ibid., 44. 
83 Ibid., 57. 
84 Ibid., 64. 
85 Ibid., 59. 
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political theorizing as mere ex post facto rationalizations of political 
behaviour . 
86 For example, one is faced with Machiavelli's statement, 'a prince 
must learn how not to be virtuous'. Say a study of the social context reveals that 
virtue in princes had in fact led to their ruin at the time. We can say that 
Machiavelli, who saw that virtue does not guarantee a prince's success, 
theorized that a prince must learn not to be virtuous in order to maintain power. 
Thus, the meaning of the sentence is made clear by the social context. 'But such 
a task, Skinner claims, is insufficient to identify Machiavelli's illocutionary 
intentions, which may be twofold. He may have been endorsing or emphasizing 
a moral commonplace or, by contrast, he may have been rejecting or repudiating 
a moral commonplace. While for Skinner the social context may help to explain 
Machiavelli's utterance, it does not mean that one has understood it. 
Understanding a text requires one to understand the meaning of the text and also 
what it was doing. 87 
Skinner's approach has had a significant impact on the subsequent 
writing of intellectual history. Let us then examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Cambridge contextualist approach. I will start with the 
advantages. I will focus upon two. The first advantage of contextualism is that 
by encouraging us to momentarily take our eyes off a given past thinker and 
investigate the specific intellectual context of his utterance, it helps us to set 
historically sensitive expectations of what a past thinker could be expected to 
say. It enables us to identify the extent to which a past thinker was following a 
certain convention, and also, when and how he departed from it. It also enables 
us to recognize the specific problem or problems a past thinker was addressing 
and through this, get a deeper sense of what he was doing. To sum up, 
contextualism helps us to ask historically sensitive questions thereby obtaining 
historically sensitive answers. 
A second advantage of the Cambridge contextualist approach is that it 
helps us to make sense of silences effectively. Again, by inducing us to survey 
the historical context and conventions surrounding a certain political debate, it 
helps us not only to see the conventionality or originality of a past thinker's 
86 Quentin Skinner, 'Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action', in 
Meaning and Context. - Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 109; 
and Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 104. 87 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', 61-2. 
30 
utterance, but also, what he failed to say. We might conjecture that a past thinker 
was, so to speak, stating his attitude towards a certain assumption 'in the form of 
88 his silence', perhaps 'polemically ignoring' prevailing assumptions. For 
example, noting that Locke made 'no appeal to the prescriptive force of the 
ancient English constitution' in the Two Treatises of Government, Skinner 
suggests that Locke may have been intentionally subverting 'one of the most 
widespread and prestigious forms of political argument at the time' with the 
mind to 'shift the discussion of political obligation onto a more abstract level at 
this point, by ignoring the claims of prescription and arguing entirely in terms of 
the concepts of natural law and natural rights. 89 Thus, on the contextualist 
approach, we are encouraged to look for the illocutionary intentions of silences. 
This is perhaps more plausible than the Straussian approach. For some critics, 
however, this approach is still problematic. For example, Kenneth Minogue 
asks: 'how does one even detect a silence, since all of us are silent about an 
infinite number of things'? For Minogue, the discovery of a silence often comes 
down to a matter of 'instinct'. 90 While this may certainly be true, we can defend 
the Cambridge approach by noting that it offers a historically sensitive criterion 
to detect a silence, which is precisely what is missing from the Straussian 
approach. It may not guarantee a discovery, but it will surely help us to sharpen 
our historical instinct. 
We have looked at some of the advantages of Cambridge contextualism. 
Let us now turn to its disadvantages. Ironically, its main disadvantage stems 
from its central assumption that writing a text can be a political act. The 
strenuous emphasis on this assumption has had the side effect of narrowing the 
scope of intellectual history. By encouraging us to focus on the illocutionary 
action of a past thinker's utterance, it has directed our attention to the polemical 
aspect of the text. As a result, it has encouraged us to see past thinkers less as 
philosophers than political actors-91 The contributions of past thinkers are seen 
as struggles to rewrite or take over the dominant language in a given language 
game. The history of political thought is portrayed as a series of contingent 
88 Skinner, The Foundations ofModern Political Thought, xiii-xiv. 89 Skinner, 'Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action', 105; see also, Skinner, The Foundations ofModern Political Thought, xiv. 90 Minogue, 'Method in intellectual History', 182. 
91 Bhikhu Parekh and P-N. Berki, 'The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology', Journal of the History of1deas 34 (1973): 163-184. 
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political moves. 92 Indeed, in his most recent book on Hobbes, Hobbes and 
Republican Liberty, Skinner writes: 
My governing assumption is that even the most abstract works of political 
theory are never above the battle; they are always part of the battle itself With 
this in mind, I try to bring Hobbes down from the philosophical heights, to spell 
out his allusions, to identify his allies and adversaries, to indicate where he 
stands on the spectrum of political debate. 93 
To be clear, I am not suggesting here that Skinner himself believes or 
suggests that identifying the political action constitutes a full understanding of a 
text. Skinner is careful to insist that 'amongst the interpreter's tasks must be the 
recovery of the writer's intention in writing what he writes', rather than insisting 
that this is the interpreter's sole task. 94 Furthermore, I am not making an a priori 
assumption here that past thinkers (especially those in the canon of political 
philosophy) cannot be political actors. Rather I am suggesting that one effect of 
this approach is that we become vulnerable to seeing texts solely in terms of 
political actions. Once we begin to focus upon illocutionary intentions, it 
becomes difficult to see past thinkers as anything other than political actors. Let 
me expand on this. 
On a linguistic contextualist account, past thinkers are seen as players in 
a 'language game'. 'Languages' are 'ways of talking' or 'modes of discourse' 
within natural languages, such as English and French, and they are games 
governed by 'certain rules and conventions'. 95 Past thinkers work within the 
boundaries of these rules, sometimes following a certain convention or 
sometimes repudiating or subverting it. By identifying these language games, 
92 Takamaro Hanzawa, 'The Western Concept of Liberty and Republicanism: A Historical 
Overview firom Outside', The Cambridge Moment (International Symposium at Chiba 
University, II- 13 December 2005), 233. 
93 Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), xvi. 
94 Skinner, 'Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts', 76; 'Some Problems in the 
Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 102. The sentences that immediately follow the 
above quote from Skinner's Hobbes and Republican Liberty confirms his commitment: 'I do my 
best, of course, to provide a careful exegesis of [Hobbes's] changing views about liberty. But I 
am at least as much interested in the seething polemics underlying the deceptively smooth 
surface of his argument'. 
95 Annabel Brett, 'What is Intellectual History Now? ', in "at is History Now?, ed. David 
Cannadine (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 115-9. 
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the contextualist approach does tremendous service identifying 'when' and 
'how' past agents achieved their 'polemical purposes'. However, there is also a 
drawback. We may narrow our historical vision by focusing exclusively upon 
the ways in which past agents were 'reworking meanings' and reducing their 
purposes to these moves. 96 To avoid reducing intellectual history to a 
historiography of the struggles in a language game, contextualists such as Mark 
Goldie (amongst others) stress the importance of locating not only the particular 
linguistic convention of an utterance but also its historical context(s). 97 In other 
words, asking the 'why': 'Why did a past thinker do what he did'? However, in 
answering this question, contextualists have developed a habit of looking for 
what a historical agent was trying to do in politics (whether in looking for one 
context or multiple contexts of a text). 98 This again leads to the problem of 
narrowing: seeing past thinkers merely as political actors. 99 
To summarize the discussion about the disadvantages of the Cambridge 
approach, the strenuous application of contextualist analysis tends to result in a 
narrowing of our historical vision. We are encouraged to focus upon the senses 
in which past thinkers were responding to particular problems arising from 
highly specific historical situations. Through this lens, a thinker's contribution 
becomes little more than a series of disconnected ideological manoeuvres. 
The contextualist approach does not encourage us to look internally for a 
deeper philosophical structure or the developing mind of a thinker. Of course, 
this is not a necessary consequence of the former method, and we should not 
close our eyes to the crucial developments in Skinner's later works on 
methodology. Amongst other things, he argues that we should focus on the 
writer's 'mental world', or 'the world of his beliefs' when we try to recover the 
writer's intentions. 100 It is significant, as Ken Tsutsumibayashi notes, that 
Skinner invokes John Dunn here, and even more so in relation to this thesis, 
because in the next section and the thesis as a whole, I will be arguing that this 
96 Mark Goldie, 'Historiographical Review: Obligations, Utopias, and their Historical Context, 
Historical Journal 26 (1983): 733. 
97 See also Brett, 'What is Intellectual History Now? ', 123; James Tully, An Approach to 
Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1-6. 
98 Goldie, 'Historiographical Review', 733. 
99 Ibid., 732f. Goldie tries to distinguish Cambridge contextualists from Richard Ashcraft, who 
he accuses of reducing Locke's Two Treatises to a polemical pamphlet, but nonetheless resists 
seeking for the significance of the text at a higher level of abstraction. 100 Skinner, 'Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts', 78. 
33 
focus on the agent's mental world, which Dunn pioneered, will help us to see the 
development of Locke's thought in a different light. 101 
Having examined the main claims of the contextualist approach and its 
advantages and disadvantages, we are in a better position to see why on this 
approach Locke is often portrayed as little more than an ideologue. A classic, 
indeed the original, example of a portrait of Locke from the contextualist camp 
is that of Peter Laslett. 102 Laslett, of course, pre-dates Skinner, but the former's 
influence on the latter has been widely acknowledged, most notably by Skinner 
himself. 103 Before Laslett, it was commonly supposed that Locke's Two 
Treatises was written shortly after the Glorious Revolution as an ex post facto 
defence and that his main adversary was Hobbes. Through a close examination 
of Locke's manuscripts and a contextualist analysis of Locke, Laslett identified 
firstly that Locke's target was not Hobbes but Sir Robert Filmer, and secondly, 
that the Two Treatises was written before the Revolution as a contribution to the 
Exclusion crisis in the early 1680s (Laslett does not dispute the fact that the Two 
Treatises was used as an ex post facto defence of the Revolution). Laslett also 
argued that Locke as a political polemicist was distinct from Locke the 
philosopher. As a philosopher, Locke had realized that he had failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a normative law of nature. But as a political 
polemicist, he needed a strong conceptual foundation for his political theory, 
which natural law could provide. Therefore, contrary to what he believed as a 
philosopher, he based his arguments in the Two Treatises on natural law. Locke 
is thus portrayed as having little consistency between his political theory and 
philosophy. From this view, it is intimated that Locke's overall development 
lacked coherence. Scholars after Laslett in the contextualist camp disagree over 
certain details about the precise occasion of the Two Treatises, but they tend to 
101 Ken Tsutsumibayashi, 'A Dialogic Critique of the Cambridge School Methodology, Keio 
Law Review 72-3 (1999-2000): 41-102 and 33-67, at (1999): 79. Although this point has 
attracted attention in Japan, it has not been the case in the Anglophone community. For 
Skinner's self-appraisal of his reception, see Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1, Sn . Skinner complains that he fcels he has 'lived in vain' when Mark Bevir failed to notice the impact of his holistic approach. Mark Bevir, 
'Taking Holism Seriously: A Reply to Critics', Philosophical Books 42 (2001): 188. 
102 Peter Laslett, 'Introduction'. 
103 Quentin Skinner, 'A Reply to My Critics', in Meaning and Context., Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 233; see also, 'An Interview with Quentin Skinner', 
Cogito 11 (1997): 69-76. 
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agree over the general portrait of Locke as a philosophically inconsistent 
polemical thinker. 104 
Let us see where the Cambridge approach leads to when taken to its 
extremes. Here, I believe that John Marshall's book John Locke: Resistance, 
Religion and Responsibility is a good example. ' 05 Marshall is not a Skinnerite 
contexualist but he is very much a student of the Cambridge approach. His 
undergraduate supervisor was Mark Goldie and his PhD supervisor was John 
Pocock. We may say that what we see in Marshall is the effect of the 
assumptions of the contextualist approach. In John Locke, Marshall proposes to 
write about the development of Locke's intellectual thought. Committed to 
recovering a contextually oriented portrait of Locke, he painstakingly analyzes 
Locke's manuscripts. Marshall produces a portrait of Locke in which Locke 
sequentially responds to the contextually specific problems he meets. 106 Locke's 
contributions are effectively reduced to solutions to the problems as he is 
confronted by them. Thus, Marshall's Locke is essentially passive. Locke is 
influenced by the materials he encounters and he often adopts them without 
considering the overall impact to his wider thought. We are encouraged to see 
the development of Locke's thought as a development with little direction, 
purpose or coherence. The development of Locke's thought becomes no more 
than the assemblage of responses to these individual problems. 
Two brief examples, which we shall examine in further detail in the 
chapters, will illustrate this point. First, it is widely accepted that Locke in the 
early 1660s advocated an authoritarian political outlook and Locke in the late 
1660s advocated a liberal one. This is a significant move which is nothing short 
of a volte-face. For Marshall, however, there is no possibility of a theoretical 
104 Mark Goldie, 'John Locke and Anglican Royalism', Political Studies 31 (1983): 61-85; 
Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics & Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986); Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist?; 
Justin Champion, 'Le culte prive quand il cst rendu dans le secrcf: Hobbes, Locke et les limites 
de la tolerence, I'atheisme et I'heterodoxie, in Lesfondements philosophiques de la tolerence vol. 
1, eds. Y. Charles Zarka, Franck Lessay and John Rogers (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2002) 221-253. 
105 Marshall, John Locke. 
106 Ibid., xvi. 'The conjunction of support for religious, intellectual and political liberty in 
Locke's thought in the 1690s will be shown to have been in significant part the result of external 
influences from the varied political, religious, social and moral causes which Locke supported 
between the late 1660s and the 1690s, and in significant part of intensive personal reflection, 
particularly influenced by massive reading and by a series of sigaificant encounters in years 
spent on the Continent with work by Dutch, French, Polish and Hungarian authors'. 
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development on Locke's part. Locke's struggle to compose a consistent 
argument in the late 1660s suggests that 'Locke was initially engaged in an 
attempt to defend toleration at Ashley's request when he himself was still not 
convinced of its viability'. 107 Here, Locke's radical change of view is attributed 
solely to external pressures. 
The second example concerns Locke's theological views. It is widely 
accepted that Locke believed in human freedom all through his intellectual 
career. Yet in his final theological work, A Paraphrase and Notes on the 
Epistles of St Paul, Marshall notes that Locke offers a grim picture of human 
sinfulness, which amounts to a repudiation of his previous commitment to 
human freedom. Again, this is nothing short of a volte-face. But for Marshall, 
this can be explained by 'a stress [Locke's] substantial reading of Paul's thought 
helped to create'. 108 Locke's radical change of view is again attributed to 
external influences. 
My point is not that Locke cannot be influenced by others. Rather, it is to 
note that for Marshall, there is an underlying assumption that thinkers do not 
think beyond a specific context. On Marshall's account, there is no possibility 
that thinkers have a governing principle and that they try to pursue its 
implications across the various areas of thought. Locke responds to specific 
questions in specific contexts. He adopts positions suitable to these situations 
regardless of whether this undermines his previous commitment. On this model, 
Locke can only appear as a thinker with little overall coherence. 
Once we accept that texts are political actions, it becomes difficult not to 
see thinkers as political actors responding to particular problems. Once this is 
settled, it becomes difficult to see any past thinker with a deeper intellectual and 
philosophical structure. 
3. The Holistic Approach 
Hopefully, nothing I have said so far suggests that I believe that we cannot learn 
anything valuable about Locke (or any past thinker) from either Straussianism or 
Cambridge contextualism. All that I have been claiming is that when these 
methodologies (or indeed, any other methodology) are applied over-rigorously, 
107 Ibid., 69. 
108 Ibid., 433. 
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we end up creating interpretive problems that we have seen above. How can we 
avoid the Scylla of Straussianism. and the Charybdis of Cambridge 
contextualism? As I have noted above, the Cambridge tradition is rich and 
diverse. In this final section, and indeed, the thesis as a whole, I will argue that a 
re-appraisal of the methodological approach which John Dunn pioneered, but 
which has been overshadowed by Skinner, can cast a different light on our 
understanding of the development of Locke's thought. In this section, I will 
examine the general assumptions of the holistic approach and its major 
advantage. Following this, I will explain how the thesis uses the advantage of 
this approach to offer a renewed insight into the development of Locke's mind. I 
will then run through the individual chapters and show how they fit into the 
overall argument of the thesis. 
Dunn's contribution to the study of intellectual history'09 has perhaps not 
been fully appreciated. ' 10 This is partly because his writing is simply difficult to 
understand but also on a less mundane note it is partly because the similarity 
with Skinner's methodology has been overemphasized. Because of the common 
nature of their reaction to the non-historical writing of history in the 1960s, their 
similarities rather than their differences have tended to be emphasized. III 
What contributions does Dunn make to the discussion of methodology? 
An important assumption we can extract from Dunn's comments on 
methodology 112 is that thinking, and thus, writing, is essentially an activity of 
understanding. In his article 'The Identity of the History of Ideas', he writes: 
'thinking is an effortful activity on the part of human beings, not simply a 
unitary performance; that incompleteness, incoherence, instability and the effort 
to overcome these are its persistent characteristics'. It is 'an activity which is 
conducted more or less incompetently for most of their waking life by a 
109 And also, Dunn's contribution to Locke scholarship. Although his book The Political 
Thought ofJohn Locke (amongst others) has been widely cited, he seems only to be remembered 
by a few pithy remarks. 
110 This does not seem to be the case in Japan. See, for example, Takashi Kato, 'On the 
"Complexity" of Locke's Thought: A Methodological Sketch, History of Political Thought 2 
(1981): 287-311; 'The Reasonableness in the Historical Light of the Essay', Locke Newsletter 12 
(1981): 45-59. 
111 This is not to say they were not noted at all. 
112 1 say Dunn's 'comments' on methodology because Dunn never develops a systematic 
methodology as Skinner does. This is because Dunn does not think that methodology can elevate 
higher than the level of prudence. See John Dunn, 'Practising History and Social Science on 
"Realist" Assumptions', in Political Obligation in its Historical Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), 111. 
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substantial proportion of the human race, which generates conflicts and which is 
used to resolve these, which is directed towards problem solving and not 
towards the construction of closed formal games'. ' 13 In other words, history of 
thinking implies a 'history of men battling to achieve a coherent ordering of 
their experience'. 114 Thus, for Dunn, the great texts of political thought are 
'products of concentrated intellectual labour and imaginative exploration by 
palpably human agents" 15 which, he argues, are 'in some sense unintelligible 
except in terms of this context'. 
Let us consider what kind of practical methodological implication the 
assumption of conceiving thinking as an effortful activity has. It invites us, 
amongst other things, to focus on the intellectual development of a past thinker 
when we consider how a past thinker came to say what he did. In particular, we 
are encouraged to inquire what assumptions were required for an agent to be 
able to say what he said and how these assumptions were formulated so that we 
can understand what the agent was trying to say. Dunn argues: 'If we are to 
understand the criteria of truth or falsehood implicit in a complex intellectual 
architectonic, we have to understand the structures of biographical or social 
experience which made these criteria seem self-evident'. 116 Therefore, once we 
accept Dunn's assumption, we are invited to look for a deeper structure, a 
complex web of beliefs and commitments that make a certain utterance 
intelligible. 
As Dunn came to realize in retrospect, his approach falls in the tradition 
of Quine's holism. 117 Thinking is 'an internally related whole'; it is not an 
'assemblage of discrete individual propositions or assertions'. Hence, for Dunn, 
a single utterance of a past thinker cannot be 'understood and episternically 
assessed firmly on [its] own'. ' 18 It is a part of a wider network of beliefs and 
assumptions, where one set of belief lends support to another. On this view, we 
113 Dunn, 'The Identity of the History of Ideas', 88. 
114 Ibid., 87. 
115 John Dunn, The History of Political Theory and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 18. 
116 Dunn, 'The Identity of the History of Ideas', 96. 
117 John Dunn, 'What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke? ', in 
Interpreting political responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 9-10. See 
W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960); From a Logical Point of 
View (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1961), 20-46. 
118 Dunn, 'What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John LockeT, 9-10. 
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are encouraged to look for central presuppositions that an author makes 
(something on the line of what R. G. Collingwood calls 'absolute 
presuppositions')' 19, and then see how his utterances at a given time relate to 
this presupposition. It is worth noting that Dunn's approach also has affinities 
with that of Mark Bevir's works. Intellectual history, on Bevir's account, is the 
'history of beliefs'. 120 Bevir, like Dunn, stresses that an agent's utterance only 
makes sense in relation to his web of beliefs, that is, in relation to the 'life- 
history' of the web of beliefs of the agent. 121 So, for example, he argues: 'If we 
know X believed P, Q, and R, one way of explaining why X believed S is to 
show how S fits in with P, Q, and R'. 122 
We have examined the general claims of the holistic approach. Let us 
move on to consider its advantages. The overwhelming advantage of this 
approach is that it draws our attention to the past thinker's internal activity - an 
activity of making his mental world coherent - and not just the political issues 
which had an impact on -him (of course, these two may be interrelated). By 
examining the whole array of commitments an agent adopted, we can make 
plausible judgments as to how certain utterances squared with the other 
commitments. If an agent changed his mind, we can search for reasons other 
than polemical ones; he may, for example, have seen the unpleasant implications 
of his commitments (Bevir calls these 'dilemmas') 123 and altered them to fit with 
his existing web of beliefs, which in turn often had the effect of altering the 
whole web of beliefs. In short, the advantage of the holistic approach is that it 
helps us to see beyond the local contexts and significances and helps us to focus 
on the bigger vision and agenda that a past thinker may have had. It helps us to 
see the connections and significances a thinker attached to a certain argument 
and encourages us to see it as a part of a wider argument. 
Another advantage of the holistic approach is that it too, like the 
previous two approaches, offers us a way to make sense of silences. On this 
"9 F-G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, intro. Stephen Toulmin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978), ch. 7, esp. 66-7; An Essay on Metaphysics, rev. ed., ed. Rex Martin (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), chs. 4,5, esp. 31-3. An absolute presupposition is 'one which stands, relatively to 
all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer', 31. It is a 
resupposition upon which others are built. 
20 Bevir, 'Taking Holism Seriously', 189. 
121 Bcvir, The Logic ofthe History ofIdeas, 192-3. 
122 Bcvir, 'Taking Holism Seriously', 189. 
123 Bevir, The Logic of the History ofIdeas, ch. 6. 
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approach, we can try to make sense of silences by synchronic and diachronic 
considerations of what web of beliefs and commitments a past thinker had and 
had developed over a period of time. 124 A silence may be explained by looking 
at how it connected with a present or a previous commitment an agent had or 
had made, which perhaps had unfavourable implications or which perhaps had 
already answered the question at hand. 
4. Overview of the Thesis 
The thesis will adopt the holistic approach just expounded. The chapters will 
each re-examine, from a holistic perspective, puzzles related to two larger issues 
about the coherence and direction of the development of Locke's thought. The 
chapters in this thesis will be a series of developing and complementary case 
studies covering aspects of the development chronologically. Perhaps one might 
ask whether a 'case study' approach is appropriate for this thesis. As we have 
seen, the holistic approach sees writing as an activity of effortful thinking and 
examines a thinker's utterances in the light of his synchronic and diachronic 
webs of beliefs. Thus, one may say that this approach inherently entails a study 
of the intellectual biography of a thinker, that is to say, an extensive study of the 
development of a thinker's mind spanning all the different areas of thought, 
which, at first sight, may only seem remotely relevant to a particular utterance. 
Given the tremendous time and space such a thorough investigation as 'the mind 
of Locke' would take, one may be excused, I hope, in the limited scope of a 
thesis, for being selective. But at the same time, one cannot be exempted from 
the task of making clear how these individual case studies come together behind 
a unifying story. 
I will now summarize the individual case studies and chapters of the 
thesis, and explain how they fit together in a narrative about the development of 
Locke's thought. Each chapter will consider a specific puzzle in Locke 
scholarship relating to two wider puzzles about the coherence of Locke's 
development and Locke's intellectual relationship with his contemporaries, pre. 
eminently Hobbes. They will each show how the holistic approach opens up 
novel ways of resolving the puzzles and how these narratives contribute to 
124 Ibid., chs. 5,6. 
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constructing a larger portrait of Locke, which differ from contextualist and 
Straussian portraits, as a systematic and distinctive thinker. 
Chapter One considers the puzzle about Locke's volte-face from an 
authoritarian politics in the early 1660s to a liberal politics in the late 1660s. 
Broadly contextualist-minded commentators have struggled to explain why 
Locke changed his political views between the early and late 1660s. They have 
traditionally tried to explain this change in terms of contingent events in the mid 
1660s. However, this chapter shows, via the holistic approach, that the change 
can be attributed to a theoretical development in Locke's thought, particularly 
natural jurisprudence. It also shows how Locke's natural jurisprudence 
developed in direct opposition to Hobbes, and how this helped Locke to shift 
from his former authoritarian Hobbesian politics to later liberal politics. More 
specifically, in this chapter, we shall see how Locke encountered a political 
problem in the early 1660s, which required him to clarify the legitimate 
boundaries of civil authority and individual conscientious liberty concerning 
indifferent things. Both were necessary to perform the duties of civil order and 
sincere worship willed by God. Locke's initial response, which prioritized civil 
order, was unsatisfactory because it bought civil order at the price of sincere 
worship. We shall see how Locke's solution to this dilemma led on to wider 
investigations about natural law, and in turn, how this development provided the 
conceptual resource to reconcile the tension between civil order and sincere 
worship. More broadly, this chapter shows Locke's struggle to disentangle 
himself from Hobbesian politics and how he strived to develop an intellectual 
system that could transcend it. 
Chapter Two considers the puzzle about the impetus behind the 
production of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding. Contexualist 
commentators have traditionally seen the project of the Essay as following 
seamlessly from the lectures on natural law. Others have seen the Essay as a 
polemical work to refute the authoritarianism of Samuel Parker. This chapter 
shows through the holistic approach that Locke's opposition to Parker's politics 
figured in a wider intellectual context to defend the former's political vision at a 
more specific philosophical level. More specifically, we shall see how Locke's 
renewed liberal political vision faced a challenge in the works of Samuel Parker 
in the late 1660s. Parker, like the Locke of the early 1660s, advocated the civil 
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magistrate's authority over religious affairs. Parker's Hobbesian politics posed a 
challenge for Locke not least because the two shared many philosophical 
assumptions in common, yet their political views were at loggerheads. We shall 
see that the difference separating Locke and Parker was that whereas Parker 
supposed the superior knowledge of the magistrate over religious affairs, Locke 
supposed that people were equally competent and that in general they were 
capable of attaining the necessary knowledge concerning morals and religion. 
We shall therefore see how a question about politics developed into a wider 
investigation about the scope of human understanding, or epistemology. More 
broadly, this chapter shows how Locke's thought developed structurally in 
opposition to the Hobbism exemplified in Parker. 
Chapter Three considers the puzzle about the supposed incoherence and 
Hobbism of Locke's hedonistic ethics and his refusal to respond positively to an 
invitation to emulate the naturalistic ethics of an anti-Hobbist writer, Richard 
Cumberland. Contextualist commentators have traditionally argued that Locke's 
hedonistic ethics was at odds with his natural law theory. Moreover, some 
contexualist commentators as well as Straussian commentators have suggested 
that Locke fell into Hobbism, even if he was not a Hobbist from the outset. This 
chapter shows through the holistic approach that Locke's hedonism 
complemented rather than contradicted his natural jurisprudence. Moreover, it 
shows that although Locke did share similar conceptual resources as Hobbes, his 
hedonistic brand of ethics differed significantly from Hobbes. Locke did not 
adopt Cumberland's solution because it came too close to Hobbes as a solution 
to it. More specifically, we shall see how Locke's morals and natural 
jurisprudence developed in a way that was consistent with his epistemology. 
Locke believed that moral knowledge was in the ambit of human understanding. 
Having rejected innate ideas, Locke needed to show how people could attain 
moral knowledge through their natural faculties. We shall see that in the 1670s, 
Locke began to develop his morals in terms of hedonism, but of a particular kind. 
Like his contemporaries, Locke linked his hedonistic ethics with the divine 
purpose, but he stressed the pleasure and pain of the afterlife rather than those of 
this present world. The latter came close to Hobbes's version of hedonism. To 
supplement his morals, Locke showed how natural reason was congruent with 
revealed theology and how the latter could help the less fortunate to attain moral 
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knowledge. More broadly, this chapter shows that Locke's thought developed 
consistently with his previous commitments, and moreover, in a way that was 
structurally different from Hobbes. 
Chapter Four considers the coherence of Locke's discussion of atheism. 
Commentators have often seen Locke's denial of toleration to atheists as an 
anomaly for the champion of liberal toleration, merely reproducing a false 
seventeenth century prejudice. Others have suggested that there was something 
significant about Locke's denial. For Straussian commentators, Locke's denial 
had less to do with his own personal faith than the utility of a God-myth for 
effective governance. Some contexualist commentators have observed that 
Locke's discussion of atheism was uncharacteristically short, perhaps for 
polemical reasons. This chapter shows through the holistic approach that 
Locke's views of atheism were in fact significant. They were complicated and 
differed from his contemporaries' significantly, showing that Locke was 
addressing a conceptually new problem. The chapter also suggests that Locke 
said very little about atheism because he was aware that he could be accused of 
atheism and also because he did not want to make it look respectable by taking it 
seriously. More specifically, we shall see how the centrality of God and natural 
law in his political system led him to argue that atheists could not be tolerated in 
civil societies. We shall see that Locke was specifically denying toleration to 
speculative atheists, that is, those people who genuinely denied the existence of 
God and natural law. Locke's own denial of innate ideas created this conceptual 
possibility that people could be genuinely devoid of all knowledge of God and 
His law. We shall see that Locke's response to this problem was to emphasize 
the role of education. More broadly, this chapter dispels the belief that Locke 
was careless and thoughtless concerning the issue of atheism. On the contrary, it 
shows that Locke was a meticulous thinker who developed his views 
systematically. 
Chapter Five considers the puzzle about the coherence of Locke's views 
on human freedom and human sinfulness. Contexualist commentators have 
intimated that towards the end of his life, Locke adopted a deterministic view of 
human sinfulness which repudiated his previous commitments to human 
freedom and natural jurisprudence. Thus, they present a portrait of a very 
incoherent Locke. This chapter shows through the holistic approach that Locke 
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did in fact remain faithful to his previous commitments. It also suggests that 
doing so was important for Locke to close off the arguments that could support a 
Hobbesian framework. More specifically, we shall see how Locke's assumption 
of a purposive God had implications for his revealed theology. Given that God 
had willed people to live according to the rules of morals or law of nature, 
Locke believed that God would not only provide them with the faculties 
necessary for moral knowledge but also the will power or the freedom to act 
according to it; otherwise the notion of responsibility would collapse. Thus, 
Locke believed in human freedom and self-determination. We shall see how 
Locke defended this vision in his later theology and developed his views on 
original sin and predestination in a way that was compatible with it. More 
broadly, this chapter shows that Locke's intellectual system was in fact coherent 
and that it structurally developed in a way that opposed Hobbes. 
The chapters of this thesis all focus on aspects of Locke's thought that 
have not received sustained attention in the scholarship. Through a holistic re- 
interpretation of these aspects, the individual case studies build into a wider 
narrative about the development of Locke's thought, particularly concerning its 
coherence and its relationship with Hobbes. They show how an engagement 
with a political question led on to wider investigations and how these 
developments were consistent with his previous commitments. They therefore 
depict a portrait of Locke as a man striving for intellectual coherence. In other 
words, they show that Locke was a systematic thinker. Moreover, they show that 
the development of Locke's thought had a definite direction. Locke's thought 
developed on the assumption of a purposive Creator. Many commentaries on 
Locke nowadays acknowledge that his thought was God-centred (and this is 
perhaps what Dunn is primarily remembered for). But very few of these have 
explicated in any detail, as this thesis does, what exactly a belief in a purposive 
God implied for the development of Locke's thought. 125 These case studies show 
that, for Locke, a belief in a purposive God implied a liberal politics where civil 
order and conscientious liberty was reconciled, based on a'system of natural 
justice backed up by God, which in its own turn, had implications for 
epistemology, educational theory, and revealed theology. By widening the 
125 One exception is Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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context, the thesis shows that although Locke's early politics approached that of 
Hobbes, and indeed, shared many common conceptual resources with him, the 
whole fabric of Locke's thought developed not towards but in opposition to 
Hobbes. It shows that Locke's reliance on God was better supposed genuine 
than spurious and shows how this drove Locke to pursue a different course than 
Hobbes. Taken together, the case studies help us to re-appraise Locke's mind 
and encourage us to take him seriously as a unique thinker in his own right - to 
cherish his imaginative force, and not to consign him to the historical dustbin. 
There is one final caveat before I move on. The reader may feel at times 
that I am over-intellectualizing Locke by claiming that he saw how one 
commitment had implications for another area of thought. I will respond in 
advance that, here, I am thinking about something on the lines of Bevir's 
distinction between 'self-conscious' and 'pre-conscious' beliefs., 26 The former 
type of belief is beliefs that people 'are aware of at that particular moment, and 
the latter is beliefs that people 'hold even though they are not self-consciously 
aware of them at that particular moment'. 127 Bevir argues that pre-conscious 
beliefs should be seen as part of self-conscious beliefs. In this thesis, therefore, I 
will be presenting beliefs and assumptions that Locke not only could have held 
self- consciously, but also pre-consciously. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of the above considerations was to point out that methodologies 
were reflections of the historian's concerns and assumptions which are brought 
to bear on the evidence and that strenuously applying certain methodological 
assumptions can foreclose other fruitful interpretative possibilities. I showed 
how this has had implications for our understanding of Locke. I showed how the 
two dominant approaches to the study of Locke produced two polarized portraits 
of Locke and how adhering to these models can limit the way we understand 
him and what can be learned from him. To offer a fresh look at Locke, I 
proposed the reconsideration of the holistic approach and outlined how this can 
reveal a different view of the character and the trajectory of the development of 
Locke's mind. 
126 Bevir, ne Logic ofthe History ofIdeas, 153 -6. 127 Ibid., 153. 
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Historians inevitably bring their own concerns and presuppositions. 
Bringing our own concerns in itself is not problematic insofar as we are first 
willing to discharge our duty to understand the past thinker in and on his own 
terms. This duty, Dunn argues, should be seen as a 'side constraint on 
interpretive license' and not a 'taboo on cognitive interest'. 128 Thus, although it 
is extremely hard - or perhaps even impossible - we should try our best to 
eschew the interpretative problem of letting our own concerns direct what a past 
thinker had said. We can try to do this by being aware of the problem, in the first 
instance, and then provisionally holding back our own concerns. Furthermore, 
although it is undoubtedly difficult to see the shortcomings of the 
methodological assumptions of an approach to which we have logically 
capitulated, we should always try to leave scope for self-criticism so that we can 
avoid the interpretative problems which an over-rigorous adherence to certain 
methodological assumptions may create. 129 
To summarize briefly, the upshot of the above reflections is that no 
single approach can or should claim methodological exclusivity. If we accept 
this, then it induces us to accept a methodological pluralism, that there are many 
appropriate approaches to intellectual history which can often yield 
complementary results. This is not to say that these various approaches will 
necessarily yield complementary or even compatible results, nor does it mean 
that there are no distinctions between good and bad writings of history. What it 
does mean, however, is that we should be aware that methodologies invariably 
have limitations; that we should be open-minded and always alert for alternative 
interpretations. A mark of good historical writing is surely that it is supported by 
evidence, but reasonable historians can reasonably draw different conclusions 
from the same evidence. Thus, there is, as Ian Harris neatly puts it, 'always 
much to be learrit from others (though not always what they think is to be leamt 
from them)'. 130 
128 John Dunn, 'What History Can Show: Jeremy Waldron's Reading of Locke's Christian 
Politics', Review ofpolitics 67 (2005): 433; see also, Dunn, 'Practising History and Social Science on "Realisf' Assumptions'. 
129 Minogue, 'Method in Intellectual History', 185,188; Bevir, The Logic of the History ofideas, 
ch. 3. 
130 Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, xiii. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Natural Law and Toleration 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a particular puzzle concerning the 
development of Locke's political thought between 1660 and 1667. It is widely 
agreed amongst Locke scholars that, broadly speaking, Locke's politics in the 
early 1660s was authoritarian whereas his politics later in the decade was 
liberal. ' However, scholars are less confident about explaining why there was 
such a dramatic change in Locke's views. It is a question that has perplexed 
Locke scholars, and indeed, according to John Dunn, 'we do not at the moment 
apparently (and may never) know the answer to it'. 2 most commentators 
working within a contexualist framework turn to contingent historical events in 
the mid 1660s for an explanation of Locke's volte-face. 3 My aim in this chapter 
is to show that a holistic analysis can help us to see an entirely different 
narrative, and through this, a significantly different portrait of Locke than those 
offered by Straussians and contextualists. I will show, in the first instance, that 
there was a theoretical development relating to natural law and jurisprudence 
which provided Locke with crucial conceptual resources to repudiate his 
previous authoritarianism and, in turn, uphold a liberal tolerationist politics .4 
Moreover, I will show that the direction of Locke's intellectual development 
proceeded in opposition to Hobbes. By re-evaluating the nature of Locke's 
development through the holistic perspective, I will shed light on aspects of the 
coherence of Locke's mind and its anti-Hobbesian characteristics which have 
not received sustained attention in the scholarship. 
I will begin by elaborating on the backdrop against which I am making 
my two claims concerning the nature of Locke's development between 1660 and 
1667 in order to bring out their significance. First, concerning my claim that the 
there was a theoretical explanation to the change to Locke's politics. In 1660, 
Locke confronted a political problem, which required him to clarify the 
1 Respectively, G and ETol. 
2 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), 28. 
3 See notes 6 and 7 below. 
4 This possibility was hinted in Geraint Parry, John Locke (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1978), 
5-6. 
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legitimate boundaries of civil authority and individual conscientious liberty 
concerning 'indifferent things'. Indifferent things, or adiaphora, were matters in 
which God had no declared views. Thus, they were matters for human discretion. 
The question was whether or not these matters could be authoritatively decided 
by terrestrial authorities, namely the civil magistrates. In the early 1660s, Locke 
argued that the civil magistrate could legitimately legislate and require 
obedience concerning religiously indifferent things; in the later 1660s, he argued 
that the magistrate could not. 
Those who have commented on Locke's volte-face tend to explain it in 
terms of a change in his attitude towards non-conformists; a change, in other 
words, dictated by historical contingency, usually owing to one of two 
5 biographical events. One is Locke's diplomatic trip to Cleves in 1665, where he 
witnessed a community of different Christian sects living together peacefully. 6 
The other is Locke's entrance into the household and patronage of Lord Ashley 
(later to be made the Earl of Shaftesbury) who was a strong supporter of 
toleration. 7 However, neither of these narratives are convincing because they 
cannot explain why in 1659, just a year before he expressed his authoritarian 
views, Locke could write favourably about Henry Stubbe's An Essay in Defence 
of the Good Old Cause, which was a work sympathetic to toleration. 
3 For a third biographical event, see Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics & Locke's Two 
Treatises of Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 92-4. Ashcraft suggests 
that Locke may have attended a sermon preached in London by a non-conformist in early 1667, 
which may have had some impact on his views. 
6 Corr. 175,177,180. Respectively, vol. i, 227-31,233-9,244-50. See for example, James Tully, 
'Introduction', in LcT, 5, and more recently, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in 
Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 52; J. R. Milton, 'Locke's Life and 
Times', in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 8, and more cautiously, J. R. Milton and Philip Milton, 'Introduction', in 
ETol, 26; G. A. J. Rogers, 'The Writing of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding', in 
Locke's Enlightenment (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1998), 8; Jacqueline Rose, 'John Locke, 'Matters 
Indifferent', and the Restoration of the Church of England', Historical Journal 48 (2005): 620; 
Luisa Simonutti, 'Political Society and Religious Liberty: Locke at Cleves and in Holland', 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (2006): 418. This view is also intimated in 
Roger Woolhouse, John Locke: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
63,82. 
' See especially, John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 69; David Wootton, 'Introduction, in Political 
Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 36-7; Johann Sommerville, 'Conscience, Law, and 
Things Indifferent: Arguments on Toleration from the Vestiarian Controversy to Hobbes and 
Locke', in Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700, eds. H. E. Braun and E. 
Vallance (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2004), 167. But cf. Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A 
Biography (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), 111. Cranston argues that Locke's views on 
toleration were already 'in line' with Ashley when he joined his household, but also argues that 
Ashley had an influence to further Locke's 'evolution as a liberal'. 
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Furthermore, Locke had expressed in his comments his regret that Stubbe did 
not extend his history of toleration to the more recent examples of 'Holland 
France Poland etc. ', by which he could have: 
added the authority of dayly experience that men of different professions may 
quietly unite ... under the same government and unanimously cary 
the same 
civill. intrest and hand in hand march to the same end of peace and mutuall 
society though they take different way towards heaven. 8 
While I will not be ruling out the impact the events in the mid 1660s may have 
had on Locke, I will be highlighting the development in Locke's natural 
jurisprudence - that God's will was universally knowable through natural law - 
which I will argue, played a vital role in making the change to his politics 
possible. 9 Thus, while I will be agreeing that there were argumentative 
continuities between Locke's political writings in 1660 and 1667, by implication, 
I will be disagreeing with those commentators who argue, albeit to different 
degrees, that there was 'no fundamental change of argument or philosophical 
purpose' between 1660 and 1667.10 
The problem that faced Locke in the early 1660s was that of reconciling 
the tension between civil authority and conscientious liberty. Through the 
holistic perspective, I will show how he struggled to resolve this problem while 
working within the bounds of a particular intellectual framework, which led to 
an epistemological crisis. I will then show how this epistemological crisis 
connected to a problem about natural law, and how he was induced to address 
a Corr. 75, vol. i, I 10. Locke's comments on Henry Stubbe's work has had a n-dxed response. 
See for example, Philip Abrams, 'Introduction', in G, 7-10; Wolfgang von Leyden, 'Introduction, 
in ELN, 21-30; Wootton, 'Introduction', 35; Mark Goldie's comments in John Locke: Selected 
Correspondence, ed. Mark Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4. Goldie suggests 
that Locke was being ironic in the letter. Abrams believes that the letter does not indicate that 
Locke was a liberal. Wootton suggests that Locke was in favour of toleration all along. 
9 Ian Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Timothy 
Stanton, 'John Locke, Edward Stillingfleet and Toleration', PhD thesis (2003), ch. l. But cf 
Abrams, 'Introduction', 88,98f and J. D. Mabbott, John Locke (London: Macmillan, 1973), 175. 
Both commentators observe the importance of the development of Locke's natural jurisprudence 
in relation to toleration, but stress the limits of human understanding and scepticism as the basis 
for toleration. 
10 P. J. Kelly, 'John Locke: Authority, Conscience and Religious Toleration', in John Locke: A 
Letter concerning Toleration in Focus, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Routledge, 
1991), 127. See also, R. P. Kraynak, 'John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration', American 
Political Science Review 74 (1980): 53-69. 
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the central questions of natural jurisprudence: how people could apprehend the 
law of nature and how they were obliged to it. Finally, I will show how this 
development in natural jurisprudence supplied Locke with the conceptual 
resources to resolve his early political problem. To clarify, I am not claiming 
that one cannot advance a theory of toleration without a particular view about 
natural law. My claim is rather that because there were developments in Locke's 
views about natural law between 1660 and 1667, it is worthwhile to pursue the 
possibility that for Locke, natural law had an integral role in his theory of 
toleration. This narrative therefore sheds light on the theoretical aspect of 
Locke's change in the late 1660s, and also, sheds light on the question of the 
consistency of Locke's attitude towards toleration. 
My second major claim is that this early development proceeded in 
direct opposition to Hobbes, and thus, that it can be seen as a response to 
Hobbes or 'Hobbism' (a crude reduction of Hobbes's doctrines). " Debates over 
the intellectual relationship between Hobbes and Locke have been polarized for 
quite some time. The first party, often following the lead of Leo Strauss, argues 
that Locke's thinking followed the pattern of Hobbes's, and often concludes that 
Locke was in fact a secret Hobbist. In other words, they see Locke in terms of 
Hobbes. 12 The second party, following Peter Laslett's lead, argues that Locke 
had little to do with Hobbes, and if there were any similarities or seemingly 
apparent allusions to Hobbes, these could be explained in terms of historically 
contingent circumstances. Hobbes's ideas were 'in the air'. Locke may have 
" For the difference between Hobbes and 'Hobbism', see Sterling P. Lamprecht, 'Hobbes and 
Hobbism', The American Political Science Review 34 (1940): 31-53; Jon Parkin, 'Hobbism in 
the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker', The Historical Journal 42 (1999): 85 -108; 
Quentin Skinner, Vision ofPolitics, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 111, 
264-86. Hobbists were reputed to hold, 1) that all right of dominion is founded only in power, 2) 
that all moral righteousness is founded only in the law of the civil magistrate, 3) that the holy 
scriptures are made law only by civil authority, 4) that whatever the civil magistrate commands 
it to be obeyed notwithstanding contrary to divine moral laws, and 5) that there is a desirable 
flory in being and being reputed an atheist. Ibid., 283. 
2 Leo Strauss, Natural Right andHistory (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1953), 202-5 1. 
See also J. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy, 1" ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 
180; Cranston, John Locke, 61-3. But cf. J. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy, 2 nd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 119-20,202. Gough refines his views in the light of Peter 
LaslcM 'Introduction', in 77G, and Abram, 'Introduction'. Whereas he previously believed that 
Locke was influenced by Hobbes, he now considers it possible that other more direct contextual 
influences can be found. 
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taken in some of Hobbes's ideas through indirect sources. Thus, Hobbes's 
influence was 'gravitational' rather than direct. ' 3 
Ever since the publication of Laslett's edition of the Two Treatises of 
Government in 1960, non-Straussian commentators have largely avoided 
discussing Hobbes together with Locke. 14 More recently, however, some 
commentators have made renewed attempts to reconsider the intellectual 
relationship between Hobbes and Locke. 15 My claim here is intended to be a 
contribution to this recently revived debate. However, my account of the 
relationship between Hobbes and Locke significantly differs from all three 
strands. While I will resist Strauss's thesis that Locke was a Hobbist, I will 
suggest that the relationship between Hobbes and Locke was more complicated 
than Laslett's account allows. I will also resist Laslett's further suggestion - 
which I take the revisionists to have developed - that Locke did share many 
things in common with Hobbes, and indeed, was overshadowed by him. First, I 
will show that there were Hobbesian echoes in Locke's early political writings. 16 
I will show that both Hobbes and Locke did face a common problem of 
reconciling civil authority and individual conscientious liberty, and moreover, 
that both stressed the magistrate's authority over indifferent things. However, 
whereas the early Locke failed to reconcile the two while working within a 
traditional intellectual framework, Hobbes had resolved the tension by using the 
same resources but by having redefined them. I will show that Hobbes's solution 
was controversial; he had created an unchallengeable civil sovereign by 
essentially reducing natural law to civil law. I will then show how Locke came 
13 Laslett, 'Introduction', 21,74. 
14 This is probably for two reasons. The first reason is because scholars have taken Laslett to 
have suggested that there was 'little historical interest to be found in a comparison of Hobbes 
and Locke', as Richard Tuck summarizes Laslett's account. See Richard Tuck, 'Hobbes and 
Locke on Toleration', in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. M. G. Dietz, (Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1990), 153. The second reason is because scholars find it difficult to 
say anything substantial about Hobbes and Locke without being associated with Strauss's 
controversial thesis. I have profited from a correspondence with Dr. Mark Goldie and Prof. 
Victor Nuovo on this issue. 
15 Richard Tuck, 'Hobbes and Locke on Toleration'; Harris, The Mind, esp. ch. 3; G. A. J. Rogers, 
'The Intellectual Relationship between Hobbes and Locke -A Reappraisal', in Locke's 
Enlightenment (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1998), 61-77; Timothy Stanton, 'Hobbes and Locke on 
Natural Law and Jesus Christ', History ofPolitical Thought 29 (2008): 65-88. 
" Most commentators (past and present, Straussian and non-Straussian) do not deny that 
Locke's early political writings had Hobbesian resonances. See for example, Parry, John Locke, 
5; Mark Goldie, 'Introduction', Political Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
xviii; Rogers 'The Writing of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding', 6; 
Sommerville, 'Conscience', 178. 
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to address the central issues in natural jurisprudence and particularly how this 
development proceeded in direct opposition to Hobbes. I will show how this 
development helped Locke to create a liberal political theory in the late 1660s 
and distinguish himself from Hobbes's authoritarianism. I will thus argue that 
although Locke did have a similar starting point as Hobbes, he was neither 
overshadowed by him nor capitulated to him. Locke, on my account, comes out 
as a distinctive thinker in his own right. 
The two interpretative claims in this chapter owe their insights to the 
holistic approach. As far as we know, Locke never said why he changed his 
position between the early and late 1660s; he also never explicitly discussed the 
writings of Hobbes. Concerning Locke's change of political view, Dunn rightly 
remarks that it is a question which we may never know the answer to; but at the 
same time, Dunn's own methodological approach helps us to think intelligibly 
about it. The holistic approach encourages us to investigate whether there was 
an assumption lacking in Locke's early political writing that was present in his 
later writing. By identifying this, we can consider what kind of theoretical work 
this assumption did. Once we begin to see that there was a structural 
development, we can also begin to see the overall direction it took. 
In what follows, I will begin by examining the parties involved in the 
debate over indifferent things and the intellectual framework in which they 
operated. I will then examine how this led to an epistemological crisis, and, 
connectedly, an issue about natural law. I will firstly examine Hobbes's solution 
to the crisis. After that, I will move on to examine Locke's early development in 
detail. Lastly, I will show how the early development reshaped his politics in 
1667. 
1. Indifferent Things, Conscience and Natural Law 
Locke's first extended political writing, composed in 1660, was a contribution to 
the debate over indifferent things. The question of this debate, broadly stated, 
was whether or not civil laws concerning indifferent things bound in conscience. 
In 1659, Edward Stillingfleet, Rector of Sutton and future Bishop of Worcester, 
observed: 'If any controversy hath been an increaser and fomenter of heart- 
burnings and divisions among us, it hath been about the determination of 
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indifferent things'. 17 The debate over indifferent things, particularly concerning 
religious ceremonies, was long-standing, and according to Richard Baxter, a 
Presbyterian minister, writing in 1661, one that had been 'a matter of Contention 
and endless Dispute' in the Church of England 'ever since the Reformation' in 
the sixteenth century. ' 8 
Philip Abrams, the first editor of the Two Tracts on Government, argued 
that despite the major political importance of the debate, there was 'not much 
argumentative development' and suggests that this was because 'the debate 
provoked by the concept of indifferency' could only end in 'an epistemological 
crisis, a crisis which no one prior to Locke was willing to face'. 19 I agree with 
Abrams here that there was an epistemological crisis and that Locke met this 
crisis head-on. 20 But I will argue that Hobbes had also identified the crisis and 
had dealt with it, although the conclusions he reached were discomfiting to the 
parties involved in the debate. Although Mark Goldie has argued that Hobbes's 
Leviathan was 'a deliberate reductio of the adiaphorist position, I will show 
how Hobbes's solution was less a reductio than an original philosophical answer 
to the epistemological crisis, and being a response to this solution, how Locke's 
solution too was distinctive. 2 1 The epistemological crisis lay in the framework of 
conscience, and connectedly, natural law, which was adopted in the debate over 
indifferent things. Before analyzing the crisis itself, let us first look at the parties 
involved in the debate and the general claims they made, and also, how the 
conflict revolved around the issue of conscience. 
Indifferent things were those things that God had not commanded or 
prohibited. Thus, other things being equal, it was a sphere over which people 
could determine what to do for themselves. Because this liberty was believed to 
be purchased through the blood of Jesus Christ, it was often called 'Christian 
17 Edward Stillingfieet, Irenicum, 2 nd ed. (London, 1662), 38. 
18 Richard Baxter, Two Papers Of Proposals concerning the Discipline and Ceremonies of the 
Church of England (London, 1661), 8. For a survey of the debate over indifferent things from 
the English Reformation, see Bernard J. Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the 
English Reformation to 1554 (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977). See also, Sommerville, 
'Conscience'; Rose, 'John Locke'. 
19 Abrams, 'Introduction', 3 7. 
20 Ibid., 48-9. See also, John Colman, John Locke's Moral Political Philosophy (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 26. 
21 Goldie, 'Introduction', xviii. 
53 
22 liberty'. People referred to the explicit will of God, namely the Scriptures, in 
search of direction concerning indifferent things, but because they drew 
different conclusions or emphasized different points which had diverging 
ramifications, their views came into conflict with one another. 
23 There were two 
main parties involved in this debate: Anglicans and Puritans. 
24 
Anglicans commonly argued that civil laws concerning religiously 
indifferent things bound in conscience. For Anglicans such as Robert Sanderson, 
Bishop of Lincoln, indifferent things were the only proper subject matter of the 
civil magistrate. 25 What God had commanded or prohibited through the 
divine 
law was obligatory whether or not the magistrate chose to enforce it. Thus, 
human power could only be exerted in the sphere of indifferent things, that is, 
where there was no 'pre-existing obligation'. 26 Moreover, unless the civil 
magistrate's authority over indifferent things was asserted, Richard Hooker 
feared, the world would be overtumed, making 'every man his own 
commander'. 27 
Anglicans stressed the importance of order and unity in religious as well 
as civil affairs. They argued that all things were to be done 'decently, and in 
order' (I Corinthians 14: 40) and maintained that the temporal authority was to 
be judge of this standard . 
28 Although Anglicans granted that by definition, 
indifferent ceremonies were not necessary for salvation, insofar as they were 
22 Robert Sanderson,. XXXVI sermons (London, 1686), 301. 
23 Colman, John Locke, 10. Colman observes that the difference between Anglicans and Puritans 
was 'more a matter of emphasis than of direct opposition'. 
24 'Puritan' is used in preference to dissenters, Presbyterians, and non-conformists, more for 
convenience's sake rather than historical precision. But the other terms commonly used are not 
without problem. Cf. Rose, 'John Locke', 606, n28. Although Rose uses 4non-confonnist', by 
her own admission, there was no church not to conform to before 1662. Again, as Richard 
Baxter noted, whilst 'Presbyterian' was commonly used as a synonym for 'puritan', it was 
strictly speaking misleading. See N. H. Keeble, 'Richard Baxter', in DNB and Richard Baxter, 
Reliquiae Baxterianae (London, 1696), 97,146. Also Presbyterians were not against the 
principle of a national church as the strict use of 'dissenter' would imply. 
'5 Robert Sanderson, Ten Lectures on the Obligation ofHumane Conscience read in the Divinity 
School at Oxford, in the year, 1647, trans. R. Codrington (London, 1660), 222-3. See also, 122. 
Against those who claimed that there should be no human laws concerning indifferent things, 
Sanderson argued that 'rather to the contrary, we may rightly judge, that these things indifferent 
are the most proper and the only most fit matter of Humane Laws'. 
26 Abrams, 'Introduction', 42. 
27 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws ofEcclesiastical Polity, 2 vols, ed. Christopher Morris (London: 
J. M. Dent, 1907), 11,363 (5.71.4). 
28 Francis Mason, The Authority of the Church in making Canons and Constitutions concerning 
Things Indifferent (London, 1607). 
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commanded by the magistrate, they bound in conscience. They stressed that God 
had required obedience to a lawful authority. 29 Sanderson, for example, argued: 
Obedience is one thing, and the Thing commanded another. The Thing is 
commanded by the Law of man, and in regard thereof the conscience is free: 
but, Obedience to men is commanded by the Law of God, and in regard thereof 
the conscience is bound. So that we are bound in conscience to obedience in 
indifferent things lawfully commanded, the conscience still remaining no lesse 
free in respect of the things, themselves so commanded, then it was before. " 
At the same time, Anglicans believed that the individual's conscience needed to 
be respected: 'the Conscience of Men are free, and ought to be so, which Liberty 
no Humane Power can, or may infringe'. 31 They argued, however, that this 
liberty was compatible with outward conformity to civil laws. Sanderson 
argued: 
[A]n Act of the will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience, as an Act of 
Judgment doth, for the Act of the will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience 
as the effect followeth its cause, but the Act of thejudgment doth precede those 
Dictates as the cause goeth before its effect. " 
Sanderson's point was that an outward conformity to civil laws could not affect 
the conscience precisely because outward actions logically came after the 
dictates of conscience; and thus, the inward liberty of conscience remained 
'uninjuried and intire'. 33 However, this was a difficult position to maintain if one 
thought that the understanding determined the will. Given this assumption, 
people could not outwardly conform to laws they disapproved without also 
becoming a hypocrite. 
29 Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, 11,362-3; Samuel Hoard, The Churches 
Authority asserted in a Sermon preached at Chelmsford (London, 1637). 
30 Robert Sanderson, Two Sermons (London, 1635), 34. See also Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 176-7. 
'Positive humane laws being rightly and lawfully constituted, which contain particular 
determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themselves indifferent, and which 
before they are determined are free to be made, or to be unmade, do by the vertue of the Divine 
Commandment (by which we are bound to obey those who are set over us by God) so oblige the 
Consciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them'. 
31 Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 192-3. 
32 Ibid., 202. 
33 Ibid., 200. 
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Puritans, on the other hand, commonly argued that civil laws concerning 
religiously indifferent things did not bind in conscience. Some Puritans 
maintained that any civil law concerning a religiously indifferent thing was 
tainted with popery and was simply sinful; and for this reason, it was to be 
disobeyed. For example, writing on English Puritanism, William Bradshaw 
observed: 
They hold that all Ecclesiastical actions invented and devised by man, are 
utterly to be excluded out of the exercise of Religion; especially such actions as 
are famous and notorious Mysteries of an Idolatrous Religion. 34 
Other Puritans such as William Perkins maintained that the civil magistrate 
could make laws concerning indifferent things, but could make them necessary 
donly in some part', that is, 'so far forth as the said act or action tends to 
maintaine and preserue the good end for which the law is made'. 35 Human laws, 
however, could not change the status of an indifferent thing; it also could not 
bind in conscience. 36 On this view, civil laws concerning indifferent things 
could be disobeyed without sin so long as such disobedience did not promote a 
general contempt for authority. 
Puritans stressed the importance of a persuaded conscience particularly 
concerning religious worship. 'Conscience', Perkins argued, 'is our companion 
and guide', which 'God hath appointed', showing 'what course we may take and 
what we may not'. 37 Conscience was the attribute in a person judging the 
rectitude of his or her action. Puritans stressed that what was not of faith, that is, 
&not done of a settled perswasion in iudgement and conscience out of Gods 
word', was sin (Romans 14: 23). Thus, Perkins maintained: 'vnlesse the 
conscience first of all approoue the thing to be good and agreeable to Gods will, 
it can be nothing else but a sinne'. 38 The implication of this view was that 
individuals were not bound in conscience to observe civil laws concerning 
indifferent things unless they were absolutely convinced of their lawfulness. 
34 William Bradshaw, English Puritanism, in Several Treatises of Worship and Ceremonies 
(London, 1660), 35. See generally, Sommerville, 'Conscience', 170-1. 
35 William Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience (Cambridge, 1596), 50-1. 
36 Ibid., 50. 
37 Ibid., 90. 
38 Ibid., 90. 
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Puritans recognized that a conscience might be erroneous, that is, that an 
individual might erroneously believe that something was contrary to conscience. 
But the individual would still sin in 'manner', though not in 'action', if he did 
something against his conscience. 39 
Conscience was at the heart of the debate. Both Anglicans and Puritans 
agreed that Christian liberty needed to be respected. But as we have just seen, 
because they emphasized different aspects of Scripture, and because these 
different emphases had diverging ramifications politically and religiously, it 
caused conflict. For Puritans, it was 'no indifferency in any man to take that 
away from a man that God hath freely given unto him' . 
40 The emphasis was on 
the individual and the liberty of his conscience. This individualistic emphasis, 
however, had a tendency to drift towards anarchy. If an individual agent was not 
convinced of the lawfulness of a civil law concerning an indifferent matter, he 
was not bound in conscience to obey it. In the debate over indifferent things, the 
focus was usually on religious ceremonies, but crucially because a clear-cut 
subdivision within the sphere of indifferent things could not be established, 
claims concerning religious affairs also had political implications. This is to say 
that the magistrate could not simply lose authority over religious indifferent 
things; once he lost authority over religiously indifferent things, he also lost 
authority over all indifferent things. Once the magistrate's authority over 
indifferent things in general was undermined, it was only a short step to anarchy. 
Although this was only a potentiality, for those writing in the aftermath of the 
civil war, it was a genuine concern. 
Anglicans responded by asserting the magistrate's authority over all 
indifferent things and the importance of doing all things 'decently and in order'. 
They argued that external conformity and Christian liberty were compatible. 
External conformity was possible without affecting the conscience because the 
dictates of conscience preceded the act. But the argument used here rested on a 
problematic view of the relation between the intellect and the will. Consequently, 
imposing an indifferent ceremony on an individual who was already convinced 
of its unlawfulness would only produce hypocritical worship, which would then 
39 William Ames, Conscience with the Power and Case thereof (London, 1639), 12. 40 William Bradshaw, A Treatise of the Nature and Use of Things Indifferent, in several Treatises of Worship and Ceremonies (London, 1660), 30. 
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go on to undermine the individual's relation with God. Even if the conscience 
was in error, say, that it was indeed necessary to obey the magistrate on a certain 
issue, the individual faced a dilemma because he would sin whether he persisted 
in his error or conformed to a practice that went against his conscience. 
The problem here was that civil authority and individual conscientious 
liberty could not be reconciled. The problem, to begin with, was that where in 
theory, reason, Scripture and conscience should be consonant, in practice they 
were not. That is to say, if Scripture was interpreted reasonably and conscience 
correctly informed, there would be no dissonance between one's civil and 
religious duties (that is, given that God did not choose to lay conflicting 
obligations on people). The more fundamental problem was that there was no 
authoritative criterion to tell whether the Anglican reading of Scripture was 
unreasonable or the conscientious scruples of the Puritans were misinformed. 
The problem lay with what one could do within the intellectual framework. Let 
us look at this framework. 
Conscience was the attribute in a person that judged the rectitude of his 
or her actions. More technically, conscience was commonly considered to be a 
part of the understanding and not the Will. 41 It was a judgment, 'a mans 
judgement of himselfe, according to the judgement of God of him', and not an 
action. 42 Conscience was not a 'contemplative judgment' which simply 
discerned the truth, but it was a 'practical judgment' which through reasoning, 
the individual discerned the goodness or evilness of his particular action to the 
end of giving directive instructions to the Will. 43 Thus, we find Sanderson 
saying: 'Conscience is a faculty, or a habit of the practical understanding, by 
which the mind of Man doth by the discourse of reason apply that light with 
which he is indued to his particular moral actions'. 44 
The mid-seventeenth century interlocutors in the debate over indifferent 
things had inherited a Thomist model of conscience in which conscience was 
composed of two parts: there was 'synteresis', which was conscience the law, 
41 Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience, 1; Ames, Conscience, 1. 
42 Ames, Conscience, 1. 
43 Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience, 2; Ames, Conscience, 2. 44 Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 3. 
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45 and 'conscientia' or 'syneidesis', which was conscience the judge. Synteresis, 
as William Ames called it, was the 'storehouse of principles', the first principles 
of practical reason. 46 It contained general propositions apprehended through the 
divine law, natural or revealed. 47 Conscientia applied these propositions to 
specific actions and assessed their goodness and evilness. Thus, synteresis and 
conscientia together functioned as a syllogism, producing the conclusions of 
conscience. Synteresis served as the major premise and conscientia as the minor. 
A typical example was: 
Everything that is unjust is to be eschewed (Major premise). 
Every theft is unjust (Minor premise). 
Thus, every theft is to be eschewed (Conclusion of conscience). 
The first principle serving as the major premise, according to Sanderson, was 
known by the light of nature; reason proved the minor premise; and conscience 
brought about the conclusion. 48 
The rectitude of the reasoning of conscience was ensured because it 
proceeded according to 'right reason' or 'recta ratio', which itself was derived 
from and subject to the divine law. 'Rectitude of everything', Sanderson argued, 
'consisteth in its conformity to its next and immediate Rule and so gradually 
ascendeth to its first and most chief Rule'. The 'immediate Rule or Law of 
conscience' was 'right reason'. Thus, conscience was 'right when it is 
conformable to right reason according to the Law which God the Supreme Law- 
giver hath praescribed'. 49 
One could be certain that the conclusions of conscience were consonant 
with the divine law because the reasoning proceeded syllogistically, and 
crucially, because at each juncture of the syllogism, divine law was involved. 
Ames summed this up neatly: 
45 Henry K McAdoo, The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology (London: Longmans, Green, 
1949), esp. ch. 3; Thomas Wood, English Casuistical Divinity during the Seventeenth Century 
(London: SPCK, 1952) esp. ch. 2; Timothy Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Colman, John Locke, ch. 2; Stanton, 'John 
Locke', ch. 1. 
46 Ames, Conscience, 4. 
47 Ibid., 28, Ames called these general propositions 'general laws'; Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 30- 
1,132-3. Sanderson called these general propositions 'universal laws'. 48 Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 14. 
49 Ibid., 38. 
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For as in the Proposition Gods Law is declared, and in the Assumption, the fact 
or condition of man is examined, according to that Law; So in the conclusion, 
the sentence concerning man is pronounced according to his fact, or condition, 
by virtue of the Law that hath beene declared. " 
At this point, one may wonder how, on this model, conscience could be 
misinformed. This was often explained in terms of the Fall. Now, the first 
principles from which the conclusions of conscience were deduced were thought 
to be 'written in the hearts of men'. 51 Although the light of nature may have 
been 'extremely obscured' by the Fall, it pleased God to leave people with 
certain practical principles . 
52 Because these first principles were very basic - e. g. 
good is to be done and evil to be avoided, or God is to be worshipped - it was 
unlikely that people would err in these things. However, one could come to have 
an erroneous conscience by wrong reasoning or drawing the wrong conclusion. 53 
Given that the light of reason was obscured by original sin, one was liable to err. 
The remedy was grace. It pleased God to provide Fallen men with 
Scripture, which made God's will known more fully, and also the assistance of 
the Holy Spirit. 54 The Holy Spirit assisted reason and helped the individual 
believer to better understand the will of God. But again, Anglicans and Puritans 
disagreed as to how the benefit of grace was meted out. Anglicans claimed that 
the Church of England mediated grace through Apostolic succession and thus 
was entitled to claim authority to direct people's conduct. Unlike the Church of 
55 Rome, they paid due regard not only to authority but also to reason. Their 
claims were supported by their reasonable reading of Scripture through the grace 
of the Holy Spirit. Puritans on the other hand claimed that the grace of the Holy 
Spirit was conferred to the elect individual. Conviction of election came 
50 Ames, Conscience, 28. 
51 Ibid., 5,10; Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 12,14,15,30,132. 
52 Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 132. See also, Ames, Conscience, 4. 
53 Ames, Conscience, 10,29. 
'4 Sanderson, Ten Lectures, 136-7. 
55 Ibid., 143-4. 
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individually. 56 Thus, the individual with the regenerate conscience should follow 
the dictates of his conscience. 
Herein lay the epistemological problem. To begin with, as a matter of 
fact, there was discord between what Anglicans and Puritans perceived to be the 
will of God. The problem was that there was no objective criterion to validate 
the claims of either party. The dictates of conscience were authoritative because 
they were derived from the divine law syllogistically. There was a possibility 
that an individual's conscience was misinformed, but through grace, this defect 
could be rectified. The regenerate individual ought to stick to his convictions. 
This conflicted with the Anglican claim that they mediated grace. However, 
neither Anglicans nor Puritans could prove that they were the true bearers of 
grace. 57 Their claims could be validated if they could demonstrate that their 
claims were consonant with Scripture or reason. Scripture, however, could not 
be adduced because it was the subject of debate. Natural law, and connectedly, 
right reason, could not be adduced because it was thought to be written in one's 
heart, 58 and thus when two parties conflicted over their content, there was no 
reference point beyond it. To the question, 'But who shall tell us what is Recta 
Ratio? ', Lord Brooke answered: 'I answere, Recta Ratio'. 59 Traditional 
resources led to an epistemological deadlock. Neither Anglicans nor Puritans 
could objectively demonstrate the validity of their claim. 
We have looked at the intellectual structure of the debate over indifferent 
things and the problem of what one could do within it. At the heart of this 
problem was to demonstrate what exactly God had commanded. In theory, 
reason, Scripture and conscience were consonant. A reasonable reading of 
Scripture and a rightly informed conscience both depended on reason, and 
connectedly, natural law. One way around the epistemological problem, on this 
model, was to develop the claims of reason and natural law. This is exactly what 
56 Colman, John Locke, 16-17,20-1. See for example, Ames, Conscience; Perkins, A Discourse 
o ffConscience. 
5 Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience, 93. In questioning how Roman Catholics could prove that 
they were the Apostolic successors of the word of God, Perkins also cast doubt on Anglican 
claims to this as well. 
58 Robert Sanderson, Reason and Judgement (London, 1663), 64 
59 Robert Greville Brooke, A Discowse Opening the Natvre of Mat Episcopacie (London, 1641), 
14; cf. John Selden, Table Talk, ed. Frederick Pollock (London: Ballantyne Press, 1927), 116. 
'When the Schoolemen talke of Recta Ratio in Moralls, either they understand Reason as 'tis 
govern'd by a Comand from above, or els they say no more than a woman, when shee sayes a 
thing is soe, because it is soe, that is, her reason p[cr]swades her it is soe'. 
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Hobbes did. But his development took an unexpected turn. In the next section, 
we shall see how Hobbes pursued the implications of this framework. 
2. Hobbes 
Broadly speaking, Hobbes's view concerning indifferentiaiings fitted in with the 
Anglican outlook. 60 In the Elements of Law, he argued that there were things 
'which in their own nature are indifferent, till to avoid indecency and discord, it 
be otherwise determined by common consent', or in other words, as we shall see, 
determined by the civil sovereign erected by common consent. 
61 In the 
Leviathan, he argued that there were 'an infinite number of Actions, and 
Gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall 
ordain to be Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of 
9 62 Gods Worship, are to be taken and used for such by the Subjects . 
Like many 
Anglicans, Hobbes argued that the Law of God 'commandeth Obedience to the 
Law CiVillq. 63 However, as Jon Parkin remarks, 'Hobbes's theories were 
curiously indeterminate, hinting at dramatically heterodox conclusions drawn 
from quite conventional premises'. 64 
As we saw at the end of the previous section, a possible conceptual 
candidate for development to resolve the tension between civil authority and 
individual conscientious liberty was natural law. In this section, I will show how 
Hobbes developed on natural law from traditional resources but produced 
startling and shocking conclusions about it, and also, connectedly, about politics. 
Let us first examine Hobbes's doctrine of natural law, then examine how this 
was reflected in his politics. 
For Hobbes, the law of nature was a 'Precept, or a general Rule', wbicb 
was discovered by reason. It forbade people to do that which were destructive to 
their lives. 65 The 'law of nature' differed from a 'right of nature' as obligation 
60 The following examples are from Sommerville, 'Conscience', 176-7. 
61 Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 70 (XI. 12). 
62 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Carnbridgc University Press, 
1991), 253. 
63 Ibid., 388,404. 
64 Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14. 
65 Hobbes, Leviathan, 91. 
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differed from liberty. Although the law of nature was obligatory, the dictates of 
reason, qua reason, did not produce moral obligations. Hobbes maintained: 
These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes, but 
improperly; for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what 
conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; wheras Law, 
properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if 
we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right 
commandeth all things; then are they properly called LaweS. 
66 
Traditionally, there were two views concerning the obligatory nature of 
the law of nature: rationalism and voluntariSM. 67 Rationalists argued that there 
were intrinsically good and bad things independent of God's will, which could 
be discovered by reason. God, qua intelligent being, governed the world 
according to these precepts. So Hugo Grotius, for example, argued that the law 
of nature was 
the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or 
disagreement with the rational [and social] nature [of man] has in it a moral 
turpitude or a moral necessity; and consequently that such an act is forbidden or 
commanded by God, the author of nature (emphasis added). 68 
Voluntarists, on the other hand, argued that the law of nature was binding 
because it was commanded by God qua the author and ruler of the universe. 
Good and bad were determined by God's will. Thus, John Selden argued 
I cannot fancy to my Selfe what the Law of nature meanes, but the law of God, 
how should I knowe I ought not to steal, I ought not to commit Adultery, unless 
66 Ibid., I 11. cf. John Seldcn, De Jure Naturali et Gentium (London, 1640). For Scldcn, 'pure, 
unaided reason merely persuades or demonstrates; it does not order, nor bind anyone to their 
duty, unless it is accompanied by the authority of someone who is superior to the man in 
question'. Quoted in Richard Tuck, Natural Right Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
fI ess, 1979), 934. Ir 7 See generally, Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the 
Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Francis Oakley, 'Locke, 
Natural Law and God - Again', History of Political Thought 18 (1997): 624-5 1; Jerome 
Schncewind, The Invention ofAutonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
68 Hugo Grotius, Hugonis Grotti De Hure Belli at Pacis, ed. William Whewell (Cambridge: J. W. 
Parker, 1853), 1.1.10.1. 
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somebody had told me, or why are these things ag[ains]t nature? Surely, 'tis 
because I have been told soe, 'tis not because I thinke I ought not to doe them, 
nor because you thinke I ought not, if soe our minds might change; whence 
then comes the restraint? from a higher power, nothing else cann bind, I cannott 
bind my selfe (for I may untie my selfe againe) nor an equall cannott bind me 
(wee may untie One another) It must be a Superiour. even God Almightie. 69 
Hobbes followed this voluntarist tradition. He held that a law was not a 
properly obligatory law without a known legislator. 70 The laws of nature, 
without a known legislator, would only be rational precepts serving an agent's 
self-interest to lead a peaceful and sociable life. But once they were commanded 
by God, they became properly binding laws. From this conventional starting 
point, however, Hobbes's doctrine of natural law proceeded in an unexpected 
direction. We shall see that he exploited the normative force of the law of nature 
as God's injunctions and created an unchallengeable civil power, a power that 
could put an end to all conflicts. He showed that the law of nature and the laws 
of the civil sovereign were essentially synonymous. 
Hobbes took the following four steps to arrive at this conclusion. First, 
he showed that in principle the laws of nature were obligatory because they were 
expressions of God's will. Secondly, he showed that in the state of nature, 
because people lacked any real knowledge of God, and connectedly, knowledge 
of His will, the laws of nature were not laws as such but qualities that disposed 
them 'to peace, and to obedience'. 71 Thirdly, Hobbes showed that because the 
laws of nature were merely theorems conducing to self-preservation, when an 
individual felt that his life was threatened, he could adduce his right of nature, 
which allowed him to make his own judgments as to what his security consisted 
in. This state where every person could make his own judgments about his self- 
preservation led to various conflicts and ultimately to the state of war. Fourthly, 
he showed that through the consent of people wishing to escape the misery of 
the state of war, the civil sovereign was created. The sovereign was a visible 
authority and authorized by the multitude to interpret the word of God. This 
essentially made the laws of nature those laws commanded by the sovereign. By 
69 Seldcn, Table Talk, 69-70. 
70 Hobbcs, Leviathan, 187-9. 
71 Ibid., 185. 
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virtue of being commanded by the sovereign, the laws of nature became 
obligatory. In this way, Hobbes made use of the normative force of natural law, 
but in a way suitable to his political agenda of creating an unchallengeable civil 
sovereign. Let us examine each step in further detail. 
For Hobbes, the law of nature was a 'Precept, or a general Rule found 
out by reason'. The dictates of reason were mere 'Theoremes', but 'as delivered 
in the word of God', they were 'properly called laws'. According to Hobbes, one 
of the ways in which God promulgated His law was by the dictates of natural 
reason. 72 Natural reason, Hobbes maintained, was 'the undoubted Word of 
God'. 73 The 'Rational' word of God corresponded to a 'Hearing', which Hobbes 
remarked was 'Right Reason'. Thus, the dictates of reason, qua the word of God, 
were thus obligatory laws. However, there was a proviso: they were obligatory 
only for 'as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence'. 74 This last 
proviso takes us to the second step. 
Hobbes insisted that laws were not laws without a known legislator or 
without sufficient promulgation. Now, throughout the Leviathan, Hobbes 
75 
maintained that God's nature was 'incomprehensible'. He acknowledged that 
by tracing back the natural causes of things to the first cause, people may be 
inclined to believe in one infinite and eternal God. 76 Indeed, the 'light of nature' 
informed people of God's attributes, but these were 'Negative' (e. g. infinite, 
incomprehensible), 'Superlative' (e. g. most high), and 'Indefinite' (e. g. good, 
just) . 
77 TbUS, these were more properly ascriptions and not descriptions of 
God's attributes. For Hobbes, sense-experience was the source of all ideas. At 
the outset of the Leviathan, he stated that there was 'no conception in a mans 
72 In De Cive, after making the same point about the inadequacy of laws of nature being laws as 
such without the command of a superior, Hobbes remarked that he intended to show that the 
laws of nature were commanded by God from 'holy scripture'. Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, 
ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthome (Cambridge, 1998), 56-7. This shift from 
'holy scripture' to 'the word of God' was significant. Jon Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics 
in Restoration England (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 68-9. One might argue that the 
emphasis on Holy Scripture had kept Hobbes's De Cive in a conventional zone. For the positive 
reception of De Cive by Anglicans, see Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 319. However, Parkin has shown that from 
early on Hobbes's readers had identified the more radical implications lingering beneath 
Hobbes's theory. See Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, esp. ch. 1. 73 Hobbes, Leviathan, 255. 
74 Ibid., 246. 
75 Ibid., 23,271,466-7. 
76 Ibid., 74-5,77. 
77 Ibid., 249-5 1. 
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mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs 
of Sense'. 78 But because God was infinite and impalpable, 
it followed that 
people did not have any positive idea of God, 'for whatsoever we conceive 
is 
Finite'. 79 
People not only lacked the knowledge of God, but also the knowledge of 
His laws. Hobbes held that 'God has no Ends'. 80 Therefore, the prospect of 
deducing man's duties from a fixed purpose was unrevealing. Furthermore, 
natural reason could not give knowledge of punishments in the afterlife, which, 
if known, would indicate what sorts of actions were consonant with God's 
Will. 81 On the traditional intellectual model, it could be argued that the 
dictates 
of right reason, which was equated to natural law, and which itself was known 
innately, would inform people of their duties. However, Hobbes had argued that 
the foundation of all knowledge was sense-experience, and in saying this, he 
rejected the idea of innateness. His concept of reason also differed from the 
traditional Scholastic use. Reason was 'nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding 
and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the 
marking and signifying of our thoughts' . 
82 It served 'only to convince the truth 
(not of fact, but) of consequence'. 83 Because reason was a faculty for reasoning 
only, it was not always equivalent to right reason. 84 In short, natural reason 
conveyed 'hypothetical information of cause and effects, not categorical 
information about duties'. 85 The departure from the traditional model, which 
equated right reason with natural law, was clear. With Hobbes's concept of 
sense and reason, one could not come to the knowledge of God or His will. 
People lacked the basic knowledge to make out that the laws of nature were 
indeed laws commanded by God. Thus, people were not the subjects of the 
&natural kingdom' of God then (that is, the kingdom God 'govemeth as many of 
78 Ibid., 13. 
79 Ibid., 250. 
so Ibid., 249; Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 89. 
81 Hobbes, Leviathan, 103. 
82 Ibid., 32. 
83 Ibid., 261. 
84 Ibid., 32. 
85 Michael Oakeshott, 'The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes', in Rationalism in 
Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1962), 329. 
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Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right 
Reason' )86 , and therefore, the laws of nature could only 
be rational theorems. 
We come to the third step now. People lacked the knowledge of God and 
His will, and because of this, the laws of nature were rational precepts and not 
obligatory laws. This created the space for the right of nature, that is, self- 
preservation to be prioritized. Self-preservation was absolutely central to 
Hobbes's thought. Hobbes insisted that a man in the state of nature had the 
liberty to do anything 'in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to 
be the aptest means' to preserve and secure his own life. 87 Reason, as we saw, 
had the force of being God's word. Hobbes coupled this concept of reason with 
an individual's right of self-preservation. What an individual interpreted as 
necessary for his preservation through reason would have the force of being 
God's word. Here, Hobbes deployed the 'reason' of the right of nature to trump 
the 'reason' of the law of nature. In the state of nature where every person had 
the right of self-preservation and the right to make his own judgments as to what 
consisted his self-preservation, there would be no objective notion of right and 
wrong, and so various disputes and controversies would arise. But at the same 
time, these disagreements would be between various 'legitimate' judgments 
because they were conclusions drawn by reason. 
What followed from these conflicts was the 'nasty' and 'brutish' state of 
war. 88 To avoid the miserable state of war, it was rational for people to heed to 
the laws of nature, which helped them to keep peace with others. In De Cive, 
Hobbes defined the law of nature as 'the Dictate of right reason about what 
should be done or not done for the longest possible preservation of life and 
limb'. 89 It directed people to lead a more sociable life. Hobbes maintained that 
" Hobbes, Leviathan, 246. Something about the role of scripture in Hobbes's account should be 
said here. As well as talking about a natural kingdom, Hobbes talked about a 'Prophetique' 
kingdom, that is, 'wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subject, 
[God] governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, 
which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets'. In part three of Leviathan, Hobbes 
tried to show how the Old and New Testaments contained a record and a prophecy of distinct 
political kingdoms with changing relationships between God, rulers and subjects. This led to a 
periodization of history and an account of the obligations appropriate to each age. See Ibid., esp. 
chs. 33,35-7,40-1. However, the crucial point here is that whether he was discussing natural or 
prophetic kingdoms, Hobbes was trying to demonstrate that the interpretative authority of God's 
law ultimately rested with the civil sovereign. Ibid., esp. 268-9. 17 Ibid., 9 1. 
88 Ibid., ch. 13. 89 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 33. 
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in principle the laws of nature were easy to interpret. But because there were 
'very few, perhaps none' who were not blinded by 'self-love, or some other 
passion', the law of nature became the 'most obscure'. 
90 That is to say, because 
different people had different interests, they would reason differently and come 
to different and conflicting conclusions. Thus, there was no unity, in practice, in 
what people took to be the dictates of right reason. Hobbes remarked that the 
laws of nature obliged 'in foro interno', or 'in conscience'. 
9' This meant that the 
laws 'bind to a desire they should take place'. But 'in foro externo', that is 
'putting them in act, the laws were not necessarily binding. Thus, in De Cive, 
Hobbes argued that the law of nature 'gives rise to obligation only when it can 
be kept with safety. 92 For Hobbes, the laws of nature were 'Immutable and 
Eternall'; but they were obliging only to a desire and a sincere effort to keep 
them. In circumstances in which others do not abide by the laws, and keeping 
the laws comes into conflict with one's desired end of self-preservation (rather 
than preserving it), it followed, in practice, that they did not need to be kept. The 
right of nature hereby trumped the law of nature. 
Up to this point, we have seen that in principle the laws of nature were 
obligatory laws as they were commanded by God through reason, but only to 
those who acknowledged God's providence. But because people did not have 
any positive idea of God, the laws of nature were merely theorems, which could 
be trumped by the right of nature. How did the laws of nature become obligatory 
in a real sense? The fourth and last step explains this. Hobbes's answer was the 
civil sovereign. Hobbes argued that in order for laws to become obligatory, the 
legislator had to be known, the laws sufficiently promulgated, and the laws 
interpreted. 93 As we saw, people lacked any positive idea of God and His will. 
Although reason disclosed the laws of nature, these were susceptible to various 
conflicting interpretations. Without an authoritative interpretation, laws could 
not be called laws as such. The civil sovereign made up for these defects. He 94 
was a visible legislator. His punishments were readily perceivable. Thus, the 
laws of nature become properly laws once they were commanded by the 
90 Hobbes, Leviathan, 190-1. 
91 Ibid., I 10; Hobbes, On the Citizen, 54. 
92 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 54. 
93 Hobbes, Leviathan, 190. 
94 1 use the pronoun 'he' to refer to the civil sovereign, as did Hobbes, although a sovereign may 
be an assembly of men. 
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sovereign. Furthermore, for Hobbes, the civil sovereign was the sole 
authoritative and authentic interpreter of natural law. 95 To escape the state of 
perpetual war, people in the state of nature would eventually agree to authorize a 
96 man or an assembly of men to act as sovereign judge. They would confer all 
their 'power and strength upon one Man, or Assembly of men' to bear their 
'Person' and 'submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to 
his Judgment'. 97 The sovereign's power would be absolute because every 
individual would transfer his right of nature, which previously granted him the 
liberty to do 'anything' in his judgment to the end of self-preservation. 
Previously, where every private man was 'judge of good and evill actions', in 
the commonwealth, the civil sovereign was the measure of good and evil. 
The laws of nature became obligatory by the civil sovereign qua 
legislator and interpreter, but also qua protector. For Hobbes, the 'end of 
Obedience is Protection'. 98 People were bound to obey that which provided 
them with protection. Obedience is 'understood to last as long, and no longer, 
than the power lasteth'. 99 But as we saw, on Hobbes's account, people did not 
have any positive idea of God. Because reason could not disclose the nature of 
God, people were not His natural subjects. As a protector, then, He was absent. 
On the other hand, the civil sovereign provided terrestrial protection. 
Before a commonwealth was erected, the laws of nature were not 
properly laws: they were 'qualities that dispose men to peace, and obedience. 
But when these laws were commanded by the civil sovereign, they then became 
laws. Hobbes thus claimed that 'the Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain 
each other, and are of equall extent'. The two were not 'different kinds, but 
different parts of Law'. And so, 'Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the 
Law of Nature'. ' 00 
Now that we have examined Hobbes's doctrine of natural law, let us 
look at its implications on the debate over indifferent things. In the state of 
nature, Hobbes conceded that 'every private man is Judge of Good and Evill 
actions'. It is also a sin not to follow one's conscience in the state of nature 
95 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 26. 96 
Ibid., ch. 18. 97 Ibid., 120. 
9' Ibid., 153. 
" Ibid., 153. 
100 Ibid., 85. 
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because an individual 'has no other rule to follow but his own reason'. 
101 All 
this changed in a commonwealth. Because a commonwealth is conceptually 
'one Person', 'it ought also to exhibite to God but one Worship'. This is 
'Publique worship' as opposed to 'Private'; the 'property whereof, is to be 
102 Uniforme'. Thus, Hobbes went on to say: 
actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a 
Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, 
proceeding from different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is 
any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all. 
103 
The implication on indifferent things was clear: they were under the civil 
sovereign's control. 
What did Hobbes have to say about conscience? For Hobbes, the 
doctrine that says 'whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne' is 
'repugnant' to civil society. 104 He remarked that 
[t]he most frequent practext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian 
Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet 
sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their 
Commandcmcnts are one contrary to the other. 'O' 
But crucially, for Hobbes, 'a mans Conscience and his Judgement is the same 
thing'. 106 As we have seen, in entering into the commonwealth, people had 
surrendered their private judgments and have undertaken to be guided by the 
& 107 publique Conscience' . Hobbes 
did admit, however, that when an individual 
received two contrary commands from God and the civil sovereign, and 'if he 
101 Ibid., 223. 
102 Ibid., 252. See also Hobbes, On the Citizen, 181. 'For Commonwealths as wholes, each of 
which is one person, natural reason prescribes uniformity of Public Worship. For actions done 
by individuals following their private reason are not actions of a commonwealth, and are not 
therefore the worship of the commonwealth; and actions of the commonwealth are understood to 
be done by order of the holder or holders of sovereign power, and hence with the consent of all 
the citizens together, i. e. uniformly'. 103 Hobbes, Leviathan, 252-3. 
104 Ibid., 223. 
105 Ibid., 402. 
106 Ibid., 223. 
107 Ibid., 223. 
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knows that one of them is Gods', it was 'manifest enough' that he should obey 
God. 108 The difficulty was that one could not distinguish between a genuine 
command from God and a self-fashioned one. Hobbes argued that the problem 
of obeying both God and the civil sovereign could be resolved by distinguishing 
between what was and was not necessary for salvation. If there was a way to 
obey the civil sovereign's command without forfeiting one's eternal life, Hobbes 
maintained, 'not to obey it is unjust'. 109 Hobbes argued that this was possible. 
He firstly argued that the situation where one's salvation would be endangered 
by submitting to the sovereign could not properly arise because if one had 
undertaken to be guided by the public conscience, his conscience would be the 
same as the sovereign's, and conceptually therefore, he would not have to sin 
because he was doing nothing contrary to his conscience. ' 10 Even if the 
individual did, as a matter of fact, have a conscientious scruple, because the 
external act would be a public act of worship, it would not be an individual 
believer's act but the sovereign's. 111 Moreover, Hobbes showed that obedience 
to the civil sovereign was simply necessary for salvation. The necessary 
conditions for salvation were contained in 'two Vertues', namely 'Faith in Christ, 
and Obedience to Laws. 112 Obedience was required to the laws of God, that is, 
the law of nature. 
Although Hobbes's doctrine of salvation may have been strangely 
minimal for many Anglicans, it did have a home in the irenic theology of the 
'Tew Circle', among them Viscount Falkland, William Chillingworth, John 
Hales and Jeremy Taylor, and later, of the latitude-men. 1 13 However, the 
108 Ibid., 403. 
109 Ibid., 403. The point here is not to say that the justness of obedience depends on its 
compatibility with salvation. For Hobbes, disobedience is unjust because it involves the breach 
of a covenant made. Ibid., 100. The point, therefore, is rather that without an overriding reason 
provided by God to disobey the civil sovereign, disobedience is simply unjust due to the breach 
of a covenant made. 
110 Ibid., 223. 
111 Ibid., 344,389. 
112 Ibid., 403. 
113 See Hobbes, On the Citizen, 240-1. Hobbes realized that his insistence of 'Jesus is Christ' as 
the only necessary article of faith to salvation 'may displease a large number of theologians' for 
'its novelty'. Johann Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context 
(London: Macmillan, 1992), 147. William Chillingworth, 7he Religion of Protestants a Safe 
Way to Salvation (Oxford, 1638), 133-5 (Answer to the third chapter, section 13); Jeremy Taylor, 
Treatises of 1. The Liberty of Prophesying, 2. Prayer ex Tempore, 3. Episcopacie (London, 
1648), esp. section 1,1-18. John Marshall, 'The Ecclesiology of the Latitude-men 1660-1689: 
Stillingfleet, Tillotson and "Hobbism7", Journal ofEcclesiastical History 36 (1985): 407-27. 
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implications of Hobbes's doctrine suggested a much more radical theology. As 
we have seen, for Hobbes, obedience to the law of nature meant obedience to the 
civil sovereign: civil laws and the laws of nature 'contain each other'. If, 
however, the sovereign forbade his subjects from belief in Christ, which was a 
necessary article of salvation, what was one to do? Hobbes argued that one 
could bypass this problem by invoking 'Naaman's license' (2 Kings 5: 17), 
whereby one could submit externally to the sovereign's commands while 
believing what one believed internally. 114 For Hobbes, the understanding was 
not subject to change at will: 'Beleef, and Unbeleef never follow mens 
Commands'. 115 Even in this extreme case, one could perform the two duties 
necessary for salvation by distinguishing between external acts and internal 
belief. But here, Hobbes intimated that belief in Christ was not necessary for 
salvation if one fully obeyed the civil law. After all, obedience to laws, 'if it 
were perfect, were enough for US9.1 16 If one was obliged to submit to the civil 
sovereign concerning a necessary article of salvation, it would apply all the 
more for indifferent things. 
' 17 The civil sovereign was a 'Mortall God! 18 
Hobbes developed an account of natural law which was deployed to 
reconcile civil authority and individual conscientious liberty. He used 
conventional terms but significantly redefined them to draw out conclusions 
suitable to his political agenda of creating an unchallengeable sovereign power. 
He showed that the law of nature could be known and have normative force. 
However, he achieved this by making natural law synonymous to civil laws. He 
showed that natural law became properly a law when it was commanded by the 
civil sovereign. The effect on indifferent things was that obedience was 
necessary to the civil sovereign and conscientious scruples were unjustified. 
114 Hobbes, Leviathan, 343-4. See also 249,414. 
115 Ibid., 343. See also 256. 
116 Ibid., 403. 
"' It is important to note that although the structure of Hobbes's theory of obedience was 
authoritarian, its implications on toleration were more ambiguous. Hobbes had maintained that 
the subjects' liberty depended on the 'Silence of the Law'. Thus, 'In cases where the Soveraign 
has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or fobeare, according to his own 
discretion'. According to Hobbes, 'such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse'. This 
means that Hobbes's theory could be used to support a policy of toleration as well as imposition. 
Hobbes, Leviathan, 152. See Tuck, 'Hobbes and Locke on Toleration'; Jon Parkin, 'Liberty 
Transpros'd: Andrew Marvell and Samuel Parker', in' Marvell and Liberty, eds. Warren 
Chemaik and Martin Dzelzainis (London: Macmillan, 1999), 269-89. 
118 Hobbes, Leviathan, 120. 
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However, the power of the sovereign stretched beyond the comfort of many 
Anglicans, not to say Puritans. 
In the following sections, I discuss Locke's contribution to the debate 
over indifferent things. I show how he initially argued himself into a position too 
close to Hobbes for his comfort. To distance himself from Hobbes, Locke 
developed an account of natural law in direct opposition to Hobbes's. Let us 
now turn to Locke. 
3. The Context of Locke's Two Tracts on Government 
Locke's first extended political writing was the English Tract of what we now 
know as the Two Tracts on Government. This was written in response to Edward 
Bagshawe, Locke's colleague at Christ Church, who had published the pamphlet 
The Great Question concerning Things Indifferent in Religious Worship in the 
Fall of 1660. The question of controversy, that is, determining the legitimate 
boundaries of civil authority and individual conscientious dissent, was, as we 
saw, a long-standing one, but it resurfaced as a question in a particular context. 
Let us briefly survey this context. Let us turn to the Restoration in 1660. 
By 1660, it was commonly believed that religion was one of the major 
causes of the civil disorder in the preceding years. "9 George Lawson, for 
example, remarked: 
In the time of our divisions, and the execution of God's judgements upon the 
three nations, I set my self to enquire into the causes of our sad and woeful 
condition, and to think of some remedies to prevent our ruin. Whilst I was busy 
in this search, I easily understood, that the subject of our differences was, not 
only the state but the church. 120 
Religion was, however, 'both a cause of trouble and the key to settlement'. 121 A 
stable political settlement therefore called for a peaceful religious settlement. 
One thing was sure: Charles's return as King guaranteed the restoration of the 
119 Conal Condren, George Lawson's Politica and the English Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43; Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms, 
1680-1685 (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 52. 
120 George Lawson, Politica Sacra et Civilis, cd. Conal Condren (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 3. 
121 Condren, George Lawson, 43n. 
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Church of England. 122 The crucial question was: in what form? John Corbet 
sketched out three possibilities: firstly, one party could be backed by the 
magistrate and sanction all the other parties; secondly, two or more parties could 
come to a compromise under the head of a comprehensive church and sanction 
the other parties; thirdly, one party could be backed by the magistrate but could 
extend toleration to the other parties. The first option was not desirable because 
it would most likely lead to violence. The third option was also not desirable 
because it would let in sects such as Quakers, Anabaptists, and Fifth 
Monarchists, those who were regarded as sectarians or enthusiasts by Anglicans 
and moderate Presbyterians. The second option was the most likely. The 
prospect of a settlement between Anglicans and Presbyterians was realistic. 123 
Anglicans had the favour of the King while Presbyterians had influence in 
Parliament. Moreover, Anglicans and Presbyterians agreed that a national 
Church was desirable and they had been holding several conferences since the 
mid 1650s in search of a compromise. 
The Declaration of Breda and the King's Declaration concerning 
Ecclesiastical Affairs demonstrated Charles 11's support for accommodation., 24 
The former declared the King's desire to advance and propagate the 'Protestant 
Religion' and guaranteed 'a Liberty to tender Consciences': 'no Man should be 
disquieted or called in Question for Differences of Opinion in Matter of Religion, 
which do not disturb the Peace of the Kingdom'. The latter firstly professed 
Charles's 'high Affection and Esteem' for the Church of England 'as it is 
established by Law' and his wish for the people's 'chearful submission' to its 
authority for the preservation of the 'Unity and Peace' of the Church. 125 But at 
the same time, it provided protection from the arbitrary imposition of Bishops. It 
made it a matter of conscience to use of the Book of Common Prayer and to 
perform certain controversial ceremonies - such as kneeling at the sacrament, 
making the sign of the cross at baptism, bowing at the name of Jesus, and 
122 John Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991), 30. 
123 John Corbet, The Interest of England in Matters of Religion (London, 1660), 24,35,36-7. 
See also Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 62f. For Rose, these three solutions corresponded 
respectively to rigid Laudians, latitude-men, and tolerationists. Rose, 'John Locke', 604. 124 'The Declaration of Breda', in The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 
1625-1660, ed. Samuel R. Gardiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 465-7; 'Declaration 
concecerning Ecclesiastical Affairs', Journals of the House ofLords II (1660-66): 179-82. 125 'Declaration concerning Ecclesiastical Affairs', 179,180. 
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wearing surplices - until a national synod had reviewed these issues. This synod, 
the King promised, was to be called in due course. Although this appeared to lay 
down the ground for a peaceful resolution under the policy of accommodation, it 
proved to be unsteady. Presbyterians had firm views concerning some of these 
controversial ceremonies. 126 In Baxter's Reliquiae Baxteriane, we see that he 
wrote to the King and exchanged letters with Anglican authorities circa 1660, 
imploring them to leave indifferent ceremonies to be freely determined by the 
individual. We see. ' however, the authorities were unwilling to concede. 
127 
Furthermore, the King was unwilling to extend conscientious liberty for the use 
of surplices in 'Our own Chapel, Cathedral or Collegiate Churches, or to any 
College in either of Our Universities. 128 Christ Church, of course, belonged to 
all of the above categories. It is in such a context that the question of indifferent 
things became an impending issue for both Bagshawe and Locke. 129 
In the Great Question, Bagshawe did not object to the King's authority 
to legislate in external matters of religious worship per se. This, he thought, was 
necessary for the sake of peace. He wished that 'all Parties would agree to 
referre the whole Cause of Ceremonies to his Majesties single Decision'. What 
Bagshawe did object to was the idea that the King should impose certain 
controversial ceremonies (though Bagshawe admitted that they were 'so very 
Trifles'), which the Scriptures had left free. 130 His reason for this was because 
imposition of things indifferent lacked Scriptural warrant. it was 'directly 
contrary to the Nature of the Christian Religion in general, which in every part 
of it is to be Free and Unforced', and more specifically, it was 'directly contrary 
to Gospelprecept'. 131 Imposition brought with it several other problems. 
126 Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae, esp. 235-6; Cornelius Burges ct al., Reasons Shewing the 
Necessity of Reformation (London, 1660). For Anglican responses, see Henry Savage, Reasons 
Shewing that there is No Need of such a Reformation of the Publique Doctrine (London, 1660), 
esp. 16-17; John Pearson, No Necessity of Reforming the Publick Doctrine of the Church of 
England (London, 1660). 
127 Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae, esp. 232-59. 
128 'Declaration concerning Ecclesiastical Affairs', 182. 
129 At Christ Church, Bagshawe's party stole as many surplices (a cloak seen to represent 
Anligcan authority) as possible and buried them in the sewers. See Abrams, 'Introduction', 36. 
In the Two Tracts, Locke twice deleted references to surplices. G, 146,178n75. This may 
suggest that Locke did not want to localize his arguments. 130 Edward Bagshawe, The Great Question concerning Things Indifferent in Religious Worship 
(London, 1660), 'Preface'. 
131 Ibid., 2,3. 
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The first problem was the 'Impossibility to fix a Point where the Imposer 
will stop': 'For do but once grant, That the Magistrate hath power to Impose, 
and then we lie at his Mercy, how far he will go'. 132 The problem was that the 
argument giving the magistrate power to impose over indifferent things could go 
down the slippery slope. If there was no room to voice conscientious dissent, 
then people would be at the mercy of the magistrate's arbitrary will. There 
would be no safeguard against unlimited imposition. For Bagshawe, this was 
nothing short of popery. Granted that the magistrate had the power to impose, he 
emay as well command those ... gross Fooleries, which are in the Popish 
worship', the 'grossest Idolatry and vilest Tyranny that was ever yet 
practised'. 133 For 'whoever doth own the Doctrine of Imposition ... brings in the 
Essence, though not the Name of Popery'. 134 
Another major problem was that of hypocritical worship. Bagshawe 
maintained that as God 'loves a cheerful Giver, so likewise a cheerful 
9 135 Worshipper, accepting of no more, than we willingly perform . The nature of 
Christianity warranted an individual to use his liberty concerning indifferent 
things in serving God, which 'his Conscience prompts him to% 136 As we saw 
above, within the dominant intellectual framework, conscience was considered 
to be the practical part of the understanding, which gave the will directive 
instruction. Given that the understanding informed the will, to perform a 
(willing' action implied that the individual worshipper was inwardly persuaded 
of the rectitude of the action. The external action, in other words, was the 
expression. of the internal judgment. However, an imposed ceremony qua 
imposition, would not win the approval of an individual's conscience, and for 
that reason, a genuine act of worship would not likely follow. Thus, Bagshawe 
argued, imposition 'inverts the Nature of the Christian Religion, not only by 
taking away its Freedom, but likewise its Spirituality'. 137 God was to be 
worshipped 'in spirit, and in Truth'. In order to perform such worship, 
conscience needed to be respected. Imposition undermined the individual's 
... Ibid., 10. 
133 Ibid., 10. 
134 Ibid., 11. The problem of unlimited imposition was also one characteristic imputed to Hobbism. See Locke's comments on Samuel Parker, in ET61,322-326. 135 Bagshawe, The Great Question, 3. 136 Ibid., 3. 
137 Ibid., 11-12. 
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relationship with God. Thus, Bagshawe argued, 'consciences, how erroneous 
soever, yet are to be tenderly and gently dealt with'. 138 
Bagshawe's argument undermined the legitimacy of accommodation. If 
accommodation under Charles 11 was going to lead on to a religious settlement, 
Bagshawe's arguments needed to be answered. 
4. Locke's English Tract 
Locke's response to Bagshawe in the English Tract centred around two points. 
First, he argued that Bagshawe had interpreted the Scriptures to his advantage 
and elicited unwarranted conclusions about the imposition of things indifferent. 
Secondly, he argued that if one proceeded from a Scriptural warrant as 
Bagshawe had, it was impossible to distinguish between civil and ecclesiastical 
matters. 139 
On the first point, against Bagshawe's claim that Scripture did not 
warrant imposition of things indifferent, Locke remarked that it was 'strange' 
that one could say that in imposing indifferent things, the magistrate sins against 
Gospel precepts, 'yet in the whole Gospel not one precept be found that limits or 
directs his authority' . 
140 Locke retorted that the 'Texts' produced by Bagshawe 
'inform Christians in general of the liberty purchased them by our Saviour, and 
there appears not in one of them any precept to magistrates to forbid their 
imposing indifferent things' . 
141 Locke argued that Scripture did not provide the 
warrant that Bagshawe had pretended to. At the same time, Locke saw the 
possibility for Scripture to be bent and used to suit one's own purposes. This 
takes us to his second point. 
The second point summarized Locke's concern with, and his case against, 
enthusiasm. Bagshawe had identified the danger of imposition of indifferent 
things falling into popish authoritarianism. Locke, on the other hand, identified 
the danger of conceding too much to the liberty of one's conscience. Without 
any fixed criterion between civil and spiritual matters, one could use conscience 
as a pretext to justify all sorts of subversive actions. Looking back at the 
Interregnum, Locke observed that there was 'no action so indifferent which a 
138 
1 ., 12. '39 Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 66-7. 140 G, 130,140. 
141 Ibid., 131. 
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scrupulous conscience will not fetch in with some consequence from Scripture 
and make of spiritual concernment': 
Grant the people once free and unlimited in the exercise of their religion and 
where will they stop, where will they themselves bound it, and will it not be 
religion to destroy all that are not of their profession? And will they not think 
they do God good service to take vengeance on those that they have voted his 
enemies? Shall not this be the land of promise, and those that join not with 
them be the Canaanites to be rooted out? Must not Christ reign and they prepare 
for his coming by cutting off the wicked? Shall we not all be taught of God and 
the ministry cast off as needless? 142 
Locke noted the danger that once it was granted that the magistrate did not have 
authority over indifferent things, people would 'all of an instant be converts, 
6conscience and religion' would 'presently mingle itself with all their actions 
and be spread over their whole lives to protect them from the reach of the 
magistrate', and they would 'quickly find the large extent of inordine ad 
spiritualia [what is excluded from the spiritual order]'. 143 Locke believed that 
Bagshawe himself 'would not make 
, 
this large use of his liberty'. He also 
believed that there were 'sincere and tender-hearted' Christians and that they 
ought to be 'gently dealt with'. 144The problem was that there was no way to 
distinguish between a sincere worshipper and an enthusiast given that Scripture 
could be interpreted in almost any way by an individual's conscience. One only 
needed to 'look some years back' to see that 'tender consciences was the first 
inlet to all those confusions and unheard of and destructive opinions that 
overspread this nation'. 145 
Locke came to the conclusion that giving authority to individual 
consciences over indifferent things was inconsistent with the security of civil 
society. He remarked that 'there hath been no design so wicked which hath not 
wom the vizor of religion, nor rebellion which hath not been so kind to itself as 
142 Ibid., 159; see also, Corr., 75, vol. i, 111. 'you know how easy it is under pretence of 
spirituall jurisdiction to hooke in all secular affairs'. 143 G, 154. 
144 Ibid., 160. 
145 Ibid., 140,160. 
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to assume the specious name of reformation'. 146 If the magistrate's authority was 
not asserted, it would 'leave the peace of that society' which is 'committed to 
his care open to be tom and rent in pieces by everyone that could but pretend to 
conscience and draw a sword'. 147 In the Latin Tract, which we shall examine in 
the next section, Locke asserted more vividly that once 'a subject's vow or a 
private error of conscience' could 'nullify the edicts of the magistrate', 
discipline will be everywhere at an end, all law will collapse, all authority will 
vanish from the earth and, seemly order of affairs being convulsed and the 
frame of government dissolved, each would be his own Lawmaker and his own 
God. 148 
Locke feared that once individual consciences could challenge the authority of 
the magistrate, the magistrate would lose control over his subjects, the result 
being civil disorder. 
Locke's solution was therefore to assert the magistrate's authority. He 
argued that if there is to be 'society, government and order, the magistrate 
4must necessarily have an absolute and arbitrary power over all the indifferent 
actions of his people'. 149 So long as it remained impossible to distinguish 
between civil and ecclesiastical concernments, civil order should be secured by 
giving the magistrate full control over all indifferent things. For Locke, this 
followed from his belief in an intelligent and purposive God. God 'in his infinite 
wisdom' had made obedience to the magistrate in all things indifferent 
6necessary and therefore not left free'. 150 Here, Locke appealed to the law of 
nature for the magistrate's commission, and avoided reference to the Scriptures: 
It was not ... requisite that we should look for the magistrate's commission to be 
renewed in Scripture who was before even by the law of nature and the very 
condition of goverment sufficiently invested with a power over all indifferent 
things. "' 
146 Ibid., 160. 
147 Ibid., 162. 
148 Ibid., 226-7. Hooker, Of the Laws ofEcclesiastical Polity, vol. 2,363. 
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Locke identified two theories of authorization by which God entrusted 
the magistrate with the power over indifferent things. The first supposition was 
that 'the magistrate's crown drops down on his head immediately from heaven'; 
that is to say that the magistrate was directly 'commissioned by God and by him 
entrusted the care of society'. The second supposition was that the crown was 
'placed there by the hands of his subjects'; that is to say that the magistrate's 
power was derived from the consent of the people. 152 On this second supposition, 
the magistrate was indirectly commissioned by God. Locke argued that 'the light 
of reason and nature of government' made it 'evident' that 'in all societies it is 
unavoidably necessary that the supreme power-must be still supreme, i. e. have 
a full and unlimited power over all indifferent things and actions within the 
bounds of that society'. 153 Once people had invested another with a power over 
their actions, they were bound to him because the law of God required 'fidelity 
and truth in all lawful contracts'. 154 For the sake of the argument, Locke based 
his argument of civil authority on the contract theory, which he considered to be 
more favourable to the 'patrons of liberty'. 155 He set out to show that even 
allowing 'every man by nature as large a liberty as he himself can wish', 'whilst 
there is society, government and order, rulers still must have the power of all 
indifferent things'. 156 But why would people invest their liberty to another? Here, 
Locke presented an argument strikingly similar to that of Hobbes's. 
Supposing man naturally owner of an entire liberty, and so much master of 
himself as to owe no subjection to any other but God alone (which is the freest 
condition we can fancy him in), it is yet the unalterable condition of society and 
government that every particular man must unavoidably part with this right to 
his liberty and entrust the magistrate with as full a power over all his actions as 
he himself hath, it being otherwise impossible that anyone should be subject to 
152 Ibid., 122,126. 
153 Ibid., 172. People were instructed by the light of nature 'in the necessity of laws and 
FI vernment and a magistrate with power over them'. ro 54 Ibid., 124-5. 
155 Ibid., 122-3. 
156 Ibid., 123. 
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the commands of another who retains the free disposure of himself, and is 
master of an equal libci ty. 157 
Locke intimated that in a state where everybody was 'master of himself', there 
would be disorder due to a lack of authority. Later in the English Tract, he 
argued that in the absence of government, there would be 'no peace, no security, 
no enjoyments, enmity with all men and safe possession of nothing, and those 
stinging swarms of miseries that attend anarchy and rebellion'. 
158 So, like 
Hobbes, he argued that it was necessary for the sake of order to entrust the 
magistrate with authority over all the liberty an individual possessed. The 
magistrate would have legitimate power over all indifferent things 'because it is 
lawful for the magistrate to command whatever it is lawful for any subject to 
do'. 159 
It is worth noting that in the Latin Tract, Locke added a third theory of 
authorization in which 'all authority is held to come from God but the 
nomination and appointment of the person bearing that power is thought to be 
made by the people'. He added this third supposition because he thought that 'a 
right to govern will not easily be derived from the paternal right nor right of life 
and death from the popular' (emphasis added). 160'lbiS last emphasis suggests 
that whatever similarities Locke had with Hobbes in the English Tract, by the 
time of the Latin Tract, he was clearly unconvinced of a Hobbesian contract 
theory derived from self-preservation. In any case, Locke considered that it was 
less an issue which of these three theories was right than that the magistrate's 
commission and power over indifferent things came from God. 
Now, in order to say that his appeal to natural law succeeded, Locke had 
to show that the tension between civil authority and individual consciences was 
resolved. After all, God would not command conflicting duties. How did Locke 
deal with the problem of conscientious dissent? Unlike Hobbes, Locke's 
contract involved individuals handing over their right over indifferent things and 
not their judgment. ' 61 So he could not say, as Hobbes had, that the problem of 
157 Ibid., 125. 
158 Ibid., 156. 
'59 Ibid., 125-6. 
160 Ibid., 23 1. 
161 Abrams, 'Introduction', 77. 
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conscientious scruples could not conceptually arise because people had 
surrendered their judgments to the public conscience (although Hobbes did have 
the problem that people as a matter offact could have conscientious scruples). 
Here, Locke made the external action/intemal belief distinction as Hobbes and 
Anglicans such as Sanderson had made. In general, 
The understanding and assent (whereof God hath reserved the disposure to 
himself, and not so much as entrusted man with a liberty at pleasure to believe 
or reject) being not to be wrought upon by force a magistrate would in vain 
assault that part of man which owes no homage to his allthority. 162 
But he went on to claim that 'a rigour which cannot work an internal persuasion' 
may work on 'an outward conformity, all that is here required'. 163 Like Hobbes, 
Locke was arguing that the understanding was not subject to change by human 
force. The magistrate could not coerce a believer to believe something. His 
concern was to regulate external actions. Like Hobbes and Sanderson, Locke 
was also arguing that believers had defacto liberty of conscience. Individuals 
could outwardly conform to civil laws concerning indifferent things while 
conscience remained unaffected. 
However, Locke was apparently aware of the weakness of his argument. 
He accepted that 'God abhors the sacrifice of the hypocritical compliant' and 
moreover, suggested that the magistrate 'may increase [his subjects] sin, while 
he endeavours, to amend their lives'. '64 Civil order came at the high cost of 
undermining sincere worship. As we have seen, conscience was to be obeyed 
because, if it was correctly informed, it was consonant with the law of God. 
Even if it was erroneously informed, it was to be obeyed because conscience had 
practical bearing on one's action and without a convinced conscience, one could 
not act out of faith. And what was not of faith was sin. God delighted in worship 
of a sincere kind. Without being able to follow one's conscience, one could only 
render hypocritical worship. Believers would thus be compelled to sin and put 
their eternal life at stake. 
162 G, 127. 
163 Ibid., 128. 
164 Ibid., 145. 
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Unlike Hobbes who had reduced the necessary condition for salvation to 
obedience to civil laws, Locke could not deny that his position would require 
conscientious believers to risk their eternal lives for the sake of civil order. 
Understandably, believers would opt to follow the former; and consequently, it 
gave the case for dissent extra momentum. 165 As it stood, Locke's appeal to 
natural law failed to solve the tension between civil authority and individual 
consciences. 
5. Locke and the Latin Tract 
Locke's difficulty in reconciling civil authority with conscientious claims was 
also present in his Latin Tract, which he wrote sometime between 1661 and 
1662. We shall see that Locke tried to subordinate the claims of conscience to 
the authority of human laws, but failed to do so, because he was still working 
within the traditional intellectual framework. 
In the Latin Tract (the more theoretically organized of the Two Tracts), 
Locke divided law into four categories: 'divine law', 'human law', 'fraternal law 
or the law of charity' and 'monastic or private law'. Divine law, which Locke 
described as the 'eternal foundation of all moral good and evil', was at the top of 
the hierarchy. This law was known either by the light of reason or revelation, 
and called natural or positive law respectively. But natural and positive law were 
both put under the common head of 'moral', because they were 'exactly the 
same in content and matter', differing only in the method of promulgation. What 
was not contained in this law was indifferent by nature. 166 Human law, the next 
in the hierarchy, was generically any command of a superior to his inferior, but 
politically it referred to the commands of the civil magistrate, to whom God had 
entrusted the responsibility of society. Its proper business was indifferent 
things. 1 67 Third on the order was fraternal law or the law of charity. It was 
commonly known as the 'law of scandal'. This was because it required the firm 
believer to give up the use of his liberty in indifferent things for a weaker 
believer who was less acquainted with his Christian liberty, lest the weaker 
believer 'performs that which he is far from convinced is lawful for him to do 
'65 Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 69. 166 G, 222-3. 
167 Ibid., 223. 
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and thus becomes guilty of a crime'. 168 Finally, there was the monastic or 
private law, a law in which 'a man imposes on himself and by a new, 
superinduced obligation' and 'renders necessary things hitherto indifferent'. 169 
Locke placed conscience in this last category. His aim was clear: by putting 
conscience in the lowest category, he tried to subordinate it to the authority of 
the civil magistrate. Locke held that 'the subordination of these laws one to 
another is such that an inferior law cannot in any way remove or repudiate the 
obligation and authority of a superior'. 170 
Following the traditional definition we have seen above, Locke defined 
the law of conscience as the 'fundamental judgment of the practical intellect 
concerning any possible truth of a moral proposition about things to be done in 
life'. "' Now, because God had 'implanted the light of nature in our hearts and 
willed that there should be an inner legislator (in effect) constantly present in us 
who edicts it should not be lawful for us to transgress even a nail's breadth', 'it 
is not enough', Locke argued, 'that a thing may be indifferent in its own nature 
unless we are convinced that it is so'. 172 In saying this, however, Locke exposed 
the weakness of his argument. He had tried to subordinate conscience to civil 
authority by relegating it to the lowest category of law, but at the same time he 
had admitted that God had wished people to follow its dictates. And if 
conscience was associated with the divine will, then understandably, people 
would put it above the magistrate's commands. 
Locke's definition of conscience as the judgment of the practical intellect 
also undermined his case for civil authority. To see this, we need to first look at 
the terms Locke used to distinguish between laws which were opposed to the 
liberty of conscience and laws which were not. He began by arguing that a 
distinction between obligation and liberty needed to be made. Obligation of 
human laws could either be 'material' or 'formal'. Material obligation was that 
which obliged the conscience necessarily because it was commanded by divine 
law before the introduction of a human law. Formal obligation was that which 
obliged the conscience although it was previously indifferent because it was 
168 Ibid., 224. 
169 Ibid., 224-6. 
170 Ibid., 226. 
171 Ibid., 225. 
172 Ibid., 225. 
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commanded by a lawful magistrate, to which obedience was necessarily 
owed. 173 Next, Locke remarked that the liberty that concerned him was twofold: 
a 'liberty of the judgment' and a 'liberty of the Will%174 Liberty of judgment 
consisted in the freedom from giving assent to something that it was in its own 
nature necessary. Liberty of will consisted in the freedom from giving assent of 
the will to some act. Locke argued that the liberty of the will could be removed 
without infiinging the liberty of the conscience. 175 Given these definitions, 
Locke argued that if a magistrate legislated concerning an indifferent thing, then 
that law bound the conscience not materially but formally. But this law did not 
remove the liberty of conscience 'since to be obeyed it requires the assent of the 
will only': it did not 'require the assent of the judgment that it has any 
necessity'. 176 Thus, the magistrate could require outward obedience without 
disturbing the individual's conscience. 
But again, the practical intellect, following the traditional intellectual 
model, lay between and overlapped with the speculative understanding, which 
was concerned with truth, and the will, which was concerned with action. The 
practical intellect qua practical had directive bearing on action. This created the 
conceptual space to argue that the stringent dualism between the intellect and the 
will was untenable. If people could not act according to conscience's direction, 
it would consist of a deviation from God's will who only accepted those actions 
which were done according to an individual's conscience. Moreover, because 
conscience was informed by divine law, it was difficult to disqualify a 
conscientious claim. Again, Locke had failed to reconcile civil authority with 
conscientious liberty. This failure lay in the framework he had inherited. 
6. Locke's Encounter with the Epistemological Crisis 
We should pause here for a moment and consider what exactly the problem was 
for Locke. The problem was that both civil authority and conscientious liberty 
were grounded on the divine law but without an adequate criterion to verify the 
genuineness of the interpretation of the divine will. 
173 Ibid., 238. 
174 Ibid., 238. 
175 Ibid., 238-9. 
176 Ibid., 239. 
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To begin with, Locke had postulated an infinitely wise and purposive 
God who had wished there to be 'order, society, and government among 
ment. 177 Whether directly or indirectly, the civil magistrate was entrusted by 
God with the power over indifferent things. 178 This was disclosed by both 
Scripture and reason. 179 Scripture, for Locke, provided 'general standards of 
conduct from which all other particular rules derive and can be deduced'. 
180 
However, Locke acknowledged that Scripture itself was the subject of debate. 
Locke had implicitly accused Bagshawe of having interpreted the Scripture 
unreasonably. In so doing, Locke implied that Scripture and reason were related 
and complementary. Scripture remained 'very silent in particular questions' as 
both Locke and Bagshawe remarked, but Locke argued that this problem could 
be bypassed by natural law: 'mankind was by the light of nature and their own 
conveniences sufficiently instructed in the necessity of laws and government and 
a magistrate with power over them'. 181 Because the law of nature and Scripture 
were both expressions of the divine will (differing only in the method of 
promulgation) and 'exactly the same in content and matter', the conclusions 
elicited from Scripture and reason, in principle, should be consonant with each 
other. Where Scripture was silent then, reason could speak on its behalf 1 82 
However, in the Two Tracts, Locke left this as an assertion and did not labour to 
demonstrate precisely how one could know the law of nature and what one 
could infer from it. The only hint of an argument he did give in the Two Tracts, 
which was from general consent, was deleted. 183 Hence, he had not 
demonstrated that Bagshawe"s Scriptural interpretation was unreasonable. To 
make this step, he would need to say more about natural law. Herein was room 
for development. 
There was also the problem of conscientious liberty. Locke tried to 
subordinate conscience to civil authority by putting it under the head of private 
177 Ibid., 122,231-2. See Abrams' comments in 23 In. Abrams notes that this 'is surely the sum 
of Locke's political philosophy at this time. His theory sets out from the will of God'. 
178 Ibid., 223,229ff. 
179 By Scripture, see Ibid., 171. 'In whatever text of Scripture the magistrate's charter for 
jurisdiction in civil indifferent things is to be found, in the very same or next verse is his warrant 
for impositions in religious'. See also, 233-5. By reason, see Ibid., 172. 
180 Ibid., 234. 
181 Ibid., 172. 
182 Ibid., 172. 'tis certain there be many particular things necessary and fit now, that are yet 
omitted in Scripture and are left to be determined by more general rules' suggests as much. 
193 Ibid., 151,179n95. 
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law, the lowest in the hierarchy of laws. For if conscientious scruples could 
nullify civil authority, civil society would collapse. 184 However, the model of 
conscience Locke had inherited was ill-suited for this purpose. We have seen 
that conscience was traditionally thought to be a syllogism where synteresis 
served as the major premise and conscientia the minor, from which the 
conclusions of conscience followed. Synteresis was informed by natural law, 
which was apprehended innately, and conscientia was guided by right reason, 
also which was written in the hearts of men. Because the conclusions of 
conscience were reached syllogistically from these premises, they would be 
consonant with the divine law. And because the conclusions of conscience were 
derived from the divine law, they would have to assume the status of divine law 
in Locke's hierarchy of laws. Thus, with this traditional model of conscience, he 
struggled to subordinate conscience to civil authority. 
As we have seen, conscience could be incorrectly informed due to the 
damage inflicted by original sin. The remedy for this was grace. God provided 
Fallen men and women with the Scriptures and the assistance of the Holy Spirit. 
The Holy Spirit helped the individual believer better understand the word of 
God. However, there was disagreement over how the benefit of the Holy Spirit 
was meted out. Anglicans claimed that the Church of England mediated grace 
through Apostolic succession and thus claimed that they were entitled direct 
people's conduct. Puritans were more individualistic. They claimed that the 
grace of the Holy Spirit was conferred to the elect individual. 
Grace, however, became an inlet to enthusiasm. By enthusiasts, Locke 
particularly seemed to have Quakers in mind. 185 Enthusiasts claimed that they 
were directly inspired by the Holy Spirit. This in itself was not problematic. The 
problem arose when the purported revelation revealed additional truths 
undermining the harmony of Scripture, reason and conscience, and ultimately 
civil order. If the Holy Spirit's testimony was superior to that of reason, as, for 
example, Calvin had maintained, then people believing to have been illuminated 
by the Holy Spirit would certainly opt to follow its dictates. 186 
184 Ibid., 226-7. 
185 Corr., 13,30,59,8 1; ETol, 306. 
186 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1960), 1.7.4-5. 
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The problem here was that there was no authoritative criterion to 
distinguish between a genuine divine inspiration and a self-fashioned one. In 
1654, Locke wrote, 'Aristotle and Scotus cannot secure us from lys and 
deceivers whereof we have an other experiment. in the quakers here amongst 
us'. 187 Enthusiasts and Roman Catholics pretended to infallibility. In a short 
manuscript on infallibility, written some time in 1661, Locke asked whether 
there was an infallible interpreter of the Holy Scripture in the church. 188 He 
answered this in the negative: the so-called infallible interpreter could not 
infallibly prove his infallibility. Only Scripture itself was infallible. However, it 
was one thing to assert that the enthusiasts' claims were unjustified, another to 
actually demonstrate that. Determining the achievement of reason and the Holy 
Spirit in interpreting the Scripture was not an easy task. Locke wrote: 
The greatest caution should be taken lest, having trusted too much in our reason, 
we neglect faith, and, by not having given due regard to the mysteries of the 
gospel, we embrace philosophy instead of religion. On the other hand, 
enthusiasm must be carefully avoided, lest while waiting for the inspiration of 
the Holy Spirit, we admire and worship our dreams. "' 
Concerning things necessary to salvation, Scripture was 'so clear and 
unambiguous'. But concerning indifferent things, Locke once again made it the 
business of human authority to intervene, and thus, argued that an 'infallible' 
judge may be needed. By 'infallible' here, however, he did not mean a 
'definitive' interpreter, by which he meant one who had authority over belief, 
but a 'directive' one, by which he meant one who guided action. 190 
We arrive at Locke's encounter with the epistemological crisis. Within 
the framework of the traditional intellectual model, there was no means of 
verification. Natural law was presumed to be known innately. It informed right 
reason, which then guided conscience to measure the rectitude of an action. But 
as early as 1659, Locke had remarked that 'every ones Recta ratio is but the 
187 Corr., 13, vol. i, 17. 
188 John Locke, 'Infallibility', in John Locke: Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002). 
189 Ibid., 72. 
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traverses of his owne steps'. 191 In saying this, he was questioning whether it 
could be asserted that reason pointed to a unanimous rule -a corollary of a rule 
being innate - given that there was no unanimity. Locke thought that reason, on 
the traditional intellectual framework, could not be relied upon any more than 
the purported inspirations of the enthusiasts. Scripture was, of course, the object 
of dispute and without the guidance of reason and grace, or indeed, by an 
eccentric use of reason and grace, its interpretation could be stretched. 
192 With 
reason, Scripture, and grace all being liable to eccentric interpretations and self- 
interested abuse, while they assumed the status of the highest order, and without 
a criterion to check them, Locke struggled to differentiate between a sincere 
conscience and a self-fashioned one. Failing to do this, it opened up the route to 
the turmoil caused by visionary Politics. 193 With the conceptual resources 
available to him, Locke was thus compelled to put forward a case for civil order 
at the cost of undermining conscience. 
7. Prospect of Development 
To recapitulate, the problem facing Locke was that both civil authority, and 
conscientious liberty were divinely grounded but without an adequate criterion 
to verify the genuineness of the understanding of the divine will. Thus civil 
authority and individual conscientious scruples came into conflict. The 
traditional resources led to an epistemological deadlock. We shall now see bow 
Locke tried to rethink the model. 
In the Two Tracts, Locke had brought with him the assumption of a 
purposive God who had prescribed certain intentions for mankind. This 
intention was manifested in the form of a natural law. If Locke could develop 
his account of natural law, which was not dealt with at any depth in the Two 
Tracts, and demonstrate that reason could come to the knowledge of the divine 
191 Corr., 81, vol. i, 123. 'tis Phansye that rules us all under the title of reason, this is the great 
guide both of the wise and the fooleish, only the former have good lucke to light upon opinions 
that are most plausible or most advantageous. Where is that Great Diana of the world Reason, 
every one thinkes he alone imbraces this Juno, whilst others graspe noething but clouds, we are 
all Quakers here and there is not a man but thinks he alone hath this light within and add besids 
stumble in the darke. Tis our passions that brutieish part that dispose of our thoughts and actions, 
we are all Centaurs and tis the beast that carrys us, and every ones Recta ratio is but the traverses 
of his owne steps'. 
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wilb then, assuming the consonance between reason, Scripture and grace, 
natural law could be adduced to measure the legitimacy of the interpretations of 
Scripture and grace and to demarcate the proper limits of civil authority and 
individual conscientious scruples. Anything contradicting that which was set by 
natural law would lack legitimacy, because being God's will, the conclusions of 
natural law would be authoritative. Locke would therefore have to reassess the 
validity and authority of the doctrine of innateness, and try to search an 
alternative path to the divine will. 
A reassessment of reason and natural law was suitable for Locke's aim 
and perhaps the most obvious way for him to proceed. The fact that at Oxford in 
1660 he was involved in a 'voluminous' exchange with Gabriel Towerson on the 
subject of natural law suggests that he was interested in the rationalistic project 
from the start of his intellectual career. After their exchange had become 
extensive, Towerson proposed to Locke: 
1. Whether (it being agreed upon between us that there is such a thing as a law 
of nature and one of those arguments which I produc'd for it admitted without 
any scruple) it were not much more for our advantage to proceed in our enquiry 
touching the law of nature, than to contend any longer about a second argument 
2.1 would willingly know of you whether you thinke the being of the law of 
nature can be evinc'd from the force of conscience in those men who have no 
other divine law to square theire actions by. 194 
In the preliminary discourses of An Explication of the Decalogue or Ten 
Commandments (1676), Towerson offered two arguments for a law of nature, 
which likely corresponded to the one 'admitted without scruple' and the one 
proposed to Locke. First, Towerson argued, given the existence of a wise and 
good God, 'creator and sustainer of the world', it followed that He had the right 
to give a law to His creatures, suitable to their nature, in order to preserve the 
natural order. Secondly, from the fact that all men had a conscience which 
excused or commended them according to what they apprehended was good or 
194 Corr., 106, vol. i, 158-9. 
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bad, it followed that there was a natural rule guiding them. 195 Towerson's letter 
shows that in 1660, Locke seemed to have been persuaded of Towerson's first 
proof of a law of nature, and indeed, we can see this in his presupposition of a 
purposive God in the Two Tracts. 196 
As we have seen, Hobbes also developed an account of natural law, 
which he used to inform his politics. However, his development had subversive 
implications. He showed that natural law could be reduced to civil laws. 
Although Hobbes showed that, conceptually, civil order and individual 
consciences need not conflict, this came at the heavy price of making the civil 
sovereign a 'mortal God'. Hobbes, however, had arrived at this conclusion 
because, on his account, God was incomprehensible and had no ends. Locke, on 
the other hand, postulated a purposive God whose will was knowable to men. 
Thus, the two men started from opposing views of God. This hinted that their 
developments would also proceed in different directions. Let us turn to Locke's 
Essays on the Law offature to see how his thought developed. 
8. Locke and the Essays on the Law ofNature 
As Censor of Moral Philosophy at Christ Church in 1663-4, Locke gave lectures 
on the law of nature. 197 In these lectures, Locke considered the following 
questions: Was there a law of nature? If so, how was it known? Was it obliging? 
If so, why was it obliging? In preparing these lectures, Locke consulted many 
sources, and these have been carefully documented by the twentieth century 
editor of the Essays on the Law of Nature, Wolfgang von Leyden. Concerning 
Locke's intellectual relationship with Hobbes, von Leyden suggests that 
'Hobbes interested and fascinated Locke, in spite of, or perhaps because of, their 
divergent views'. 198 In this section, we shall see that Locke and Hobbes shared 
195 Gabriel Towerson, An Explication of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments (London, 1676), 
2-3. Both of Towerson's points here were taken up by Locke in his first essay of the Essays on 
the Law ofNature (ELN). 
196 The fact that the Latin Tract was in the same collection as the Essays supports the point that 
there was a continuity. Abrams, 'Introduction', 16-17. 
197 Apparently, it was an occasion in which both tutor and student engaged in active debates. 
ELN, 237-8. Also, Locke's Essays on the Law ofNature was composed in the Scholastic style of 
taking up a question, followed by arguments for and against it. Thus, calling them quaestiones 
may be more accurate. See Robert Horwitz, 'Introduction, in Questions concerning the Law of 
Nature, eds. Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), 52-5; M. A. Stewart, 'Critical Notice, Locke Newsletter 23 (1992): 150-1. 
198 ELN, 37. 
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some similarities, which can be explained by their common move away from the 
traditional intellectual framework. However, we shall also see that Locke's 
development proceeded in direct opposition to Hobbes. Whereas Hobbes 
assumed that God was incomprehensible and that His intentions were not 
knowable to mankind, Locke assumed that God was purposive and that His 
intentions were knowable to mankind. 
In the opening essay, Locke considered whether there was a law of 
nature: he affirmed that there was. Locke argued that God presided (and 
presides) over nature and had set rules appropriate to the nature of a given thing. 
Man was no exception. The infinitely wise God did not create man without a 
purpose. He had certain intentions for mankind and these intentions were 
manifested in the form of a natural law. Thus, man was subject to natural law. 
Locke described the law of nature as 'being the decree of the divine will 
discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and what is not in 
conformity with rational nature, and for this reason commanding or 
prohibiting'. 199 
Given that there was a law of nature, the next question Locke asked was: 
how was it known? People (at least those in the 'right frame of mind') came to 
know the law of nature by the light of nature. 200 By the light of nature, Locke 
meant that people could come to the knowledge of certain truths by the proper 
use of their natural faculties. 201 At this point, Locke considered the resources 
available to him: the current views of the sources of knowledge of natural law 
were inscription, tradition, general consent, and sense-experience. In the second, 
third, and fifth essays, Locke rejected the first three explanations. He rejected 
inscription because there was simply no evidence of innate ideas. Inscription 
went hand in hand with general consent. 202 If all men were famished with innate 
ideas, then they must certainly acknowledge a common morality. But this was 
not the case. The travel literature Locke had read suggested quite the opposite 
199 Ibid., 111, no. 4. 
200 Ibid., 113-15; Dunn, The Political Thought ofJohn Locke, 22. 
201 ELN9 123. 
202 Ibid., 137-9; Like the Two Tracts, Locke apparently considered an argument sympathetic to 
general consent at the draft stage, but then deleted it, Ibid., 292-3. Cf. Hooker, Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity, vol. 1,175-7 (1.8.3). This may suggest that Locke took the criticism of the 
sceptics seriously - that natural law does not exist because there was no universal agreement - 
and thought that he needed to provide a better answer to meet the sceptical challenge. However, 
this is not to say that Locke was a sceptic. Cf. Wootton, 'Introduction', 26-3 1. 
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story. But even if there was a general consent, for Locke, this would still not 
prove that it was a natural law because the law of nature must be inferred from 
the first principles of nature and not from another person's beliefs. On similar 
grounds, he rejected tradition. Tradition, Locke argued, was more a matter of 
trust rather than knowledge as such. 
In the fourth essay, Locke made his own commitment clear, that is, to 
sense-experience. For Locke, the light of nature was sense-experience in 
conjunction with reason. Sense-perception provided the raw data and reason 
arranged these into 'images of things' and formulated new ones from the first 
ones, and so on. Here, reason was understood as a 'discursive faculty, a means 
to natural law, and not the moral principles themselves, which was the end. 203 
He opposed the traditional Scholastic practice of equating the 'dictates of 
reason" with the law of nature. 204 Reason, for Locke, was merely 'a faculty of 
the mind' and only searched and interpreted the law. This conceptual shift put 
Locke very close to Hobbes. Hobbes too had favoured sense-experience and 
reason over inscription, tradition, and general consent. 205 He also described 
reason as a discursive faculty rather than the law itself. But crucially, Locke 
differed from Hobbes in his view of God's nature. 
How then did Lockean sense and reason, contra Hobbes, lead people to 
the knowledge of natural law? First, Locke outlined what must be known for a 
law to be known and binding. There were two conditions to be met. The first 
was that there must be a law-maker, a superior power to which man was subject. 
The second was that the law-maker wished people to conduct themselves in 
accordance with his Will. 206 Locke inferred the first of these conditions, that is, 
the existence of a powerful and wise God, from creation. 207 Through sense- 
experience, one could perceive the world, and reason disclosed that it was 
beautifully ordered. From this, one could infer that there must be a wise and 
powerful creator, namely God. Given a wise God, Locke assumed that He surely 
could not have created the world 'without a purpose', 'with no fixed aim'. 
203 El , N) 149. 204 Ibid., 111,149. 
205 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 32-3; Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, 85. 206ELN, is i. 
207 Ibid., 153. 
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208 Hence the second condition, God 'intends man to do something'. As this 
intention would be God's will, this would show what Locke thought the content 
of natural law was . 
209 Sense-experience and reason revealed that creation was 
intended for God's glory, and thus that man was to render worship to God. This 
was man's religious duty. Politically, it showed that because men were urged to 
'procure and preserve a life in society', and to enter and maintain a society (their 
ability to speak implied this), they had a duty of self-preservation .2 
10 
There was nothing particularly special about the content of natural law 
that Locke had identified. I will discuss the problem of its indeterminacy below. 
But first, I will note another problem. Locke had shown that men were urged by 
a 6certain propensity of nature' or 'an inward instinct' of self-preservation, and 
'impelled by life's experience and pressing needs' to enter into and preserve a 
life in a society. He had shown that given this undeniable urge to preserve one's 
life, it was rational to maintain a political life. Hobbes could have said as much. 
Crucially though, Hobbes arrived at this conclusion from a different route. 
Although he had distinguished between right and law of nature, the content of 
the latter was derived independently of God's intentions because these were not 
knowable. And because the laws of nature were independent of God's intentions, 
they were not obliging. This in its own turn created the space for the right of 
nature, or self-preservation, to become the de facto measure of content and 
obligation. Locke had to say more than he had about the necessity of civil 
society if he wanted to avoid the conclusions about obligation that Hobbes had 
elicited. Locke tried to keep the distinction between right, which implied a 
liberty, and law, which implied an obligation, clear . 
21 1 The obligation of the law 
of nature was the next question he considered. 
How could natural law be properly binding? Locke defined obligation 
generally as 'the bond of law whereby one is bound to render what is due', and 
in relation to natural law, 'the bond of natural law whereby one is bound to 
discharge a natural obligation, that is, to fulfil the duty which it lies upon one to 
perform by reason of one's nature, or else submit to the penalty due to a 
208 ibid., 157. 
209 Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, 85. This formulation of natural law emphasizing 
sociability shows that Locke was (in part) following a well-established tradition from at least Grotius. See Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 100. 210 ELN, 157-9. 
211 Ibid., 111. 
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perpetrated crime'. 212 On Locke's account, one could be obliged to another 
agent only insofar as that agent had the right and power over him. It was 
unquestionable in Locke's mind that man's superior was God. Man was 
dependent on God as the creator and as the wise creator. 213 That God could 
create the world from nothing meant that He was omnipotent, that is, He could 
do anything: man's existence depended on His will because if it so pleased Him, 
He could 'reduce us again to nothing'. 214 That there was beauty, order, and 
regularity in the world implied that God was a wise creator. Man was dependent 
on His wisdom, because He could provide wise directions to mankind .2 
15 Thus, 
obedience was rightfully and rationally due to God. We thus see here, Locke's 
move to reconcile the tension between a voluntaristic understanding of 
obligation and a rationalistic one. 
One had a liability to pay dutiful obedience, that is, one was bound to 
submit to the will of the superior insofar as it was promulgated and there were 
no impediments to perform it. One also had a liability to punishment, which 
arose from 'a failure to pay dutiful obedience'. 216 Locke made sure to argue that 
fear of punishment did not necessarily put people under obligation. There was a 
difference between an obligation due to a power which could 'coerce offenders 
and punish the wicked' (e. g. one captured by a pirate), and an obligation due to 
one with authority and dominion over the agent, or to a power which derived its 
authority from this source by legitimate procedure (e. g. one subject to a king). 
Locke argued that 
all obligation binds conscience and lays a bond on the mind itself, so that not 
fear of punishment, but a rational apprehension of what is right , puts us under 
an obligation, and conscience passes judgement on morals, and, if we are guilty 
of a crime, declares that we deserve punishment. 217 
One was obliged to the will of a superior who had rightful authority over him; 
and understanding that put him under obligation. That God had annexed rewards 
212 Ibid., 181. 
213 Ibid., 183. 
214 Ibid., 187. 
215 Hanis, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 8 1. 216 ELNJ 183-5. 
217 Ibid., 185. 
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and punishments to the breach of His laws obliged agents in the sense that it 
helped them to see their obligation due to Him who had 'authority and 
dominion'. 218 Conscience (conscientia) then judged whether one's actions 
conformed to the will of the superior. 
Concerning obligation, Locke wrote that 'some things bind "effectively", 
others only "terminatively", i. e. by delimitation'. What Locke termed 'effective' 
obligation was the 'prime" and 'formal' cause of obligation, which came from 
the will of the superior. What he called 'terminative' obligation was the 
prescription of the 'manner and measure" of man's duty to God. Locke 
explained: 'We are bound by Almighty God because He wills [i. e. effective 
obligation], but the declaration of His will delimits the obligation and the ground 
of our obedience [i. e. terminative obligation]'. Men were morally bound to what 
God had made known as His Will. 219 
Locke believed that natural law met all these conditions. 220 There was 
a 22 1 God, the moral legislator, and His laws were sufficiently promulgated. 
However, we should note a structural difficulty which faced Locke in rejecting 
an innate law of nature. Here, I return to the problem of indeterminacy. The 
Essays intimated that everything that God had willed was morally obligatory. It 
did not specify the precise boundary as to what was willed by God in general 
and what was willed by God particularly to mankind as morally obligatory. On 
an innatist Scholastic model, the problem would not arise because certain 
precepts would be known innately. Having rejected an innate law of nature, 
Locke had to produce another explanation. I will address this problem in 
Chapter Three. I will therefore not go into any detail about his alternative 
explanation in this chapter. For the moment, suffice it to say that there was a 
problem that needed to be addressed. 
Having argued that the law of nature was morally obligatory, in the 
seventh essay, Locke then argued that its obligation was 'perpetual and 
universal'. It was perpetual in the sense that it was 'coeval with the human race', 
that is, as long as man existed and his nature was unchanged. Although the 
binding force of natural law was 'continuous' and 'never change[d]', there could 
219 Ibid., 185. 
219 Ibid., 185-7. 
220 Ibid., 187. 
221 For the significance of 'a' God, see Chapter Four. 
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be a change 'in both the times and the circumstances of actions, whereby our 
obedience [was] defined'. Locke's point was that one could not be expected to 
simultaneously perform everything the law of nature commanded due to the 
obvious limitations in human capabilities. Thus, he maintained, we 'can 
sometimes stop acting according to the law, but act against the law we 
cannot'. 222 Next, the law of nature was universal because given first that there 
was a harmony between human nature and the law of nature, and second that 
what was proper for the rational nature remained proper so long as the given 
nature was unaltered, it followed that all those who shared this nature, 'i. e. all 
men in the world', were morally bound to it. That is to say, because all men 
were endowed with a rational capacity, and because God had so designed the 
world that sense and reason could lead to the apprehension of natural law, it 
could be said that it was universal, i. e. applicable to all mankind. 223 
Having worked out his thoughts on natural law, Locke now turned to 
those who threatened it: namely Hobbes and the Hobbists. At the outset of the 
sixth essay, Locke took note that there were those who made self-preservation 
the foundation of natural law . 
224 It is hard to imagine that Locke did not have 
Hobbes or, at least, a Hobbist in mind. He retorted against the Hobbist account 
that self-preservation could hardly be an explanation of an obligatory law 
because a law based on self-preservation would only be a law of convenience, 
not a duty as such: Locke remarked, 'the observance of this law would be not so 
much our duty and obligation, to which we are bound by nature, as a privilege 
and an advantage, to which we are led by expediency'. 225 He pointed out that the 
distinction between right and law of nature would be annulled on this model. 
Natural law would be determined by right of self-preservation, which in short 
could mean anything: 
And thus, whenever it pleases us to claim our right and give way to our own 
inclinations, we can certainly disregard and transgress this law without blame, 
though perhaps not without disadvantage. 226 
222 ELN, 193. 
223 Ibid., 199. 
224 Ibid., 181. 
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I will come back to this last proviso 'not without disadvantage' presently. 
In the eighth essay, Locke continued with his case against Hobbism. He 
addressed the question: 'Is every man's own interest the basis of the law of 
nature? '. His answer was 'No'. Locke began by clarifying the terms he used. By 
the 'basis' of natural law, he meant the 'primary and fundamental law', which 
was 'the standard and measure of all the other laws depending on it' and 
from 
227 
which the ground of obligation was derived . By 'each man's personal 
interest' 
he meant each person's 'liberty to do what he himself, according to 
circumstances, judges to be of advantage to him'. 
228 In denying that each 
person's own interest was the basis of the law of nature, Locke was denying that 
private judgments could be the standard of what was 'just and right'. Locke 
made it clear that he did not mean that a person's private interest and natural law 
(as the 'common rules of human equity') conflicted. 229 Surely, he argued, 
natural law was in mankind's interest (it was, for example, the 'strongest 
protection of private property'). On the other hand, as the proviso 'not without 
disadvantage' intimated, a brute pursuit of one's self-preservation and self- 
interest could bring disadvantages. This could be read as a criticism of Hobbes's 
subordination of natural law to self-preservation. It is important to note, 
however, that Hobbes's account was more subtle and he did argue that following 
the laws of nature were conducive and disregarding them deleterious to self- 
preservation and peaceful, commodious living. 
230 Happiness, for Hobbes, 
consisted in attaining what one desired; and all men desired continual peace. 
The laws of nature were a means to a 'peaceable, sociable, and comfortable 
living', 231 and thus, (insofar as they remained effective to these) they were 
conducive to happiness and were to be observed. For Hobbes, the usefulness of 
the laws of nature to self-preservation was the basis of natural law. Locke seems 
to have detected the subtleties of Hobbes's conceptual moves, and responded to 
227 Ibid., 205. 
22" Ibid., 207. 
229 Ibid., 207. 
'0 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14,15. 231 Ibid., I 11. 
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them as well. 232 Right at the end of the eighth essay, Locke observed that 'an 
objector' might argue that 
if the observance of natural law and of every duty of life always leads to what is 
useful and if whatever we do according to the law of nature cannot but create, 
either directly or indirectly, great advantages, then the basis of natural 
law is 
each man's own interest. 
The objector would go on to argue that 
the truth of the minor premises is evident, for the observance of this law gives 
rise to peace, harmonious relations, friendship, freedom from punishment, 
security, possession of our property, and - to sum it all up in one word - 
happiness (faelicitas)'. 233 
Locke's response to this objector was that utility was 'not the basis of the law or 
the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it'. 
234 For Locke, 
obligation consisted in the will of God; utility was a by-product of obedience to 
God's will, which He had designed in His wisdom (I will develop on the 
connection between this point and Locke's hedonism in Chapter Three) . 
235 To 
act according to what was obligatory was right. The rightness of an action did 
Gnot depend on its utility' but 'its utility [was] a result of its rightness'. Some 
(right) actions were not expedient by themselves (e. g. keeping a promise, though 
it were to one's hindrance), but once they related to obligatory laws, and 
disobedience brought some kind of punishment, then those actions became 
expedient. We can see this as a response to Hobbes who had made what was 
useful, right, and because (or rather to the extent it was) useful, obligatory. Von 
232 Cf. Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo, trans. William 
Abbott Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), 242-3 (Book 2, ob. 4,5). 'Now, indeed, there 
are those who, with considerable subtlety, deduce all other laws from the first alone' [i. e. That 
any one whatsoever, should protect his own life and limbs, as far as he can, and save himself 
and what is his own]. Pufendorf also seems to have seen the subtleties of Hobbes's move to 
make self-preservation the fundamental law, and peaceful social life a 'secondary' component 
which 'men have been compelled by accident to take up'. 
233 ELN, 215. 
234 Ibid., 215. 
233 Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought I (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 40. Darwall also notes the connection with Locke's hedonism. 
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Leyden has suggested that Locke drew upon Robert Sharrock, who was an 
Oxford friend of Robert Boyle, and who had argued against Hobbes in his 
Ypothesis Etike of 1660 that utility depended on moral goodness and not vice 
versa. 236 A closer examination of the arguments of the Essays, however, 
suggests that Locke's engagement with Sharrock was more critical. 237 Sharrock 
argued that people were obliged to more than mere self-interest. He criticized 
Hobbes's concept of happiness - the 'continuall progresse of the desire, from 
one object to another 238 _ noting that happiness also consisted in relief from the 
anxiety of the continual pursuit of desire. 239 Sharrock postulated a system of 
natural justice: morally good actions were awarded with the pleasures of a good 
conscience and morally bad actions with the pains of a bad conscience. He had 
established the obligation of natural law with its natural sanctions: good and bad 
consciences acted as indicators of the obligation due to the divine will. But in a 
way, Sharrock fell into the same structural trap as Hobbes, making utility 
(pleasure of good conscience) the source of obligation, the difference between 
the two being that he redefined the meaning of utility. Locke would make use of 
the language of pleasure and pain but related it to God's justice in the afterlife 
(Chapter Three). For Locke, God's will was the source of obligation. Obligation 
qua obligation stood independent of utility. The Essays thus suggests that Locke 
engaged with both Hobbes and anti-Hobbesian literature. 
In this section, we have seen that Locke developed his views about 
natural law in opposition to Hobbes. Contra Hobbes, Locke started from the 
assumption that there was a purposive God. He showed that the implication of 
this assumption was that natural law could be known and oblige without 
adducing the civil sovereign. We have also seen that he responded to possible 
objections raised from the Hobbists. With a fully-fledged account of natural law, 
which was previously lacking in his early political writings, Locke was equipped 
to reconsider the question of indifferent things once again. 
236 ELN, 3 8; Robert Sharrock, Ypothesis Etike, (Oxford, 1660), 62. 237 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, 214. 
238 Hobbes, Leviathan, 70. 
239 Sharrock, Ypothesis Etike, 21-2. 
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9. 'An Essay concerning Toleration' and Natural Law 
Hitherto, we have seen that in the Two Tracts, Locke failed to resolve the 
tension between civil authority and individual conscientious liberty concerning 
indifferent things. We have seen that this was because at the time, he did not 
have the conceptual resources to escape the epistemological crisis, to which the 
debate fell prey. As a solution, Locke considered natural law. However, the 
development in natural law needed to avoid the Hobbesian reductio of natural 
law into civil laws, which led to an authoritarian politics. As we have seen, 
Locke's Essays responded to Hobbes, and produced a law of nature that was 
knowable and obliging without recourse to the civil sovereign. In this section, 
we shall look at Locke's 'An Essay concerning Toleration' and see how his 
views on natural law fitted in with his politics in the late 1660S. 240 We shall see 
how the views of natural law Locke developed in the Essays helped him to 
bypass the Hobbesian politics implicit in his Two Tracts. 
Before we move on to examine how Locke's account of natural law 
reshaped his politics, let us briefly consider where the policy Locke had 
advocated in the early 1660s had led in practice. A lot had happened between 
1660-62 when Locke wrote the Two Tracts and 1667 when he wrote 'An Essay'. 
A religious settlement between the Anglicans and the Presbyterians had seemed 
realistic at the time of the Restoration. But public opinion turned against the 
Presbyterians. On Christmas Eve of 1660 the 'Convention Parliament' was 
dissolved and the staunchly Anglican 'Cavalier Parliament' was returned. 
Concurrently, with bishops returning to their local dioceses, episcopacy made a 
strong recovery. In this atmosphere, Anglicans and Presbyterians met at Savoy 
in the Spring of 1661 to fulfil the promise made in the Declaration of Breda to 
call a national synod to review the prayer book. At this conference, Presbyterian 
concerns were marginalized and the revised prayer book confirmed traditional 
Anglican values concerning controversial ceremonies. In May of 1662, the Act 
of Uniformity received royal assent. This Act firstly required ordination by 
bishops; secondly, it reinstated the Thirty-nine Articles and the Common Book 
of Prayer; and thirdly, it required the repudiation of the Solemn League and 
240 See especially, Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 108-117. 
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Covenant. 241 The Act required all ministers to conform to it by St 
Bartholomew's day (Aug 24) of that year. Predictably, many ministers had 
conscientious scruples against the requirements of the Act, and consequently, 
some 1700 ministers were ejected, many moderate Presbyterians. Dissent was 
made inevitable. The policy that Locke had advocated in the Two Tracts had 
produced many victims. 
Further repressive measures were introduced to discourage dissent in the 
following years. In 1664, the Conventicle Act, which prohibited non-conformist 
assemblies, and in 1665 the Five Mile Act, which prohibited non-conformist 
ministers from living within five miles of a corporate town, came in tandem. 
With the latter, what is commonly called the 'Clarendon Code' was 
242 completed . 
Whatever his own intentions were, as Lord Chancellor, Clarendon was 
thought to be responsible for the various oppressive legislations. Clarendon was 
sacked, however, after a series of natural disasters in the mid 1660s and a fatal 
military defeat at Medway in 1667. Thus, when the Conventicle Act was due to 
expire at the end of the parliamentary session in 1667, there were rumours of 
more favourable legislation for the non- conformists. As a result, in the years 
between 1667 and 1668, many proposals were made in favour of comprehension 
and toleration. In 1666, Locke had joined the household of Lord Ashley. At the 
time, Ashley was one of Charles 11's leading ministers and a supporter of 
241 The Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 'required the explicit renunciation of episcopacy'. 
Spurr, The Restoration, 7. For full text, see 'The Solemn League and Covenant', in The 
Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, ed. Samuel R. Gardiner 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 267-71. 
242 R. S. Bosher, The Making of the Restoration Settlement (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1951); 
David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); J. P. 
Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution 1603-1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); 
I. M. Green, The Re-establishment of the Church of England, 1660-63 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); R. A. Beddard, 'The Restoration Church', in The Restored Monarchy, 
ed. J. R. Jones (London. Macmillan, 1979); Paul Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the 
Reconstruction of the Old Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Spurr, The 
Restoration; Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke. For the impact of the Conventicle Act and the Five 
Mile Act, see G. R. Cragg, Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution 1660-1688 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957) and C. E. Whiting, Studies in English 
Puritanism from the Restoration to the Revolution, 1660-1688 (London: Frank Cass, 1968). For 
Charles 11's Declaration of Indulgence, see Boshcr, The Making of the Restoration Settlement, 
249f; Green, The Re-establishment, 143,213,219-26; Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament, 181-5; 
Spurr, The Restoration, 50-1. For the difference between the Clarendon Code and Clarendon's 
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toleration. It was under Lord Ashley's patronage that Locke wrote 'An Essay 
concerning Toleration'. 
In 'An Essay', Locke addressed the question of liberty of conscience 
once again. At the very beginning of 'An Essay', he noted that hitherto, the 
debate had been divided into two sides: those who advocated 'absolute 
obedience' (e. g. Locke of the Two Tracts) and those who defended 'universall 
liberty in matters of conscience' (e. g. Bagshawe). 243 The problem, he suggested, 
was that neither side made it clear what could have a title to liberty or showed 
the boundaries between imposition and obedience. As a result, one was faced 
with the Scylla of enthusiasm, which undermined civil society, and the 
Charybdis of authoritarianism, which undermined a sincere believer's 
relationship with God. In 'An Essay', Locke proposed to 'clear the way. 
Locke's solution involved making a distinction between the types of 
opinions and actions. He identified two: the 'speculative' and the 'practical'. 
These were Scholastic terms in which the practical affected conduct and the 
speculative did not. What was important was the content of the two. Speculative 
opinions and actions included opinions such as 'the beliefe of the trinity, 
purgatory, transsubstantion, Antipodes, Christs personall reigne on earth'. It also 
included 'Place, time, & manner' of worship. 244 Practical opinions and actions 
were subdivided into two categories: morally indifferent and morally relevant. 
Morally indifferent practical opinions and actions were those which pertained to 
society, but were neither intrinsically good nor bad. Morally relevant practical 
opinions and actions were, conversely, intrinsically good or bad, and thus were 
moral virtues and vices. 245 
Parallel to these distinctions, Locke set the boundaries of civil authority 
and individual liberty. Locke argued that the magistrate's business related only 
to civil affairs. The 'whole trust, power & authority' of the civil magistrate was 
Gvested in him for noe other purpose, but to be made use of for the good, 
preservation, & peace of men in that society over which he is set'. This 
corresponded to the content of natural law that Locke had identified in the 
Essays. As we have seen, in the Essays, he had argued that the maintenance of 
243 ETol, 269. 
244 Ibid., 271,272. 
245 Ibid., 27 1. 
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society was a natural duty as much as one was obliged to preserve oneself Civil 
government was erected for this purpose and this purpose only (whether it was 
erected by God's direct appointment or the consent of the people), and it was 
this end which 'ought alone to be the measure of its proceeding'. 246 
Opinions and actions that concerned the magistrate were therefore those 
that 'disturbe the state or inconvenience [one's] neighbour'. 247 It followed that 
speculative opinions and actions did not come within the magistrate's 
cognizance because 'bare speculations give noe bias to (one's] conversation 
with men, nor haveing any influence on [one's] actions as [one is] a member of 
any society'. Given this, Locke argued that concerning speculative opinions and 
divine worship, people should have 'unlimited' freedom and toleration. 248 
Locke maintained that the magistrate was an "umpire between man and 
man '. 249 Religious worship (which was also prescribed by the law of nature)250, 
on the other hand, was wholly between God and man, 251 and worship being 'that 
homage which I pay to that god I adore in a way I judg acceptable to him, & soe 
being an action or commerce passeing only between god & my self, hath in its 
owne nature noe reference at all to my governor or to my neighbour, & soe 
necessarily produces noe action which disturbs the community'. 'For', Locke 
continued, 
kneeling or siting at the sacrament can in its self tend noe more to the 
disturbance of the government, or injury of my neighbour, then siting or 
standing at my owne table; weareing a cope, or surplice in the church, can noe 
more alarme, or threaten the peace of the state, then wearing a cloak, or coat in 
the market. 252 
The departure from the Two Tracts is clear. As we have seen, in the Two Tracts, 
Locke had argued that the civil magistrate had 'absolute and arbitrary power' 
over all indifferent things, civil or religious. 253 Thus, the magistrate could rightly 
246 ELN, 157,159; ETol, 269-70. 
247 ETol, 272. 
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impose certain controversial ceremonies, including the use of surplices and 
kneeling at the sacrament. But in 'An Essay, Locke maintained that nothing 
was indifferent in religious worship. 
254 Given the nature of worship, one needed 
to be convinced that one's worship was 'the true way of worship'. And because 
worship, whatever the style, had no effect on the peace of society, Locke argued 
that it was not the magistrate's proper concernment. The magistrate's concern 
was secular, which, in the vocabulary of the day, denoted those things which 
255 terminated in this world. His concern did not extend to the spiritual world. 
The magistrate had no business in religious affairs as such. I will come back to 
this proviso 'as such' below. 
The argument that the magistrate's power extended only to secular and 
not to religious affairs was complemented by two further assumptions. Here, 
Locke pursued the implication of a belief in a purposive God. First, Locke 
argued that the understanding was not subject to change by coercion. The way to 
salvation was through the 'voluntary & secret choise of the minde'. But this 
could not be 'wrought on by any humane compulsion'. Thus, he argued that it 
cannot be supposd that god would make use of any means, which could not 
reach but would rather crosse the attainment of the end'. 
256 This showed that 
God had not intended the magistrate to impose in religious worship. 257 
The second complementary assumption was that the magistrate did not 
necessarily have superior knowledge concerning salvation. Concerning the 
knowledge of salvation, in principle, the magistrate and the subjects stood on 
equal ground. Locke maintained that the magistrate had 'noe more certain or 
more infallible knowledg of the way to attain it [sc. salvation] then I my self, 
where we are both equally inquirers both equally subjects, & wherein he can 
give men noe security, that I shall not, nor make me any recompense if I doe 
254 ETol, 308. 
255 It is important to note that secular meant those things that terminated in this world. By the 
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miscarry'. 258 Magistracy did not imply superior knowledge. Moreover, he could 
not make any reparation in another world should he force one to the wrong 
religion. By implication, Locke maintained that individuals were capable and 
ultimately responsible for taking care of their own souls. Thus, this also showed 
that God did not intend the magistrate to interfere with religious worship. 259 
Locke insisted that, in principle, morally indifferent practical opinions, 
qua morally and politically indifferent, also had a title to toleration. But qua 
indifferent, it was the proper subject of the magistrate. Things were indifferent 
and entitled to toleration 'soe far, as they doe not tend to the disturbance of the 
state'. However, 
the conscience, or persuasion of the subject, cannot possibly be a measure by 
which the magistrate can, or ought to frame his laws ... there being noe thing soe 
indifferent which the consciences of some or other, doe not check at [i. e. stop 
short]. 
In the tone of the Two Tracts, Locke argued that there would be rnoe law, nor 
government' if one denied the magistrate's authority over indifferent things. 260 
Thus, it was acknowledged 'on all hands' that the magistrate had jurisdiction 
over indifferent practical opinions . 
261 The measure by which the magistrate 
framed his laws related to natural law, that is, it related to the 'good & welfare 
of the people'. Locke maintained that the magistrate was permitted to act 
according 'to the dictates of his owne conscience, & persuasion'. However, qua 
man, the magistrate was accountable to God for his actions, and qua magistrate, 
he was accountable to God 'for his laws & administration ... according as they 
are intended to the good, preservation, & quiet of all his subjects in this world'. 
Because in the Essays Locke had shown that the law of nature was knowable, he 
could confidently claim that the rules intended for the 'good, preservation, & 
quiet' of the subjects were 'soe certaine & soe cleare' that the magistrate 'can 
258 ET61,273. 
259 In Chaptcr Two, we shall see how this assumption was challenged by Samuel Parker. 260 ET61,276. 
261 Ibid., 276; Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 110-11. 
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scarce erre in it unlesse he doe it willfully'. 262 Natural law did not allow space 
for religious enthusiasm to seep into the magistrate's jurisdiction. 
The other category of practical opinions and actions were those which 
were morally relevant, in other words those which were intrinsically good or bad. 
Thus it included moral virtues and vices and the duties of the second table. Here 
again, Locke argued, 'however strange it may seeme', the magistrate did not 
have any business in enjoining these opinions or actions unless they related to 
the 'good & preservation of mankinde under government'. 263 As such, moral 
virtues and vices related to the health of one's soul, thus a matter between God 
and man. However, it was clear that the magistrate commanded the practice of 
virtues, not because they were virtuous, but because 'they are the advantages of 
man with man, & most of them the strong ties & bonds of society; which cannot 
be loosend, without shattering the whole frame. 264 Again, Locke was confident 
that morally relevant practical opinions and actions made 'but a litle part of the 
265 disputes of liberty of conscience' as far as men's conscience were concerned. 
This suggests that both magistrate and subject could distinguish between what 
was 'in their owne nature good or bad'. In other words, Locke maintained that 
people were capable of perceiving a fixed moral law, the law of nature, and their 
obligations under it. 
Locke believed that genuine conflict between the magistrate and subjects 
was unlikely. In principle, the law of nature was knowable. Because the 
magistrate's duty related to natural law, which entrusted him with the 
preservation of society, conscientious scruples that undermined the preservation 
of the society could be stripped of its authority. Civil order was hereby secured. 
Of course, the magistrate was not infallible. An individual could also sincerely 
believe that a certain law concerning indifferent thing was contrary to his 
persuasion. Therefore, conflict could arise between the magistrate's commands 
and the subjects' conscience. In such a case, Locke recommended passive 
disobedience. 266 That is to say, subjects should follow their conscience as much 
as possible 'without violence', but incur the punishment prescribed by the law. 
262 ETol, 277. 
263 Ibid., 281. See generally, 275-284. 
264 Ibid., 282. 
265 Ibid., 280. 
266 Ibid., 279,284. 
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Locke had offered a solution to the problem of civil authority and 
Christian liberty. The magistrate's business related to secular affairs. His duty 
was to maintain peace in society. Religious worship, whatever style, being 
speculative and thus innocuous, was entitled to unlimited toleration. Genuine 
conflict was unlikely because natural law, which was knowable, set a clear line 
between the legitimate activities of civil authority and individual liberty. The 
magistrate's power did not concern religious worship as such. Here, I come back 
to the proviso 'as such'. 
Locke observed that some men mixed with their 'religious worship, & 
speculative opinions, other doctrines absolutely destructive to the society 
wherein they live': they blended in subversive opinions with their religion, 
'reverencing them as fundamentall truths, & submiting to them as articles of 
267 their faith' . 
Locke's prime target was Roman Catholics. As early as 1659, 
commenting on Henry Stubbe's work, Locke had expressed his wariness of 
extending toleration to Catholics, noting 
how easy it is under pretence of spirituall jurisdiction to hooke in all secular 
affairs since in a commonwealth wholy Christian it is noe small difficulty to set 
limits to each and to define exactly where on[e] begins and the other ends. 268 
If a purported divine worship had subversive implications, there was no excuse: 
it must not be tolerated. Civil order was informed by natural law, which was the 
expression of God's will knowable to rational beings. Therefore, religious 
enthusiasm could not legitimately challenge it. If however, Catholics could 
separate the subversive doctrines from their purely speculative ones, though it 
, is very hard to be done', they would merit toleration. 
Finally, although the magistrate's business did not concern religious 
worship as such, the belief in a God was not simply a religious matter, but had 
practical bearing: 
the beleif of a deite is not to be recond amongst purely speculative opinions for 
it being the foundation of all morality & that which influences the whole life & 
267 Ibid., 284. 
269 Corr., 75, vol. i, 111. 
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actions of men without which a man is to be counted noe other then one of the 
most dangerous sorts of wild beasts & soe uncapeable of all societie. 269 
Because natural law was knowable and obliging, Locke could make the 
arguments about the purpose of civil government, about its proper business, 
authority and integrity, and about people's ability to apprehend the moral virtues 
and be obliged to them, just to mention a few which concerned Locke's 
fundamental argument in 'An Essay'. And to be obliging, natural law required a 
legislator, namely God. Thus, atheists were excluded from the benefits of 
toleration. 270 
In 'An Essay concerning toleration', natural law firmly supported 
Locke's politics. Natural law showed that the magistrate's duty was to preserve 
society. This assumption enabled Locke to make a distinction between the 
legitimate boundaries of civil authority and individual liberty. Speculative 
opinions and divine worship did not affect the peace of society and therefore 
merited toleration. The magistrate's power only related to opinions and actions 
which could disrupt the peace of society. Religious enthusiasm and sectarianism 
could be ruled out because it was clearly disruptive to society. The magistrate's 
authority concerned things between man and man. What was between God and 
man was not his concern. This was complemented by the assumption that people 
were capable of performing their duties to God, given that natural law was 
knowable. Given that humans were fallible, there would be inconveniences at 
times, but in general, civil order and religious worship did not conflict. With the 
development in natural law, Locke had offered a solution to the question of 
reconciling civil authority and individual conscientious liberty. 
10. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I examined the development of Locke's thought between 1660 
and 1667, focusing on his political theory and natural jurisprudence. I set out to 
show why Locke's political views changed between the early and late 1660s. 
Commentators have usually explained this in terms of a change in historical 
circumstances, but I have attempted to offer an entirely different account by 
269 EToI, 308. 
270 1 will discuss the problem of atheism in Chapter Four. 
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using the assumptions from the holistic approach. I argued that Locke's Two 
Tracts failed to resolve the tension between civil authority and Christian liberty 
because in this work, Locke lacked the conceptual resources to bypass the 
epistemological crisis to which this debate led. I showed that Locke developed 
his natural jurisprudence in the Essays, which then equipped him to resolve the 
problem in his 'Essay concerning Toleration'. I thus showed that there was a 
theoretical aspect to the change in Locke's politics between the early and late 
1660s. I also argued that Locke's development proceeded in opposition to that 
of Hobbes's. Hobbes had also developed an account of natural law and used it to 
resolve the problem between civil authority and Christian liberty. Hobbes's 
solution, however, came at the cost of reducing natural law to civil law and also 
denying individual conscientious liberty, although he tried to show that 
conceptually there was no dissonance between the individual and civil laws. 
Locke showed that natural law was knowable and binding without adducing the 
civil sovereign, and from this assumption, developed a distinctive political 
solution to that of Hobbes's. 
From my narrative, we can draw some further conclusions. For one, we 
can put a question mark against the narrative that portrays an intolerant Locke in 
the early 1660s and a liberal Locke in the later 1660s. Locke did not necessarily 
think that different Christian sects could not live together peacefully, but he 
simply lacked the theoretical resources at one point to show that civil order and 
individual dissent could be reconciled. 
Connected to this conclusion, we can say that Locke was indeed a 
thinking man and that his intellectual development had direction and purpose. 
Locke began with a conviction that there was a purposive God, and because 
purposive, Locke believed that He would not create a world of disorder. He 
thought hard about how seemingly conflicting duties could be reconciled. He did 
not simply change his views because of contingent circumstances. He thought 
through the implications of his own commitments. This led Locke to distinguish 
his thought from his predecessor Hobbes, who opposed this vision. We have 
therefore seen how Locke offered a novel moral and political solution against 
another original thinker, Hobbes. In other words, we have seen how Locke's 
mind operated and why it was unique. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
Toleration and the Scope of Human Understanding 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a particular puzzle concerning the 
development of Locke's political thought and epistemology between the late 
1660s and 1671. The puzzle requires us to explain why Locke turned to a 
specific epistemological investigation about the scope of human understanding 
in 1671. Traditionally, commentators have seen Locke's turn as a mere 
continuation of his investigation of natural law in 1664.1 Other contextualist 
commentators have sought a political motivation behind Locke's turn, that is, a 
motivation to outflank the epistemological foundation of the authoritarianism of 
his political adversary, Samuel Parker. 2 Recent contextualists have suggested 
that both of these narratives played a role in Locke's turn, while tending to 
emphasize the role of the first narrative. 3 My aim in this chapter is to show via a 
holistic analysis that there is another narrative that ties the two traditional 
accounts together, namely Locke's consistent opposition to Hobbism. I will 
show that Locke opposed Parker's politics but that his opposition was in fact 
part of a broader attempt to defend his political vision against Hobbism. I will 
show that to this end, Locke developed some of his long-standing philosophical 
assumptions about natural jurisprudence, and more specifically, epistemology, 
in a way that supported his increasingly liberal political theory after 1667. 
The year 1671 was when Locke began to pen his thoughts on the subject 
of human understanding. This became the first foundations of his major 
philosophical work An Essay concerning Human Understanding, published 
nearly two decades later. Fortunately, thanks to James Tyrrell, Damaris Masharn, 
and Locke himself, we know in some detail the origin of Locke's turn to 
epistemology. In the 'Epistle to the Reader' of the Essay, Locke wrote: 
Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee that 
five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very 
remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that 
1 See note 6 below. 
2 See note 10 below. 
3 See note 14 and 15 below. 
ill 
rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, without coming 
any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my 
Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon 
Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, 
what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. 4 
This meeting took place in the winter of 1670-1, and Tyrrell recalled that he was 
4one of those that then met there when the Discourse began about the Principles 
of morality and reveald Religion'. 5 
It is easy to see Locke's epistemological inquiry in 1671 as following 
directly from the inquiry in the Essays on the Law of Nature. Locke had argued 
in this work that natural law could be known, accompanying this with a view of 
human understanding that sense and reason could lead to this knowledge. 
Traditionally, therefore, the Drafts of the Essay composed in the early 1670s 
have been seen as the continuation of Locke's interest in the law of nature. 6 
However, what this narrative does not make clear is what motivation Locke 
would have had to focus on the more specific question of the proper scope of 
human understanding at that precise moment. My aim in this chapter is to offer 
one such explanation. 71 will argue that the controversy provoked by the 
publication of Samuel Parker's A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity in 1669 
gave Locke a strong incentive to turn to epistemology. As we shall see, Locke 
and Parker shared many philosophical assumptions, including assumptions 
about natural law, which informed their politics. However, Parker's work posed 
a threat to the political views Locke had advocated in 'An Essay concerning 
4 E, 'Epistle to the Reader', 7. 
3 See Tyrell's copy of the Essay in the British Library, 622, f. 14. For accounts of the 
background of the Essay, see Roger Woolhouse, 'Lady Masham's Account of Locke', Locke 
Studies 3 (2003): 178; H. R. F. Bourne, The Life ofJohn Locke, vol. I (Germany: Scientia Verlag 
Aalen, 1969), 248-9; Maurice Cranston, John Locke. - A Biography (London: Longmans, Green, 
1957), 140-1; G. A. J. Rogers, 'The Writing of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding', 
in Locke's Enlightenment (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1998), 10. Tyrrell recalled that the meeting 
took place in the 'winter of 1673', but he was mistaken about the date. Locke produced two 
drafts of the Essay in 167 1. 
6 Philip Abrams, 'Introduction', in G, 84-107; Wolfgang von Leyden, 'Introduction', in ELN, 
60-82. 
7 Other useful accounts can be found in: Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke, rev. ed. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 5, and also, G. A. J. Rogers, 'The Intellectual 
Setting and Aims of the Essay', in The Camhridge Companion to Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Lex Newman (Cambridge- Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7 -3 3. Both works focus on the scientific and philosophical context of the Essay. 
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Toleration' by asserting the civil magistrate's authority over religion on the 
basis of his professional competence. Parker's view came dangerously close to 
that of Hobbes. In 'An Essay' Locke had argued that the magistrate had no 
business in religion as such, one of his arguments being that both the magistrate 
and subjects were 'equally inquirers' concerning their salvation. 
8 Because Locke 
and Parker had similar views about natural law, Locke therefore needed to take 
the discussion to a more specific level and investigate what the proper scope of 
human understanding was to show that his politics, and not Parker's Hobbist 
politics, was firmly supported by these philosophical assumptions. 
Parker is an underestimated figure in the drama leading up to the 
production of Locke's early drafts of the Essay. 
9 So far, the only extensive case 
for reading Locke's Drafts as a response to Parker has been made by Richard 
Ashcraft. 10 Ashcraft argues that reading the Drafts as 'an attempt to outflank 
Parker by destroying his epistemological basis for his position' throws 'a great 
deal of light upon the political significance of some of the philosophical issues 
discussed in that work as well as upon the internal structure of the Essay itself - 
that is, why certain points are discussed at alF. " Ashcrafts thesis has had its 
supporters. G. A. J. Rogers subscribes to this view more or less uncritically. 
12 Jon 
Parkin adopts this thesis, albeit in his own way, and suggests that through an 
engagement with Parker's Hobbism, Locke was answering his own Hobbism of 
the Two Tracts. 13 
Others have been more critical of this thesis. While acknowledging that 
'the debate on toleration did raise fundamental problems of epistemology', and 
thus, that Ashcraft's thesis 'has some merit', David Wootton warns that the 
thesis has the tendency to reduce Locke's Essay to 'a work of Whig Philosophy'. 
For Wootton, the Essay has 'intellectual origins which pre-date the controversy 
provoked by Parker'. Thus, he claims, the Drafts were not merely a response to 
8 ETol, 273. 
9 Drafts A and B in D. 
10 Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics & Locke's Two Treatises on Government (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 106,110-11. 
" Ibid., I 11. 
12 G. A. J. Rogers, 'Introduction', in Locke's Philosophy. - Content and Context (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 2-3. This view is also intimated in his 'The Writing of Locke's Essay', 
9,10. 
13 Jon Parkin, 'Hobbism in the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker', Historical 
Journal 42 (1999): 104. 
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Parker but also a continuation of Locke's long-standing interest in the limits of 
human knowledge. 14 Along similar lines, John Marshall argues that Ashcraft has 
failed to make a distinction between Locke and the non-conformists and that he 
has given a false impression that the Drafts were composed in a circle 
dominated by non-conformists. 15 Marshall also stresses the point that Tyrrell's 
gloss suggests that the Drafts arose from 'broad discussions about revealed 
religion and morality' and 'not of toleration'. The discussion was an expansion 
upon arguments and investigations which Locke 'had pursued many years 
before reading Parker'. ' 6 
Wootton and Marshall, I believe, rightly point out that Ashcraft's thesis 
has a tendency to reduce the Drafts to a work of proto-Whig philosophy. 
Interestingly, this is a rare occasion when Wootton and Marshall see Locke 
operating beyond an immediate context. However, the gist of their accounts, 
especially Marshall's, drifts towards the traditional view. Wootton sees the 
Parker controversy as an additional reason for Locke to continue a long-standing 
inquiry. Marshall intimates that the political issues emerging from the Parker 
controversy were not directly related to Locke's long-standing epistemological 
concerns, with which the Drafts were primarily concerned. Thus, my more 
polemical task in this chapter will be to show that Wootton and Marshall's 
contextualism fails to identify the deeper structure of Locke's thought. The 
Parker controversy and Locke's long-standing intellectual concerns both played 
a part in Locke's broader project to oppose Hobbism. Parker raised new 
philosophical problems which, for Locke, served as an impetus to develop upon 
an existing set of philosophical assumptions. While Locke's engagement with 
Parker in 1670 showed that his objections were indeed political, this is 
compatible with the view that his objections were linked to his wider 
epistemological and natural jurisprudential concerns. Through the Parker 
14 David Wootton, 'Introduction', in Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 30. 
13 We know from Lady Masham's report that James Tyrrell and David Thomas, the physician, 
were likely participants of this debate. Woolhouse, 'Lady Masham's Account', 178. Other 
candidates are Nathaniel Hodges (Ashley's chaplain), Thomas Firmin, Thomas Stringer, Thomas 
Sydenham, John Mapletoft, and Lord Ashley himself. Von Leyden, 'Introduction', 61; John 
Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 78n; Rogers, 'The Writing of Locke's Essay', 10. Contra Ashcraft, 
Marshall stresses that 'all were Anglicans'. Firmin and Mapletoft were not on Marshall's list, but Mapletoft was Anglican, and although Firmin tended towards Socinianism, he was well- 
acquainted with latitudinarian Anglicans. 'John Mapletoft' and 'Thomas Firmin, in DNB. 16 Marshall, John Locke, 76-8, esp. 77-8n. 
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controversy, Locke was induced to make clearer how his political position was 
not only supported by natural law, but also, by other philosophical assumptions. 
For Locke, Parker's Discourse became an impetus to defend his anti-Hobbesian 
political views at a more philosophical level - in other words, to complement his 
long-standing philosophical concerns. 
One may wonder why Locke did not address the philosophical issues in 
his response to Parker in 1670. Noting that Locke only asked questions in his 
comments to Parker, Parkin suggests that 'providing answers was perhaps more 
difficult because Locke realized that he shared so many of Parker's own 
assumptions'. 17 Another way of saying this is that Locke had not yet fully 
developed a philosophical account which could distance himself from Parker's 
Hobbist politics or that Locke had not yet fully identified the precise 
philosophical nature of the disagreement between Parker and himself Here, the 
holistic approach encourages us to take seriously the possibility that during the 
meeting of 1671, Locke came to see the philosophical nature of the 
disagreement between Parker and himself and thus, that the Drafts were an 
attempt to develop his epistemology in order to strengthen his political theory 
against Parker, who had exposed the vulnerability of his politics and natural 
jurisprudence, and indeed, against Hobbism in general. 
In what follows, I will begin by briefly looking at Parker's biography. I 
will then summarize the main claims Parker makes in the Discourse. Next, I will 
examine Locke's response to Parker in 1670.1 will show how the political 
disagreement between Locke and Parker connected with a disagreement about 
epistemology, while the two shared many assumptions. Lastly, I will examine 
some of the claims in the Drafts which relate directly to the Parker controversy. 
1. Parker's Life before A Discourse ofEcclesiastical Polity 
Who was Samuel Parker, the author of the Discourse, to whom Locke 
responded? 18 This is an appropriate question to ask because, as one modem 
commentator observed, until recently, Parker was 'all but forgotten' and is still 
17 Parkin, 'Hobbism in the Later 1660s', 104. 
18 Although Parker's Discourse was published anonymously, it was clear that the author was Parker. See Ms. Locke c. 39, fol-8. which bore the heading 'Qs On S. Ps discourse of toleration. 69'. See also, Locke's memorandum book, add. 46470, fol. 27 which is also reproduced in part in George Williamson, 'John Locke's Pocket Book', in A Locke Miscellany, ed. Jean S. Yolton (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990), 140. Locke recorded his purchase of 'parkers disc. -0-3-6. 
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'virtually unknown today outside a relatively small but growing circle of 
scholars'. 19 By this, the commentator meant that 'history has buried Parker in 
either defamation or obscurity', or in other words, either there is 'no general 
scholarship on Parker' or if he is mentioned at all, it tends to be the 'overly 
simplistic' portrait of a cantankerous High Church opponent of toleration. 
20 A 
number of recent scholars have more carefully unveiled Parker's intellectual 
multifariousness, 21 although he is sometimes still portrayed simply as the anti- 
tolerationist par excellence . 
22 Parker, we shall see, was not simply an ill- 
tempered ecclesiastical thug, but an intelligent and competent theorist who 
needed to be taken seriously. 23 
In 1669 when Parker wrote the Discourse, he was a domestic chaplain to 
Gilbert Sheldon, Archbishop of Canterbury. However, Parker's upbringing was 
not Anglican. According to Anthony Wood, he was born in September 1640 at 
Northampton to parents who were 'severe Puritans and Schismaticks' and was 
'puritanically educated' at Northampton Grammar School. He entered Wadharn 
College, Oxford, in 1656 where he was under the tutelage of a 'Presbyterian 
Tutour', and 'according to his former breeding', led 'a strict and religious life'. 
He received his BA in 1659.24 
After the Restoration, being on bad terms with the Warden of the 
College, Dr. Walter Blandford, Parker transferred to Trinity College where he 
received his MA in 1663. During his MA, 'by the prevailing advice' of Dr. 
Ralph Burthurst, Parker was (he later publicly claimed) 'rescued from the chains 
19 Gordon Schochet, 'Between Lambeth and Leviathan: Samuel Parker on the Church of 
England and Political Order', in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, eds. Nicholas 
Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 189; 'Samuel 
Parker, Religious Diversity, and the Ideology of Persecution', in The Margins of Orthodoxy, ed. 
R. D. Lund (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 120. 
20 Schochet, 'Between Lambeth and Leviathan', 189-91. 
21 Other than the two articles by Schochet cited above, see Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 
chs. 2 and 3; J. G. A. Pocock, 'Thomas Hobbes: Atheist or Enthusiast? His Place in a Restoration 
Debate', History of Political Thought 11 (1990): 737-49; Jon Parkin, 'Liberty Transprosd: 
Andrew Marvell and Samuel Parker", in Marvell and Liberty, eds. Warren Chemaik and Martin 
Dzelzainis (London: Macmillan, 1999); 'Hobbism in the Later 1660s', esp. 96-107; Science, 
Religion andPolitics in Restoration England (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), esp. 37-45. 
22 Selina Chen, 'Locke's Political Arguments for Toleration, History of Political Thought 19 
(1998): 167-85. This is the only (easily) accessible modem work listed under the heading 
'Parker, Samuel' in the on-line 'John Locke Bibliography', 
httD: //www. libraries-12su. edu/tas/locke/. 
23 J. R. Milton and Philip Milton, 'Introduction', in ET61,6 1. 
24 Anthony Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, vol. 2 (London, 1692), 616; Jon Parkin, 'Samuel Parker', 
in DNB. 
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and fetters of an unhappy education'. 25 Since then, he became a 'zealous Anti- 
puritan and strong Asserter of the Church of England'. In 1664, he was ordained. 
The next three years Parker's writing career was prolific: he successively 
published Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo in 1665, A Free and Impartial 
Censure of the Platonick Philosophie in 1666, and An Account of the Nature and 
Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodness in 1667. In the Tentamina, Parker 
sought to show that modem natural philosophy could combat atheism instead of 
falling into it. 26 A Free and Impartial Censure grew out of the last chapter of the 
first book of the Tentamina. 27 In this work, Parker offered a comprehensive 
attack on the Platonic philosophy, looking at morality, logic, natural philosophy, 
28 
and natural theology, his chief concern being the last. Parker's An Account of 
the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodness grew out of the last 
book of the second book of the Tentamina. 29 Parker argued that God's dominion 
was founded on His power rather than His goodness. He tried to reconcile the 
tension between God's sovereign right and authority with His goodness by 
rejecting Platonic essentialism, which asserted that God's power was restricted 
by His goodness, and argued that God had a free and habitual propensity to be 
good . 
30 His Tentamina attracted the attention of Gilbert Sheldon, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, and also, John Wilkins. In 1666, nominated by Wilkins, Parker 
became a Fellow of the Royal Society, and in 1667, he became one of Sheldon's 
chaplains. 31 Parker's Discourse was probably written as part of an anti-toleration 
campaign led by Sheldon. 32 
Parker's early philosophical works are noteworthy for their proximity to 
Locke's thinking during the same period. Both Parker and Locke were members 
25 Samuel Parker, A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie (Oxford, 1666), 
'Epistle Dedicatory'. 
26 Samuel Parker, Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo (London, 1665). 
27 Parker, A Free and Impartial Censure, 2. 28 Ibid., 3,40,46. 
29 Ibid., 2. 
30 Samuel Parker, An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodness 
(Oxford, 1666). On 'Platonic essentialism', 27; on 'Habitual propensity', 29,37. 
31 A. Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, 616-2 1. 'Samuel Parker, DNB. 
32 See especially, Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 23n, 44. Ashcraft's sources are C. E. Whiting, 
Studies in English Puritanism from the Restoration to the Revolution, 1660-1688 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1968), 502 and Victor Sutch, Gilbert Sheldon, Architect ofAnglican Survival 1640- 
1675 (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 109. See also, John Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 58-9; Schochet, 'Between 
Lambeth and Leviathan', 195-6; Mark Goldie, ed. Political Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 211; Parkin, Science, Religion andPolitics, 37. 
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of the Royal Society (Locke became a fellow in 1668) and they both displayed 
an attachment to the new experimental science. 33 In A Free and Impartial 
Censure, Parker rejected innate ideas on the basis of their being useless. He 
contested firstly: 
to what purpose should Providence imprint such obvious and apparent Notices 
as this [i. e. the speculative principle 'the whole is greater than its parts'] upon 
the minds of Men, when as but to open our eyes, is enough to discover their 
undoubted Truth and Evidence? 
Parker maintained that people with 'animadversive Faculties' would not need 
innate ideas to discover such obvious certainties. Secondly, granting that there 
were innate ideas, one could not be certain of their veracity: 'For 'tis not 
impossible but the seeds of Error might have been the natural Results of my 
Faculties, as Weeds are the first and natural Issues of the best Soyles'. Without 
certainty of their veracity, one had no reason to trust them. For Parker, 'the only 
way to be fully satisfied of their Truth and Sincerity, is to examine them by a 
wary and discreet Experience'. 'Experimental knowledge' was the 'safest and 
most unquestionable'. This emphasis on experimental knowledge therefore 
rendered 'all lesser evidence', that is, innate ideas, 'vain and unnecessary'. 34 
In the Essays, Locke had also rejected innate ideas, whether speculative 
or practical. Like Parker, for Locke, 'the proper method of establishing 
" Although Parker was enthusiastic about the Royal Society, he was never an active member. 
He was expelled for non-payment in 1685. 'Samuel Parker', DNB; Schochet, 'Between Lambeth 
and Leviathan', 194n. For Parker's enthusiasm of the Royal Society, see, for example, Parker, A 
Free and Impartial Censure, 44-6. There is, however, no record of Locke and Parker having 
ever met, Milton and Milton, 'Introduction', 62. However, Locke did refer to 'our old Friend Dr: 
P. Bishop of oxford' in a letter to Tyrrell, 29 August 1687, Corr., 957, vol. iii, 257. Although, as 
Milton and Milton note, this does not establish that Locke and Parker met, it does show, at least 
that Parker was in the mind of both Locke and Tyrrell. There is manuscript evidence suggesting 
that Parker was in the mind of the two men in the early 1680s. Around this time, Locke and 
Tyrrell were preparing a response against Edward Stillingfieet's Mischief against Separation 
(1680) and The Unreasonableness of Separation (168 1). See Ms. Locke c. 34, fol. 144. '[B]y this 
sort of infallibility (ex parte post) when the thing is once done, any conscientious Christian is 
forever shut up from all hopes or endeavers after ease to his unsatisfyed mind any other way, 
then by blind obedience & must for Full satisfaction take this summary of Eceecal Polity 
wherewith a late famous Champion would up all his, what I have written, I have written'. I am 
Frawful to Dr. Timothy Stanton for bringing this to my attention. 4 Parker, A Free and Impartial Censure, 55-7. See also, John W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of1deas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 44-6. 
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principles' was 'by induction and by observing particulars'. 35 As we shall see, 
Locke and Parker's views on natural law were also similar. However, although 
they shared similar philosophical assumptions, their politics were at loggerheads. 
Let us now turn to Parker's Discourse and see how his views on natural law led 
to his politics. 
2. Parker's Hobbism in A Discourse ofEcclesiastical Polity 
In this section, I will consider Parker's views on natural law and other 
assumptions and show how these shaped his authoritarian politics, which, as we 
shall see, Locke later characterized as Hobbesian. Underwriting Parker's politics 
in the Discourse were his assumptions about natural law. Parker believed that 
there was a God 'endued with Goodness and Equity'. When God made mankind, 
He willed their 'Welfare and felicity': 36 men were 'sent into the World to live 
37 happily here, and prepare [themselves] for happiness hereafter'. All mankind 
therefore had, 'by Divine Appointment, 'a common Right and Title to 
Happiness'. God being benevolent also created mankind in such a condition in 
which they could acquire this state. God thus made men naturally sociable. For 
Parker, society was absolutely necessary to preserve human nature because men 
were not 'self-sufficient' and stood in 'need of mutual assistance'. Society, in 
turn, could not subsist itself without 'mutual Aids of Love and Friendship'. it 
followed that in order to preserve society and attain happiness, one was obliged 
to 'aim at the common good of Mankind': 
there will plainly arise from the Constitution of Humane Nature an Essential 
Iustice, that demands of every man Offices of love and kindness to others as 
well as to himself; in that without this that Common welfare and happiness, 
35 ELN, 145. However, we should be aware that Locke and Parker were not making use of the 
same argument against innate ideas. See Grenville Wall, 'Locke's Attack on Innate Knowledge', 
in Locke on Human Understanding, ed. I. C. Tipton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 19- 
24. Wall argues that whereas Parker's rejection of innate ideas was based on his scepticism of 
their truth, Locke's was not. Wall argues that Locke could not countenance a 'God-deceiver 
problem'. For Locke, 'if there were any innate principles imprinted on our mind by God, they 
would have to be taken as true'. 36 d 
37 
Samuel Parker, A Discourse ofEcciesiastical Politie, 3 ed. (London, [1669] 1671), 121-2 
Ibid., 81. 
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which Nature, or rather that Divine Providence that made iý design'd for all and 
every individual of Mankind, must become utterly unattainable. " 
Put differently, God had made the attainment of happiness in this life and the 
next dependent on 'the practice of Moral Vertues and Pious Devotions', which 
He had 'declared by the Laws of Nature and Revelation'. 39 
Divine law, however, only broadly defined the scope of moral virtues. 
As to the particulars, Parker argued, God had entrusted the civil magistrate with 
the authority to decide. The law of God and nature 'in general forbid Theft, 
Incest, Murther, and Adultery'. But 
what these crimes are they determine not in all Cases, but is in most particulars 
to be explained by the Civil Constitutions; and whatsoever the Law of the Land 
reckons among these Crimes, that the Law of God and of Nature forbids. 40 
Given that the civil magistrate had power over 'great and weighty Designs of 
Religion', it was 'strangely humoursome' to say that he did not also have power 
over indifferent things .4' For Parker, all this was true because God being wise 
and 'knowing to what passions and irregularities mankind is obnoxious' put men 
under govenu-nent. Men's judgments were liable to 'Passions, Appetites, and 
Follies', and if they were left to be their own judge as to the particulars of the 
law of God and nature and of indifferent things, their diverse 'Humours' and 
'Interests' were bound to lead to 'endless' dissension and 'all other 
inconveniences that would naturally follow upon the state of war'. 42 
Government was made an 'indispensable necessity' for the preservation of 
human society. 43 Natural law, the observance of which was necessary for the 
attainment of happiness, effectively required obedience to the particular laws 
enjoined by civil magistrate. 
38 Ibid., 122. 
39 Ibid., 81. 
40 Ibid., 79. 
41 Ibid., 79-80. 
42 In his critique of Hobbes, Parker denied that the state of nature was the state of war. He based his critique on the theological incongruity of Hobbes's view with his notion of a Good God. Ibid., ch. 4. 
43 Ibid., 28-9. 
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Parker's argument here was a common one used by the latitudinarians, 
notably Edward Stillingfleet and Simon Patrick. 44 And like the latitudinarians, 
Parker's politics faced the problem of drifting towards Hobbesian absolUtisM. 
45 
For Parker, 'the prime and most important end of Government' was 'Peace and 
46 Tranquillity of the Commonwealth'. To this end, he argued that the power of 
the supreme government of every commonwealth must be 'universal, absolute, 
and uncontroulable, in all Afairs whatsoever, that concern the Interests of 
47 mankind, and the ends of Government'. By 'all Afairs', he meant both civil 
and religious affairs. Parker believed that the civil magistrate must be 'vested 
with a Power to govern and conduct the Consciences of Subjects in Affairs of 
Religion' because religion, as he analyzed, had 'the strongest influence upon 
humane Affairs'; it governed the 'minds of men' and drove them 'any way'. So 
'unless Religion be subject to the Authority of the Supreme Power', Parker 
maintained, the 'Peace and Tranquillity of the Commonwealth' could 'never be 
48 sufficiently secured'. Hence the subtitle of the Discourse: Wherein the 
authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of 
external religion is asserted: the mischiefs and inconveniences of toleration are 
represented, and all pretenses pleaded in behalf of liberty of conscience are 
fully answered. 
Parker also provided an historical account of the magistrate's power over 
both civil and religious affairs. Because government was necessary for the 
preservation of human nature, he argued, God had placed people under 
government. The first governments were established 'purely upon the natural 
Rights of paternal Authority', which in time evolved into 'Kingly power'. Thus 
'it came to pass that in the first Ages of the World, Monarchy was its only 
Government'. King's were also vested with 'Priestly Office', which, according 
to Parker, was a custom 'universally practis'd over all Kingdoms of the world 
" Edward Stillingfleet, Irenicum, 2 nd ed. (London, 1662), passim; Simon Patrick, A Friendly 
Debate (London, 1668), 104-7 and A Continuation of the Friendly Debate (London, 1669), 421 - 
2. For Parker as a latitudinarian, see Richard Ashcraft, 'Latitudinarianism and Toleration: 
Historical Myth versus Political History', in Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England, 
1640-1700, eds. Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, Perez Zagorin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 158. See 172n for a comprehensive list of references. See also, Parkin, 
'Hobbism in the Later 1660s', 96 and Science, Religion and Politics, 37. 45 Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, esp. ch. 1. 46 Parker, Discourse, 11. 
47 Ibid., 27 
48 Ibid., 10-12. 
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for well nigh 2500 years, without any one president to the contrary'. When 
Christ came to earth, He came to 'establish new Laws of Religion', but nothing 
'to set up any new Models of Politie'. Tbus, for Parker, sovereign governments 
in his own day still had power over civil and religious affairs. '9 
Now, Parker could say that religion had the strongest influence upon 
human affairs because he conceived religion in terms of morality. Moral virtues 
were necessary to preserve human society, and human soci ety necessary to 
preserve human nature. And for Parker, it was 'certain' that 'the Duties of 
Morality are the most weighty and material concerns of Religion' . 
50 He wrote: 
The Precepts of the Moral Law are both perfective of our own Natures, and 
conducive to the Happiness of others; and the Practice of Vertue consists in 
living suitably to the Dictates of Reason & Nature. And this is the substance 
and main Design of all the Laws of Religion, to oblige Mankind to behave 
themselvs in all their actions as becomes Creatures endued with Reason and 
Understanding, and in ways suitable to Rational Beings, to prepare and qualifie 
themselves for the state of Glory and Immortality. And as this is the proper End 
of all Religion, That Mankind might live happily here, and happily hereafter; so 
to this end nothing contributes more than the practice of all Moral Vertues, 
which will effectually preserve the Peace and Happiness of Humane Societies, 
and advance the Mind of Man to a nearer approach to the Perfection of the 
Divine Nature. " 
Having defined religion in terms of morality, Parker then argued that all 
religion 'must of necessity be resolv'd into Enthusiasm or Morality,. 'The 
former', he maintained, 'is meer Imposture, and therefore all that is true must be 
reduced to the latter'. 52 Parker's crucial move in the Discourse was to establish a 
link between non-conformism and enthusiasm. 53 One link was lanpage. 54 For 
49 Ibid., 28-37. 
50 Ibid., 77. 
51 Ibid., 68-9. See also, Milton and Milton, 'Introduction', 62-3. 
52 Ibid., 76-7. 
53 Ibid., esp. 74-6. See also, Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 53-4. This move was not unique to 
Parker. cf. G, passim. 
54 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 69; Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, 39. On language 
in general see, N. H. Keeble, The Literary Culture of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth- 
Century England (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987) and Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, 
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Parker, the virtue of the 'sober Christians of the Church of England' was that 
they expressed the 'Precepts and Duties of the Gospel in plain and intelligible 
Terms'. On the other hand, non-conformists 
have effectually tum'd all Religion into unaccountable Fansies and 
Enthusiasms, drest it up with pompous and empty Schemes of Speech, and so 
embrace a few gawdy Metaphors and Allegories, instead of the substance of 
true and real Righteousness. 
The language of the non-conformists was but 'childish Metaphors and 
Allegories' and 'barbarous and uncouth Similitudes'. For Parker, there were 
essentially no doctrinal distinctions between the different denominations of non- 
conformists: they only vary in 'Phrases and Forms of Speech', which are, in the 
end, 'the peculiar Shibboleths of each Tribe'. So 'whoever among them can 
invent any new Language, presently sets up for a man of new Discoveries; and 
he that lights upon the prettiest Nonsense, is thought by the ignorant Rabble to 
unfold new Gospel-Mysteries'. In this way, the state is 'shattered into infinite 
Factions, with sensless and phantastick Phrases'. 55 
Another link between non-conformism and enthusiasm was conscience. 
Parker defined conscience as 'every private mans own judgment and perswasion 
of things', a definition with strong Hobbesian echoes. 56 He recognized the 
sacrosanct nature of conscience, but he was also wary of its capacity to be 
exploited by the non-conformists. 57 For Parker, conscience was a pretext used 
by non-conformists to authorize their 'own judgment and perswasion of things' 
and deployed whenever they 'have a mind to controul or disobey (the 
sovereign's] Decrees'. 58 According to Parker's diagnosis, '[m]ost men's minds 
or Consciences are weak, silly, and ignorant things, acted by fond and absurd 
principles, and imposed upon by their vices and their passions'; and so, if non- 
and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780,2 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1). 
5 Parker, Discourse, 74-6. 
56 Ibid., 6,7. Hobbes, Leviathan, 223; Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 51; Schochet, 'Samuel 
Parker', 134. 
57 Parker, Discourse, ch. 8. Parker later recalled that it was 'by way of Irony' he called 
conscience an 'Imperious faculty', particularly 'when Subjects make bold to infringe the Rights 
of Sovereign Princes under its pretence and protection'. Samuel Parker, A Defence and Continuation q the Ecclesiastical Politie (London, 1671), 222. )f 
58 Parker, Discourse, 5-6. 
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conformists were 'entirely left to their own conduct, in what mischiefs and 
confusions', he asked, 'must they involve all Societies'? 59 'Everything any man 
has a mind to, is his Conscience': 'Murther, Treason, and Rebellion plead its 
60 Authority' . 
Parker argued that unbridled liberty of conscience was the root of 
the whole array of evils pestering the state: 'The Mischiefs that ensue upon the 
permitting men the Liberty of Consciences are endless' . 
61 'Government', he 
remarked, has 'never been controut'd or disturb'd so much by any thing as 
Conscience'. 62 
However, Parker's definition of conscience was notoriously unclear. 
While he often talked about liberty of conscience as having practical bearing, as 
63 
we have just seen, he sometimes talked about it as if it did not . And 
because 
liberty of conscience did not have practical bearing, we find Parker arguing in 
some parts of the Discourse that it was not inconsistent with civil order: 'Let all 
matters of meer Conscience, whether purely Moral or Religious, be subject to 
Conscience meerly'; in other words, 'Let men think of things according to their 
own perswasions, and assert the Freedom of their Judgments against all the 
Powers of the Earth. 'This Sovereignty of Conscience', Parker maintained, 'is 
no entrenchment upon that of Princes'. 64 However, Parker quickly added a 
proviso, indicating that conscience could have practical bearing: 
as for matters that are not confined within the Territories of meer Conscience, 
but comeforth into outwardAction, and appear in the Societies of men, there is 
no remedy but they must be subject to the Cognizance of Humane Laws, and 
65 come within the Verge of Humane Power (emphasis added). 
Likewise, he stated: 
59 Ibid., 7. 
60 Ibid., 6. 
61 Ibid., 2. 
62 Ibid., 4. 
63 John Owen, an Independent minister and early critic of Parker's Discourse, castigated Parker 
for not making clear what he meant by 'conscience'. John Owen, Truth and Innocence Defended 
(London, 1669) p. 88. For the ambiguity of Parkcr's definition of 'conscience', see Schochet, 'Samuel Parker', 134-5. 
64 Parker, Discourse, 89. 
65 Ibid., 90. 
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To assert the Freedom of the Mind of Man, as far as 'tis not inconsistent with 
the Government of the World, in that a sincere and impartial use of our own 
Understandings, is the first and Fundamental Duty of Humane Nature 
(emphasis addcd). 66 
How are we to understand what Parker meant by conscience? In fact, Parker did 
tell us what he had meant in a remarkably neglected section of A Defence and 
Continuation of the Ecclesiastical Polite. Here he stated that he 'kept [himself] 
close to the rigour and propriety of Scholastick Terms'. He 'warrantably' called 
conscience 'both an Opinion and a Faculty', although he was aware that they 
were 'not the same thing'. 
67 Parker was deliberately using conscience in this 
double sense perhaps to enable himself to respond to enthusiasm while 
acknowledging the sacrosanct nature of Christian liberty. By arguing that in 'all 
Matters of pure Speculation' men were free, he could say that he had paid 
sufficient respect to liberty of conscience. And by arguing that consciences 
which led to subversive actions fell under the magistrate's cognizance, he could 
deal sufficiently with enthusiasm. 
However, Parker's argument for the liberty of conscience also had a 
Hobbesian twist. He insisted on a dualism between external actions, which could 
be policed, and internal beliefs, which could not. For Parker, mankind had a 
'Natural Right to the Liberty of Conscience in matters of Religious Worship, by 
which he meant, 'a Liberty of Iudgment, but not of practice I. 
68 Parker argued 
that as such religion was essentially an internal activity: 'the whole substance of 
Religious Worship is transacted within the Mind of Man, and dwells in our 
Hearts and Thoughts beyond the reach of Princes'. It could not be coerced by 
human power. Herein lay Christian liberty, External worship, on the other hand, 
was only an ancillary means of expression, and hence, 'no part of Religion it 
self. Consistently, 'Divine Wisdom has so little concern'd it self to prescribe 
any particular Forms of Divine Service'; and thus, Christian laws have not 
69 prescribed 'particular Expressions of Worship and Adoration' . 
Matters 
concerning external religious worship were indifferent, and so, were under the 
66 Ibid., 92-3. 
67 Parker, Defence, 221-2. 
68 Parker, Discourse, 92. 
69 Ibid., 98-100. 
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magistrate's gaze. The civil magistrate could legislate concerning external 
religious worship without violating one's conscience because internal judgments 
were not subject to human coercion. The subjects had de facto liberty of 
conscience. For Parker, this was sufficient allowance to require outward 
obedience . 
70 However, the problem with the rigid intemal/extemal distinction 
was that without being able to perform the actions following from one's belief, 
one could not worship God in a sincere manner, and thus, was forced to sin. 
Non-confon-nists would argue that Parker had to do a better job of respecting 
weak and tender consciences. But for Parker, such an argument was an inlet to 
enthusiasm. External actions had to remain under the authority of the magistrate. 
Parker's response to the enthusiasm of non-conformists rested on the 
assumption of the civil magistrate's professional competence. 71 Non-conformists 
demanded liberty of conscience on the grounds of the Scriptural teaching, 
'Whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin. In other words, if an individual believer was 
not persuaded of the lawfulness of a certain religious ceremony, he would be 
compelled to sin should the magistrate command the use of it. However, Parker 
retorted that a 'weak Conscience is the product of a weak Understanding', it 
'always proceeds in some measure of want of wit'; and therefore, 'if Princes 
must consult their Subjects Consciences in all their Laws, this would make all 
the Wisdom of Government submit to the power of folly and ignorance'. 72 
Parker argued that a consciousness of one's ignorance (which is implied by a 
weak conscience) should lead towards a 'stronger obligation to obedience'. An 
individual who 'resigns up himself to the Wisdom of his Superiours, in matters 
doubtful and disputable, is in effect governed by the best and safest Dictates of 
his own Conscience'; he should consider the civil authorities 'more competent 
Judges of the fitness and expediency of Publick Laws, whose work and office it 
is to understand them, than himself, who is wholly ignorant of the management 
and transaction of Publick Affairs. 73 Religion having the strongest influence 
70 Ibid., 93-5. 
71 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 68. 
72 Parker, Discourse, 269-70; 'want of wit', 279. 73 Ibid., 279-80. 
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upon public affairs, the 'silly people' had every reason to submit to the 'Publick 
Wisdom' concerning religion in addition to the other aspects of civil life. 74 
Despite the fact that there were many echoes of Hobbesian absolutism, 
Parker tried to distinguish himself from Hobbes. He included a detailed critique 
of Hobbes in the Discourse, rejecting Hobbes's theory of the generation of the 
state and his doctrine of natural law, which he thought reduced obligation to 
self-interest. 75 However, for many of his critics, the conclusions Parker reached 
appeared to be nothing more than a variant of Hobbes"s absolutiSM. 
76 John 
Hurnfrey, the ejected minister, accused Parker of becoming a 'young Leviathan' 
in the course of his critique against Hobbes. 77 John Owen, the Independent 
minister, similarly commented on Parker's critique of Hobbes that 'the 
Hypothesis whose Confutation he hath undertaken-is rather suited to promote 
what he aims at, than what he opposeth' . 
78 Andrew Marvell, the poet and satirist, 
remarked that Parker was walking on the 'Territories of Malmsbury', except 
'the Arrogance and Dictature with which he imposes it on the World, surpasses 
by far the presumption either of Gondibert or Leviathan'. 79 Parker accepted that 
some of his arguments savoured 'not a little of the Leviathan'. But he 
impenitently remarked: 'But yet how can I avoid it? are not these my own 
words? Though that I might deny, yet am I content to confess that I have said 
something not much unlike them. 80 
As we shall see in the next section, the thrust of Locke's response to 
Parker also focused on Parker's Hobbism. Parker's Hobbism was perhaps 
alarming for Locke because he realized that he had much in common with 
Parker. We shall then see after that, how Locke tried to distinguish himself from 
Parker's Hobbism. 
74 See also, Ibid., 152-3. 'The giddy multitude judge weakly, fancy strongly, and act 
passionately; and, unless restraind by wary and sober Laws, will drive on so furiously in a good 
cause, till they run their Religion into Folly and Faction, and themselves into tumults and riotous 
ýroceedings'. 
3 Ibid., ch. 4. 
76 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 42. 
77 John Hurnfrey, A Case of Conscience (London, 1669), 11-12. For Parker as a 'young 
Leviathan', see also, John Hurnfrey, The Authority of Magistrate (London, 1672), 67-7 1; Henry 
Stubbe, Rosemary& Bayes (London, 1672), 18. 
71 Owen, Truth and Innocence, 28 1. 
7' Andrew Marvell, The Rehearsal Transprosd (London, 1672), 60. 
80 Parker, Defence, 279. 
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3. Locke's Discussion of Parker's Hobbism 
So far, we have looked at Parker's life and works before he published the 
Discourse. We have also looked at how his arguments in the Discourse drifted 
towards Hobbesian absolutism. In this section, we shall see that the thrust of 
Locke's political response to Parker's Discourse focused on his Hobbism. 
Parker's Hobbism would have been alarming for Locke, because although his 
political views opposed those of Parker's, he had many philosophical 
assumptions in common with him. Locke would therefore need to show how 
these philosophical assumptions could be used to defend his political views 
rather than those of Parker's. We shall see that the disagreement between Locke 
and Parker related to the question of the scope and proper subject matter of 
human understanding, which gave Locke a strong incentive to turn to 
epistemology. To refute Parker's politics, Locke's response needed to take an 
epistemological turn. 
In the late Fall of 1669, Locke bought a copy of Parker's Discourse, 
probably for his patron Lord Ashley. 81 Sometime between 1669 and early 1670, 
Locke made some manuscript notes on it. 82 Noting that Locke's questions only 
related to pages 11-29 and 144-53 of Parker's Discourse, John and Philip Milton, 
the most recent editors of Locke's writings on law and politics between 1667 
and 1683, argue that 'there is no obvious reason why Locke should have 
confined his comments to these particular parts of Parker's book', and 
conjecture that these may be 'stray survivors from a considerably fuller body of 
notes that have since been lost'. They go on to speculate that Locke may have 
been planning to write a 'detailed critique', but even if he was, the project was 
apparently abandoned. 83 
However, there are good reasons to suppose that Locke's notes on Parker 
comprised an argumentatively complete response, and in lieu of ftirther evidence 
of a larger body of notes, this is perhaps the best way to view them. 84 Even if 
81 Add. 46470, fol. 27. 'parkers disc. -0-3-6'. The dates recorded around this entry, 15 Nov and 2 
Dec 1669, indicate that he purchased this work shortly after its publication on 22 Nov 1669. 
Edward Arber, The Tem Catalogues, 1668-1709,3 vols. (London, 1903-6), 1,21. 
82 Locke, 'Notes on Samuel Parker's Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie', in ETol, 322-6. These 
have also been reproduced in Cranston, John Locke, 131-3 (Incomplete); Goldie, ed., Political 
Essays, 211-15. 
83 Milton and Milton, 'Introduction', 70. 
84 There seems to be a general belief and expectation that Locke read thoroughly and responded 
extensively to all the important works he came across. Although this is true in a certain sense, in 
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these notes were only stray survivors, Locke did touch on the essential points of 
Parker's arguments, focusing on his Hobbism. Independent evidence suggests 
that Locke was particularly interested in Hobbes and Hobbism in 1669 . 
85 TbiS is 
hardly surprising. The Hobbesian dimension of the toleration debate had been 
steadily coming to prominence. In addition, the spring and summer of 1669 saw 
the trial and, in late July, the public recantation of the Cambridge Hobbist 
Daniel Scargill. Shortly after the recantation sermon was published, Locke 
purchased Hobbes's Latin works. He would also go on to purchase books 
associated or commenting upon Hobbes. 86 
Let us then move on to the actual notes. Locke started by summarizing 
the general thrust of Parker's arguments. It focused on why Parker thought a 
supreme power was necessary in every society, how far this power needed to be 
extended to maintain the peace of society, and how this power was legitimized 
through the course of history. The summary suggests that Locke read the whole 
of the first chapter (pages 1-64), although he seemed to have focused on pages 
28-52. This focus makes sense if Locke was concerned with identifying the 
general drift of Parker's arguments because the chapter was entitled 'A more 
General Account of the Necessity of an Ecclesiastical Power, or Sovereignty 
over Conscience in matters of Religion' (emphasis added). It also makes sense 
that Locke's notes do not refer to the second and third chapter because these two 
another sense, it is misleading. Locke usually provided extensive responses to relatively short 
pamphlets and tracts. Edward Bagshawe's pamphlet, The Great Question concerning Things 
Indifferent in Religious Worship, which occasioned the Two Tracts, was only 16 pages. Sir 
Robert Filmer's Patriarcha was 140 pages. Jonas Proast's three responses to Locke's Letters on 
Toleration were, respectively, 30 pages, 70 pages, and 80 pages. Therefore, it should not come 
as a surprise if Locke did not prepare a comprehensive, sentence-to-sentence response to 
Parker's 330-page Discourse at a time he was working for Ashley. 
" Given that Locke purchased works by Richard Cumberland, Thomas Tenison, John Templar, 
who published anti-Hobbesian works and responses to Hobbes's Latin works in the early 1670s, 
we can say that Locke's interest was persistent. Ms. Locke f. 48, fol. 18. 'Mr Strachy. 
Cumberland agt-Hobbes May. 15'. For Tenison and Templar, see John Harrison and Peter Laslett, 
The Library ofJohn Locke, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 244, no. 2849 and 
2850. 
86 Add. 46470, fol. 19, 'liobbs pd [illegible] 1-0-0'. This is probably a reference to Hobbes's 
Latin works which Locke bought for his friend John Strachey. The price of Hobbes's Latin 
works was 20 shillings, i. e. I pound. Arber, Tenn Catalogues, 1,7. See also, on the second page 
of the reverse side of the pocket book, 'Hobs's works Latin'. See also, Williamson, 'John 
Locke's Pocket Book', 140. Locke's pocket book contains a list of books that Locke had 
purchased in 1669 often for his friends and his patron, Lord Ashley. Although it has received 
little attention in the existing scholarship so far, it is an invaluable source not only to learn about 
the intellectual trend in the late 1660s, but also, to learn about Locke's own interests. For the Scargill Affair, see Parkin, 'Hobbism in the Later 1660s' and more recently Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 244-52. 
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chapters were more specific expansions of the general arguments in the first. 
That the titles of chapters two and three both begin with 'A more Particular' 
suggest as much: 'A more Particular Account of the Nature and Necessity of a 
Sovereign Power in Affairs of Religion' (pages 65-87) and 'A more Particular 
State of the Controversie, concerning the Inward Actions of the Mind, or 
Matters of meer Conscience' (pages 87-110). Locke may then have perused 
Parker's refutation of Hobbes in the fourth chapter, perhaps without any serious 
objections. 87 But when in the fifth chapter, Parker attacked those who tried to 
use Hobbes's theory to justify toleration, Locke argued that Parker himself had 
fallen in with Hobbes's doctrine. 88 
Let us now examine Locke's objections against Parker in detail. To make 
the distinctions clearer, I will juxtapose the points where the two men agreed 
and where they disagreed. First of all, Locke and Parker agreed concerning the 
general content and role of natural law. Like Parker, Locke believed that society 
was necessary for the preservation of human nature. As we have seen in Chapter 
One, Locke had argued in the Essays that God had made people naturally 
sociable, implanting in them the urge to preserve a life in society with other 
people. According to natural law, people were obliged to preserve society as 
much as they were obliged to preserve themselves-89 To this end, Locke believed 
that government was necessary because experience showed that people could 
not 'live peaceably & quietly togeather, without uniteing under certain laws & 
growing into a common-wealth'. 90 The laws of the civil magistrate were 
obliging because natural law ordered 'obedience to superiors and the keeping of 
public peace'. 91 
Locke also agreed with Parker that civil order was the prime end of 
government. For Locke, magistrates were entrusted with authority 'for no other 
purpose but to be made use for the good, preservation, and peace of men in that 
society'. This, Locke argued, is and should be the only measure according to 
87 Parker, Discourse, ch. 4, 'Of the Nature of all Actions Intrinsecally Evil, and their Exemption from the Authority of Humane Laws, against Mr. Hobs; with a full confutation of his whole Hypothesis of Government', 111-34. 
88 Ibid., ch. 5, 'A Confutation of the Consequences that some men draw from Mr. Hobs's Principles in behalf of Liberty of Conscience', 135-70. 89 ELN, 157,159. 
90 E761,269. 
91 ELN, 119,189. 
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which the magistrate should 'square & proportion his laws: model & frame his 
government'. 92 Thus, Opinions and actions with destructive implications were 
not to be tolerated by the magistrate. Accordingly, in his notes on Parker, Locke 
remarked: 'The end of government being publique peace tis noe question the 
supreme power must have an uncontroulable right to judg & ordeyne all things 
that may conduce to it'. That the magistrate, whose business it was 'only to 
preserve peace', could retrain those opinions that had a 'direct tendency to 
disturb it, was an assumption 'every sober man' would alloW. 93 
Where Locke and Parker disagreed was over the impact of religion on 
civil order. Parker argued that religion had the strongest influence upon human 
affairs and that it was therefore absolutely necessary for the peace of society that 
affairs of religion were subject to government. Locke, however, believed that 
divine worship, both inward and outward performances thereof, belonged to the 
speculative realm, which did not concern society or government. Thus in his 
notes, he queried: 'whether it be at all dangerous to the magistrate that he 
beleiving free will, some of his subjects should beleive predestination, or 
whether it be more necessary for his government to make laws for weareing 
surplices, then it is for wearing vests? '. 94 
However, Locke did not deny that certain religious groups, namely the 
Roman Catholics, promoted subversive opinions under the pretence of religion, 
and thus were subject to government. Indeed, in 'An Essay concerning 
Toleration', he argued that Catholics took their religion in 'grosse' and mixed 
religious doctrines with destructive opinions. He therefore believed that they 
should not be tolerated by the magistrate. Hence, he could say in his comments 
to Parker: 'That the magistrate should restraine Seditious doctrines who denys'. 
However, Locke remarked that Parker had taken this logic and gone one step too 
far. Because religion had a strong impact on people's opinion, did it follow, 
Locke asked, that the magistrate 'ought to force men by severity of laws & 
penaltys to force men to be of the same minde with him in the speculative 
opinions in religion, or worship god with the same ceremonys'? Apparently, 
Locke did not think so, because in his notes he also inquired whether 
92 ET61,269. 
93 Locke, 'Notes on Samuel Parker', 323,325. 
94 Ibid., 325. 
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'uniformity established by a law be ... a necessary means to it [i. e. public peace]', 
and whether 'subdivision of opinions into small sects be of such danger to the 
government'. Given that the magistrate could restrain opinions that directly 
disturbed the peace of the commonwealth, did it follow that he could also 
restrain all other doctrines? If not, Locke argued, Parker's argument for the 
magistrate's authority over religion in general was incomplete; but if it did 
follow, as Parker had intimated, then 'how far' was 'this short of Mr Hobbs's 
doctrine'? 95 Despite his efforts to distance himself from Hobbes, for Locke, 
Parker's politics was indistinguishable from Hobbesian absolutism. 
The crucial question is: how did Parker end up so close to Hobbes? 
Locke identified Parker's underlying philosophical assumption, which led to his 
Hobbist politics: Parker had assumed that the magistrate had superior knowledge. 
Herein lay the fundamental disagreement with Locke's politics. Because Parker 
conceived religion in terms of morality, which upheld human society, he could 
say that 'true piety secures the publique weal'. On the other hand, this meant 
that for Parker the false notions of God and worship were a danger to public 
peace. Thus, Parker maintained that magistrates needed to be given the power to 
96 restrain religious mistakes. Locke asked 'whether assigneing those ill effects 
that follow to mistakes', i. e. 'wrong notions of god & his worship', Parker 'does 
not suppose the magistrates power to proceed from his being in the right ? 97 
Locke identified that Parker had supposed professional competence on the part 
of the magistrate whereas he had stressed equal competence of both magistrate 
and subject. 98 If Parker was not supposing that the magistrate had superior 
knowledge, then it would mean that on his account, the fate of Christianity 
depended contingently on the magistrate's knowledge, who could 'force the 
subject to renownce his owne opinions however quiet & peaceable' and 'declare 
assent & consent' to those of his own profession. If this was the case, it was 
strange that 'Christ & the Apostles directed not their discourses, & addressed 
their miracles to the princes & magistrates of the world to perswade them', 
95 On Roman Catholics, ET61,284; Locke, 'Notes on Samuel Parker', 324,325,326. 96 Parker, Discourse, 12. 
97 Locke, 'Notes on Samuel Parker, 324. 
98 ET61,273. 
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because 'by preaching to & converting the people', these people would lie 
'under a necessity of being either Seditious or Martyrs'. 99 
We can now start to see how Locke's engagement with Parker could 
have led to his turn to epistemology. Parker and Locke both rejected innate ideas 
and maintained that sense and experience led to knowledge of natural law. They 
also agreed that natural law required people to be sociable and maintain the 
peace of society under government. However, whereas Parker thought that 
religion should be controlled by the magistrate because it had the strongest 
influence on human affairs, Locke did not. Whereas Parker argued that false 
religious belief was pernicious to society, Locke did not. Moreover, whereas 
Parker stressed the professional competence of magistrates concerning 
knowledge of the true religion, Locke denied this assumption and maintained 
equal competence of all men. This does not mean that Locke denied that there 
was scope for error concerning religious worship. But error did not 
automatically lead to civil destruction, as Parker had suggested. It also did not 
mean that people were incompetent, again as Parker had suggested. In principle, 
all people were capable of attaining the knowledge of natural law, which 
commanded them to preserve society and worship God. As to the particulars of 
worship, nobody had infallible knowledge, implying that each individual was 
responsible to perform what he thought was most pleasing to God. Because 
natural law could be known and deployed as an authoritative standard, Locke 
believed that a clear line (albeit with occasional inconveniences) could be drawn 
between genuine and self-fashioned claims to conscience. It was possible to 
distinguish subversive religious doctrines from false but unthreatening ones. 
This being so, civil order could be salvaged without subjecting religion as such 
under government. 
Therefore, from the assumption of equal competence coupled with the 
further assumption of the unthreatening nature of purely speculative opinions 
(whether true or false), Locke arrived at toleration, whereas Parker's assumption 
of professional competence coupled with the assumption of the destructive 
nature of false notions of God led to uniformity and intolerance, or in other 
words, a politics indistinguishable from Hobbism. Parker's Hobbism of the 
99 Locke, 'Notes on Samuel Parker', 324. 
133 
Discourse thus gave Locke a strong incentive to reassert the scope of human 
knowledge, that is, to reassure that religion and morality were proper subjects of 
human understanding, and not just certain individuals, in order to rescue the 
assumptions necessary for his theory of toleration. 
4. Locke's Drafts on Human Understanding 
We have seen that in his comments on Parker's Discourse, Locke took note that 
the disagreement between Parker and himself related to epistemology. Parker 
had assumed that the magistrate had superior knowledge concerning religion, 
but Locke denied this. For Locke, Parker had inferred, incorrectly, that a 
purposive God entrusted the magistrate with power over religious affairs; the 
fact that Christ and His Apostles did not focus on converting princes and 
magistrates suggested otherwise. Locke believed that all people were equally 
competent concerning their religious duties. Parker could however point to daily 
experience and refer to the 'giddy multitude' and 'silly people'. Locke did not 
need to deny the common observation that 'very many people' were 'ignorant' 
and 'so thoughtless' as to ignore the truths dictated by natural law. 100 The task 
incumbent on Locke was to show that although there were many ignorant people, 
in principle, men qua rational beings were capable of moral and religious 
knowledge. This is the task he undertook in the Drafts of the Essay. In this final 
section, I will look at some relevant arguments in Locke's Drafts. I will limit 
myself to Draft A, the first of the Drafts. 
In Draft A, Locke remarked that the 'greatest part of man kinde are by 
the constitution of humane affairs unavoidably given over to invincible 
ignorance'. The 'means of knowledg & enquiry' of those people whose 'lives 
are wome out only in the provisions of liveing' are 'commonly narrow as their 
fortunes, & their understandings are but little instructed when all their whole 
time & pains is laid to still the crokeing of their owne bellys or the crys of their 
children'. 101 Neither were the wealthy free from ignorance. They were 'cooped 
in soe close by the laws of their country' and 'the strict gards of those whose 
interest it is to keepe them ignorant, least [i. e. lest] knowing more they should 
beleive the lesse in them'. However free these wealthy people may seem, they 
100 ELN, 199,20 1. 
lolD, 67. 
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were 'enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man', i. e. the 
'understanding'. This was 'generally the case of all those who live within the 
reach of the inquisition. The 'good catholick is to swallow downe opinions as 
silly people doe empiricks pills without knowing what they are made of or how 
they will worke'. Although Locke singled out Roman Catholics, it is not hard to 
imagine that he had 'all self-interested clerics' in the Church of England in mind, 
who tried to keep people in a state of ignorance, thus under their control. 102 
There were other sorts of people who lacked knowledge not because they were 
hindered by daily labour, but those 'who though they have riches & leisure 
enough & want neither parts not learning', 'yet out of lazynesse' could never 
arrive at crucial truths. Because most people were in a state of ignorance, they 
assented to lesser probable opinions. ' 03 
Although Locke thought that most people were in a state of ignorance, 
this was not because they were incompetent. People were capable of moral and 
religious knowledge. He maintained: 
Nor have we any reason from the narrowncsse of our ownc thoughts to doubt 
the Existence of the great god or a first aethernal, cause because our dim 
understandings cannot discover his incomprehensible way of being. "' 
In may well be the case that man's faculties were 'ignorant of many things in 
god' and may be 'too little to have adaequate apprehensions of an infinite being'. 
For Locke, 'all knowledge is founded on and ultimately derives itself from 
sense'. 105 Thus, concerning 'the existence, Essence, nature, & operations of 
immaterial beeings as God. Angels &c', 'being concerning matters out of the 
reach of our senses', were matters of probability which depended on 
'Experience & Testimony'. One could not have direct sensation of spirits, but 
one could have probable knowledge of them according to propositions already 
in the understanding, obtained through sense experience. 106 And 'Upon which 
grounds', Locke asserted: 
102 Ibid., 68. Marshall, John Locke, 76. 
103 D, 68-9. 
104 Ibid., 82. 
'0' Ibid., 4. 
106 Ibid., 65-6. 
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I doe not doubt but the being of a God may be made out more clearly & with 
greater assureance then of any thing even immediatly observable by our senses. 
And that the common things of our dayly experience if our facultys are but 
carefully & orderly imploid about them, will lead us to clear apprehensions of a 
Greater & Wiser being'. 107 
As he had argued in his Essays, Locke maintained in Draft A that in order to 
establish the divine laws, which were 'properly & truly the rules of good & 
evill', one had to prove firstly that there was a lawgiver 'with power & will to 
reward & punish', and secondly that this lawgiver 'hath declard his will & 
law'. 108 Locke was confident that God's existence, the first of the two conditions, 
could be made out. From this, the second condition would follow. 
Although Locke deferred his proof of the existence of God for the 
moment (he fulfilled this promise in the published version of the Essay 
concerning Human Understanding), 109 and also, the precise content of God's 
will and law (this is the subject of Chapter Three), his point in this 
epistemological work was clear enough: despite all the hindrances and 
obstructions of life to moral and religious knowledge, all people qua rational 
being, and not just certain individuals, were fit to make out their duties to God. 
Locke's Drafts attempted to outflank Parker's epistemological assumption of the 
magistrate's superior knowledge, which underwrote his Hobbist politics. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have examined the development of Locke's thought between 
the late 1660s and 1671, focusing on the relation between his political theory 
and epistemology. In 1671, Locke turned to a specific epistemological inquiry of 
the proper scope of human understanding. Traditionally, commentators have 
seen this move simply as a continuation of Locke's inquiry of natural law in his 
Essays, composed in the early 1660s. 1 10 My main aim was to show that while 
there was certainly a continuation between the Essays and the Drafts of 1671, 
107 Ibid., 66. 
log Ibid., 4 1; cf. ELN, 15 1. 
109 E, 4.10. 
110 Abrams, 'Introduction', 84-107; von Leyden, 'Introduction', 60-82. 
136 
there was also a pressing political impetus which drove Locke to consider this 
narrower and more specialized subject. I argued that Locke had significant 
objections against the political Hobbism of Parker's Discourse of 1669, and to 
outflank the epistemological assumption of this work, and to fortify his own, he 
turned to epistemology. 
According to the critics, the danger with the view emphasizing the role 
of Parker in the composition of the Drafts and Essay was that it had the 
tendency to reduce Locke's Drafts to a work of Whig propaganda. However, 
while accepting this criticism, I noted that the critics, on the other hand, had the 
tendency to downplay the connection between a theory of toleration, natural and 
revealed law, and epistemology. My polemical aim in this chapter was to show, 
against the critics, how Locke's objections against Parker were, in the first 
instance, political, but connected to wider questions about the proper scope of 
human understanding and, more fundamentally, the terms on which people stood 
in relation to one another under God's dispensation. Whereas Parker assumed 
the professional competence of magistrates concerning religion and morality, 
Locke assumed the equal competence of subjects and magistrates. Parker and 
Locke shared many assumptions about natural jurisprudence and epistemology. 
However, other things being equal, these assumptions were indeterminate in 
their ramifications and did not, without further development, support a particular 
political vision. That Parker had fallen into Hobbism seemed to suggest that 
these assumptions led to Hobbism. Parker's Hobbism, which was also a recent 
problem for Locke, would have motivated Locke to show that his tolerationist 
politics, and not Parker's authoritarian politics, was supported by these 
assumptions. Contra the critics, therefore, I showed that Parker brought to the 
forefront one implication of a position which Locke and Parker seemingly had in 
common, and that for Locke, this was a crucial problem which needed to be 
faced. In other words, I showed that Locke's politics and long-standing 
philosophical concerns were intimately connected. 
The conclusion elicited in this chapter perhaps may seem to be a product 
of the Cambridge contextualist approach. Indeed, I focused on a particular 
historical incident and portrayed a polemical aspect of Locke. But by bearing in 
mind the assumptions of the holistic approach, I shed light on a neglected 
narrative. I showed that there was an intimate connection between issues of 
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politics, natural jurisprudence, and epistemology, and that Locke's Drafts were 
not simply a product of a continuing inquiry about natural law or a response to a 
particular political pamphlet, but a product of a more complicated relation of 
these prima facie different inquires. The two methodological approaches are 
compatible, and I showed in this chapter especially how a re-appreciation of the 




Hedonism and the Divine Design 
The general aim of this chapter is to show that there was direction and 
consistency in the trajectory of Locke's thought and that it contrasted with the 
positions of his contemporaries. I will examine a puzzle concerning the status of 
hedonism in Locke's morals between the early 1670s and the mid-1690s. 
Traditionally, two criticisms have been levelled against Locke's hedonistic 
ethics. First, that his hedonistic ethics was incompatible with his natural law 
theory; secondly, that by endorsing a hedonistic ethics, he had fallen into 
Hobbism. My aim in this chapter is to deploy a holistic analysis to show that 
neither criticism captures the significance of Locke's hedonism. I will show that 
Locke's hedonism complemented rather than contradicted his natural law theory. 
Moreover, I will show that the development of his theory can be seen as a 
response to a major problem that confronted him in the mid-1660s about the 
content of natural law, and that his solution differed significantly from Hobbes. 
it is widely acknowledged that Locke conceived of his ethics 
hedonistically, at least from 1676 onwards. There have been two strands of 
criticism levelled at Locke's adoption of hedonism. The critics of the first strand 
argue that by adopting ethical hedonism, Locke introduced a subjective notion 
of morality which was incompatible with his belief in a universal moral law. 
Wolfgang von Leyden, for example, argues that '[t] o hold a belief in an ultimate 
moral law, or law of nature' and to maintain that good and evil are relative to the 
individual 'is to express two doctrines which, if not altogether incompatible, are 
bound to produce vacillation and vagueness in the mind of him who hold them'. 
Here, we are faced with an incoherent Locke. 2 
' Wolfgang Von Leyden, 'Introduction', in ELN, 72. 
2 See also, Richard I. Aaron, John Locke, Yd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 256-69; J. D. 
Mabbott, John Locke (London: Macmillan, 1973), 112-28. Mabbott intimates that there was a 
tension between Locke's hedonism and natural law theory, but seeks a possibility of reconciling 
these in terms of utilitarianism, esp. 126-8. But cf. Francis Oakley, 'Locke, Natural Law and 
God - Again', History of Political Thought 18 (1997): 627. Oakley argues that Locke's 
hedonism was complementary rather than against his natural law theory and that 'the scholarship 
of the past quarter of a century has been marked by something of a burgeoning consensus to the 
effect that, in so arguing, Locke was not completely deluding himself'. Oakley thus thinks it 
4redundant' to dwell further on this issue. But I do not think that it is a redundant exercise not least because as we shall see, there is still much to learn about the character and role of Locke's 
hedonism. 
139 
The critics of the second strand argue that by adopting ethical hedonism, 
Locke fell into Hobbism. Famously, Isaac Newton apologized to Locke for 
taking him 'for a Hobbist' during a state of mental disorder. 3 There is 
compelling evidence that Newton had Book 2, Chapter 27,4 Section 5 of Locke's 
Essay in mind when he made this accusation, where Locke had offered his 
hedonistic definition of good and evil. 5 For modem commentators such as David 
Wootton, although Locke was not a full-blooded Hobbist, the charge of 
Hobbism, was nevertheless justified. By the time of the publication of the Essay, 
Locke had realized that he could no longer maintain that there was a moral law 
knowable to unaided human reason. He was, however, optimistic that hedonistic 
morality in most European societies would more or less coincide with (what he 
took to be) the content of natural law. Therefore, like Hobbes, 'worldly self- 
interest and the quest for collective security substituted for a known moral law'. 
6 
Here, we are faced with a Locke who fell into Hobbism inadvertently. 
Against these two strands of criticism, I will offer a narrative by using 
the holistic perspective which shows that Locke's hedonistic ethics was in fact 
consistent with his previous thought, and moreover, developed in opposition to 
Hobbism. it is worth noting that Straussians also reject the two strands of 
criticism, claiming to the effect that Locke was coherently a moral relativist or a 
Hobbist. ' Yet, by implication, I will be rejecting the various strands of 
' Corr., 1659, vol. iv, 727. 
4 E, 2.27.5 of the first edition. E, 2.28.5 in subsequent editions. 
5 G. A. J. Rogers, 'Locke, Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists', in Philosophy, Religion and 
Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. John W. Yolton (Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 1990), 359-60. According to Rogers, 'It is very well known that 
Newton frequently turned back the comcrs of pages to indicate passages which particularly drew 
his attention'. Rogers observes that 'On page 157 of [Ncwton's] copy there is a turn up which 
roints unambiguously to the opening words of the Essay II, XXVII, 5'. 
David Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist?, in Religion, Secularization 
and Political Thought: Thomas Hobbes to J. S. Mill, ed. James E. Crimmins (London: Routledge, 
1989), 43. 
' Similarly to the first strand of critics, Samuel Zinaich Jr. argues that Locke's view of moral 
good and evil is 'logically inconsistent with the view that there is a single, ultimate, moral 
standard'. Samuel Zinaich, Jr., John Locke's Moral Revolution (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 2006), 120. However, he argues that this was not because Locke was incoherent, but 
precisely because the Locke of the Essay was not the Locke of the Essays who had argued for a 
law of nature. For Zinaich, Locke was not incoherent, but conversely, coherently a moral 
relativist. On the other hand, Straussian commentators such as Peter Josephson and Peter Myers 
suggest similarly to the second strand of critics, that on the surface Locke's ethical hedonism 
seems reconcilable to his natural i urisprudcnee. Locke argued that God had annexed rewards and 
punishments, that is, pleasure and pain, to morally good and evil actions. Indeed, natural law 
was promulgated by pleasure and pain. However, Locke effectively showed that the sanctions of 
the afterlife were ineffective and replaced them with a law of human invention. Thus, Josephson 
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Straussian theses. I will now proceed to say a little bit more about the narrative 
that I identify. 
As we have seen in Chapter One, in the mid 1660s, Locke's morals and 
natural jurisprudence faced a problem of demarcating the precise extent of moral 
obligation! In the Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke had argued that in order 
to show that there was a morally binding law, one needed to show first that there 
was a superior being who was entitled to give laws, namely God, and secondly 
that He had declared His will qua legislator that certain things were or were not 
to be done. 9 Although Locke had provided a proof of the existence of God and 
shown that He had willed certain things, nowhere in the Essays did he 
distinguish between what God had willed generally and what He had willed 
specifically as moral laws. The Essays seemed to suggest that Locke had simply 
assumed that everything God had willed was intended to be morally obligatory. 
In other words, Locke could not say determinately what God had intended to be 
morally obligatory. If this was the case, he could not be sure that anything God 
had willed was intended as such. Locke's epistemological investigation in the 
Drafts of 1671 did little to improve upon this omission. 
There were two important developments in Locke's thought which 
helped him to account for this moral problem. The first development was 
Locke's hedonistic ethics, which was implicit but inchoate in the Essays and the 
Drafts. 10 This development provided Locke with a palpable guideline which was 
consonant with his empiricist commitment to discover what God had intended to 
be morally obligatory. If one assumed that God had organized the world in such 
a way that what was morally good produced pleasure of a particular kind, by 
virtue of being pleasurable in that particular way, one could know that certain 
actions were willed to be performed as a part of the law of nature. 
and Myers intimate that Locke was a secret follower of Hobbes. Peter C. Myers, Our Only Star 
and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for Political Rationality (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1998); Peter Josephson, The Great Art of Government: Locke's Use of Consent 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 
8 Ian Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
ch. 8, esp. 266-8. 
9 ELIV, 157. 
'0 Hans Aarsleff, 'The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke', in John Locke: 
Problems andPerspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 
122f 
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The problem of verifying the content of the law of nature was one that 
faced seventeenth century philosophers and theologians committed to naturalism. 
There were two popular strands of naturalism in seventeenth century England, 
which I will refer to as 'Stoic/Scholastic naturalism' and 'Epicurean 
hedonism'. ' 1 The former held that through the study of nature, one could 
discover what was intrinsically good and evil for human nature, and hence, what 
God had set as moral duties, which could be confirmed by the happiness and 
misery attached to these actions. 12 The latter, on the other hand, were sceptical 
of the intelligibility of the nature of things, and instead stressed the importance 
of pleasure and pain as guides to moral conduct. 13 Locke showed affinities with 
both strands: his early Essays suggest a deep knowledge and influence of Stoic 
thought; but firom the 1670s onwards, as we shall see, this was overshadowed by 
the Epicurean strand. 14 However, Locke's hedonism was of a peculiar kind. 
Whereas Hobbes had stressed those of the present world, Locke stressed the 
pleasure and pain of the afterlife. I will argue that Locke's development suggests 
that he was making an effort to distance himself from the crude hedonism of 
Hobbes which led to moral relativism. 
11 Jon Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 1999), chs. 3,5,6. 
12 Robert Sharrock, Ypothesis Ethike (Oxford, 1660); Richard Cumberland. A Treatise of the 
Laws of Nature, ed. Jon Parkin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005); Samuel Parker, A 
Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law ofNature and the Christian Religion (London, 
1681); James Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature (London, 1692). See also, 
Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms, intro. W. R. Inge (London: Elkin 
Mathews, 1930); Select Notions, 1685 (Menston: Scolar Press, 1971); Nathaniel Culverwell, An 
Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, eds. Robert A. Greene and Hugh 
MacCallum (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 197 1). 
13 Pierre Gassendi, The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi, ed. and trans. Craig B. Brush 
(London: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1972). For Pierre Gassendi's Epicureanism see, Francois 
Bernier, The Discourse of Happiness, Virtue, and Liberty collectedfrom the Learned Gassendi 
(London, 1699), ch. 1; Abrege de la Philosophie de Gassendi, vol. 6 and 7 (Paris: Fayard, 1992). 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); 
Walter Charleton, Physiologia-Epicuro-Gassendo-Chareletonia (London, 1654); Robert Boyle, 
Some Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Naturall Philosophy (Oxford, 
1663); A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, eds. Edward B. Davis and 
Michael Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); The Works of Robert Boyle, 
eds. Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis, 14 vols. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999). 
14 For Locke's Stoicism, see ELN, passim; M. A. Stewart, 'Critical Notice', Locke Newsletter 23 
(1992): 152-3; Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, 84-5; Victor Nuovo, 'Aspects of Stoicism 
in Locke's Philosophy', in Studies on Locke, eds. Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer, 2008). Cf. Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), esp. ch. 2, 'The Use of Diversity: Locke's 
Sceptical Critique of Stoicism', 34-68. 
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Despite his best efforts, in the early 1690s Locke's moral epistemology 
in the Essay concerning Human Understanding was accused of nothing short of 
Hobbism. 15 To rescue Locke from this charge, Tyrrell, who was probably 
familiar with Locke's Essays, 16 recommended that he follow in the footsteps of 
the Hobbesian critic Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae in which the 
author argued that the content of natural law could be known through the 
happiness and misery annexed to natural sanctions. 17 However, Locke never 
responded to Tyrrell's call. I will argue that Locke was uneasy about the 
Curnberlandian strand of ethical naturalism which emphasized the divine 
sanctions in this life because it came too close to Hobbes for a refutation of him. 
The second development which helped Locke account for the moral 
problem was his confirmation of the relation between reason and revelation. 
Because Locke was queasy about the Cumberlandian strand of ethical 
naturalism which blurred the distinction between natural and moral good and 
evil, he needed to show how people could perceive the content of the sanctions 
of the afterlife. Locke had maintained in the Drafts that people were ignorant 
concerning many things in life and that it was rational to base one's assent on 
probability. From the late 1670s onwards, he began to stress in his manuscripts 
that the existence of the afterlife could be known with high probability. In 1695, 
he wrote and published the Reasonableness of Christianity which showed how 
the Christian revelation was congruent with reason and how it reinforced the 
content of natural law. 18 Although Locke's hedonism relied on revelation, it 
avoided the reductio of moral good and evil to natural good and evil, and thus 
distanced itself from Hobbism. 
The argument will proceed as follows. I will start by outlining Locke's 
epistemology as revealed in the Drafts. We shall see show how Locke was 
committed to naturalism and empiricism, but also, how his commitments here 
precluded him from building an account of moral epistemology through the 
knowledge of the nature of things. I will then show how hedonism fitted in with 
his moral epistemology and how it provided him with an evaluative language. I 
will argue that Locke made a crucial distinction between natural and moral good 
Corr., 1301, vol. iv, 100-2. 
Von Leyden, 'Introduction', 85-8. Corr., 1307, vol. iv, 109. 
Cumberland, A Treatise, 308, (1.12), and 546-8, (5.24). 
18 RCh. 
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and emphasized the divine sanctions of the afterlife rather than those in the 
present life to distance himself from Hobbes. I will juxtapose Cumberland to 
Locke and show how the two thinkers differed, despite Tyrrell's optimistic 
reckoning of their compatibility and the usefulness of the former in an anti- 
Hobbesian campaign. Finally, I will show how the development of probability 
complemented the natural and moral distinction and distinguished Locke's 
ethical hedonism from those of his contemporaries. 
1. Ignorance of the Nature of Things 
In this section, I will examine Locke's epistemological claims in the Drafts of 
1671 and show how the view developed here concerning human ignorance of 
the nature of things led him to conceive moral knowledge increasingly 
hedonistically from the mid 1670s. 
At first sight, Locke's views expressed in the Essays seemed to hint at a 
development towards constructing an account of moral epistemology from the 
nature of things. He had argued that the law of nature was 'firmly rooted in the 
soil of human nature". By this, he meant that there was a 'harmony' (or 
conformity) between human nature and natural law, which could be known by 
the light of nature. So, 'what is proper now for the rational nature, in so far as it 
is rational, must needs be proper forever, and the same reason will pronounce 
everywhere the same moral rules'. Thus, insofar as people were 'endowed with 
a rational nature', they were morally bound by the law of reason or nature. For 
Locke, natural law 'does not depend on an unstable and changeable will, but on 
the eternal order of things'. 'For it seems', he wrote, 'that certain essential 
features of things are immutable, and that certain duties arise out of necessity 
and cannot be other than they are'. 19 In this context, it would have seemed 
relevant to be able to know the nature of things, especially that of man; and 
indeed, as we shall see below, this was the direction of development Tyrrell 
thought that Locke's philosophy could take. 
However, by the time he published the Essay, Locke believed that 
natural philosophy, that is, the knowledge of the nature of physical things, was 
t9 ELN, 199. 
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not a 4science' in the proper sense. 20 That is to say, 'certainty' was not attainable 
in this field . 
21 But we shall see below that Locke's epistemological pessimism 
about the knowledge of nature of things was already present in the Drafts of 
167 1.22 Let us now peruse Drafts A and B in turn. 
In Draft A, Locke maintained that the foundation of all human 
knowledge was sense-experience. From sense, we acquire 'simple Ideas', such 
as 'heat & light, hard & soft' and so on. These are the 'simplest Ideas we have & 
the first objects of our understandings'. Next, he noted how people observed that 
6a certaine number of those simple Ideas goe constan[t]ly togeather which 
therefor the understanding takes to belong to one thing'. In other words, people 
observe in the world that certain things contain more than one simple idea and 
thus are 'a complication of many simple Ideas'. 23 Locke called these compounds 
&complex ideas'. 24 Now, this particular thing or object to which a certain number 
of simple ideas or qualities belonged, and by which people understood a 'united', 
'common subject', he referred to as 'substance' or 'matter'. 25 Examples of 
substance include 'man, horse, sun, water, Iron'. Locke argued that people's 
knowledge of substances do not extend beyond the 'sensible qualitys supposd to 
be inhaerent in it', and because of this, they cannot pretend to the knowledge of 
the 'essence' of things. So, for example, the idea of sun 'is noe thing but the 
collection of these severall simple Ideas round, bright, hot. having a constant set 
motion a good way from us. &c'. Because 'our senses doe not quickly discover 
to us how many of these simple Ideas or qualitys are constantly united in one 
subject', our ideas and definitions of the substance of things are 6often very 
imperfect'. Indeed, people's knowledge of the essence of physical things was no 
better than their apprehension of spirits. 26 
20 E, 4.12.10. 
21 Ibid., 4.3.26. 
22 Michael Ayers, Locke, vol. 2 (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 34, and generally, chs. 
3,4; 'The Foundations of Knowledge and the Logic of Substance: The Structure of Locke's 
General Philosophy', in Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context, cd. G. A. J. Rogers (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 56; H. A. S. Schankula, 'Locke, Descartes and the Science of Nature', in 
John Locke: Symposium Woffienbuttel 1979, ed. Reinhard Brandt (Berlin and New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1981), 163-80, esp. 174. 23 D, 1. 
24 Ibid., 39,170f. 
25 Ibid., 1-2. 
26 Ibid., 2. 
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Draft B essentially expounded the same argument concerning human 
ignorance of the essence of substances or matter. Sensation and reflection 'are 
the two only principles of originalls from whence we receive any Ideas 
whatsoever'. Here again, Locke claimed that 'Externall objects' cannot 'furnish 
the understanding with any Ideas but sensible qualitys because they operate on 
the sense noe other way & soe we can have noe other notice of them'; neither 
can 'the minde furnish the understanding with any Ideas but of its owne 
operations & the severall ways & modes thereof. So, 
when we talke of or thinke on those things which we call material substances as 
man horse stone the Idea we have of either of them is but the complication or 
collection of those particular simple Ideas of sensible qualitys which we use to 
finde united in the thing cald horse or stone ... & which are the immediate 
objects of our sense. 
Because 'we have noe other Idea of that matter or substan[c]e but what we have 
barely of those sensible qualitys supposed to inhaere in it', Locke concluded, 'it 
comes to pass that we have noe Ideas nor notion of the essence of matter, but it 
lies wholy in the darke'. 27 Locke's point was that the foundation of knowledge 
being sense-experience, we can only know as far as what is perceivable by 
sense-experience. And as Locke observed, sense was unsatisfactory to come to 
the knowledge of the essence of substances. 
We see that Locke's philosophical structure was characterized by his 
commitment first to knowledge via sensory experience and second to pessimism 
of the knowability of the essence of substances. 28 Consistent with these 
commitments, the Drafts indicate that Locke was a nominalist: he believed that 
all natural things were particulars. Universality did not belong to things 
themselves and there were 'no mind- or language-independent justifications for 
grouping things or qualities under a single heading. 29 More precisely, he was 
what Walter Ott calls a 'restricted' nominalist, that is, one who 'imposes extra- 
linguistic or extra-mental limits on the nature and number of kinds we construct', 
27 Ibid., 129-30. 
28 Ayers, 'The Foundations of Knowledge and the Logic of Substance', 56. 29 D, 9,82,173. Walter R. Ott, Locke's Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 72. 
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or more simply, one who imposes constraints on the basis of 'objective 
resemblances' . 
30 According to the guidance of sense, Locke noted, people 
distinguished and organized particular things into 'sorts' and 'species' and gave 
them 'setled & fixed' names. However, the essential constitution of natural 
things being unknown, the precise boundaries between the sorts were also 
'seldom' known to people. 31 Indeed, because of this, universal propositions 
about certain things, in which collections of simple ideas were predicated of the 
subject, came at the price of being uncertain or certain but uninformative. So for 
example, looking at the proposition 'man is rational', we could surely include 
the predicate 'rational' in the definition of man, but this definition, while true for 
us, would only be 'verbal' because we do not 'have certain knowledg that things 
doe soe exist' externally. 32 
However, while Locke acknowledged that people were left in 
considerable ignorance concerning the natural world, he was much more 
optimistic about the prospect of moral knowledge. He was convinced that 
having created mankind for a purpose, God had sufficiently equipped them to 
attain 'all the ends requisite to such a being', i. e. temporal and eternal happiness, 
and indeed, in the Essay, he claimed that 'Morality is the proper science, and 
33 Business of Mankind in general'. Locke's remarks elsewhere in the Drafts 
suggested that moral knowledge was in the ambit of human knowledge. His 
assertion that moral ideas and rules were 'much easier' and 'much clearer' than 
the nature of things suggests as much. 34 Whereas some of Locke's 
contemporaries, as we shall see below, derived morality from the nature of 
things, Locke moved towards making natural philosophy and moral knowledge 
distinct. 35 
Locke was optimistic about moral knowledge because he conceived it in 
terms of a 'relation'. In the Drafts, Locke defined a relation as the 'Agreeing or 
disagreeing of two of more thing[s] one with an other in any way wherein they 
30 Ott, Locke's Philosophy ofLanguage, 72. See generally, 71-77. 31D, 176 for 'setled & fixed', 183 for 'seldom', see generally 181-3. 32 Ibid., 27-8. 
33 Ibid., 119; E, 4.12.11. 
34 D, 40,42,268,269. 
35 Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 46. 
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36 are capeable of being compared'. He maintained that relations were the subject 
of knowledge because all relations 'terminate in & are concernd about those 
simple Ideas either of Sensation or reflection', which are 'the whole materials of 
our knowledg'. 37 Our knowledge of relations equal those of simple ideas 
because 
agreement or disagreement being things whereof we have as cleare, Ideas as of 
any other whatsoever it being but the destinguishing simple Ideas or their 
degrees one from another without which we could not have noe destinct 
knowledg at all. 38 
In short, for Locke, if people could not distinguish between simple ideas, i. e. the 
founding blocks of all knowledge, they could not know anything at all. Thus, 
Locke was confident that the notions we have of relations were 'generally 
clearer & more distinct, (though not then simple Ideas) yet certainly then of 
those of positive substances'. The notion, for example, of 'father or brother is a 
great deale clearer then that of a man'. This was for two reasons. First, because 
the knowledge of 'one action or simple Idea is commonly sufficient' to supply 
the notion of relation, whereas the knowledge of substantial beings such as man 
or horse require 'an accurate collection of sundry Ideas'. Secondly, because 
many relations were 'only of mans making', it was natural that 'he should have 
true Ideas of his owne workmanship'. 39 
Morality was a type of relation in which an action was compared to a 
rule. Moral goodness and evilness were measured according to the conformity or 
disagreement of an action to a certain rule. But because the ideas of virtue and 
vice were not real existing objects, Locke observed, 'we cannot by the 
immediate information of our senses conversant about real existing things get a 
notion of them'. 40 He thus identified two ways of attaining moral ideas or rules. 
The first way was by 'common consent of the country & those men whose 
language we use'. Even if 'there were noe law noe punishment noe obligation 
36 A 35. 
37 Ibid., 221. 
38 Ibid., 37. 
39 Ibid., 334,220. 
40 Ibid., 40. 
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humane or divine', there 'must & would be in the societys of men notions of 
virtues & vices'. Actions thought to be laudable or blamable in a given society 
were called virtue and vice respectively. Because these ideas of virtue and vice 
were 'wholy in mens owne making', independent of external things 'depending 
not at all upon things without them that are hard to be knowne, knowledge of 
these could be attained. Indeed, people were to be blamed if they could not come 
to a clearer knowledge of this kind of morality than natural things. This rule 
pertained with 'speaking properly & understanding of words & fashons & 
atteineing reputation', and was the prototype of the 'law of reputation' in the 
Essay, of which we shall see later on. 
This first kind of morality was infort-ned by local language and practice. 
The important thing to notice here is that this kind of morality was not 
dependent on the knowledge of the nature of things. It was possible to have such 
knowledge without having to enquire into the murky constitution of man and 
trying to discover what was perfective to such a nature. However, the problem 
with the first kind of morality was that it tended towards moral relativism. Locke 
noted that 
since other mens Ideas of morall things to which they apply the same names are 
unknowne to one an other unsteady & uncertain & very different one from an 
other. these morall words are in discourses amongs[t] men useing the same 
language often not understood by one an other & at best of very doubtful & 
uncertain signification. 41 
However, Locke was optimistic that the content of the moral ideas and rules of 
this sort coincided with the second kind, which were 'properly & truly the rules 
of good & evill', or more simply, the law of nature. 
The second way of attaining moral ideas and rules had a different 
foundation from that of the first. These moral notions were not of 'our owne 
making' but depended on 'something without us', and so were 'not made by us 
but for us'. These rules were set out by a superior being with power to reward 
compliance and punish noncompliance. Conformity or disagreement with these 
41 Ibid., 269. See also, 41: 'from the different Ideas of men using the same language the 
signification of the name in divers mens mouth may be doubtful'. 
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standards 'bring upon us good or evil' and thus pertained to our 'liveing well & 
atteining happynesse'. To come to the knowledge of these moral rules however, 
it was first necessary to demonstrate that there was a lawgiver, namely God, and 
secondly that He had a declared will and law, that is, the law of nature. At this 
point, Locke aborted his argument, noting that it was his purpose to show first 
that the rules set out by the lawmaker ultimately terminated in simple ideas; 
secondly that these rules being known, moral actions were as 'easily & clearly 
knowne as any other Relation'; and thirdly that we come to these notions by 
sense and reflection, their being 'noe thing but collections of simple Ideas'. 42 
This rule was to be supposed until there was a 'fit place to speake of .. God & 
the Law of Nature'. 43 
Locke evidently did have his own thoughts about the content of the law 
of nature (his example in Draft B was 'Thou shalt love they neighbour as thy 
self'), but he had not shown how this could in fact be known to have been willed 
by God as morally obligatory. As Locke had argued in the Essays (as we have 
seen in Chapter One), for a law to be obligatory, it was necessary to show that 
obligation was effective, i. e. by being the will of a superior, as well as 
terminative, i. e. by delimitation. In the Essays, Locke had offered a proof of the 
existence of God, which met the first criterion of obligation. But what was 
missing in Locke's account of natural law was the second of these two criteria, 
demarcating the precise content of moral obligation. If natural law was to be 
binding, he needed to show how God had declared His law to mankind. Unlike 
the first kind of morality, the second kind was externally informed. It was 
therefore not of man's own making. So if this rule was to be known, Locke had 
to show how this external law, which he supposed was God's will, was 
discoverable through sense experience. 
The Drafts hinted at a possible development. Locke had argued that the 
law of nature was 'properly & truly' the rules of good and evil 'because the 
conformity or disagreement of our actions with these bring upon us good or 
evil' (emphasis added). Natural law 'influence[s] our lives' by informing us 
about 'liveing well & atteining happynesse'. Grammatically speaking, 'good' in 
the latter sense (i. e. bring upon good) cannot mean the conformity to a law, but 
42 Ibid., 42,269-70. 
43 Ibid., 269; cf. 41, 'god the Law of nature & revelation'. 
150 
rather it must be the consequent 'good' thereof Thus, it would have to mean an 
observable outcome following the morally good action. Given this assumption, 
Locke could argue that what was good for man was intended by God to be 
obligatory because being purposive, He had organized the world such that 
morally good actions (conformity to a rule) were rewarded with some good 
(benefit resulting from conformity to the rule). Thus, given Locke's assumptions, 
one possible development was ethical hedonism. 
There were two main strands of ethical naturalism and hedonism in 
seventeenth century England: Stoic/Neo-Scholastic naturalism and Epicurean 
hedonism. In the first group, I include the Cambridge naturalists such as 
Benjamin Whichcote and Nathaniel Culverwell, together with Robert Sharrock, 
44 Cumberland, Parker, and Tyrrell. In this chapter, I will concern myself mainly 
with Cumberland and Tyrrell. What the Stoic/Scholastic naturalists appropriated 
from Stoicism was the assumption that the natural world was ruled by the divine 
will and that through experience and contemplation, the wise man could come to 
the understanding of nature, and thus, the divine will. A moral life was one that 
was in accordance with nature. 45 In this vein, the Stoic/Scholastic writers 
maintained that through an examination of the natural world, one could come to 
the knowledge of the nature of things, that is, what was intrinsically good or evil 
for a certain nature. Because the natural world was divinely created and 
superintended, one could construe natural good and evil as natural divine 
sanctions. Hence, through a study of the natural world, one could come to 
understand what God had intended to be morally obligatory. So, for example, 
Sharrock argued that virtuous actions were rewarded with the pleasures of a 
good conscience while vicious actions were punished with the pains of a bad 
one. The pangs of conscience could thus be adduced as an indicator of the divine 
Will. 46 
44 Hans Blom groups Robert Sharrock amongst what he calls the 'Cumberlandians'. Although 
this term was obviously chosen for convenience's sake, it is nonetheless a misleading one. 
Although Cumberland spoke favourably of Sharrock, Sharrock predates Cumberland, so cannot 
be a Cumberlandian. Moreover, the term Stoic/Scholastic naturalist captures the wider tradition 
which both Sharrock and Cumberland belonged to. Hans Blom, Causality and Morality in 
Politics (Utrecht, 1995), 130. 
`5 For a summary of Stoicism, see Cicero, On Moral Ends, ed. Julia Annas and trans. Raphael 
Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) esp. Book 3. See also, Cumberland, A 
Treatise, 68-91. 
'6 Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 211-14. 
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In the second group, the Epicurean hedonists, I include Pierre Gassendi, 
Hobbes, Walter Charleton, and Robert Boyle. Epicurean hedonism was revived 
in tandem with the revival of Epicurean atomism. Atomism, which explained the 
natural world in terms of matter and motion, appealed to a generation that was 
becoming increasingly suspicious of the occult and obscurantist 
Aristotelian/Scholastic science, which, on the other hand, explained the natural 
world in terms of forms and ends. 47 For this generation, the atomistic 
explanation fitted in better with the phenomenological reality of the capacity of 
human reason. However, Epicurean atomism brought with it two major 
problems. First, it could easily lead to the denial of divine providence. Secondly, 
it could lead to a brute animal form of hedonism. If the natural world was 
explained in terms of matter and motion, knowledge could only be acquired 
through sensory experience. Being confined to the ends of the physical world, 
human appetites and desires necessarily became the standard of good and evil. 48 
Gassendi redeemed Epicurean hedonism which Cicero had caricatured 
and brought into disrepute. Gassendi accounted for the first problem by 
synthesizing the atomistic worldview with theological voluntarism. Atoms did 
not randomly collide with each other; they were governed by God, but who was 
beyond human sensory comprehension. Gassendi accounted for the second 
problem by two arguments. First, he clarified that Epicurus' hedonism was not a 
recommendation of sensual pleasure, but, on the contrary, of virtue: happiness, 
that is, the state of bodily health and tranquility of mind, was attained not by 
47 For criticisms against the Aristotelian/Scholastic science, see for example, Gassendi, The 
Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi, and Joseph Glanville, The Vanity of Dogmatizing (London, 
1661), chs. 16 and 17. For Aristotle, in order to achieve understanding of something, one needed 
to explain its four causes: efficient, material, formal and final, or respectively, what brings it 
about, what it is made of, what its form is, and what it is for. See Aristotle's Physics in The 
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), bk. 2 ch. 3, 
240-42. See also, R. S. Woolhouse, Locke (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983), 67-8, and generally 
ch. 8; Stephen Everson, 'Introduction', in The Politics and the Constitutions of Athens 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xxxii. 
48 Frederick Vaughan, The Tradition ofPolitical Hedonismfrom Hobbes to J. S. Mill (New York: 
Fordharn University Press, 1982). See also, Charles Harrison, 'The Ancient Atomists and the 
English Liberature of the 17ý' Century', Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 45 (1934): 1-74; 
Thomas Mayo, Epicurus in England (Dallas: Southwest Press, 1934); Robert H. Kargon, 
Atomism in Englandfrom Hariot to Newton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); James 
Tully, 'Governing Conduct', in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund 
Leites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Howard Jones, The Epicurean Tradition 
(London: Routledgc, 1989); Thomas Lennon, 7he Battle of the Gods and Giants (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1993); Margaret Osler, Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Parkin, Science, Religion andPolitics, ch. 5. 
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lustful desires, but by a virtuous life. Secondly, he argued that the soul was 
immortal and that there was a caring and superintending God who rewarded the 
just and punished the wicked. 49 
Given his view concerning human ignorance of the nature of things and 
his nominalism, Locke could not build an argument upon the assumption that 
one could derive an intrinsic good perfective to human nature (this will be 
become clearer in the section where I will compare and contrast Cumberland 
and Locke). Therefore, the direction of Locke's development took an Epicurean 
rather than a Stoic/Scholastic route from the mid 1670s. However, at the same 
time, this development proceeded in opposition to that of Hobbes's. Thus, 
before we move on to consider the development of Locke's ethical hedonism, let 
us first examine that of Hobbes. 
2. Hobbes's Hedonistic Ethics 
In the Leviathan, Hobbes defined good as 'whatsoever is the object of any mans 
Appetite or Desire', and evil as the object of his 'Hate' or 'Aversion'. There was 
no common rule of good and evil 'to be taken from the nature of the objects 
themselves'. Thus, for Hobbes, good and evil existed only 'in relation to the 
person that useth them'; in the state of nature, this would be every person, and in 
50 a commonwealth, the civil sovereign. In the state of nature, where 'Private 
Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill', the state of war inevitably followed 
because good and evil 'in different tempers, custurnes, and doctrine of men, are 
different'. Indeed: 
divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the sense of what is pleasant, 
and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also what is 
conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the 
same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is 
callcth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and callcth Evil. 5' 
49 Bemier, The Discourse ofHappiness, ch. 1; Abrege de la Philosophie de Gassendi, Vol. 6 and 7. Osler, Divine Will, 36-77. 
'0 Hobbes, Leviathan, 39. 
51 Ibid., 110-11. 
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Hobbes's hedonistic ethics was subjective; that is to say, the definition of good 
and evil were relative to the individual's own perception of pleasure and pain. 
But because this relativistic morality led to the state of war, Hobbes argued, 
'consequently (emphasis added) all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and 
therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which ... are Justice, Gratitude, 
Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good'. Hobbes's 
point was that because the state of war was the most miserable condition 
possible, to avoid it, people would come to appreciate the pleasure of peace and 
everything which led to it. 
Interestingly however, Hobbes showed traces of Stoic naturalism as well. 
In chapters 28 and 31 of the Leviathan, Hobbes expressed his thought on natural 
punishments. I quote the relevant passages in full. In chapter 3 1, he argued: 
There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a 
chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to give a 
man a prospect to the end. And in Chayn, there are linked together both 
pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for 
his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and 
these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which arc the 
beginning of more Harme than Good. And hereby it comes to passe, that 
Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with 
Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; 
Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; 
and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the 
breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the 
reach of the Lawes of Nature; and therefore follow them as their naturall, not 
arbitrary effeCtS. 52 
In chapter 28 'rewards and punishments', Hobbes made a similar argument: 
where as to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers hurtfull 
consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or 
wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; 
52 Ibid., 253. 
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such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be said 
to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine. 53 
However, in the Latin edition of the Leviathan, Hobbes substantially truncated 
the long list of natural punishments in chapter 31 following 'Intemperance is 
naturally punished with Diseases', replacing it simply with t&Cs. 54 We may 
suspect that this was because he was uneasy with the potential implications of 
his political references (i. e. 'Negligent government of Princes' was punished 
with 'Rebellion'). This is consistent with the fact that the section in chapter 28 
remained unaltered, which had no political references. In any case, as it appears 
so far, Hobbes held on to the thought that there were natural punishments, which 
could be attributed to God, the author of the natural world. 
However, there was a snag with Hobbes's Stoic naturalism. For 
Cumberland and the Stoic/Scholastic naturalists, the study of nature revealed the 
divine will and could be adduced to explain the extent of moral obligation. 
Although Hobbes appeared to argue in the same vein, as we saw in Chapter One, 
55 the Hobbesian God was incomprehensible and had 'no Ends'. People neither 
had a positive idea of God nor a confirmation of His fixed purpose. Thus, for 
Hobbes, the civil sovereign, a mortal God, replaced God as legislator. In other 
words, Hobbes moved effective obligation from God to the civil sovereign. 
Because he took this step, he could explain terminative obligation in terms of the 
laws promulgated by the civil sovereign. God being absent from the equation, 
natural punishments were less moral obligations than mere rational precepts 
about the course of nature, unless they were the subject of the civil sovereign's 
legislation. Thus, Hobbes's Stoic naturalism was effectively reduced to a study 
of natural regularities devoid of moral content. 
We have seen that there were two strands present in Hobbes's ethical 
hedonism: there was the subjective strand where good and evil were defined in 
terins of an individual's sense of pleasure and pain in the state of nature, and the 
civil sovereign's will in a commonwealth; and there was the Stoic strand where 
an objective standard of good and evil could be discovered through the natural 
53 Ibid., 215. 
54 Hobbes's Latin edition of the Leviathan in Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera 
Philosophica (Amsterdam, 1668), 172. See also, Cumberland, A Treatise, 624-5 (5.5 1). 55 Hobbes, Leviathan, 249. 
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pleasure and pain God had annexed to certain actions. However, Hobbes 
stripped away the moral content from the Stoic strand, replacing this with the 
civil sovereign's commands; he thereby reduced his ethical hedonism to human 
natural inclinations. Indeed, as Locke observed, 'a Hobbist, with his principle of 
self-preservation, whereof himself is to be judge, will not easily admit a great 
56 
many plain duties of morality'. We shall see in the next section how Locke's 
hedonistic development avoided this Hobbesian reductio of morality. 
3. The Development of Locke's Hedonistic Ethics 
I will now examine the development of Locke's hedonism in further detail and 
show how it differed from Hobbes. I will suggest that Locke made an important 
distinction between natural and moral good because he was aware of the 
Hobbesian implications of a morality based on natural inclinations, which led to 
moral relativism. We shall see how the natural and moral distinction provided 
Locke with the conceptual resources to delineate the content of natural law. 
The notion of pleasure and pain had appeared in Locke's writings as 
early as the Essays and, as we have seen briefly, the Drafts. In the Essays, in the 
context of a discussion about God's existence and His rightful power over 
mankind, Locke connected pleasure and pain to the divine design. Since God 
has 
created the soul and constructed the body with wonderftA art, and has 
thoroughly explored the faculties and power of each, as well as their hidden 
constitution and nature, He can fill and stir the one with sorrow or delight, the 
other with pain or pleasure; He also can lift both together to a condition of the 
utmost happiness or thrust them down to a state of misery and torment. " 
In the Drafts, other than the passage concerning moral relations cited above, in 
the context of responding to the sceptics and Cartesians, Locke stressed that the 
evidence of 'pleasure or pain. i. e. happynesse or misery' was certain, 'beyond 
which we have noe concernment either of knowing or being'. " The references 
56 john LoCke, 'Study (Extracts)', in Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 371. 
57 EW 155. 
58 D, 21. 
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to pleasure and pain were sporadic and we may indeed say that he had not yet 
developed a hedonistic system of morality in these earlier works. But it is not 
the case, as von Leyden amongst others have suggested, that when Locke fully 
adopted hedonism in the mid 1670s, he was importing something completely 
alien to his intellectual framework and subsequently struggling to fit it in. On the 
contrary, hedonism provided Locke with the missing piece to outline the moral 
content of natural law. 59 
Locke's journal entry on 16 July 1676 marks his first recorded attempt at 
elaborating a hedonistic ethics. Here, Locke defined good and evil in terms of 
pleasure and pain. The pleasure and pain with which Locke was concerned were 
mainly those of the mind. The impressions made on the body needed to reach 
the mind in order to produce pleasure and pain, and pleasure and pain 'coming 
from the body is quite lost and perishes as soon as the mind ceases to be affected 
by them' . 
60 For Locke, things could be 'good' in two senses. That which 
produced pleasure was 'properly and in its own nature good' and that which 
served to procure pleasure was also good. Locke called the former bonum 
jucundum (what is good because pleasurable). He sorted the latter into two: utile 
(what is good because useful) and honestum (what is good in itself). These latter 
goods were 'good', Locke argued, because they were 'ordained by God to 
procure the jucundum' and thus a 'means to help us to happiness'. Otherwise, 
Locke argued, 'I do not see how they would be reckoned good at all'. 61 Thus, 
utile and honestum were reduced tojucundum. 62 
Locke observed that people seek pleasure and shun pain. Happiness was 
the ultimate human goal. He developed on the assumption in the Essays that 
pleasure and pain were connected to the divine design: 'God has so framed the 
constitutions of our minds and bodies that several things are apt to produce in 
both of them pleasure and pain, delight and trouble, by ways that we know not, 
but for ends suitable to his goodness and wisdom'. 63 For Locke, the main work 
59 John Colman, 'Locke's Empiricist Theory of the Law of Nature', in The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, ed. Peter IL Anstey (London: Routledge, 2003), 115 f. 
60 John Locke, 'Pleasure, Pain, the Passions', in Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 240. 
6' Ibid., 241. 
62 Edward A. Driscoll, 'The Influence of Gassendi on Locke's Hedonism', International Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1972): 99- 100. 
63Locke, 'Pleasure, Pain, the Passions', 238. 
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hedonism was doing was to offer an account of moral psychology, that is, to 
show how people were motivated to perform a certain action: He maintained, 'In 
voluptas and dolor, pleasure and pain ... there are two roots out of which all 
passions spring and a centre on which they all turn. Where they are removed, the 
passions would all cease, having nothing left to wind them up or set them 
going'. 64 He maintained this view in a manuscript entry in 1693, Toluntas', 
where he noted that an agent was driven to an action not because of the moral 
rectitude of the action itself but because pleasure was annexed to its 
performance . 
65 However, at the same time, pleasure and pain enlightened people 
as to what constituted a morally good or bad action by virtue of being an action 
stimulated by God. That is, if God had framed people so as to perform certain 
actions, then those actions could be deemed good. In this way, hedonism was 
useful to fill in the gap of the content of moral obligation. 
However, Locke's brand of hedonism stressed the pleasure and pain of 
the afterlife. Seeking pleasure in itself was not to be condemned. But it was to 
prefer 'the momentary pleasures of this life to those joys which shall have no 
66 end'. Indeed, in the Essay, noting that there were 'Principles of Actions' which 
were 'lodged in Men's Appetites', Locke argued that 'if they were left to their 
full swing, they would carry Men to the over-turning of all Morality'. 67 This 
fitted in with his claim that 'a Hobbist, with his principle of self-preservation, 
whereof himself is to be judge, will not easily admit a great many plain duties of 
morality'. 68 The development of Locke's hedonism (as we shall see below) 
suggests that he was aware of the Hobbesian implications of a morality based on 
natural good and evil, and thus be developed his thought in direct opposition to 
that of Hobbes. 
There were two aspects to the development of Locke's ethical hedonism 
during the 1670s and 80s: quantitative and qualitative. We shall see how 
understanding these two aspects helps us to see, against von Leyden's view, that 
Locke's hedonism and natural law theory were not at odds, but rather, that they 
supported each other. I will begin by considering the quantitative aspect. Locke 
" Ibid., 23 8. See also, 'Ethica B', in Political Essays, 319-20. 
65 John Locke, 'Voluntas', in Political Essays, 32 1. 
66 John Locke, 'Happiness B', in Political Essays, 271. See also, 'Thus I Thinke', in Political 
Essays, 296-7. 
67 E, 1.3.13. 
68 Locke, 'Study', 371. 
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argued that there was nothing on this earth that was sought for and was not 
&exposed by the pen of some writer or other. 69 People in this world were 'still 
unsatisfied, uneasy, and far from happiness'. 
70 Locke's valedictory speech as 
moral censor at Oxford put this point clearly: 'This life never brings anyone to a 
point where he can be content with himself, but sends him away panting and 
ever empty, after remote and future goods'. 
71 Locke thus argued that it was 
'probable' that there would be a future state of happiness or misery, where one's 
fate depended on the 'ordering' of his or her actions in this terrestrial life. 
72 
Otherwise 'repentance and sorrow for some would have but very little good in 
it' being pains, 'if it were not a means and way to our happiness'. 73 Locke's 
point was that the pleasures to be experienced in the afterlife far surpassed those 
of this present life. This was the quantitative aspect of Locke's hedonism. Let us 
turn to the qualitative aspect. 
By the qualitative aspect, I am referring to Locke's distinction between 
natural and moral good. In the mid 1670s, Locke had not yet formulated a clear- 
cut distinction between natural and moral good and evil, though it was clear that 
in suggesting that our time on earth was a 'probationership' and that people 
were going to be accountable for their actions in the afterlife (that is, the 
ordering of their actions to God's law in this life determined their eternal fate in 
another), there was room for such a development. 74 These pleasures and pains 
were not merely products of natural regularities, but those which were annexed 
to eternal rewards and punishments in another world by God's will and power. 
Temperance, for example, 'serves to procure health and ease in this world and 
happiness in the other' (emphasis added) while gluttony 'does quite the 
contrary'. 75 
In the mid 1680s, the natural/moral distinction became more and more 
apparent. There is an interesting journal entry, which has so far neither been 
published nor noted, entitled 'Natural' dated Thursday, 9 March, 1684, which 
shows Locke looking into the distinction between natural effects and constant 
69 John Locke, 'Happiness A', in Political Essays, 251-2. 
70 John Locke, 'Understanding', in Political Essays, 263. 
71 ELN, 227. 
72 Locke, 'Understanding', 263. See also, 'Morality, in Political Essays, 267-9. 
73 Locke, 'Pleasure, Pain, the Passions', 24 1. 
74 Locke, 'Understanding', 263. 
75 Locke, 'Pleasure, Pain, the Passions', 241. 
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divine intervention. He copied out a passage from Nicolas Malebranche's De la 
Recherche de la Verite, which read: 
Les cffets naturels sont ccux qui sont des suitte des loix generales que Dieu a 
etablies pour la production et. pour la conservation de toutes choses: Les effets 
surnaturels sont ceux qui ne dependent point de ces joiX. 
76 
This quoted sentence came out in the original text as a reply to an argument 
which stated that bodies would require a certain nature to act with, and not by 
constant divine intervention, if the widely acknowledged distinction between 
natural and supernatural effect was to have any meaning. 
77 Supernatural, for 
Malebranche, could be said to relate 'to future goods', 'the merits of Jesus 
78 
Christ', 'the first and principal order in the intentions of God', and so on. In 
noting this passage, we may speculate that Locke was thinking about how 
natural effects could be differentiated from heavenly rewards and punishments, 
which would be in the category of the supernatural. For Locke, who put 
emphasis on the sanctions of the afterlife, this was a useful and pertinent 
distinction he could take up. 
By the late 1680s, Locke had fully developed the natural/moral 
distinction. In the well-discussed 'Of ethick in general' (1686-8), a manuscript 
intended for the final chapter of the Essay, Locke wrote: 
The difference between moral and natural good and evil is only this; that we 
call that natural good and evil, which, by natural efficiency of the thing, 
produces pleasure and pain in us; and that is morally good or evil which, by the 
76 Ms. Locke E8, p. 33. The relevant translation is as follows: 'I say that this distinction is 
allowable in the mouth of theologians, if they mean that natural effects are those that are the 
consequences of the general laws that God has established for the production and preservation of 
all things, and that supernatural effects are those that do not depend on these laws. The 
distinction is genuine in this sense. Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, Elucidations 
of the Search after Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1980), 'Elucidation Fifteen', 'On the third chapter of the second part of the sixth book. 
Concerning the efficacy attributed to secondary causes, 'Fifth Proof. Reply', 667-8. 
77 Ibid., 667, 'Fifth Proof: I If bodies did not have a certain nature orforce to act, and if God did 
all things, there would be only the supernatural in even the most ordinary effects. The distinction 
between natural and supernatural, which is so widely accepted and which is established by the 
universal assent of the learned, would be extravagant and chimerical'. 78 Ibid., 668. 
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intervention of the will of an intelligent free agent, draws pleasure or pain after 
it, not by natural consequence, but by the intervention of that power. 79 
So, for example, hangovers produced by overindulgence is a 'natural evil', but 
at the same time, it is a 'transgression of a law, by which a punishment is 
annexed to it', and thus, making it a moral evil. Although Locke submitted, as 
von Leyden notes, that 'good and bad, being relative terms, do not denote 
anything in the nature of the thing, but only the relation it bears to another, in its 
aptness and tendency to produce in it pleasure or pain', and so 'that which is 
good for one man is bad for another', he was sure that there was 'nothing 
morally good which does not produce pleasure to a man, nor nothing morally 
80 evil that does not bring pain to him'. Moral good and bad actions always 
produced pleasure or pain respectively because moral ideas were defined in 
terms of a law set by God's will, and He had willed His law to be observed. 
Locke made this clear in the Essay, when he said that nobody 'can take us out of 
his hands'. 81 So compliance (i. e. the compliance of a free agent) with it brought 
eternal rewards, and thus, eternal happiness, while noncompliance (of the same 
agent) brought eternal punishments, and thus, eternal misery. 82 The 
consideration of these rewards and punishments would be the only motive for 
action of a free understanding agent. 83 
Locke expressed his hedonistic views of morality in his published work 
as well. In the Essay, he argued: 
Morally Good and Evil then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our 
voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from the 
Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure and Pain, 
79 John Locke, 'Of Ethic in General', in Political Essays, 301. This is also reproduced in John 
Locke: Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 9-14. For 
corrections to Nuovo's transcription, see M. A. Stewart, 'Review' of John Locke: Writings on 
Religion, Locke Studies 5 (2005): 247. 
80 Locke, 'Of Ethic in General', 301. 
81 E, 2.28.8. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, 245: 'By denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men 
may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. 
82 It is unclear whether Locke believed in eternal punishments though. See for example, John Milner, An. 4ccount of Mr. Lock's Religion (London, 1700), chs. 15 and 31,186-8. RCh, lxxii- lxxiii; PaN, 'Introduction', 51-6; W. M Spellman, John Locke (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997), 
68. See also, Locke's manuscript 'Resurrectio et Quac Sequuntur', in PaN, 679-84. 83 Locke, 'Of Ethic in General', 30 1. 
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attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law- 
94 
maker, is that we call Reward and Punishment. 
Once again the distinction between natural and moral good and evil was 
highlighted: 
It would be in vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule to the Actions of 
another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance with, and 
punish deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil, that is not the natural 
product and consequence of the Action it selL For that being a natural 
Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of it self without Law. This, if I 
mistake not, is the true nature of all Law, properly so called. 85 
Commentators such as von Leyden fail to see that Locke's hedonism and 
natural law theory can be reconciled because they overlook the natural/moral 
distinction. The natural/moral distinction was important for Locke because it 
enabled him to offer a solution to the problem of demarcating the content of 
natural law while distinguishing himself from Hobbes. It distinguished between 
the pleasure and pain of what was merely a result of a natural regularity and 
what was a result of a divine intervention. If natural good and evil became the 
standard of morality, as Hobbes had shown all too clearly, it would lead to moral 
relativism in the state of nature and absolutism in the commonwealth. Thus, the 
sanctions of the afterlife became important for Locke's hedonism. Although 
both Hobbes and Locke shared an Epicurean structure, in important ways, they 
differed. 
This section concludes my examination of the development of Locke's 
hedonistic ethics and the first development noted above in relation to the 
problem of establishing the content of natural law. I will now move on to the 
second development where Locke developed his account of probability and 
knowledge of the sanctions of the afterlife with high probability. We shall see 
how this complemented the first development. But before moving on to this, I 
84 E, 2.28.5. 
85 E, 2.28.6. 
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will begin by considering why this second development was necessary for 
Locke - namely because his hedonism was accused of nothing short of Hobbism. 
4. The Accusation of Hobbism 
Despite his best efforts, Locke was often taken as a Hobbist. As I mentioned at 
the outset, Newton apologized for taking Locke for a Hobbist during his mental 
breakdown in the early 1690s. Tyrrell's correspondence with Locke in 1690 also 
shows that his Essay was charged with Hobbism. In this section, I will show 
why Locke was taken for a Hobbist and how Tyrrell thought Locke could avoid 
being identified with Hobbes. More broadly, I will show how Locke was 
operating with a similar hedonistic structure as Hobbes but wished to avoid his 
conclusions. This section will thus allow us to see how Locke wished to 
distinguish himself from Hobbes and how this led on to the development of his 
account of probability. 
The central question of the exchange between Locke and Tyrrell was 
how one arrived at the knowledge of natural law and the sanctions annexed to it. 
Tyrrell reported that 'some thinkeing men at Oxford' who had read the Essay 
were 'dissatisfyed' with what Locke had said about the law of nature. 86 In the 
Essay, Locke identified three types of laws to which people related their actions: 
divine law, civil law, and philosophical law or the law of reputation. 
Respectively, people judged whether their actions were 'Sins or Duties', 
'Criminal or Innocent', 'Vertues or Vices'. The divine law was, for Locke, 'the 
only true touchstone of moral Rectitude'. This was the law given by God to 
mankind. God enforced His law with rewards and punishments of 'infinite 
weight and duration, in another life'. It was according to this law that people 
judged of the 'most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their action'. The civil 
law was the 'Rule set by the Commonwealth'. This law engaged to protect the 
'Lives, Liberties, and Possessions' of those who obeyed it, and could take away 
the same of those who disobeyed it. This law, Locke observed, 'no body over- 
looks'. The philosophical law or the law of opinion or reputation was the rule of 
virtue and vice determined by the 'praise and blame' according to 'Maxims, or 
86 Corr., 1301, vol. iv, 101. 
163 
Fashions' of a certain society. This was the 'common measure of Fertue and 
Vice'. 87 
According to Tyrrell and the Oxford men, Locke's suggestion that there 
were three laws to which people compared their actions was taken to imply that 
there was in fact no universal standard of good and evil. In their view, Locke 
'resolved all vertue and vice, and the Law by which it is establisht [i. e. natural 
law], out of a commonwealth, and abstracted from divine Revelation; into the 
praise, or dispraise that men give to certaine actions in several clubs or 
societyes'. This came 
very near to what is so much cryed out upon in Mr: Hobs; when he asserts that 
in the state of nature and out of a commonwealth, there is no moral good or 
evil: vertue, or vice but in respect of those person, that practice it or thinke it 
so. 88 
However, as Locke defended himself, his point here was to show firstly 
'how men came by moral Ideas or Notions', which he thought 'they did by 
comparing their actions to a rule', and secondly, 'what rules men take to be the 
standards to which they compare their actions to frame moral Ideas', which he 
thought were 'the divine law, the Municipal law and the law of reputation or 
89 fashon'. In other words, his point was to show that as a matter offact people 
relate and measure the rectitude of their actions to these various laws. 
In his next letter to Locke, Tyrrell suggested that the root of the 
confusion between Locke and the Oxford men seemed to be his unconventional 
use of divine law. In their eyes, the Locke of the first edition of the Essay had 
not made the distinction between divine positive law and natural law clear. By 
divine law and a law given by God to mankind, the Oxonians took Locke to be 
referring not to the law of nature but to the revealed law of Moses, which was 
reinforced by Jesus Christ. This seemed to suggest that Locke left no room for 
17 E, 2.28.7-10. 
88 Corr., 1301, vol. iv, 101-2. Indeed, this is the portrait of Locke depicted by Straussians such 
as Zinaich. Basing his evidence on 2.21.55 of the Essay, Zinaich argues that for Locke 'there is 
no agreement as to what the proper good of man is, but also that there is no proper good for 
man'. He goes on to argue that this view is 'inconsistent with a natural law theory', 137. See 
Fenerally, chs-3 and 4. 
9 i Corr., 1309, vol. iv, 112. 
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natural moral obligations other than those prescribed by the law of reputation. 
Tyrrell interpreted that what Locke called the divine law was what 'others call 
the Law of nature'. Although Tyrrell accepted this definition (or rather, what he 
took to be Locke's definition), he had his doubts whether Locke could 
demonstrate the sanctions of the afterlife, and hence, a universally applicable 
law of nature. If Locke failed to demonstrate this, it would put him on a par with 
Hobbes. To rescue Locke from the charge of Hobbism, Tyrrell urged him to 
consider Richard Cumberland's A Treatise of the Law of Nature, which refuted 
the Hobbesian thesis by showing a system of deciphering the divine will from 
natural sanctions. 90 
Locke's response to Tyrrell and the Oxonians was one of indignation. 
First, he directed them to the relevant passage in the Essay where he had 
affirmed a law of nature knowable by the light of nature (i. e. E, 1.3.13). He then 
picked up on their criticism that by divine law he could not have meant the law 
of nature because he had said it was 'a law given by God to mankinde'. 
Sarcastically, he pointed out that the law of nature 'in these mens opinions, had 
not God for its author', because if it had, 'he gave it to mankinde' (emphasis 
added). And just for the sake of argument, Locke remarked that one might even 
say that a law given to mankind would preclude the Mosaic or Gospel law, as 
they took him to have said, since the former was given particularly to the 
Israelites and the latter to people '2000 Years after Moses law, and 4000 years 
after the Creation', which makes it 'hard to conceive' that it was a law given to 
mankind. 91 
As to Tyrrell's suggestion that what he meant by divine law in 2.27.8 (or 
2.28.8) of the Essay was really what 'others call the law of nature', Locke 
categorically rejected this as contrary to his purpose. By divine law, he had 
meant it 'indeffinetly': it included the Old and New Testament, 'the Alcoran of 
the Mahumetans', 'the Hanscrit of the Bramins', as well as the law of nature. 
Thus, he meant divine laws. Whether these revelations were 'true or false' was 
less an issue than whether people actually related their actions to them. 92 it 
might seem in saying that he was 'talking not about the true law of God, but 
90 Corr., 1307, vol. iv, 107-9. 
91 Corr., 1309, vol. iv, 110- 11. 
92 Ibid., 112-13. 
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about the particular divine laws that happen to be respected in different 
societies', Locke was admitting that 'he had not identified a universally 
applicable moral law', as Wootton suggests. 93 But what Locke was trying to say 
in this context was that there were many divine laws to which people referred 
their actions, the law of nature being one of them. How to prove the true divine 
law was not the issue. 
Next, Locke picked up on the Oxonians' second criticism, which was 
that by divine law he could not have meant the law of nature, because the only 
enforcements he referred to were rewards and punishments of another life, and 
he did not make it clear where to find this law except in the Scriptures. Locke 
firstly retorted that 'only' was Tyrrell's own insertion and not his. But he then 
argued that if these men were suggesting that the sanctions of the afterlife were 
no enforcement at all, 'they cannot but be very sincere and Zealous stiklers, for a 
divine law of Morality only upon rewards and punishments of this life 'tis easy 
to see what a kinde of Morality they intend to make of it'. The development of 
Locke's thought suggests that he believed that worldly based ethics led to 
Hobbism; and to refute this, he needed to stress the sanctions of the afterlife. He 
corrected Tyrrell by noting that he never said that the content of the sanctions of 
the afterlife could be found in Scripture. And against Tyrrell's doubt whether he 
could prove these sanctions, Locke retorted that 'the probability of rewards and 
punishments in another life I should thinke might serve for an inforcement of the 
Divine law'. 94 
Finally, Locke never responded to Tyrrell's invitation to adopt the 
ethical naturalism of Cumberland. In the light of the discussion above, we can 
conjecture the reason for Locke's silence. Contra Tyrrell, Locke thought he had 
things right in the first place. I will pursue this contention in the following two 
sections. In the next section, I will argue that Locke rejected Cumberland's 
ethical naturalism because it downplayed the importance of the sanctions of the 
afterlife, which in turn downplayed the important distinction between natural 
and moral good. Reducing God's sanctions to the perceivable natural 
phenomena led to Hobbism. rather than departing from it. Then in the final 
section, I will show how probability had become central to Locke's moral 
93 Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist? ', 4 1. 94 Corr., 1309, vol. iv, 111-12. 
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epistemology. Thus, in this final section, I will be examining Locke's second 
development concerning the question of the content of natural law. 
5. Locke and Cumberland Compared 
Before considering why Locke rejected Tyrrell's invitation to join in the 
Cumberlandian enterprise, we should pause briefly to ask what the intellectual 
relationship between Cumberland and Locke was. The evidence suggests that 
the relationship was indirect rather than direct. 
95 Most importantly, Locke did 
not possess a copy of Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae. He did purchase a 
copy on 15 May 1672, shortly after its publication, but this was not for himself 
but for his life-long friend John Strachey. 96 Edward Driscoll intimates that 
Locke may have read and absorbed the distinction between natural and moral 
good from Cumberland, pointing at the striking similarity between the tWo. 
97 
But as we saw above, the natural/moral distinction formally appeared in Locke's 
writings in the late 1680s; so given the timing and given also that other authors 
made similar distinctions, it is difficult to establish any conclusive link. Locke 
did possess a copy of Cumberland's Jewish Measures and Weights (1686), but 
this was not a work about natural law or moral epistemology as such. Thus, his 
main source(s) concerning Cumberland's natural jurisprudence and moral 
epistemology would likely be indirect, namely via Samuel Parker or Tyrrell. 
Locke possessed a copy of Parker's Demonstration of the Divine Authority of 
the Law of Nature (1681) which was a work modelled explicitly on 
Cumberland's A Treatise. 98 As regards to Tyrrell, in addition to the short 
remarks on Cumberland in his letters to Locke, Tyrrell also sent him a copy of 
his own work, A BriefDisquisition on the Law offature (1692) which was, like 
Parker, modelled on Cumberland as well. However, according to the surviving 
correspondence between Locke and Tyrrell, although Locke promised probably 
sometime shortly after 9 August 1692 to comment on the places that Tyrrell had 
drew upon Locke's works, he had not fulfilled his promise roughly five months 
`5 This is also Murray Forsyth's view. See 'The Place of Richard Cumberland in the History of 
Natural Law Doctrine', Joumal of the History ofPhilosophy 20 (1982): 37E 
96 Ms. Locke f. 48, fol. 18. Wr Strachy. Cumberland agt-Hobbes May. 15. 97 Driscoll, 'The Influence of Gasscndi on Locke's Hedonism', 105n. 9' Samuel Parker, A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature and of the 
Christian Religion (London, 168 1), 'Preface', ix. 
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later in 7 January 1692/3, causing Tyrrell to point out to him where exactly the 
relevant sections were. 99 
What we do know is that Locke read Tyrrell's letter of 27 July 1690, 
which recommended him to follow Cumberland's lead; thus I will use this as the 
starting point for my investigation of the intellectual relationship between Locke 
and Cumberland. We have seen that Locke was enraged by the Oxford men's 
inference that basing the law of nature on the sanctions of the afterlife was in 
essence to deny any sanctions at all. Tyrrell's letter to Locke had made it clear 
that Cumberland had not denied the importance of the sanctions of the afterlife. 
Indeed, as Tyrrell noted, Cumberland maintained in De Legibus that God had 
introduced rewards and punishments to secure the end of the 'Common Good', 
and 'if any thing, necessary to this End, be wanting in this Life, it will be 
supplied by God in a Life to come'. 100 Parker, who followed Cumberland, was 
more forceful concerning the afterlife: 
if there be a Deity, there must be a Law of Nature; and if a Law of Nature, a 
future State. And on the contrary, if no future State, no Law of Nature; and if 
no Law of Nature, no Deity. 101 
However, although not as egregiously as the Oxford men, Tyrrell portrayed the 
Cumberlandians as positing otherworldly sanctions as secondary: 
But I conceive men for the most part lye under sufficient obligations to observe 
the Laws of nature from those natural rewards to Duty, and punishments for sin, 
which God hath by the natures of the things themselves appointed in this life; 
and where those fall short, that God will make it up in the life to comes, as Dr: 
Cumberland hath very fully proved in his booke of the Laws of nature against 
Mr: Hobs. and Dr: Parker as to the necessity of a future state hath more fully 
made out in his Demonstration of the Law of nature according to Mr: Cum 
Principles (emphasis added). 'O' 
" Corr., 1522, vol. iv, 494-5, (9 Aug 1692); 1589, vol. iv, 619-20, (7 Jan 1693). See also 1424, 
vol. iv, 323-4 (22 Oct 1691). Tyrrell had asked for Locke's comments before he sent it to the 
publisher, but apparently Locke did not do this for him. 100 Cumberland, A Treatise, 5.19. 
101 Parker, A Demonstration ofthe Divine Authority, 'Preface', xxii. ... Corr., 1307, vol. iv, 108-9. 
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In saying this, Tyrrell showed that the Cumberlandians effectively downplayed 
the afterlife because it was beyond the natural world, and thus, without natural 
effects. 
If Tyrrell's letter was Locke's only contact with Cumberland, there is a 
slight suspicion that he may have got the wrong impression of Cumberland, 
albeit not an uncommon one, as one who posited the obligation of natural law to 
arise from its (natural) sanctions. 103 That neither Cumberland nor Tyrrell meant 
it in this way is clear since they both argued in their respective treatises that 
obligation arose from the will of God. Moreover, Tyrrell had stated so in the 
letter: 
I fully agree with you in your definition ... divine, or natural Law; since did it 
not proceed from God as a Lawgiver I am satisfyed it could not properly be 
called a Law; and the not takeing God into this Hypothesis has bin the great 
reason of Mr: Hobs mistake that the Laws of nature are not properly Laws nor 
doe oblige mankind to their observation when out of a civil state, or 
commonwealth. '04 
But immediately after saying this, Tyrrell continued 'But I conceive men for the 
most part lye under sujfzcient obligations to observe the Laws of nature from 
those natural rewards to Duty' (emphasis added), which could be taken to imply 
that natural sanctions themselves could oblige people. 
However, even if Locke did not construe Cumberland in this way - that 
is to say, even if we give a fair representation of Cumberland - the gap between 
the two men was irreconcilable. In his letter, Tyrrell touched on the key aspects 
of Cumberland's moral epistemology and what be said about Cumberland here 
was enough for Locke to have a good idea of Cumberland's project and also 
enough to disagree with him. However, to make the structural disagreement 
clearer, I will not confine myself to Tyrrell's letter but will also examine 
Cumberland's De Legibus and Tyrrell's Brief Disquisition in further detail. I 
103 Knud Haakonssen, 'The Character and Obligation of Natural Law according to Richard Cumberland', in English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 37f, 37n27. 
" Corr., 1307, vol. iv, 108. 
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will now show how Cumberland's natural and moral philosophy differed from 
that of Locke's, and how the important distinction between moral and natural 
good dissolved in Cumberland's theory. We shall see that in operating on 
Hobbes's terms, Cumberland approached, rather than distanced himself from 
Hobbes. 
In De Legibus, Cumberland argued that the laws of nature could be 
reduced to one universal principle: that only by striving to promote 'the common 
Good of the whole System of rational Agents', of which God is a part, will 
people serve their own 'Happiness'. 'Contrary Actions' will only produce 
'Misery'. 105 For Cumberland, 'benevolence', that is, the willing of good (i. e. an 
act of the will), and distinguished from love, played a key role: 
The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the 
happiest State of every, and of all the Benevolent, as far as is in their Power; 
and is necessarily requisite to the happiest State which they can attain, and 
therefore the common Good is the supreme Law. 106 
For Cumberland, God was the first cause (which could even be proven by 
Hobbes's principles) and from hence, he inferred that natural effects were 
reflections of the divine Will. 107 He argued that from examining the 'nature of 
things' one could arrive at certain truths about what kind of actions were 
conducive to the common good. 108 Cumberland deployed the discoveries of 
modem science to prove this point (this is a process Tyrrell decided to skip). 
109 
It is quite clear why Locke did not pursue the Cumberlandian route: he 
was sceptical of the extent of the knowledge of natural philosophy. He had 
denied the ability to penetrate into the real constitution of natural things and had 
also denied any universals in nature. Tyrrell took note of this, and indeed when 
he came to write his Brief Disquisition, although he was optimistic of the 
similarities between Locke and Cumberland, he was well aware that Locke may 
have had some doubts about the Cumberlandian method. Thus in the Brief 
105 Cumberland, A Treatise, 1.9. 
106 Ibid., 1.4. 
107 Ibid., 'Introduction', section 7. 
108 Ibid., 1.1,2. 
" Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, 221. 
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Disquisition Tyrrell conceded: 'our Faculties are not fitted to pierce into the 
internal Fabrick, and real essence of Bodies as the above-mentioned Author of 
the Essay of humane Understanding [i. e. Locke], hath very well observed'. Yet 
he quoted from Locke's Essay with considerable latitude and tried to incorporate 
him into the Cumberlandian project: 
That the knowledge we have of them [sc. natural things] is sufficient to 
discover to us the being of a God, and of a Divine Providence, and that that the 
knowledge of our selves, and the Nature of other things are sufficient to lead is 
into a full, and clear Discovery of our Duty towards him. " 0 
Furthermore, in the main body of the BriefDisquisitlon, Tyrrell quoted a chapter 
from the Essay on the collective ideas of substances, which he used to show how 
the common good of mankind could be developed through an examination in 
which the natures of individual men were accumulated-' 11 Tyrrell took these 
instances as evidence of the compatibility between Locke and Cumberland. 
However, he was apparently worried about Locke's opinion of his use of the 
Essay in the BriefDisquisifion and thus he urged him to confirm whether he had 
not mistaken his sense. 112 Locke made no reply. 
The question that concerns us is whether Tyrrell's optimism about the 
compatibility between Locke and Cumberland was justified. Locke and the 
Cumberlandians agreed on many points. For example, Tyrrell's borrowing from 
Locke against innate ideas was predictable and unproblematic. 113 However, their 
agreements were often less substantial than superficial. Here, I will consider the 
natural/moral good distinction. On the surface, Locke, Cumberland and Tyrell 
could agree about the distinction between natural and moral good. ' 14 However, a 
closer examination reveals that the distinction essentially dissolved on the 
Cumberlandian model. Given the importance of this distinction for Locke's 
ethical hedonism, I argue that Locke and Cumberland were irreconcilable. 
110 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, 'Preface to the Reader'. The 'Preface' is also reproduced in Mark Goldie, ed. The Reception of Locke's Politics, 6 vols. (Brookfield, VT: Pickering and Chatto, 1999), 1,127-56. The quote appears on 154. References to Tyrrell's Brief Disquisition 
hereinafter are to the original text. 
I' Tyrrell, BriefDisquisffion, 215-17; cf. E, 2.24. 112 Corr., 1424,1522,1589. 
Tyrrell, BriefDisquisition, 4,195-7,209,211. 
Corr., 1307, vol. iv, 108. Tyrrell, BriefDisquisition, 119-21 (3.10). 
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For all three men, in contradistinction to natural good, moral good 
referred to the happiness gained through the conformity of a voluntary action to 
some law, namely law of nature. 115 However, Cumberland and Tyrrell 
effectively diluted the distinction between the two goods. Natural and moral 
good was resolved into natural good. 'The Whole of moral Philosophy, and of 
the Laws of Nature', Cumberland argued, 'is ultimately resolv'd into natural 
Observations known by the Experience of all Men, or into Conclusions of true 
Natural Philosophy'. 116 According to Cumberland, moral philosophy could be 
seen as an extension of natural philosophy because 
altho the voluntary Actions of Men, whose Effects are external, do not take 
their Rise in the same manner with Motions merely natural, from the impulse of 
other Bodies, but are determine'd by our Reason and Free-will; nevertheless, 
since they are true Motions produc'd by, and receive their Measure or 
Proportion from, the Powers of our Body, which are of the same Nature with 
the Powers of other natural Bodies, they must, after once they exist, by a like 
Necessity and altogether in the same manner, as other natural Motions, produce 
their Effects according to the Laws of Motion. 117 
Cumberland's argument was that although moral acts were distinct as voluntary 
actions, they were nonetheless performed physically. ' 18 Because moral actions 
have this physical aspect, they could be understood in terms of natural 
philosophy, which helped to 'discover the Causes of Generation, Duration, and 
Corruption' and 'demonstrate the necessary Connexions of such Effects with 
their Causes. ' 19 Thus, the good and evil of moral acts could be deciphered by a 
serious study of natural philosophy. 
For Cumberland, natural good, in relation to created beings, was what 
preserved them, or made them more perfect or happy. 120 Naturally good things 
115 E, 2.28.5; Cumberland, A Treatise, 5.9; Tyrrell, BriefDisquisition, 312. For Tyrrell, 'A moral 
Good is those voluntary Actions and Habits which are conformable to the Law of Nature, or 
Reason, considered as given by God, as a Law-giver, for a Rule of all our Humane, or voluntary 
Actions: For there arc many natural Goods that conduce to a man's happiness, which are not 
morally good, nor are commanded by any Law'. 116 Cumberland, A Treatise, 1.3. 
117 Ibid., 1.17. 
118 Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, 180-1. 
"9 Cumberland, A Treatise, 1.17. 
120 Ibid., 5.9. 
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were $more general and first known in the order of Nature'. So, 'Things 
Naturally good' are 
distinguisli'd from things Morally Good'; for these are only voluntary actions 
conformable to some Law, especially, that of Nature. Therefore Good is not to 
be taken in this sense [sc. moral], when it is inserted in the Definition of the 
Law of Nature, because it is absurd, to Define any thing, by what supposes the 
thing Defin'd, already known. There are many things Naturally Good, that is 
such as contribute somewhat to the Happiness of Man, which are not Morally 
Good, as being either not voluntary Actions, or not commanded by any 
Law ... On the contrary, I am of opinion, "That no action of the Will is enjoin'd 
or recommended by the Law of Nature, and, consequently, Morally Good, 
which does not, in its own nature, contribute somewhat to the Happiness of 
Men. 99121 
What Cumberland meant here was that natural law could not be defined in terms 
of moral good because it was a special case of natural good, and being so, moral 
good had to suppose that natural good was already defined in order to know the 
effects of its goodness. Moral good could be subsumed under the bead of natural 
good because it was a branch of goodness in that it was an effect created by a 
voluntary act, but shared the characteristic of preserving and leading the 
individual to happiness and perfection, and thus to the common good of rational 
beings. Both natural and moral good could be measured by their effects, that is, 
their contributory effects to the common good. 
In this way, although distinguishing between natural and moral good, 
Cumberland blurred the distinction between the two and reduced the moral into 
the natural. This would have been problematic for Locke because although the 
Cumberlandians conceptually differed from Hobbes, on a more practical level, 
they came close to admitting that natural good could serve as the barometer of 
moral goodness, which was the Hobbist position. Tyrrell did note this: 
The not taking notice of which distinction, between natural and moral Goods, 
hath been the occasion of another great Error in Mr. H. [i. e. Hobbes] when he 
121 Ibid., 5.9. Cf. Tyrrell, Brief Disquisition, 'The Second Part', principle 6 section 7; see also, 1.19,2.21,3.11,3.28,4.27 (references by chapter and section). 
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makes that which seems good to every man's own sel(, to be the only object of 
his deSireS'. 122 
But the distinction being blurred, it was hard to accept Cumberland's arguments 
as a refutation of Hobbes. The development of Locke's thought in the 1680s 
shows that for Locke it was vital to keep the distinction clear. Locke thought 
that this could be achieved by stressing the sanctions of the afterlife. The 
sanctions of the afterlife being important for his ethical hedonism, so 
proportionately his account of probability of the afterlife became important. I 
will now turn to consider Locke's account of probability and how it completed 
his ethical hedonism. 
6. Probability 
When, in July 1690, Tyrrell questioned whether Locke could demonstrate the 
sanctions of the afterlife of the law of nature, Locke's response was one of 
frustration: 
Will nothing passe with you in religion or Morality but what you can 
demonstrate? If you are of so nice a stomach I am afraid If I should now 
Examine how much of your religion or Morality you could demonstrate how 
much you would have left, not but that I thinke that demonstration in those 
matters may be carried a great deale farffier than it iS. 123 
Locke clarified his intention in the particular section of the Essay to which 
Tyrrell was referring: the 'demonstration of future rewards and punishments was 
no more my businesse than whether Squaring of the circle could be 
demonstrated or no'. His point here was that like any other relation, moral 
relations were demonstrable. If demonstration had been the business in hand, 
Locke stated that the 'probability of rewards and punishments in another life... 
might serve for an inforcement of the Divine law'. 124 
These statements are telling of Locke's account of human understanding 
and probability. Much of the Essay concerning Human Understanding was more 
122 Tyrrell, BriefDisquisition, 312. 
123 Corr., 1309, vol. iv, 111. 124 Ibid., 112. 
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about human ignorance than human knowledge. Indeed, the Essay showed how 
much of the world remained unknowable to human mind. 125 To regulate one's 
belief, acting upon certainty was undoubtedly the best, but where certainty was 
lacking, people must let probability 'supply the defect of our knowledge'. 
126 
Locke's argument was that in the lamentable but unavoidable absence of 
certainty in the great proportion of human life, it was impracticable to try to act 
without basing one's assent on probability. 
127 
To the modem eye, an account of natural justice based on probable 
sanctions may seem flimsy, and most likely, an indication of failure. 128 However, 
probability had a different theoretical significance in seventeenth century 
England when Locke was writing than it does today. Probability in England as a 
popular resource in natural philosophy, ethics and theology only emerged 
recently in the mid century (although earlier instances of arguments using 
probability did exist, notably in the works by the members of the Tew circle), 
and as Locke's use of it showed, it was a 'new concept of rationality'. 129 It was 
consistent with what Locke took to be the reality of the state of human 
knowledge (or rather ignorance) and consistent also with God's purposive 
design, in which people were provided with the necessary wherewithal for the 
great concernment of life. Thus, one cannot conclude that in Locke's view his 
natural jurisprudence had failed simply on the ground that he resorted to 
probability. 
What was Locke's ground for holding that the afterlife was probable? In 
the Drafts, Locke merely presupposed God's existence and His sanctions, and in 
the Essays, the immortality of the soul, and aborted any attempt to prove 
"' Richard Ashcraft, 'Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy', in John Locke: Problems 
and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 195, 
passi M. 126 E, 4.15.4. 
127 Ibid., 4.16. 
128 David Wootton, Personal communication. See also, Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or 
Natural Law Theorist? ', 52-3. 
129 Ian Hacking, The Emergence ofProbability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); 
Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983). For earlier instances, see most notably William Chillingworth, 
The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation (Oxford, 1638), 224, and more generally, 
Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 101-18. 
For probability as a new concept of rationality, see James Tully, 'Governing Conduct', 25. For 
rationality of probability, see E, 4.16.5. See also the extensive list in Tully, 'Governing Conduct', 
p. 26n for possible sources of influence and the circulation of the concept of probability. 
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them. 130 But in the Essays and Essay, he proved the existence of God to his 
satisfaction. 131 In the Essay, he argued that God by definition was 'most 
powerful' and 'most knowing', existing from eternity and the Creator of all, the 
132 One 'who governs all things'. Given Locke's intellectual resources, from the 
existence of such a wise and superintending God, he could assume that God had 
a purpose, and willed His creation to carry out some role. And since it was 
meaningless without annexing rewards and punishments to compliance and 
deviation from His will, some sort of sanctions were probable. Since eternal 
sanctions outweighed temporal ones, one had good reasons to think that afterlife 
punishments were likely. 
There is no denying that this was a long and tedious thought process, and 
so perhaps impracticable. But it fits the structure of Locke's account of 
probability, in which probability was 'the likeliness to be true, the very notation 
of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or 
Proofs, to make it pass or be received for true'. 133 Probability was 
nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagreement, by the 
intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at 
least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and 
is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather 
than the contrary. 134 
The grounds of probability are first the 'conformity of any thing with our 
Knowledge, Observation, and Experience'. 135 The deduction of the existence of 
God's punishments from the existence of God could be placed in this category. 
The second ground was the 'Testimony of others, vouching their Observation 
and Experience'. This depended on the credibility of the person(s) giving the 
testimony. Although this still lay in the future, Locke would write The 
Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) which relied on the credibility of the 
130 D, 41,269; ELN, 173. 
131 ELN, 151-7; E, 4.10. 
132 E, 4.10.6,19. 
133 Ibid., 4.15.3. 
134 Ibid., 4.15.1. 
135 Ibid., 4.15.4. 
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Gospel writers. 136 However one wished to derive it, from the existence of God 
or by Scripture, there was an ample possibility of sanctions in the afterlife, at 
least, reasonable enough to regulate one's actions based on the supposition. 
The development of Locke's thought in his manuscripts shows that he 
adhered to the probability of the existence of the afterlife in which happiness 
would be perfected. In a 1677 manuscript entry 'Understanding', Locke argued 
that because people were 'still ... far 
from happiness' in this world, 'it seems 
probable that there should be some better state somewhere else'. It was 
scertain-that there is a possibility of another state when this scene is over, and 
that the happiness and misery of that depends on the ordering of ourselves in our 
actions in this time of our probationership here. 137 In 'Morality', a manuscript 
entry written probably in 1677, Locke argued that it was 'evident that there is 
pleasure an pain to be had in this life and that it is possible there may be a state 
after this life wherein men may be capable of enjoyments or sufferings'. 138 
Locke's confidence in the probability of the afterlife continued into the 
1690s. In a manuscript entry in 1693, 'Ethica B', Locke wrote: 'Happynesse is a 
continuation of content without any molestation very imperfect in this world noe 
body happy here. certain. may be perfect in an other world. possible. 
probable'. 139 In the same page, he wrote on the theme of 'censure" that 'every 
being capable of happinesse or misery asks for the avoiding of one to make way 
for the other. Happinesse & misery consists in & are made up of noe thing but 
pleasure & pain'. He then defined what happiness, perfect happiness, misery, 
and perfect misery were in turn, and ended with the final remark, 'In both kinds 
there may be infinite degrees', which was a reference to happiness and misery. 
When Locke referred to infinite happiness and misery, it most certainly meant 
the afterlife. 
However, David Wootton argues that in 'Ethica A' of 1692, Locke 
explored 'the possibility of arguing in terms of worldly happiness alone', which, 
he notes, would have been 'unnecessary' had he argued from God's justice to a 
136 Hobbes, Leviathan, 48-9,267. Hobbes too described that belief in the Scripture was not 
knowledge but faith (unless you were one of the writers to whom it was supernaturally revealed). 137 Locke, 'Understanding', 263. 
138 Ibid., 268. 
139 MS. Locke c. 28, fol. 141. This is reproduced in part in John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 1. 
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system of punishment. 140 According to Wootton, Locke presented the scheme of 
the sanctions of the afterlife 'not as a view he is committed to, but as one that 
others ... are obliged to put 
forward'. Indecd, we may say that of Locke's 
manuscript entry 'Voluntas' 1693 as well, which asserted that God had annexed 
'punishments and rewards' to 'moral rectitude and pravity' to move the human 
will, but did not mention anything of the otherworldliness of these sanctions. 141 
Two points deserve mentioning here against Wootton. The first point 
concerns the nature of manuscript entries. Although some of Locke's manuscript 
entries were extensive, most of them were simply some occasional thoughts he 
had jotted down. There was no necessity of laying out all his presuppositions. 
Thus, given that his other manuscripts in the same time show that he believed 
that the afterlife was probable, we can still assume that he had not given up on 
developing an account of the sanctions of the afterlife based on probability. The 
second point concerns the nature of Locke's argument. Wootton draws the 
conclusion that Locke had abandoned the attempt to build an account of natural 
justice based on the sanctions of the afterlife on the grounds that Locke 
considered formulating an argument of morality based on secular hedonism. But 
we should note that Locke never said that his brand of hedonism referred only to 
the sanctions of the afterlife. On the contrary, Locke castigated Tyrrell for 
misquoting him and taking him to have said that the divine law was only 
enforced by the sanctions of the afterlife. Locke noted that 'only' was Tyrrell's 
own insertion, and 'that', be supposed, 'would have as well Excluded the law of 
Moses as well as that of Nature, and I imagin the law of the Gospel too,. 142so 
one cannot immediately draw the conclusion that Locke had abandoned the 
attempt to build a system of ethics based on the sanctions of the afterlife, simply 
by the fact that be discussed the moral prospect of secular hedonism and said 
little about the afterlife. In any case, the purpose of the secular hedonistic 
argument in 'Ethica A' can be seen as an attempt to show that the logic of self- 
interest of ethical hedonism need not lead to purely egoistic conclusions. 143 Even 
so, Locke did not pretend that such a derivation was a complete account of 
140 Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist? ', 5 1. 
141 Locke, 'Voluntas', 321. 
142 Corr., 1309, vol. iv, I 11. 
143 John Colman, John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1983), 235-6. 
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morality or carried the force of one. It is still clear that Locke thought that by 
bringing in the 'necessity of another life (wherein God may put a distinction 
between those that did good and suffered and those who did evil and enjoyed by 
their different treatment there)', morality would be enforced 'the stronger'. 144 
Locke had shown that people had good reasons to believe that there was 
an afterlife where they would be rewarded or punished according to their 
conduct on earth. By stressing the afterlife, he had shown that his ethical 
hedonism was different from the Hobbists and also the Cumberlandian strands. 
However, what his moral epistemology and natural jurisprudence still lacked 
was how the precise content of natural law, and thus, the precise extent of moral 
obligation, could be known. This posed a problem for Locke. 
Through a holistic appreciation of Locke's intellectual corpus, we can 
see that his immediate solution in the mid 1690s - although this was less a full 
solution than a supplement - was to show how reason and revelation supported 
each other - namely, the publication of the Reasonableness of Christianity. 
145 
Locke's correspondence to his Dutch theologian friend Philipus van Limborch 
revealed that Locke's immediate motive for writing this work was his interest in 
the theological question of justification. 146 Modem commentators suggest that 
this may have been triggered by the Antinomian controversy between 
Presbyterians and Independents during the winter of 1694-5, which revolved 
around the Calvinist doctrine of election and predestination. Another relevant 
event may have been the Deist Controversy, which emerged as a reaction to the 
exclusivism of the Calvinist doctrine of election. 147 However, the holistic 
method encourages us to escape the particular contexts and map the 
Reasonableness onto Locke's wider project, thereby allowing us to see a wider 
significance to it. 
The significance of the Reasonableness in relation to Locke's moral 
epistemology was that it provided people with 'a clear knowledge of their 
144 Locke, 'Ethica A', in Political Essays, 319. 
145 Takashi Kato, 'The Reasonableness in the Light of the Essay', Locke Newsletter 12 (1981); 
Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 277; Timothy Stanton, 'Hobbes and Locke on Natural Law and 
Jesus Christ', History ofPolitical Thought 29 (2008): 65-88. 
146 Corr., 190 1, vol. v, 370; W, vol. 7,186-7. 
147 V. Nuovo, 'Introduction', in The Reasonableness of Christianity (Bristol: Thoerrunes Press, 
1997), x-xi; 'Locke's Theology, 1694-1704', in English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 195-7. 
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148 duty'. In the Reasonableness, Locke maintained that there was a law known 
by the light of nature, which was 'the eternal, immutable Standard of Right'. 149 
But he remarked that it was 'too hard a task for unassisted Reason, to establish 
Morality in all its parts upon its true foundations; with a clear convincing 
light'. 150 It was 'plain in fact, that humane reason unassisted, failed Men in its 
great and Proper business of Morality. It never from unquestionable Principles, 
by clear deductions, made out an entire Body of the Law of Nature. 151 Indeed, 
the 'greatest part of mankind want leisure and capacity for Demonstration. 152 
The philosophers of the past from 'Solon and Bias in Greece', 'Tully in 
Italy', and Tonfutius, as far as China' have contributed their share to set out a 
moral code. However, the 'Opinion of this or that Philosopher, was of no 
Authority'. 153 For a law to be 'a standard to which Men should conform their 
Manners', its authority needed to come from 'Reason or Revelation'. It was 'not 
every Writer of Morals, or Compiler of it from others, that can thereby be 
erected into a Law-giver to Mankind'. In order to have one's 'Rules pass for 
authentique directions', one 'must shew, that either he builds his Doctrine upon 
Principles of Reason ... 
Or must shew his Commission from Heaven; That he 
comes with Authority from God, to deliver his Will and Commands to the 
World'. 154 Locke held that nobody before Jesus' time ever succeeded in doing 
SO. 
Jesus Christ supplied for this deficiency: It was 
a surer and shorter way, to the Apprehensions of the vulgar, and the mass of 
Mankind, that one manifestly sent from God, and coming with visible 
Authority from him, should as a King and Law-maker tell them their Duties; 
and require their Obedience; Than to leave it to the long, and sometimes 
intricate deductions of Reason, to be made out to them'. 155 
148 RCh, 147. 
149 Ibid., 140. 
150 Ibid., 148. 
151 Ibid., 149-50. 
152 Ibid., 157. 
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Therefore, Jesus' mission, according to Locke, was to fully establish the law of 
nature. He clarified the extent of obligation required by God. Jesus 'was sent by 
God: His Miracles shew it; And the Authority of God in his Precepts cannot be 
questioned'. Hereby morality 'has a sure Standard, that Revelation vouches, and 
Reason cannot gainsay, nor question; but both together witness to come from 
God the great Law-maker'. 156 
Revelation provided Locke with the missing piece of his moral 
epistemology and natural jurisprudence; how people could come to the 
knowledge of the content of natural law. The Reasonableness required assent to 
revelation, which in Locke's terms was 'faith'. A revelation from God was 'a 
setled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of 
room for Doubt or Hesitation'. 
157 Faith was a matter of probability, but of the 
'highest degree'. 
Locke's solution did not show how the content of natural law could be 
known purely by natural reason and deduction. To this extent, it was only a 
partial solution. But this did not signify a departure from the rational project. 
158 
The Reasonableness tried to show that revelation was amenable to reason. In the 
Essay, Locke maintained that faith required the regulation of reason: 'Because 
though Faith be founded on the Testimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing 
any Proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth of its being 
a divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge', or in other words, our 
'Reason'. 159 This was a position he needed to maintain given his queasiness 
about enthusiasm (as we have seen in Chapter One), which was furthermore 
reinforced in his added chapter of the fourth edition of the Essay, 'Of 
Enthusiasm'. 160 Revelation that passed the test of reason was truly the object of 
faith in contradistinction to enthusiasm. 161 By showing how revelation and 
"" Ibid., 153. 
157 E, 4.16.14. Although original revelation left no room for doubt or hesitation, the more the 
testimony removed away from its original witness, the more it weakened the force of the proof, 
Ibid., 4.16.10. However, the Gospels were written by the disciples who were first hand witnesses 
of divine revelation. 
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reason were not mutually exclusive, but rather, complementary, Locke 
supplemented his ethical hedonism, and thereby, his response to the problem of 
terminative moral obligation. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I examined the development of Locke's moral epistemology 
from the 1670s to the mid 1690s. I have shown how the development related to a 
problem about moral obligation, which he had encountered in the Essays of 
1664. Specifically, the problem involved showing how natural law was 
terminatively obligatory, that is, showing the precise extent of what God had 
willed as moral laws. A common solution to this problem in the seventeenth 
century for those who rejected an innate natural law was ethical naturalism and 
hedonism. The assumption of this was that God had annexed pleasure and pain 
to certain actions, and this information in turn could be used to determine what 
He willed to be morally good or evil. Through the pleasure and pain the 
individual experiences, one could delimitate the extent of moral obligation. The 
naturalist project had two strands, both Christianized: Stoic/Scholastic 
naturalism, which presupposed the knowability of the nature of things, and the 
knowability of the good and evil through a study of this, and Epicurean 
hedonism, which denied this. Locke's early writings suggested a Stoic influence, 
but from the 1670s onwards, the Epicurean strand became increasingly 
prominent in his writings coinciding with his pessimism of certainty in natural 
philosophy. 
Broadly conceived, Hobbes also fell into the Epicurean strand, but he 
pushed the implications to its extremes: he effectively took God out of the 
equation and made moral good and evil relative to the individual's experience of 
natural pleasure and pain. Locke's ethical hedonism, albeit sharing the 
Epicurean characteristics, developed in opposition to Hobbes. Locke 
distinguished between natural and moral good and argued that the pleasure and 
pain of moral good and evil were those of the afterlife. In doing so, he prevented 
moral goodness from being confounded with mere natural regularities or natural 
inclinations, which could lead to the overturning of all morality (a point that 
could be learnt from Hobbes). 
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However, Locke's critics did not think he had adequately distanced 
himself from Hobbes; instead they accused him of Hobbism. To rescue Locke 
from the charge of Hobbism, Tyrrell recommended him to model his natural 
jurisprudence on Cumberland, who, in Tyrrell's mind, had shown successfully 
that God's will could be discovered by natural sanctions. In other words, Tyrrell, 
who was familiar with Locke's earlier writings, thought Locke could develop 
the Stoic/Scholastic aspect of his naturalism. Locke's development suggested 
that he was not going to take the Cumberlandian route. Despite Tyrrell's 
optimistic assessment of the compatibility of the two men, Locke's nominalism 
and scepticism of the knowability of the nature of things was incompatible with 
Cumberland's natural philosophy. Furthermore, Cumberland's natural law 
theory blurred the distinction between natural and moral good, which 
undermined its effectiveness as a response to Hobbism. 
Locke however faced another difficulty. Although he succeeded to 
distinguish his brand of hedonism from his contemporaries, he still had the 
problem of showing how the afterlife's divine sanctions could be known. Locke 
was doubtful that the bulk of humankind had the energy or the leisure to 
demonstrate a complete body of ethics. His solution thus depended on an 
account of probability. He used revelation to supplement the shortcomings of 
natural reason. By showing that probability was congruent with reason, and that 
faith was a matter of probability, he showed that revelation and reason were not 
mutually exclusive but worked together. Thus, although not in purely 
philosophical terms, he showed that the content of natural law could be made 
out rationally. 
The purpose of this chapter was to show how the holistic approach could 
shed light on the development of Locke's thought. Seen in the light of holism, 
we can see that the development of Locke's hedonism, which is often simply 
seen as a theory of motivation, as a prolonged intellectual struggle, a struggle to 
respond to a problem of terminative obligation he encountered in his earlier 
writings. The approach also helps us to see that the development of probability 
and the Reasonableness not as an isolated theological inquiry but as a 
development related to the same problem, although at first sight the connection 
may have seemed to be remote. 
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Finally, through the application of the holistic approach, this chapter 
showed in what ways Locke's response to the problem of terminative moral 
obligation was original compared to those of his contemporaries. We saw that 
on his contemporaries' view, Locke failed to address the problem with the same 
sophistication as, say, Cumberland. As a result, he was often accused of falling 
inadvertently into Hobbism, which was seen less as a genuine solution than a 
reductio. But we saw in this chapter how Locke saw the deeper structural 
problem of ethical naturalism and how one needed to proceed in order to avoid 
Hobbism. In sum, we saw how Locke's thinking worked systematically as a 
whole and how it transcended his contemporaries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Problem of Atheism 
So far in this thesis, I have been examining the development of Locke's thought 
between the early 1660s and the mid 1690s and showing how his investigation 
into a political question - about the legitimate boundaries of civil authority and 
individual religious worship - led on to wider investigations into the character 
and the extent of the human understanding, the content of natural jurisprudence, 
and the grounds of moral obligation. We have seen that Locke's thinking 
developed in different directions around the settled conviction that there was a 
wise, purposive, almighty, and superintending God whose existence was the 
'foundation of all morality'. Indeed, we saw in Chapter One that for this very 
reason, for Locke, 'a beleif in a deitie was not to be reconed amongst puerly 
speculative opinions'. ' From early on in his intellectual life, Locke perceived 
atheism to be anathema to his intellectual framework. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a puzzle concerning the 
significance of Locke's views about atheism. It is well-known that in his 
celebrated Epistola de Tolerantia or Letter concerning Toleration (1689), Locke 
denied toleration to atheists: 
Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God. Promises, 
Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no 
hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, 
dissolves all. 2 
This is a very important statement, and indeed, as we shall see, one that is 
crucial to understanding the trajectory of Locke's thought. Traditionally, 
however, commentators have dismissed Locke's statement and have said very 
little about it. 3 The reasons for this are not difficult to speculate. For one, Locke 
himself said very little about atheism in general. Moreover, what he did say 
about it seemed to reproduce an erroneous seventeenth century commonplace, 
ET61,308. 
LCT, 5 1. 
3 For example, see notes 6,7,8,9. 
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which, for one who is often hailed as the champion of toleration, is a great 
embarrassment. Against the traditional view, there are both Straussian and 
contexualist commentators who have attached a greater significance to Locke's 
denial of toleration to atheists. Straussian commentators have suggested that 
Locke's denial was more tactical than genuine. A general fear of God was a 
4 useful means of government. For Justin Champion, a recent contexualist 
commentator, the significance of Locke's exclusion of atheists lies in its brevity. 
By polemical brevity, Locke repudiated the conventional broad definition of an 
atheist and thereby widened the scope of toleration. 5 
My aim in this chapter is to show through a holistic reconsideration that 
Locke's denial of toleration to atheists was indeed significant and complicated 
but for different the reasons than those suggested in the literature hitherto. In 
maintaining the centrality of God in Locke's thought, by implication, I will be 
rejecting the Straussian narrative. Locke's exclusion of atheists is better 
supposed genuine than spurious. Also, while I will be acknowledging the 
validity of Champion's narrative, which highlights the polemical aspect of 
Locke's denial of toleration to atheists, I will show that there are other aspects to 
Locke's views, which help us to understand the trajectory of his mind. I will 
show that Locke's previous philosophical commitments created novel 
theoretical problems which required particular responses, particularly in the area 
of education. Thus, I will show against the dismissive traditional view that 
Locke did think carefully about the problem of atheism, and indeed, had a 
sophisticated account of how to deal with it. I will show how this account 
reveals a more interesting story about the development of Locke's mind than is 
usually suggested by Locke scholars. I will suggest in turn that Locke's 
confrontation with this new conceptual problem may help us to explain exactly 
why he, unlike his contemporaries, had very little to say about atheism despite 
the importance he clearly attached to it (what could possibly be more important 
than something that dissolves all? ). My suggestion is that Locke may well have 
4 Michael S. Rabich, 'The Reasonableness of Locke, or the Questionableness of Christianity% The Journal of Politics 53 (1991): 933-57; Peter Josephson, The Great Art of Government: Locke's Use of Consent (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 25 7-60. 1 Justin Champion, Te culte prive quand il est rendu dans le secret: Hobbes, Locke et les limites de la tolerence, I'atheisme et I'heterodoxie', in Lesfondementsphilosophiques de la tolerence vol. 1, eds. Y. Charles Zarka, Franck Lessay and John Rogers (Paris' Presses Universitaires de France, 2002). 
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been concerned about the dangerous implications of his own theory. In some 
ways, this narrative parallels the puzzle about Locke's intellectual relationship 
with Hobbes. Although Locke said little about atheism, he had reasons not to do 
so, just as in the case of Hobbes. By re-examining Locke's views about atheism 
through a holistic lens, I will contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature 
and extent of Locke's theory of toleration, and moreover, recover a portrait of a 
more meticulous, philosophical and systematic Locke. To fully appreciate the 
significance of the argument in this chapter, I will start by summarizing in 
greater detail the scholarship concerning Locke's discussion of atheism. 
In the minds of the great majority of Locke scholars, Locke's exclusion 
of atheists was an embarrassing moment in an otherwise laudable liberal treatise. 
Thus, they have traditionally said relatively little about Locke's discussion of 
atheism apart from quoting the short paragraph from the Letter which we have 
seen above and accompanying it with an equally short commentary, and often, 
dismissive or unsympathetic. 
The standard view of Locke's exclusion of atheists from the eighteenth 
century to the present is that while Locke was in many respects the champion of 
toleration, he was also, as Maurice Cranston remarks, 'very much a man of his 
time in thinking that people who did not believe in God could not be bound by 
oaths'. 6 But this is not to deny that there was scope for tolerating atheists on 
(something approaching) Locke's own premises. For example, A. John 
Simmons argues that Thomas Jefferson, who extended toleration to atheists, 
4expressed views more suitable than Locke's own to the principles of Locke's 
Letter'. 7 The problem was that Locke's assessment of the danger posed by 
atheists was conditioned by the prejudices of the enthusiastic religious culture of 
seventeenth century England, and this prevented him from extending toleration 
to them. From a modem perspective, Locke's assessment is, and indeed, was, 
empirically false. Richard Dees asserts that Locke's claim that atheists had no 
6 For eighteenth century critics of Locke, see John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration, and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 697. Marshall lists 
Thomas Jefferson and Joseph Priestley. Maurice Cranston, 'John Locke and the Case for 
Toleration', in eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus, John Locke: A Letter concerning Toleration in Focus (London: Routledge, 1991), 85. 
7 A. J. Simmons, On the Edge ofAnarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 127. See 
also Alex Tuckness, 'Rethinking the Intolerant Locke', American Journal ofPolitical Science 46 (2002). Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. Frank Shuffelton (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 165. 
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reason to keep their promises because they did not fear eternal damnation is 
'simply false'. 8 John Rawls suggests furthermore that 'presumably a greater 
historical experience and a knowledge of the wider possibilities of political life 
would have convinced [Locke] that [he] was mistaken'. 9 The core claim of the 
standard view is that Locke's exclusion was a contingent judgment. It was based 
on an erroneous commonplace of the seventeenth century which could be 
overcome by modem empirical evidence of the existence of law-abiding atheists. 
it is therefore not a surprise that commentators often complement their criticism 
of Locke's traditionalism and conservatism with praise of his French Huguenot 
contemporary Pierre Bayle's modernism. Bayle, famously, had suggested that a 
society of atheists was a serious possibility. 10 
Against this standard view, John Dunn (most notably) has persistently 
argued that the assumption of God was absolutely central to Locke's moral and 
political thought. " And because this was so, Locke's exclusion of atheists was 
not 'a casual or neurotic spasm of superstition'. 12 It 'lay at the very foundation 
of his theory of the content and binding force of moral duty'. His was not a 
'causal hypothesis' about the degree to which on any given occasion an atheist 
would misbehave, but rather, 'the rational implications of atheism for human 
practice"; once accepted, atheism logically 'should affect men's demeanour as a 
whole dramatically for the worse'. This was what 'expelled it from the protected 
13 arena of free intellectual exploration'. When Locke asserted that the taking 
away of a God even only in thought dissolved all, 'he meant what he said': "that 
the theoretical assumption of a godless universe must destroy the possibility of 
14 any integrated and authoritative normativity for human beings as such. 
In the same vein, Jeremy Waldron has offered an extensive and 
sympathetic account of Locke's exclusion of atheists. Like Dunn, Waldron 
8 Richard Dees, Trust and Toleration (London: Routledge, 2004), 110-11. 
9 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), l go. 
" Pierre Bayle, Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, trans. Robert C. Barlett (Albany: 
State University Press of New York, 2000). Cf Political Writings, ed. Sally L. Jenkinson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 312-20. 
" This has been Dunn's claim throughout his career. See John Dunn, The Political Thought of 
John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Locke: A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
12 John Dunn, 'What History Can Show: Jeremy Waldron's Reading of Locke's Christian 
politics', The Review ofPolitics 67 (2005), 448. 
13 John Dunn, 'The Concept of "Trust" in the Politics of John Locke', in Philosophy in History, 
eds. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 288. 
14 Dunn, 'What History Can Show', 448. 
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shows that Locke's exclusion was an integral component of his thinking which 
held together the 'whole framework of natural law equality', or in other words, 
the 'fabric of Lockean politics and Lockean morality'. I 5While Waldron 
maintains that the exclusion of atheism is 'not an option for us', he argues how 
Locke's reasons for their exclusion 'are still relevant to our philosophical 
enterprise of trying to arrive at a comprehensive grounding for and justification 
of our commitment to [the ideal of equality]% 16 Both Dunn and Waldron agree 
that 'it is far from clear' whether 'those of us who believe ourselves to inhabit a 
godless universe' have any intellectually good reasons to suppose that Locke's 
pessimism was, or is, unfounded. 17 
My own sympathy, contra the standard view, rests with Dunn and 
Waldron's view that Locke's moral and political thought necessarily entailed the 
exclusion of atheists. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to establish this 
point, which I take to have been established in earlier chapters. What is 
remarkable here is that even Dunn, who acknowledges the significance of 
Locke's assessment of atheism, remarks that 'there is no reason to believe that 
eiSM 8 Locke thought very carefully about this question [i. e. the problem of ath 
A quick survey of seventeenth century writers on atheism suggests that 
Locke's discussion was unusually short, and appears to confirm that he had not 
reflected upon the problem extensively. In the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, many intellectuals were writing against atheism at great length: Henry 
More's An Antidote against Atheism (1653), Charles Wolseley's The 
Unreasonableness of Atheism (1669), and Ralph Cudworth's The True 
Intellectual System of the Universe: wherein all the reason and philosophy of 
atheism is confuted and its impossibility demonstrated (1678) are only some of 
the most famous examples. 19 
's Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
228. 
" Ibid., 235, and more generally, ch. 8. 
17 Dunn, 'What History Can Show', 448-9; Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 243. But cf. 
N. M. Stolzenberg and G. Yaffe, 'Waldron's Locke and Locke's Waldron: A Review of Jeremy 
Waldron's God, Locke, and Equality', Inquiry 49 (2006): 211-5. Stolzenberg and Yaffe question 
the validity of Waldron's claim against the possibility of a normative secular theory of equality. "' John Dunn, 'What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke? ', in 
Interpreting Political Responsibility (Cambridge- Polity Press, 1990), 19. 
` Henry More, An Antidote against Atheism (London, 1653) and also, An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (London, 1660); Charles Wolseley, The Unreasonableness of 
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However, I will show that there are good reasons to believe that Locke 
did think carefully about the problem of atheism, and indeed, that there was a 
complicated intellectual story behind his discussion, a story which has been 
hitherto overlooked. More specifically, I will show how Locke's philosophical 
commitment to the rejection of innate ideas gave rise to a new and disquieting 
conceptual problem of the 'speculative atheist', and also, how he responded to it. 
Commentators have often complained that there is such a lack of information 
that nothing revealing can be said about Locke's response to atheism. Richard 
Vernon writes for example: 'We just don't know ... what [Locke] thought "not 
tolerating" atheists entailed, exactly - and conclusions based upon inference are 
contestable' . 
20 However, I will show that we can reconstruct Locke's thought 
from investigating his often neglected writings on education and the conduct of 
the understanding. 21 
I also hope to show how this narrative can perhaps help to explain 
Locke's peculiar terseness in discussing atheism in general despite the 
importance he clearly attached to it. I will suggest that Locke's encounter with 
the problem of the speculative atheist is the clue to understanding his reticence. 
The speculative atheist was someone who seriously denied the existence of God. 
Atheism of this sort was usually presumed to be impossible in the seventeenth 
century. One major reason for this was that many intellectuals assumed that the 
idea of God was innate (in the sense that it was imprinted upon the mind or it 
received immediate assent). 22 In showing that there were no innate ideas, Locke 
also created the conceptual space to say that people could be without the idea of 
God, and moreover, that they could come to seriously deny His existence. I will 
suggest that Locke may have wished to say little about atheism because he did 
not want to give it undue attention. People might come to think it was something 
Atheism (London, 1669); Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual SYstem of the Universe (London, 1678). 
" Richard Vcmon, The Career of Toleration (Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queen's University Press, 1997), 147. 
21 STE and CU. 
' See generally, David Berman, A History ofAtheism in Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 
ch. I. John Marshall notes the problem of the impossibility of speculative atheism but fails to see that Locke opened such a possibility by rejecting innate ideas. See Marshall, John Locke, Toleration, and Early Enlightenment Culture, 694f. 
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respectable if others were taking great effort to refute it. 23 Indeed, Cudworth's 
True Intellectual System had 'earned a less welcome reputation as a book that 
was a little too effective in describing the arguments of the atheist'. 24 
This chapter has two main parts. In the first part, I will make the case for 
my interpretation of Locke's discussion of atheism and show how his 
developing philosophical commitment patterned the nature of this discussion. 
More specifically, I will analyze Locke's definition of an atheist, show how he 
differentiated different species of atheists, and explain how these distinctions 
can be explained in reference to specific developments in his thought. In the 
second part, I will show how Locke addressed the problem of the speculative 
atheist. I will argue that Locke's distinction between the different species of 
atheists had implications for how he thought one ought to deal with them. The 
question of how to treat an atheist for Locke depended on what species a certain 
atheist belonged to, or in other words, what stage of atheism an atheist was at. 
To make this point clearer, I will consider how on Locke's account an atheist 
becomes 'truly' an atheist. Finally, I will consider the reasons behind the brevity 
of Locke's explicit discussion of atheism. 
1. Locke and the Speculative Atheist 
As Foucault once remarked: 'People know what they do; they frequently know 
why they do what they do; what they don't know is what what they do does'. 25 
This was essentially Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury's 
criticism of his former tutor, Locke. Locke 'struck at all Fundamentals, threw all 
Order and Virtue out of the World, and made the very Ideas of these (which are 
the same as those of God) unnatural, and without Foundation in our Minds'. 26 
According to Shaftesbury, in rejecting innate ideas, Locke had given momentum 
23 Thus, David Berman suggests that some intellectuals who did not support the idea of innate ideas nevertheless denied that speculative atheism was possible to try to repress it from 
roliferating. Berman, A History ofAtheism in Britain, 34. ?4 
Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 334. 
Locke possessed a copy of Cudworth's True Intellectual System. Harrison, John and Laslett, Peter, The Library ofJohn Locke, 2 nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 119, no. 896. Locke was also familiar with Cudworth's arguments. Aaron, R. I. and Gibb, Jocelyn, An Early 
Draft of Locke's Essay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 118. Locke was close to Cudworth's daughter, Damaris Cudworth, later to be Lady Masharn. 
25 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), 187. 
26 See note 72 below. 
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to atheism and moral relativism, despite his sincerity as a Christian. In this 
section, I will show how avant la lettre, Locke was aware of the kind of problem 
posed by Shaftesbury; that is, that the rejection of innate ideas would have 
subversive consequences for morality and religion, and indeed, that it would 
give rise to a new conceptual problem, the problem of the 'speculative atheist'. 
First, let us look at what Locke said about atheists in the Letter 
concerning Toleration once again. Here, he memorably asserted: 
Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, 
covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold 
upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves 
all. Besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, 
can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a 
toleration. 27 
As we can see, his discussion was short, and at first sight, one is inclined to 
conclude that this was simply because he knew that the untrustworthiness of 
atheists was such a widely accepted belief that he thought he did not need to say 
much about it. Indeed, Greg Forster claims that Locke's argument against 
atheism in the Letter was 'brief because 'the principle for which he was arguing 
was so widely accepted at the time that it must have come across as a truism'. 28 
it is definitely true that atheists were in general held to be intolerable. But a 
closer examination reveals that Locke was not merely reproducing an erroneous 
commonplace but doing something rather different and subtle. 
Let us consider Locke's definition of an atheist in the Letter. The key 
sentence is this: atheists are those 'who deny the being of a God'. To a modem 
reader, this may appear as uncontroversial as the statement that bachelors are 
those who are unmarried. However, once we put this into the context of the 
seventeenth century, we can begin to see a different story. Justin Champion, 
who is to my knowledge the only commentator to have carefully contextualized 
Locke's discussion of atheism, takes note of the peculiarity of defining atheism 
11 LCT, 51. 
28 Greg Forster, John Locke's Politics of moral Consensus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 175-6. 
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simply as the denial of 'the being of a God' . 
29 It is important to register that the 
concept of atheism was not at all straightforward in the seventeenth century. An 
atheist could refer to someone who did not necessarily deny the existence of 
God, but nevertheless acted as though He did not exist. This was known as 
spractical atheism'. 30 Used polemically, an atheist could also refer to someone 
who subscribed to (what Trinitarian Anglicans and Puritans commonly regarded 
as) a heterodox Christian doctrine, such as Socinianism, Arianism, and Deism. 31 
Indeed, Locke himself was accused by John Edwards, an Anglican clergyman of 
intemperate disposition, of being 'all over Socinianized', and thus, tending 
towards atheism. 32 These doctrines were considered to be atheistical because 
they cast doubt on orthodox beliefs such as the Trinity and also because they 
were closely associated with philosophical positions which made God's 
existence irrelevant, for example, arguing against the immateriality of the SOU1.33 
The upshot is that one did not necessarily need to deny the existence of God to 
be considered an atheist: one only needed to deny through action or thought that 
His existence made a difference to what, here and now, human beings ought to 
do. Champion tellingly observes that 'defending the authenticity of Scripture 
was central to all the major acts of legislation against blasphemy between 1648 
34 and 1697' (emphasis added). Given this context, for Champion, Locke's 
definition is significant because by narrowing the type of atheism not to be 
tolerated, i. e. those who only denied the being of a God, it broadened the scope 
of toleration. If Locke had understood 'atheist' in the wider polemical sense, a 
great many more groups of people would have been excluded from the benefits 
of toleration. Thus, Champion believes that Locke defined atheism 'in such a 
restricted way because he wanted to broaden the category of speculative opinion 
that could be embraced within legitimate belief. 35 
" Champion, 'Le culte prive'. 
30 Berman, A History ofAtheism in Britain, 2. 
31 See for example, John Edwards, Some Thoughts concerning the Several Causes and Occasions of Atheism (London, 1695), 64,120; Richard Bentley, Eight Boyle Lectures on Atheism (New York: Garland Pub., [1692-3] 1976), 6. 
32 Edwards, Some Thoughts, 113. 
33 David Wootton, 'New Histories of Atheism', in Atheism fi-om the Reformation to the Enlightenment, eds. Michael Hunter and David Wootton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 25-6. 
34 Champion, 'Le culte prive', 236. 
35 Ibid., 236. 
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As we can see, focusing on 'the being of a God' in the definition helps us 
to clarify what exactly the 'atheist' Locke was talking about was denying, and 
through this, what he considered to be absolutely incompatible with civil society 
(the fact that he prefaced his discussion of the atheist with 'those are not at all to 
be tolerated' suggests as much). While granting the importance of this focal 
point, I will leave this head, and in the remaining space of this section, focus on 
the sense and significance of the word 'deny' in the definition, which the holistic 
perspective enables us to see, and show how this reveals yet another dimension 
to Locke's position about toleration. 
Intolerable atheists, for the Locke of the Letter, are those who deny the 
being of a God. To suggest that one could deny the existence of God was 
significant because intellectuals in the seventeenth century usually argued that it 
was impossible to genuinely deny His existence, or in other words, to be a 
speculative atheist. By the impossibility of speculative atheism, writers often 
meant either that it was conceptually impossible or logically contradictory and 
untenable. In the latter sense, Ralph Cudworth, most notably, devoted the entire 
voluminous fourth chapter of his True Intellectual System (which amounted to a 
massive 450 pages) to demonstrate that atheism was built upon 'contradictory' 
propositions. 36 Robert Boyle also wrote in Some Considerations Touching the 
Usefulnesse of Experimental Naturall Philosophy that the atheists' 'paradoxes 
have been looked upon as so irrational, that, as soon as they have been proposed, 
they have been disdainfully rejected and condemned by all the rest of mankind, 
who have looked upon the patrons of them as monsters, rather than 
philosophers'. 37 
One major reason for its purported conceptual impossibility was the 
belief that the idea of God was innate. Pierre Nicole (whose work Locke had 
translated) wrote, for example: 
What pains soever atheists take to rase out of the minds of men that general 
apprehension of a deity, which the very view of the world naturally imprints 
36 Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, passim. 37 Robert Boyle, Some Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Naturall philosophy (Oxford, 1663), 'Essay 5 9,10 1. 
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there, they have not been able to extirpate, or wholly efface those characters 
that are stamped so clear, and are sunk so deep. " 
Richard Bentley also noted in the first of his Boyle Lectures, 'The Folly of 
atheism', when commenting on the text of Psalm 14, 'The fool hath said in his 
heart, there is no God, that he did not know 'any Interpreters that will allow it 
to be spoken of such as flatly deny the being of God'. Bentley surmised that 
these interpreters were induced to this conclusion 'from the commonly received 
notion of an Innate Idea of God, imprinted upon every Soul of Man at their 
Creation, in Characters that can never be defaced'. Thus, it followed for these 
interpreters that 
Speculative Atheism doth subsist only in our Speculation: whereas really 
Human Nature cannot be guilty of the crime: that indeed a few sensual and 
voluptuous Persons may for a season eclipse this native Light of the Soul; but 
can never so wholly smother and extinguish it, but that at some lucid intervals it 
will recover it sclf again, and shine forth to the conviction of their 
Confidence. 39 
Bentley therefore concluded that on this understanding, there could only be 
practical atheists, that is, those who 'believing his Existence, do yet seclude him 
from directing the Affairs of the World, from observing and judging the Actions 
of Men'. 
We should pause for a moment to clarify what exactly was at stake here. 
We may wonder why it should have mattered to the deniers of speculative 
atheism whether such a thing could actually exist or not. One possible reason for 
their denial is logical consistency. Believing that the idea of God was innate, 
intellectuals were committed to maintaining that it was impossible for 
individuals to be without the notion of God or that they could blot it out from 
their mind by denying His existence . 
40 However, I believe that intellectuals were 
concerned about something more than just logical consistency (although this 
38 Pierre Nicole, Discourses on the being of a God (London, 1712), 1.5; John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 136. 
39 Bentley, Eight Boyle Lectures on Atheism, 4. 
40 Berman, A History ofAtheism in Britain, 34. 
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was important). There is evidence to suggest that they were concerned about 
securing the belief of the naturalness of the idea of God. 
Philosophers and theologians were keen to show that belief in God was 
natural. For example, one of Henry More's key aims in An Antidote was to 
demonstrate 'that the Notion or Idea of God is as Naturall, Necessary and 
Essentiall to the Soul of Man, as any other Notion or Idea wh'tsoever' . 
41 Edward 
Stillingfleet maintained in the Origines Sacrae that a belief in God was 'so 
consonant with human nature'. 42 In the same vein, Ralph Cudworth defended in 
43 the True Intellectual System the 'naturality of the idea of God' . To their minds, 
it was necessary to show that the idea of God was natural to human nature to 
show in turn that morality and religion was natural to mankind, which, 
intellectuals agreed, upheld human society. There was a general consensus 
(excluding Bayle) that without a belief in God or religion, morality and human 
society would collapse. More, for example, claimed that if people came to think 
that there was no God or religion, they would consider themselves 'free from all 
wringings of conscience, trouble of correcting their lives, and feare of being 
accountable before that great Tribunall'. 44 Stillingfleet likewise argued: 'The 
foundations of all religion lie in two things; that there is a God who rules the 
world, and that the souls of men are capable of subsisting after death ') . 
41 
Quoting Cicero, he went on to argue: 'Take away the being andprovidence of 
God out of the world, and therefollows nothing but perturbation and confusion 
in it; not only all sanctity, piety and devotion is destroyed, but all faith, vertue, 
and humane Societies too; 'which', for Stillingfleet, 'are impossible to be 
upheld without Religion, as not only he [i. e. Cicero] but Plato, Aristotle, and 
Plutarch have fully demonstrated 9.46 
To show that belief in God was natural to human nature, there was a 
widespread tendency amongst philosophers and theologians to argue that the 
idea of God was innate, which, they argued, could be proved by the universal 
consent of mankind. Stillingfleet, a strong proponent of universal consent, 
argued that one could prove 'That God hath imprinted an universal character of 
More, An Antidote, 19. 
Edward Stillingfieet, Origines Sacrae (London, 1662), 3 66. 
43 Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 7, and more generally, ch. 4. 44 More, An Antidote, 2. 
45 Stillingfleet, Origines Sacrae, 361. 
46 Ibid., 394. 
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himself on the minds of men' by the fact that 'the whole world hath consented in 
it'. He maintained: 'we assert this universal consent of mankind, as to the 
existence of a Deity, to be a thing so consonant to our natural reason, that as 
long as there are men in the world it will continue'. 47 Boyle, who rarely 
commented on innate ideas, wrote: 'The Knoledg of God is Threefold: Inbom, 
which all men bring into the World with them', which 'is euident in all 
48 Nations'. In this context, the existence of speculative atheists would have 
inauspicious implications because it would undermine the universal consent of 
mankind concerning the existence of God. Universal consent undermined, the 
innateness of the idea of God would be threatened, and this, in its turn, would 
give cause to question the naturalness of the idea of God. 49 
Although Locke believed that the notion of a God was 'agreeable to the 
common light of Reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our 
knowledge' and also that there was something very close to a general consensus 
concerning the existence of God, he opposed this traditional intellectual 
framework, which relied on innate ideas . 
50 He devoted the entire first book of 
the Essay to rejecting innate ideas, and to make his case stronger, showed that 
the idea of God was not innate .51 He also rejected universal consent as proof of 
innateness. 52 As we have seen in the previous chapters, Locke's objection to an 
innate law of nature dated back to 1664; his antipathy to innate ideas in general 
probably goes back to the same time, certainly to 1671 as the Drafts show very 
47 Ibid., 384-5. 
48 Robert Boyle, 'Of Piety', in The Early Essays and Ethics of Robert Boyle, ed. John T. 
Harwood (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 170. 
49 Stillingfleet insisted that 'we have no evidence at all' of 'any whole Nation, which have 
consented in the denyal of a Deity'. But even if speculative atheists did exist, he did not think 
that this would disprove the universal acceptance of the idea of God: 'For I demand of the 
greatest Atheist, Whether it be sufficient to say, that it is not natural for men to have two legs, 
because some have been born with one'. Stillingfleet, Orgines Sacrae, 392. This was a clumsy 
argument because it gave rise to two questions: If there was universal consent concerning the 
existence of God, who was he arguing against? And wasn't it a circular argument to say that 
unbelief in God was unnatural when he was trying to prove that belief in God was natural? 
These considerations have led David Berman to conjecture that there was a 'repressive 
tendency' amongst intellectuals; that is, in denying that speculative atheists could exist, or even if they did, arguing that they were brutes, intellectuals were repressing the thought that atheism 
was a rational belief they could endorse, thereby defending the naturalness of a belief in God. Berman, A History ofAtheism in Britain, esp. ch. 1. 
5' Quote from E, 1.4.9; on general consensus, ELN, 109; W, vol. 4,494. 51 E, 1.4. 
52 ELN, 165; E, 1.2,1.4. 
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plainly. 53 1 will now argue that in rejecting innate ideas, Locke in fact helped to 
create the conceptual problem of the speculative atheist, that is, one who 
seriously denied the existence of God in word and thought. I will argue that 
Locke was denying toleration to this particular species of atheist, which, I will 
show, was a significant break from his contemporaries. And because he was 
making this move, I will argue, he had a strong motive not to say much about 
atheism in general to avoid drawing too much attention to its potentially 
subversive implications for morality and religion. 
As we saw above, intellectuals insisted that one could not really deny the 
existence of God if this was presumed to be innate. Locke, however, rejected 
that there were innate ideas. For Locke, it was a given fact (something we might, 
following R. G. Collingwood, call an 'absolute presupposition' )54 that people 
appropriated and derived ideas in their minds, which became the building blocks 
of knowledge, from sense experience and rational reflection. Moreover, Locke 
postulated that people's natural faculties were God-given, and God being 
veracious, their faculties, when employed properly, were reliable (i. e. not 
deceptive) and would reveal 'Whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of 
Life, and Information of Vertue'. 55 Given his confidence that sense experience 
and reason were sufficient to lead to all the necessary knowledge for this life and 
the next, Locke argued that it was incompatible with the idea of a wise and 
purposive God that He should do something redundant as to provide people with 
56 innate ideas in addition to their natural faculties. 
Next, Locke went on to show how common experience reinforced his 
case against innate ideas. For Locke, innateness implied that an idea or principle 
was universally present and accepted. However, although universal consent was 
a necessary corollary of an idea being innate, it was not sufficient as a proof of 
its innateness: an idea being universally accepted did not prove that it was innate, 
if one could show that the same knowledge could be attained by an alternative 
way, which Locke believed it could. 57 
" ELN, no. 3; D, 103 f. 
54 F-G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, intro. Stephen Toulmin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978), ch. 7, esp. 66-7; An Essay on Metaphysics, rev. ed., ed. Rex Martin (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), chs. 4,5, esp. 31-3. 
11 E, 1.1.5. 
56 A 119; E, 1.2.1. 
57 E, 1.2.3. 
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in any case, Locke argued that there was no universal consent 
concerning, amongst other things, the existence of God and a law of nature. 
From early on in his intellectual career (as we have seen in Chapter One), Locke 
had realized that what people called right reason, which was traditionally 
equated with an innate natural law, was no more than the dictates of their self- 
fashioned self-interests. 's In the Essays, the Drafts and the Essay, he cited 
instances recorded in the travel literature of whole nations without the notion of 
God. 59 Moreover, he observed that few children seemed to have the idea of God 
or the idea that He ought to be worshipped . 
60 The lack of universal agreement 
concerning the idea of God and natural law indicated that there were no innate 
ideas in general. 
Locke objected to the doctrine of innateness whether in its 'na7fve' form, 
which claimed that certain ideas were imprinted on the mind at birth by God or 
in its more sophisticated 'dispositional' form, which claimed that there were 
certain ideas easily assented to when occasioned by external Stimuli. 61 Locke's 
objection against the na7fve form was this: if ideas were stamped on people's 
minds at birth, in principle, these ideas should be present in children, idiots, and 
savages as well as adults, the fit-minded and the civilized, which he observed 
was not the case. His objection against the dispositional form was this: if certain 
ideas were assented to upon external stimuli, this would imply that every idea to 
which people ever assented was innate, which for Locke was an odd position to 
adopt; it would also imply that the ideas and principles became clearer by 
teaching, which would undermine the authority of such impressions. 62 Moreover, 
if it was assumed that people assented to certain ideas upon external stimuli, for 
example the idea of God, it could not explain why there were some nations 
totally unresponsive to the greatness of creation. 
Now in rejecting innate ideas in its various forms, Locke also helped to 
create the conceptual problem of speculative atheism. It should be noted here 
that part of his proof against innate ideas rested on the fact (for him) that there 
58 Corr., 8 1, vol. i, 123. 
59 ELM, 173,175; D, 104-6; E, 1.4.8. 
60 E, 1.4.19. 
61 John W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way Of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 29; Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 5 If 
62 Ej 1.2.21. 
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were actually people without the notion of a God. To be sure, this was an 
empirical claim counterposed against another empirical claim that there were 
innate ideas. Thus, there was still scope for the innatists to retort to Locke's 
criticism and deny that speculative atheism was a genuine possibility. For 
example, they could contest (as John Milner would do later on) the validity of 
the travel literature from which Locke cited his examples of peoples without the 
notion of a God, or they could argue that the atheistical 'profligate Wretches' 
Locke observed in contemporary English society was no proof of the existence 
of speculative atheists unless he could show that they were not practical atheists, 
so to speak, talking tough. Although, for Milner, Locke's atheists were acting or 
speaking as if God's existence had no influence over their lives here and now, 
deep down in their hearts, they had a notion of God which they could not 
erase. 63 
Whether Locke's criticism of innatism. itself was open to criticism is 
beside my point. The main point I want to make here is simply that Locke had a 
different view about human understanding from his contemporaries, and in 
thinking differently, he created a problem which others neither wanted nor 
needed to face - the problem of the speculative atheist. 
How did the rejection of innate ideas create the conceptual possibility of 
speculative atheism? This question is linked to the question about how the 
atheist becomes truly an atheist, which I will discuss in greater depth in the next 
section. Here, I will highlight the conceptual point. For Locke, because there 
were no innate ideas, people were born without any ideas; famously, the mind 
was, as it were, a 'white paper'. 64 Thus, people were all bom ignorant of the 
knowledge of God, a 'fault' (i. e. shortcoming), he later noted in the Third Letter 
for Toleration, 'that which we were every one of us once guilty of . 
65 Locke 
believed the people were all capable of eventually arriving at the knowledge of a 
63 John Milner, An Account of Mr Lock's Religion (London, 1700), 8. Milner argued that Locke 
could not claim that there were genuine atheists unless Locke 'could assure us (which he cannot) 
that their Atheistical Discourse is the Language of their Hearts, as it is too plainly the Language 
of their Lips and Lives. For any thing that he knows, their Hearts may give their Tongues the 
Lye, and there may be inward Fears and Whispers that there is a God, at the same time that they 
most stoutly deny it: or if not at the same time, yet afterward Sickness, or the Approach of Death, 
may awake the Sense of a Deity, which they hop'd they had laid asleep, never to awake; and 
make the Notions and Characters which they had labourd to obliterate, as legible as ever,. " E, 2.1.2. 
65 W, vol. 6,233. 
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God through their natural faculties, but at the same time, he acknowledged that 
there would be a stage in their lives in which they would be inevitably without 
the notion of God. Hereby, he firstly created the possibility of what I will call 
the 'ignorant' atheist, an atheist who has simply not yet developed the notion of 
a God. I distinguish this kind of atheism from speculative atheism, which for 
Locke was absolutely incompatible with civil society. Locke clearly thought that 
ignorant atheists were qualitatively different from speculative atheists, and also, 
less threatening to religion and civil society than them. He wrote: 
It being less dangerous to religion in general to have men ignorant of a Deity, 
and so without any religion, than to have them acknowledge a superior Being, 
but yet to teach or allow them to neglect or refuse worshipping him in that way 
that they believe he requires, to render them acceptable to him: it being a great 
deal less fault ... to be ignorant of him, than, acknowledging a God, not to pay 
him the honour which we think due to him (emphasis added). 66 
Thus it is misleading when Waldron writes, '[a]fter all, we were all atheists once, 
says Locke', as if Locke had suggested that the two kinds of atheism were the 
same. 67 1 will show how this characterization is unhelpful especially considering 
the issue of how to treat atheists, which we shall discuss in the next section. 
Locke's rejection of innate ideas created the space for ignorant atheists. 
Although Locke maintained that people were capable of coming to the 
knowledge of God through sense experience and reason, precisely because there 
was reasoning involved, there was also scope for error. An agent could reason 
himself into believing that God did not exist, and because he could reason 
himself into believing so, he could obstinately adhere to his view. Of course, it 
was possible on earlier accounts to suggest that agents could error and even 
deny God's existence. However, innatists were able to respond by claiming that 
whatever such an agent may have been saying aloud, deep in his heart, he had 
the notion of God imprinted and thus could not have been seriously denying the 
existence of God. No longer able to adduce innate ideas, Locke was faced with 
the problem of the speculative atheist. 
66 Ibid., 233. 
67 Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 234. 
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To be sure, Locke's intention was not to encourage atheism. But in 
rejecting innate ideas, he removed the conceptual bulwark which previously 
made the denial of atheism possible, thereby casting doubt on the naturalness of 
the belief in God. Whether before or after the publication of the Letter and the 
Essay in 1689, rejecting innate ideas would have met with hostility on account 
of weakening the proof of the existence of God. According to William 
Molyneaux's observation, writing to Locke in 1696: 'He that, even ten years ago, 
should have Preachd, that the Idea Dei non est Innata [i. e. the idea of God is not 
68 innate], Had certainly drawn on him the Character of an Atheist'. Still in 1697, 
to argue against the innate idea of God was received with hostility: against 
Locke's design to prove that there was no innate idea of God, Stillingfleet, now 
the bishop of Worcester, argued: 
But doth not this [i. e. to argue against the innate idea of God] however take off 
from the force of an Argument some have used to perswade Men that there is a 
God [i. e. universal consent]? I meddle not with Innate Ideas; but have not some 
Persons of Note, in these Matters, used the Argument from the Mark and 
Character of God imprinted on the Minds of Men to prove his Being? And have 
you not set your self to disprove it? 69 
William Sherlock equated Locke's Essay to 'the Old Atheistick 
Hypothesis, which banishes Original Mind and Wisdom out of the World, and 
therefore not the Maker of it'. 'o And 'when Men who profess to believe a God 
and another World, advance such Principles as tend to overturn, or at least very 
much weaken the Belief of both, it is fitting upon such an Occasion, to consider 
what they have to say'. 71 Stillingfleet and Sherlock's criticism makes clear that 
68 Corr., 213 1, vol. v, 702. But by this time, Bentley and Whiston were 'very large upon it [the 
rejection of innate ideas]'. Also by this time, an abridgement of the Essay was making its way 
into the Oxford curriculum. Corr., 1887, vol. v, 351. Yet significantly, the first book, which 
attacked the idea of innate ideas, was abridged. This may suggest that there was still resistance 
against the polemic against innatism amongst the Oxford dons. See G. A. J. Rogers's 
'Introduction' to An Abridgement of Mr Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding 
(Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990). 
69 Edward Stillingfleet, The Bishop of Worcester's Answer's to Mr Locke's Letter (London, 
1697), 90. 
70 Corr., 2202, vol. vi, 5; William Sherlock, A Discourse concerning the Happiness of Good Men (London, 1704), 124. 
71 Sherlock, A Discourse concerning the Happiness, 124-5. 
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writers were profoundly suspicious of arguments that took away the building 
blocks of the naturalness of the belief in God. 
Perhaps one of the severest criticisms levelled against Locke (although 
he did not live to see it) was by the third Earl of Shaftesbury, the grandson of 
Locke's patron the First Earl of Shaftesbury. According to Shaftesbury, writing 
to a young prot6g6 in 1709, though he could attest to Locke's 'Sincerity as a 
most zealous Christian and Believer', it was not, as it was commonly supposed, 
Hobbes, but Locke who had destroyed the foundation of morality. For 
Shaftesbury, Locke 'struck the home Blow'. Hobbes's 'Character and base 
slavish Principles in Government took off the poyson of his Philosophy'. But 
Locke 'struck at all Fundamentals, threw all Order and Virtue out of the World, 
and made the very Ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) 
unnatural, and without Foundation in our Minds'. 
innate is a word he poorly plays upon; the right word, though less used, is 
connatural. For what has birth or progress of the foetus out of the womb to do 
in this case? The question is not about the time the ideas entered, or the moment 
that one body came out of the other, but whether he constitution of man be such 
that, being adult and grown up, at such or such a time, sooner or later (no 
matter when), the idea and sense of order, administration, and a God , will not 
infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him. 
Shaftesbury observed that Locke, 'who had more Faith, and was more leam'd in 
Modem Wonder-writers [i. e. the travel literature], than in Antient philosophy, 
gave up an Argument for the Deity, which CICERO (tho' a profess'd Sceptick) 
would not explode'. The upshot of Shaftesbury's criticism of Locke was that in 
rejecting innate ideas, he had effectively made the notion of God unnatural, 
thereby destroying the foundation of morality and advancing the cause of moral 
relativism and atheism. 72 
72 See Shaftesbury's Several Letters Written by a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the Universit 
.Y (London, 1716), 39-40. This is also reprinted in The Life, Unpublished Letters, and the 
Philosophical Regimen ofAnthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. B. Rand (London, 1900), 403-5. Cf. 
ibid., 4-5. In a previous letter dated 24 February 1706/7, Shaftesbury did speak favourably of 
Locke's Essay. 'HOWEVEP, I am not sorry, that I lent You Mr. LOCKE'S Essay of Human Understanding; which may as well qualify for Business and the World, as for the Sciences and a University. No one has done more towards the Recalling of Philosophy firom Barbarity, into Use 
and Practice of the World, and into the Company of the better and politer Sort; who might well 
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We have now seen how Locke created the conceptual problem of the 
speculative atheist and the critical responses it would attract. The question then 
is: how did he deal with it? This is the subject of the next section. 
2. Locke's Response to Speculative Atheism 
In the previous section, we saw that a consideration of Locke's wider thought 
enabled us to see a unique aspect of his discussion of atheism. We saw how in 
rejecting innate ideas, Locke also created the conceptual problem of speculative 
atheism. For many intellectuals in the seventeenth century, this problem did not 
arise because they, unlike Locke, postulated that the idea of God was innate. 
Without innate ideas, Locke had to entertain the possibility that people could 
reason themselves into atheism. In other words, because he could not adduce 
innate ideas, speculative atheism was a genuine problem for him. 
The question I will investigate in this section is this. Given that Locke 
created the problem of speculative atheism, how did he think that it should be 
dealt with? We know from the Letter that Locke thought that atheism was 
absolutely incompatible with civil society, and thus, argued that it was not to be 
tolerated by the magistrate. But what exactly did 'not to be tolerated" entail? As 
I have noted at the outset of this chapter, modem commentators have been 
perplexed as to what exactly Locke thought we ought to do with atheists. 
Now, much of what Locke did say about atheism may initially give the 
impression that in his view, atheists were to be treated violently and harshly. His 
tone was usually impatient and potentially destructive. In A Vindication of the 
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke maintained that atheism was a 'crime', 
which, 'for its madness as well as guilt, ought to shut a man out of all sober and 
civil society'. 73 He frequently compared those who disbelieved in the existence 
of God and the law of nature to 'brutes' or 'wild beasts'. In the Essay, he wrote 
that nobody is 'so brutish as to deny' that 'God has given a Rule whereby Men 
should govern themselves'; and indeed, that it was a surprise that 'a whole 
Nation of Men should be any where found so brutish, as to want the Notion of a 
be ashamed of it in its other Dress. No one has opened a better or clearer Way to Reasoning. 
And above all, I wonder to hear him censured so much by any Church of ENGLAND-Men, for 
advancing Reason, and bringing the Use of it so much into Religion; when it is by this only that 
we fight against the Enthusiasts, and repel the great Enemies of our Church'. " W, vol. 7,162. 
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74 God'. In 'An Essay', he asserted that without the belief of a deity, 'a man is to 
be counted noe other then one of the most dangerous sorts of wild beasts & soe 
uncapeable of all societie. 75 And if we consider the fact that in the Two 
Treatises, Locke argued that one who has renounced 'Reason, the common Rule 
and Measure, God hath given to Mankind', may be destroyed as a 'wild Savage 
Beast', we might well speculate that Locke thought that atheists, whom he 
equated with wild beasts, should be destroyed. 76 
As far as the secondary literature is concerned, however, although 
atheists lose the great majority of human rights, and their belief (or disbelief) is 
to be suppressed by the magistrate, there is no explicit indication that atheists 
were to be treated like warmakers, who were also compared to wild beasts, or 
that they could be slaughtered at Will. 77 But beyond this point, commentators 
have struggled to say anything constructive. 
In what follows, I will show how a holistic consideration of Locke's 
thought, particularly a consideration of his often neglected (that is, in the context 
of a discussion about atheism) writings on education and the conduct of the 
understanding, can help to shed light on the question of the treatment of 
atheists . 
78 We shall see that for Locke, atheism was an indication of people 
failing to use their faculties properly. His response was therefore to show how 
one's faculties could be trained through education. As the secondary literature 
suggests, there is no indication of bigotry on Locke's part and indeed, I will 
show that when coercion is hinted, there was an educative purpose behind it 
74 E, 2.28.8; 1.4.9. 
75 ETol, 308. 
76 7TG, 11.11. 
77 Dunn, 'What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke? ', 19; 
Simmons, On the Edge ofAnarchy, 127n; Vernon, The Career of Toleration, 147. 
78 There is a manuscript entitled 'Deus' dated 1696 which I want to take note here. Ms. Locke 
c. 28, fols. 119-20. In this manuscript, Locke examined the validity of Descartes's proof of the 
being of God against the atheists. According to Locke, the atheists -a reference to Hobbes and 
the Hobbists - were not questioning the existence of an eternal Being, but suggesting that this 
Being was a 'Sensless material Substance'. After pointing out the deficiencies of Descartes's 
proof of the being of God from the idea of necessary existence as a response to the atheists, 
Locke argued as follows: 'internall perception self consiousnesse or intuition from whence 
therefore may be drawn by a traine of Ideas the Surest and most incontestible proof of the 
Existence of God'. This is a revealing passage and one which seems useful and relevant in an investation about Locke's conceptual response to speculative atheism. An examination of this 
manuscript is surely an important element in a holistic investigation and I consider this a complementary project to mine. However, in this chapter, I focus on the role of education in Locke's dealing with the problem of speculative atheism to bring to light, in the limited space of the chapter, one neglected aspect of Locke's thought which shows how a seemingly peripheral 
area of his thought may help to shed light on his wider intellectual concerns. 
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(whether this is of any comfort to the modem day atheist reading Locke is a 
different matter). 
I will first consider how, on Locke's account, atheists become atheists, 
that is, given their natural faculties, how do they go wrong? I will then consider 
Locke's response to this problem. Finally, I will say something about Locke's 
general terseness about the issue of atheism. 
3. The Atheist becomes an Atheist 
In reconstructing a story about Locke's discussion about atheism, two of his 
later works are of particular interest: namely, Locke's Some Thoughts 
concerning Education, which was published in 1693 but written from 1684 for 
Edward Clarke, giving recommendations as to how to rear and educate his 
young son, and his Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which was published 
posthumously but was written in 1697 as it was originally intended to be a 
chapter in the Essay. What kind of story do these works tell about how Locke 
thought atheists became atheists? The general story developed by Locke 
suggests that he thought atheists were simply people who were lazy and did not 
use their faculties properly. 
In his Conduct of the Understanding, Locke argued that besides one's 
professional calling, everyone 'has a concern in a future life which he is bound 
to look after' . 
79 Religion is man's 'calling as he is a man in the world'. 80 Thus, 
'it mightily lies upon him to understand and reason right': he 'cannot be excused 
from understanding the words and framing the general notions relating to 
religion right'. 81 Locke believed that 'everyone has enough to get as much 
knowledge as is required and expected of him, and he that does not that is in 
love with ignorance and is accountable for it'. 82 Locke saw no reason for 'the 
meaner sort of people' to give themselves up to a 'brutish stupidity' in their 
tnearest concernment'. He noted that the Huguenot peasantry - whose plight he 
reckoned to be much worse than the 'day-labourers in England' - demonstrated 
splendid competence 'to learn to understand their religious duties', possibly 
79 CU, 8. 
So Ibid., 19. 
" Ibid., 8. 
112 Ibid., 37. 
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surpassing those of a 'higher condition' among the English population. 83 The 
English and Europeans were particularly fortunate, on Locke's account, because 
Christianity was very much a part of their everyday life. Divine revelation was 
in a hand's reach. The 'one day of seven, besides other days of rest' allows 
enough time for people to set their mind on their religious duties, if they 
would but make use of these vacancies from their daily labour and apply 
themselves to an improvement of knowledge with much diligence as they often 
do to a great many other things that are useless, and had but those that would 
enter them according to their several capacities in a right way to this 
knowledge. 84 
In short, Locke's point was that 'any human being who cared enough about the 
goal and took sufficient trouble could reconstruct themselves to do S09.85 
As with the expectation that all should be religious beings, Locke had the 
same expectation for people doing theology, that is, natural theology. Theology, 
a science 'incomparably above the rest', contains 'the knowledge of God and 
His creatures, our duty to Him and our fellow creatures and a view of our 
present and future state'. It is 
the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end, i. e. the 
honour and veneration of the Creator and the happiness of mankind. This is that 
noble study which is every man's duty and everyone that can be called a 
rational creature is capable of. " 
As we can see, Locke was saying that one who could not gather the minimal 
knowledge of one's natural duties to God was simply not using his faculties 
properly. 'We are born. to be, if we please, rational creatures', Locke said; but lit 
is use and exercise only that makes us so, and we are indeed so no further than 
industry and application has carried us'. 87 As Geraint Parry notes, 'proper use', 
83 ibid., 8; John Dunn, 'Bright Enough for All Our Purposes: John Locke's Conception of a Civilized Society', Notes and Records ofthe Royal Society 43 (1989): 143. 
" CU, 8; see also, E, 4.20-3. 
85 Dunn, 'Bright Enough for All Our Purposes', 143. 
86 CU, 23. 
87 Ibid., 6. 
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for Locke, implies 'consistency and industry'. 88 Thus, the problem with the 
atheists on Locke's account was that they are lazy when it comes to the care of 
their souls. 
Locke identified three 'miscarriages' of which people could be guilty in 
relation to the use of their reason. 89 First, there were those who hardly reasoned 
at all and followed the paths laid down by others. This was a fault Locke 
observed in Catholics. " Secondly, there were those who put passion in the place 
of reason. This was a fault the enthusiasts made. 
91 Thirdly, there were those who 
sincerely attempted to reason, but were nonetheless misled because they lacked 
a full view of all that pertained to that which was the subject of inquiry. This 
partiality to opinions was prejudicial to knowledge and improvement. 92 Because 
6everyone in his private affairs uses some sort of reasoning', he tends to be 
denominated as being 'reasonable'. However, that 'one who is found reasonable 
in one thing is reasonable in all' was, for Locke, a false inference. Locke 
remarked: 
it is true that he who can reason today about one sort of matters cannot at all 
reason today about others, though perhaps a year hence he may. But wherever a 
man's rational faculty fails him and will not serve him to reason, there we 
cannot say he is rational, how capable soever he may be by time and exercise to 
become so'. 93 
Impartiality in one's enquiry was not easy, Locke admitted, but it was 'the right 
way to truth', which people 'must follow who will deal fairly with their own 
understandings and their own SOUIS9.94 
The timing of the Conduct of Understanding suggests that it was this 
third miscarriage that Locke thought that the atheist was guiltY of committing. It 
is well-known that Locke took particular interest in the case of the Scottish 
8B Geraint Parry, John Locke (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1978), 42. 
89 CU, 3. 
90 LcT, 49-5 1; E, 4.20.10; Philippus van Limborch, 'Extracts from A Compleat System, or Body 
ofDivinity', in John Locke and Christianity, ed. Victor Nuovo (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), 
63-4. 
91 E, 4.19. 
' CU, 22. 
9' Ibid., 6. 
94 Ibid., 35. 
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student Thomas Aikenhead 'the Atheist', who was executed for blasphemy on 8 
January, 1697.95 Reflections upon this incident may well have prompted Locke 
to write the Conduct of the Understanding in early April 1697.96 We know from 
his correspondence with James Johnston, Secretary of State for Scotland from 
1691 to 1696, that Locke avidly collected documents and papers pertaining to 
this trial. 97 His collection included the 'Paper', which gave an account by 
Aikenhead himself of 'how he had arrived at his sceptical opinions'. Importantly, 
the 'Paper' stressed 'his insatiable inclination to truth. Contemporary witnesses 
also testified . that Aikenhead was 'not vicious, and extreamly studious'. 
98 
Aikenhead allegedly derived his thoughts by the reading of 'some atheistical 
books', perhaps provided by his colleague Mungo Craig. Locke's comments in 
the Conduct of Understanding suggest that he had in mind somebody like 
Aikenhead, who had a strong passion for truth, yet nonetheless reasoned himself 
into atheism. The Conduct of Understanding suggests that Locke would have 
applauded Aikenhead's courage to investigate the truth and fight against 
received opinions and dogmatism. 99 But he wrote: 'We should contend earnestly 
for the truth, but we should first be sure that it is truth, or else we fight against 
God, who is the God of truth; and 'the reason why some men of study and 
thought that reason right and are the lovers of truth do make no great advances 
in their discoveries' is because 'they converse but with one sort of men' and 
, they read but one sort of books'. 100 The lack of impartiality was, for Locke, a 
fault, and a fault which, as the Aikenhead case showed, could lead to atheism. 
95 Michael Hunter, 'Aikenhead the Atheist: The Context and Consequences of Articulate 
Irreligion in the Late Seventeenth Century', in Atheism from the Reformation to the 
Enlightenment, eds. Michael Hunter and David Wootton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992). Another marginal case of heterodoxy in which Locke took an interest was the German 
Balthasar Bekker, a minister of the Public Church in Amsterdam, who was accused of 
undermining the authenticity of Scripture and being an 'advocate of atheism, for denying the 
influence of evil spirits. Corr., 1409, vol. iv, 294-301. 
96 Corr., 2243, vol. vi, 87 (10 April 1697). '1 have lately got a little leisure to think of some 
additions to my book, against the next edition, and within these few days have fallen upon a 
subject that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, 
the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of 
the chapter will be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I 
imagine it will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay'. 97 Corr., 2207, vol. vi, 17-19 (27 February 1697). See list of documents on page 17. 98 Hunter, 'Aikenhead the Atheist', 230. 
99 CU, I I. 
"0 Ibid., 11; 3. 
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We now have a general idea of Locke's explanation of how atheists 
became what they were, that is, deniers of the being of a God: namely that they 
were partial and lazy when it came to examining about their natural religious 
duties qua man. Let us now take some time to inquire further into the question 
of what, on Locke's account, the cause of atheism was. For Locke, the mind was 
something that needed to be 'set right', so that 'on all Occasions it may be 
disposed to consent to nothing, but what may be suitable to the Dignity and 
Excellency of a rational Creature'. 101 From this claim, we might expect some 
kind of causal story of the development of misguided minds, i. e. of the atheists. 
But 'one feature of a growth theory that Locke does little to delineate, as John 
and Jean Yolton, the modem editors of Locke's Some Thoughts observe, 'is the 
acquisition of beliefs'. 102 Indeed, this is a ftustrating reality for the student of 
Locke. However, I will show that a closer examination of his writings on 
education reveals how he thought atheists acquired an unfavourable habit of 
reasoning. 
In Locke's view, the education children receive from their parents plays 
a significant part in the beliefs they acquire and the ways in which they learn to 
reason. In the Two Treatises, Locke argued that parents have a duty to take care 
of their children during their 'imperfect state', and 'inform the Mind and govern 
the Actions of their yet ignorant Nonage, till Reason shall take its place'. 103 
However, after the child reaches the age of reason, he is free and is on equal 
status as his father. 104 To let the child yield to 'an unrestraind Liberty, before he 
has Reason to guide him' is not to make him free, but contrariwise, 'to thrust 
him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much 
beneath that of a Man, as theirs'. 105 
It is important to register the point that for Locke, '[tlo guide one's self 
by the law of nature and reason is not merely to live an orderly and virtuous life: 
it is to have the very essence of humanity'. 106 From what we have seen in 
Chapter One, for Locke, God was the author of the law of nature and reason, and 
so, being a 'man' in his terms implied that one acknowledged His existence. 
101 STE, 31. 
'02 John W. and Jean S. Yolton, 'Introduction', in STE, 39. 
103 7TG, 11.58. 
104 Ibid., 59. 
'05 Ibid., 63. 
106 Yolton and Yolton, 'Introduction', 25. 
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Thus, in A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke 
asserted: 'As men, we have God for our King, and are under the law of reason; 
and so 'he that believes one eternal, invisible God, his Lord and King, ceases 
thereby to be an atheist' (emphasis added). 107 In this light, we see that education, 
that is, teaching how to reason properly, literally 'humanizes' the chiid. 108We 
see that much responsibility ties with parents and educators. How did Locke 
suggest they should educate their children? 
In Some Thoughts, Locke recommended that the 'true Notion of God' - 
that is, 'as of the independent Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all Things, 
from whom we receive all our Good, who loves us, and gives us all Things' - 
should be 'imprinted on' the child's mind at an early stage to secure the 
foundation of virtue-109 He advised the parents that on this occasion the child 
need only be told that God 'made and governs all Things, hears and sees every 
Thing, and does all manner of Good to those that love and obey Him'. ' 10 He 
warned that 'unseasonably' teaching more may be damaging: the nature of the 
'infinite Being' being 'incomprehensible', those 'who have not strength and 
clearness of Tbought, to distinguish between what they can and what they 
cannot know, run themselves into Superstition and Atheism, making God like 
themselves, "' or (because they cannot comprehend any thing else) none at 
all. ). 112 The child must be taught only 'as far as his Age is capable'. ' 13 Adults, 
like children, were also prone to falling into atheism by being taught things 
above their strength: As early as 1667, Locke had conjectured that 
the defineing & undertakeing to prove severall. doctrines which are confesd to 
be incomprehensible & to be noe otherwise knowne but by revelation, & 
'07 W, vol. 7,229. 
10' Yolton and Yolton, 'Introduction', 25; see also John W. Yolton, Locke: An Introduclion 
(oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 37. 
109 STE, 136. 
"o Ibid., 136. 
"I one major problem Locke had with polytheism was that it made the gods essentially human. 
ELN, 175. polytheism was for Locke essentially the same as atheism. 
112 STE9 136. Similar ideas can be found in the additional chapter 'Of Association of Ideas' in 
the Essay: 'Let custom from the very Childhood have joind Figure and Shape to the idea of God, and what Absurdities will that Mind be liable to about the DeityT. E, 2.33.17. 113 STE, 139. 
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rcquireing men to assent to them in the termes proposd by the Doctors of your 
severall churches, must needs make a great many atheists. 114 
As it was the case with teaching basic natural theology, Locke cautioned 
parents to take extra care with the method of teaching Christianity, lest it led to 
irreligion. 115 Children should learn the Lord's Prayer, the Creeds, and Ten 
Commandments 'perfectly by heart'. 116 They should also read the Bible (and 
perhaps only the Bible until they are ready to read Cicero's On Duties) . 
11 7 
However, Locke went far as to say that 'the promiscuous reading of it [sc. the 
Bible] through, by Chapters, as they lie in order, is so far from being of any 
Advantage to Children' for 'principling their Religion, that perhaps a worse 
could not be found'. He went on to say that he was 'apt to think, that this in 
some Men has been the very Reason, why they never had clear and distinct 
Thoughts of it all their Life-time'. 11 8 
The passages we have just been looking at are tremendously important 
because they give us a vivid idea of how Locke thought that people fell into 
atheism. To sum up, Locke's claim was that excessive attempts to reason about 
God's nature (i. e. engaging in complicated natural theology) at a premature 
stage could lead to a false notion of God or even atheism itself Locke intimated 
that the causes of this excessive reasoning were internal and external to the 
individual. The internal cause was 'curiosity'. Concerning curiosity, Locke 
remarked that it should be 'as carefully cherished in Children, as other Appetites 
suppressed'. 119 On Locke's account, therefore, the parents have a great 
responsibility to inform the child of what they want to know, but not to give 
them more than they can take in. Excessive curiosity may be one of many biases 
in the child's natural tempers, which he may be unavoidably born with; and 
Geither to take off, or counter-balance' these natural inclinations was the 
'Business of Education. 120 The external cause was the religious and educational 
114 ETol, 302. 
115 STE, 158. 
116 Ibid., 157. 
117 Ibid., 185. 
"8 Ibid., 158. 
119 Ibid., 108. 
120 Ibid., 139. 
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environment in which the child happened to be placed. Parents, tutors, and local 
priests may overzealously introduce religious doctrines to a child. 
We may infer from the above consideration that on Locke's account, the 
inquisitive but ignorant reasoning of a child could become the arrogant and 
stubborn reasoning of an adult. Because his beliefs were instilled in childhood, 
and 'riveted there by long Custom and Education', he was inclined to think that 
these beliefs were innate principles. Once this has happened, Locke observed, it 
was 'beyond all possibility of being pull'd out again'. 12 1 Because such a person 
has absolute faith in his reasoning, he will abandon the passion for truth and 
further inquiry, and will fail to see that his knowledge was partial. At this point, 
he becomes a stubborn speculative atheist, one that is truly menacing to civil 
society. His false reasoning, his failure to come to the knowledge of God and the 
law of nature renders him a 'madman' and one who ought never to have been set 
free from parental government. 122 
4. Treatment of Atheists 
We have now seen how on Locke's account, an atheist becomes an atheist. Next, 
I will consider how Locke thought atheists should be treated. In considering how 
Locke thought we should deal with atheists, we need to distinguish between the 
ignorant atheist - that is, an atheist by virtue of his unavoidable ignorance in 
nonage or an atheist by virtue of not yet having seriously contemplated his 
religious duties - and the speculative atheist. As we saw above, from what 
Locke said in the Third Letter, the ignorant atheist was less damaging to religion 
and less faulty than a hypocritical worshipper. The Conduct of the 
Understanding advanced a view consistent with this. Here, Locke wrote: 'it 
being of worse consequence to steer one's thoughts by a wrong rule than to have 
none at all, error doing to busy men much more harm than ignorance to the slow 
and sluggish'. "' For Locke, it was imperative that one guided oneself by the 
right rule, namely the law of nature and reason. Those transgressing the law of 
nature declared themselves 'to live by another Rule, than that of reason and 
common Equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of Men, for 
121 E, 4.20.9. 
ln Ibid., 2.11.13,2.33.4; W, vol. 7,162; 77G, 11.60. 
123 CU, 13. 
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their mutual security'; and thus, a man 'becomes dangerous to Mankind'. 124 The 
speculative atheist did just this. The speculative atheist was one who 'rationally' 
reached the wrong conclusion that God does not exist, and obstinately held fast 
to this view. This was the atheist as such and the truly intolerable atheist. As we 
shall see, Locke differentiated the way in which we should treat the ignorant 
atheist and the speculative atheist. Here, 'obstinacy' is the key word. 
Locke's response to children and 'very mean' people, that is, those who 
fit the description of the ignorant atheists was patient. In a discussion of 
correcting the child, he remarked in Some Thoughts: 
Nor is that hastily to be interpreted obstinacy, or wilfullness, which is the 
natural product of age or temper. In such miscarriages they are to be assisted, 
and helped towards amendment, as weak people under a natural infirmity; 
which though they are warned of, yet every relapse must not be counted a 
perfect neglect. 125 
In the case of the 'very mean' people, Locke considerately argued: 'they would 
be found not to want understanding fit to receive the knowledge of religion, if 
they were a little encouraged and helped in it as they should be. 126 
But his attitude was much more impatient with the stubborn speculative 
atheist. Because the stubborn atheist was convinced that his or her own rule is 
right, he or she was of much worse consequence than one who was merely 
ignorant of the rule of reason. In the Essay, Locke suggested that it was 
commendable that the magistrate should suppress atheism: 
we should have too much Reason to fear, that many, in more civilized 
Countries, have no strong, and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds; 
and that the Complaints of Atheism, made from the Pulpit, are not without 
Reason. And though only some profligate Wretches own it too barefacedly 
now; yet, perhaps, we should hear, more than we do, of it, from others, did not 
the fear of the Magistrate's Sword, or the Neighbour's Censure, tie up Peoples 
124 7TG, 11.8. 
125 STE, 80. 
126 CU, 8. 
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Tongues; which, were the Apprehensions of Punishment, or Shame taken away, 
would openly proclaim their Atheism, as their Lives do. 127 
This way of dealing with the atheist is strikingly similar to the way he dealt with 
the obstinate child in Some Thoughts. 128 Locke was famously against whipping 
as a means of education. But there was 'one Fault' which he thought it 
appropriate to whip the child: 'Obstinacy or Rebellion'. Stubbornness, and an 
obstinate disobedience 'must be master'd with Force and Blows: For there is no 
other Remedy'. 129 
However, Locke insisted that the 'shame of Whipping, and not the Pain, 
should be the greatest part of the Punishment'. 130 Locke was well aware of 
people's inclination to seek the approbation of others while shunning anything 
that might bring shame upon them. Locke's approval of the use of shame against 
atheists was no coincidence. Thus, it is extremely unhelpful when Waldron 
deleted the references to public opinion and 'shame', and focused exclusively on 
the magistrate's sword. 131 One of Locke's arguments in the Letter is that force 
cannot change people's inward persuasion. 132 Though Locke later conceded 
through his exchange with Jonas Proast that force did have an effect on belief, 
he still resolutely believed that it was likely only to produce hypocrisy. This is 
where public opinion played a crucial role. The uniqueness of Some Thoughts 
was with its use of the agent's desire for approbation as a means to create virtue 
within the agent. 133 Although reputation is 'not the true Principle and Measure 
of Vertue', it is nevertheless that 'which comes nearest to it,. 134 By deploying 
shame, Locke tried to motivate the atheists to turn their eyes to their primary 
duty as men. The fact that people were moved by esteem was distasteful for 
Locke, but he took this disposition to his advantage and used it for his 
purpose. 135 For coercion, in the end, may only make the atheist a hypocrite. 136 
127 Et 1.4.8. 
128 STE, 78-80. 
129 Ibid., 78. 
"0 Ibid., 78. 
I" Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 234. 
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133 Ian Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
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Unless atheists are genuinely brought out of their misconception, there remained' 
a grave danger to civil society. 137 Locke seems to have taken seriously the idea 
that 'A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump' (Gal 5: 9). He would have been 
all the more certain about this when he immersed himself in the study of Paul's 
epistles. In this work, he paraphrased: 'the influence of one man enterteind 
among you may mislead you all'. 138 That there were people who sincerely 
denied God's existence 'though but even in thought' was an alarming situation. 
The atheist needed either to be corrected or hindered from voicing his opinion in 
public - more so, if his argument had the appearance of rationality, or perhaps 
even more so, if he was a gentleman. For Locke wrote: 'For if those of that Rank 
[sc. Gentlemen] are by their Education once set right, they will quickly bring all 
the rest into Order'. Surely this logic could work for the worse. 139 
5. Locke's Brevity 
This last point about the impact of public opinion brings us to the question about 
the peculiar brevity of Locke's discussion of atheism. Compared to his 
contemporaries who dealt with the problem of atheism extensively, Locke said 
very little explicitly about it. This seems odd given the importance he clearly 
attached to the problem of atheism. In light of the considerations hitherto, I will 
consider the reasons that may have been behind his terseness. 
We have seen above that Locke's rejection of innate ideas created the 
ignorant atheist and thereby the possibility of the speculative atheist. Given that 
the idea of God was not innate, there was a possibility that people could 
genuinely reason themselves into atheism, that is, deny the being of a God. 
Locke's own philosophical commitment showed that speculative atheism was 
possible, but it would not have been a problem to which he would want to draw 
"' A crucial point highlighted in the recantation of Daniel Scargill, a professed atheist and Hobbist was that 'recanting Hobbists are intrinsically unreliable'. Recantation 'was always a flawed punishment for a Hobbist, because Hobbes had famously suggested that under the order 
of the civil magistrate it was permissible to give an external profession without actually 
internally subscribing to the view expressed'. Jon Parkin, 'Hobbism in the Later 1660s: Daniel 
Scargill and Samuel Parker', Historical Journal 42 (1999): 95. 
"' Once oath taking (and the like) is 'looked on as Formalities of Law', or once 'Custom of 
straining Truth' has 'dipt Men in Pedury, and guilt with Temptation has spread it self very wide, 
and made it almost fashionable in some Cases, it will be impossible for the Society ... to subsist'. M, 213. 
138 PaN, 151. 
139 STE, 'Epistle Dedicatory'. Cf. David Wootton, 'Introduction', Political Writings 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 109. 
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attention. We have seen that, for many seventeenth century intellectuals, 
opening up the possibility of speculative atheism would cast doubt on the 
naturalness of the notion of God and with it, morality and religion. Thus, one 
reason Locke did not address the issue of atheism at length may have been to 
avoid drawing attention to the possibility of atheism itself. 
Connectedly, and perhaps more crucially, Locke may have avoided an 
extensive discussion of atheism because he did not want people to think that 
speculative atheism was a respectable opinion that could be embraced. A serious 
refutation of atheism could have the unintended effect of providing ammunition 
against religion and theology. If Locke, a gentleman, took up atheism as an 
opinion requiring serious refutation, it would give it undesirable respectability as 
a view that one could rationally and seriously entertain, or at least, something 
worth reflecting upon. 
This thesis is all the more plausible given the example of Ralph 
Cudworth. As I have noted above, Cudworth wrote the True Intellectual System 
wherein he refuted the 'reason and philosophy' of atheism. However, he 
desisted from publishing the second part of the True Intellectual System because 
the first part had undesirably given ammunition to atheistic arguments in 
extensively discussing it. 140 Indeed, Henry Atherton, possibly with Cudworth in 
mind, observed that: 
those very Arguments which have been made use of to confute one Atheist, 
have made twenty; for the less curious and examining (which certainly arc far 
the greater number) seeing learned persons start so many difficulties, and spend 
so much time and labour in the Argumentative part to convince, do from thence 
conclude that the thing is at least dubious. "' 
If atheism was out for serious public scrutiny, Locke feared, given the force of 
public opinion, it could gain currency. Therefore, atheism could not be treated 
seriously. 142 
140 William Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated, 2 Vols. (London, 1742), 11, x- 
xii; Berman, A History ofAtheism in Britain, 62-3; Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, 334. 
141 Henry Atherton, The Christian Physician (London, 1683), 4. 
142 Wootton, 'Introduction', 109. 
217 
The narrative of Locke's terseness concerning atheists parallels his 
terseness concerning Hobbes. As we have seen, rejecting traditional arguments 
for theism in favour of new ones was seen as compromising theism itself and a 
vindication of atheism. Likewise, departing from traditional ways of thinking 
and sharing many similar conceptual resources with Hobbes, Locke would have 
wanted to avoid drawing attention to these similarities to avoid incurring the 
charge of atheism with which Hobbes was associated. Moreover, a serious 
rebuttal of Hobbes would effectively draw attention to his arguments rather than 
discrediting them. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I examined the development of Locke's discussion of atheism. 
Locke's view on atheism has usually been treated dismissively by modem 
commentators and brushed aside as an anomalous reproduction of an erroneous 
seventeenth century commonplace by an otherwise liberal (even on modem 
standards) thinker. Moreover, the fact that he, unlike his contemporaries, did not 
discuss this important issue at length seemed to confirm that he had not 
seriously reflected upon it. 
The purpose of this chapter was to show through a holistic analysis that 
there is a more complicated intellectual story behind Locke's discussion of 
atheism. I showed how a holistic analysis could help us to learn more about 
Locke's views on atheism in general, that is, what exactly Locke's atheists 
believed or disbelieved, how they became what they were, and how Locke 
thought we should deal with them. Previous scholarship had struggled to say 
anything concrete about these issues not least because of the paucity of 
information provided by Locke in his writings about toleration. However, a 
consideration of his often neglected writings on education and the conduct of the 
understanding suggested that there was a sophisticated intellectual story behind 
his view on atheism. One of the ways in which atheists could become atheists 
was through partiality in their consideration. The causes of this may also be 
multiple, but one was getting involved in difficult considerations about the deity 
when one was still intellectually unprepared. Locke distinguished between the 
ignorant and speculative atheists, and offered different ways in which we should 
treat them. Concerning the ignorant atheist, it was suggested that the educator be 
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patient and gradually train the atheist in the skills needed to inquire into issues 
more broadly. Concerning the speculative atheist, it was suggested that they be 
treated as an obstinate child, but the punishment imposed on them stressed the 
educative purpose behind it, and used public opinion to encourage the atheist to 
rethink again. 
Through this reconsideration, the holistic perspective also helped us to 
think intelligibly about Locke's peculiar silence concerning the issue of atheism 
in general. Because Locke was aware that in denying innate ideas, he had 
created the conceptually new possibility of the speculative atheist, and because 
the existence of this possibility cast doubt on the naturalness of the idea of God, 
and in turn, on the naturalness of morality and religion, he did not want to draw 
attention to it. An extensive discussion would not only draw attention to the 
possibility of speculative atheism, but also, would also give it undue 
respectability: the fact that one had to offer an extensive argument against 
atheism would suggest that it was a view that needed to be taken seriously. 
Finally, I should like to note the implication that follows from this 
chapter concerning the coherence of Locke's thought. Through the above 
considerations, this chapter showed how Locke pursued the implications of his 
philosophy and how this patterned the way in which he thought about the limits 
of toleration. It also showed how Locke's politics centred on the notion of a God 
and how education could be both the problem and remedy of fostering that 
notion. In other words, this chapter showed, contrary to the almost universally 
held view that Locke never seriously reflected on the problem of atheism, that 
he did think hard about this problem, and that he did so in a way that connected 
with his wider thought. This chapter therefore helps us to appreciate that Locke 
was a much more coherent, meticulous and philosophical thinker than we have 
been encouraged to believe. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Reconciling Human Freedom and Human Sinfulness 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a particular puzzle about the 
coherence of Locke's revealed theology in relation to his wider thought. More 
specifically, it examines a puzzle about the coherence of Locke's views on 
human freedom and human sinfulness with particular reference to Locke's A 
Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul. This issue has attracted little 
attention to date, but as far as the existing literature is concerned, contextualists 
have traditionally claimed that in Locke's later theology there exists a tension 
between human freedom and human depravity. The implication of this view is 
that at the end of his life Locke came to adopt a view of human sinfulness that 
undermined the entire fabric of his thought which rested, amongst other things, 
upon the assumption that people were free and responsible agents. My aim in 
this chapter is to show through a holistic analysis that although Locke was 
convinced of human corruption, his religious thought in fact developed in a way 
that was consistent with his previous assumptions about human freedom. I will 
also suggest that this narrative may help us to see the structural anti-Ilobbism of 
Locke's thought. 
The selection of this puzzle is not without reason. First, the problem of 
human freedom in the Paraphrase is an exemplary case where a tension in 
Locke's writings is identified by a narrow contextualist approach, but which, 
through a holistic examination, can be rendered coherent. Thus, it is a case that 
shows the limits of particular methodologies and shows how the holistic 
approach can help us to see different intimations of Locke's overall coherence. 
Moreover, the Paraphrase itself has been neglected in Locke scholarship. 
This case study fills in this gap by casting light not only on the often neglected 
content of Locke's revealed theology, but also, its role in his wider thought. This 
last point is particularly significant in the context of recent studies of Locke's 
religious thought. Ever since Geraint Parry's observation in 1978 that a 
4profound study of Locke's theology [was] a striking gap in the literature', 
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numerous invaluable studies on Locke's religious thought have been published., 
However, the more recent studies on Locke's revealed theology tend to be 
narrowly focused on very specific issues, and as a result, have encouraged a 
culture which ghettoizes it from his wider thought. The example I have in mind 
is the major debate over whether Locke was a Socinian, more specifically, 
whether he was a Unitarian or not. 
2 Although such a debate is invaluable for 
making clearer judgments about Locke's religious orthodoxy (or rather, 
heterodoxy), without further explicating what the significance of his being a 
Unitarian would be for his thought as a whole, it tends to promote the idea that 
Locke's revealed theology had little, if any, impact beyond itself. 
The third and last significance of this puzzle is that it offers an 
alternative approach to the one above that tends to consider Locke's religious 
thought in isolation. The problem of human freedom provides a clear example of 
how Locke's revealed theology was connected to his wider thought, and this in 
turn helps us to see how Locke's whole intellectual system in fact developed in 
opposition to Hobbism, and not towards it. 
The traditional view concerning Locke's revealed theology is that it was 
inconsistent with his other intellectual commitments. 3 For example, David 
Wootton has suggested in his article 'John Locke: Socinian or natural law 
theoristT that from the early 1680s Locke was a fideistic Socinian for whom 
there was no universally binding moral law known to mankind before Christ, 
and therefore, knew all along that his claim for a deductive science of morality 
was 'deeply problematic and perhaps false'. On this account, Locke had 'no 
1 Geraint Parry, John Locke (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 19783,28. See for example, Arthur 
Wainwright, 'Introduction', in PaN; W. M. Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and 
Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19943; Maurice Wiles, Archel)pal 
Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); John C. Higgins- 
Biddle, 'Introduction', in RCh; Victor Nuovo, 'Locke's Theology, 1694-17041, in English 
Philosophy in the Age ofLocke, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Goko Seno, 
Rokku shukyo shiso no tenkai [The Development of Locke's Religious Thought] (Suita: Kansai 
University Press, 2005); Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundation of Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 216-3 3. 
2 John Marshall, 'Locke, Socinianism, "Socinianism7, and Unitarianism', in English Philosophy 
in the Age of Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Nuovo, 'Locke's 
Theology'. 
'Peter Laslett, 'Introduction', in TTG, 88-9; David Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural 
Law TheoristT, in Religion, Secularizzation and Political Thought. Thomas 11obbes to J. S. Mill, 
ed. James E. Crimmins (London: Routledge, 1989). However, cf Peter A. Schouls, Imposition of Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and Reasoned Freedom (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992). 
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good grounds for confidence in the natural law position adopted in the Two 
4 Treatises'. This suggestion is coupled by a further one that Locke was a 
Hobbist, albeit 'narrowly interpreted' as one denying a universally binding 
moral law, possibly by 1690, and definitely by the time he wrote his final 
5 theological work, the Paraphrase. The upshot of Wootton's argument is that 
Locke's natural law project and Socinian religious thought were at odds; that is, 
to be consistent, Locke needed either to be a natural law theorist or a fideistic 
Socinian and/or a Hobbist. However, according to Wootton, Locke seemed to 
have contented himself with believing 'different things when dealing with 
different problems'. Indeed, the 'problem of resolving the contradictions', 
Wootton suggests, may be seen as Locke's 'bequest to posterity'. 6 
Wootton illustrates the general problem that Locke's religious thought 
was inconsistent with his wider commitments. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine Locke's revealed theology through the holistic perspective and show, 
contra Wootton's general portrait of Locke, that it was consistent with his 
previous commitments. Since it is beyond this chapter to offer a general account 
of Locke's revealed theology, I will concentrate on a Particular puzzle which 
will illustrate this point most clearly. To this end, I will consider Locke 9s 
account of human freedom, and connectedly, his account of original sin and 
predestination, particularly in reference to the Paraphrase. Let us turn to the 
details of this puzzle. 
According to commentators such as Arthur Wainwright and John 
Marshall, the portrait of an incoherent Locke is reinforced when we turn to 
Locke's account of human freedom in the Paraphrase. Wainwright and 
Marshall have noted that Locke's account of human freedom advanced in this 
work is at odds with his account in the Essay concerning Human 
Understanding. 7 In their view, the account articulated in the Paraphrase 
indicates that towards the end of his life, Locke came to adopt a deterministic 
view of human sinfulness approaching Calvinism and Jansenism, of men and 
women woefully enslaved by sin. Through his later exegetical studies, Locke 
was finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile his commitments to human 
4 Wootton, 'John Locke', 39. 
5 Ibid., 43. 
6 Ibid., 61. 
7 Wainwright, 'Introduction', 56-7 and Marshall, John Locke, 432-4. 
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freedom and natural jurisprudence with Pauline theology. The implication of 
Wainwright and Marshall's account is profound: if Locke was adopting this 
grim view of human freedom and sinfulness, it meant he was rejecting his 
commitment to human freedom which was underwriting not only his morals and 
natural jurisprudence, but also his anti-Calvinistic liberal theology until that 
point. Thus, Wainwright and Marshall's account of Locke in the Paraphrase 
confirms Wootton's thought that Locke was an incoherent thinker. 
In this chapter, I will re-examine Locke's discussion of human freedom 
in the second edition of the Essay (and onwards) and the philosophical exchange 
between Locke and Philippus van Limborch in the early 1700s. This holistic 
examination of Locke's thought will show that Wainwright and Marshall's 
account was based on a narrow reading of Locke's concept of will, and 
moreover, show, contra Wainwright and Marshall, that Locke's account of 
human freedom in the Paraphrase was consistent with his Essay. I will therefore 
show through this analysis that Locke's revealed theology was very much in line 
with his previous commitments, thereby suggesting that Wootton's portrait of 
Locke misrepresents the nature of Locke's religious thought. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. After discussing Locke's 
commitment to human freedom, I will examine Locke's account of original sin 
articulated in his religious writings and manuscripts and consider how this 
account reflected his previous interests. I will then go on to demonstrate that the 
same is true of his account of predestination. Having shown how Locke's 
revealed theology bore the impress of his previous thought, I will go on to 
examine the problematic statements in the Paraphrase which at first sight 
undermine his coherence. Against Wainwright and Marshall, I will show how 
Locke's account of 'uneasiness' in the Essay and his exchange with van 
Limborch on the issue of free will can offer the conceptual resources to re-read 
the Paraphrase in a different light, reconciling the tension between it and the 
Essay, and more generally, his wider thought. Finally, in the concluding section, 
I will draw out the wider implications of this chapter, noting how it can tell a 
Story not only about Locke's coherence but also how his thought developed 
systematically in opposition to Hobbes. 
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1. Locke and Human Freedom 
In this section, I will very briefly review Locke's philosophical commitment to 
human freedom and natural jurisprudence. This will help us to see more clearly, 
in the next section, how Locke's revealed theology - more specifically, his 
accounts of original sin and predestination - patterned itself after this 
commitment. It will also help us to see Locke's structural opposition to Hobbes. 
Locke believed in human freedom. This was a crucial assumption for his 
morals and natural jurisprudence. Locke believed that God created mankind and 
endowed them with a rational nature. God, being purposive, did not create men 
and women without a purpose. He bound them by a law suitable to their nature, 
i. e. the rule of morals or the law of nature, and enforced this law by meting out 
rewards and punishments in accordance with men's obedience or disobedience. 
For Locke, God was not only purposive, but also just; it followed that if He had 
put people under a law, He would also make them capable of lawful conduct. 8 
Locke believed that morality was possible only if people were free 
agents. We can reconstruct Locke's own train of thought on the relation between 
morality and free agency from a logical sequence he used in the Essay: 'Men 
shall bepunished, God the punisher, just Punishment, the Punishedguilly, could 
have done otherwise, Freedom, self-determination'. 9 Locke's logic here was that 
without human freedom, there could be no moral responsibility; without moral 
responsibility, there could be no just punishments; and without just punishments, 
there could be no morality as such, or to say the least, no point in having a law 
of morals. For Locke, God required of men 'no more than we are able to do, and 
sees what was, and what was not in our power'. 10 God's justness implied that 
people would have the necessary capability to act according to His requirements. 
Indeed, it was 'necessary', Locke maintained, 'for the vindication of God's 
justice and goodness, that those who miscarry should do so by their own fault, 
that their destruction should be from themselves, and they be left inexcusable'. ' 1 
This suggested that if there was a law of nature prescribed by God, people 
would not only be able to know the content of the law, but also be able to act 
8 ELAI, 157,199. 
9 E, 4.17.4. 
10 Ibid., 2.21.53. 
" W, vol. 6,160. 
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according to it. Human freedom was a necessary assumption for Locke's morals 
and natural jurisprudence. 
Conversely in Locke's view, those who denied human freedom made 
'Men no other than bare Machins' and took away 'all Moral Rules whatsoever', 
leaving 'not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive, 
how any thing can be capable of a Law, that is not a free Agent'. On this ground, 
the deniers 'must necessarily reject all Principles of Vertue, who cannot put 
Morality and Mechanism together; which are not very easy to be reconciled, or 
made consistent'. 12 
Locke did not explicitly say who the deniers of human freedom were, but 
his Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris's Booky suggest he had determinists like 
Hobbes and Spinoza in mind. Criticizing John Norris's claim that people were 
occasional causes for God's producing thoughts in motion in them, Locke wrote: 
A man cannot move his arm or his tongue; he has no power, only upon 
occasion, the man willing it, God moves it. The man wills, he doth something; 
or else God, upon the occasion of something, which he himself did before, 
procured this will, and this action in him. This is the hypothesis that clears 
doubts, and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinosa, by resolving 
all, even thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible fatal necessity. 13 
For Locke, human freedom upheld morals and natural jurisprudence. We shall 
see in the next section how Locke's revealed theology reflected this interest. 
2. Locke and Original Sin 
As we have seen, Locke believed in human freedom. There is a question 
whether Locke's account of human freedom was philosophically coherent or not. 
However, for the purpose of this section, it need only be said that he believed 
that people were free agents. In this section, I will consider how Locke's belief 
12 E, 1.3.14. 
13 W -6. Hobbes had maintained that every act of will was necessary, , vol. 10,255 which 
proceeded from a cause, and that cause from another, continually until it reached the first cause, 
God. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
146-7 and more generally Hobbes and Bramhall: On Liberty and Necessity, ed. Vcre Chappell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Locke was familiar with the lattcr work, which is suggested by the fact that there is a passage from this work copied in one of his interleaved 
Bibles. Higgins-Biddlc, 'Introduction', lxxxvii. 
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in human freedom was reflected in his revealed theology, starting with his 
account of original sin. 
To begin with, what was original sin? Original sin (or birth sin) usually 
referred to the involvement of all mankind, in some fashion, in the 
consequence(s) of Adam's sin. This view was regarded as orthodox in Locke's 
day, and was the position adopted by Anglicans, Puritans, and Catholics. 
Occasionally, original sin referred only to Adam's personal sin, and thus, on this 
view, there was no involvement of mankind in the consequence(s) of Adam's 
sin. This view, on the contrary, was regarded as unorthodox, and was the 
position adopted by Pelagians and Socinians. Two views were common in 
Locke's day, which opposed this latter view. Against the claim that Adam's sin 
was personal, there were those following St Augustine who argued that Adam 
sinned qua representative of mankind, and thus, that all posterity were imputed 
with the guilt of this first sin. There were those following Augustine and Calvin 
who went further and argued that human nature was corrupted after Adam's sin, 
and that all posterity inherited a sinful nature. 14 
For those who believed in human freedom, the Augustinian and 
Calvinistic account of inherited human corruption was anathema. As we shall 
see, although Locke never denied that people were sinful, he did not adduce the 
traditional explanation of inherited human depravity through original sin. Let us 
retrace his views from his earlier writings before turning to his major theological 
works, the Reasonableness of Christianity and the Paraphrase. 
The Two Tracts on Government were indeterminate about original sin. In 
the English Tract, Locke referred to the Fall in passing while making a point 
about human corruption: 'we cannot doubt there can be anything so good or 
innocent which the frail nature or improved corruption of man may not make 
use of to harm himself or is neighbour'. To this claim he added, '[e]ver since 
man first threw himself into the pollution of sin, he sullies whatever he takes 
15 into his hand' . However, although these statements show LC)cke's conviction 
in human sinfulness, they were by no means causal explanations of it. They did 
not state that people were sinful because of the Fall, only that they were sinful 
14 Gilbert Burnet, An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England (L,, ndon, 1699), 108-10. 
13 G, 155. 
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after it. Likewise, the Essays on the Law of Nature were equally inconclusive. 
Locke's only reference to the Fall in the Essays was its irrelevance as a defence 
of an innate moral law. 16 
In a letter he wrote in March 1678, Locke indirectly expressed views 
which were in opposition to original sin. Replying to Denis Grenville's question, 
whether people were obliged 'strictly and precisely at all times to doe that which 
in it self is absolutely best', Locke answered that while sometimes the best 
action was obvious and clear, in the course of daily life, God had allowed 
considerable latitude in people's actions. This was because Locke could not 
imagine that 
God who has compassion on our weaknesse and knows how we are made, 
would put pore man nay the best of men, those that seeke him with sincerity 
and truth under almost an absolute necessity of sining perpetually against him, 
which will almost inevitably follow if there be noe latitude alowed us in the 
occurrences of our lives. 17 
Likewise, in a journal entry of August 1680, reflecting on God's 
goodness and wisdom, Locke commented that he could not imagine that God 
'hath made anything with a design that it should be miserable, but that he hath 
afforded it all the means of being happy that its nature and state is capable of'. 
Moreover, he could not suppose that the exercise of God's justice 'should 
extend further than his goodness has need of it for the preservation of his 
creatures in the order and beauty of that state that he has placed each of them 
18 in' . It 
is hard to imagine how these comments, which elaborate on God's good 
will to mankind, could be compatible with a doctrine of necessary sinning. 
The whole tenor of Two Treatises of Government and Some Thoughts 
concerning Education suggests a similar opposition to original sin, or at least, to 
its effects. The Two Treaties presupposed rational people capable of morals. For 
Locke, God, having given man 'an Understanding to direct his Actions, has 
allowed him a freedom of Will, and liberty of Acting, as properly belonging 
" ELN, 139. 
17 Corr., 374, vol. i, 557. 
Is John Locke, 'The Idea We have of God', in Political Mitings, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 237-8. 
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thereunto, within the bounds of that Law he is under'. 19 Moreover, the Two 
Treatises spoke of 'the Golden Age' which existed 'before vain Ambition, and 
amor sceleratus habendi, evil Concupiscence, had corrupted Mens minds into a 
Mistake of true Power and Honour'. 20 This golden age was clearly a description 
of post-lapsarian men, given that it referred to 'Governours' and 'Subjects', i. e. 
goverment. 
Although Some Thoughts did refer to natural biases, the claim that 
education could make people 'Good or Evil, useful or not' suggested that 
whatever debility people had inherited, it was not devastating - certainly not an 
inherited necessity to sin (as the Two Tracts had referred to 'improved 
corruption'). Moreover, the suggestion that there were 'some [albeit few] Mens 
Constitutions of Body and Mind so vigorous, and well fmmed by Nature, that 
they need not much Assistance from others, but by the strength of their natural 
Genius, they are from their Cradles carried towards what is Excellent' could 
hardly be compatible with the view that all post-lapsarian men were inclined to 
nothing but evil. 21 
Thus, it is not hard to imagine, given the general direction of his views 
so far, that when Locke came to write about the Fall more explicitly and 
extensively in his major theological work the Reasonableness of Christianity, 
his account would reflect his previous views and reject the doctrine of total 
human corruption. 
In the 'Preface' to the Reasonableness, Locke revealed that it was the 
'little Satisfaction and Consistency' he had found 'in most of the Systems of 
Divinity' which had driven him to a consideration of the Christian religion 
through 'the sole Reading of the Scripture'. 22 The central question that the 
Reasonableness addressed was that of the faith required for justification and 
salvation. For Locke, it was obvious from the New Testament that this question 
presupposed that people were in a state from which they were in need of being 
restored and saved. Thus, before considering what Jesus Christ had restored, 
Locke turned to consider what people had lost by Adam's Fall. 23 
" 7TG, 11.58. 
20 Ibid., II. I 11. 
21 sm i. 
22 RCh, 3. 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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Locke maintained that it was clear to an 'unbiassed' reader of the 
Scripture that Adam fell from a 'state of perfect Obedience, which is called 
Justice in the New Testament' (according to Locke, the word 'Justice' should be 
translated 'Righteousness'). By the Fall, Adam lost Paradise, 'wherein was 
Tranquility and the Tree of Life', or in other words, 'Bliss and Immortality'. In 
the Garden, God had put Adam and Eve under a law and had annexed a penalty 
to the breach of this law. According to this law, Adam and Eve were forbidden 
to eat from the tree of knowledge. God had forewarned Adam that 'in the day 
that thou eatest thereof [i. e. the forbidden fruit] thou shalt surely die' (Gen 
2: 17). 24 The crucial question that needed to be addressed was: what was meant 
here by 'death'? Here, there was disagreement amongst theologians. 
For Locke, the meaning of death was straightforward. It was to be 
construed literally as 'a state of Death and Mortality'; that by Adam's 
transgression, 'all Men are Mortal, and come to die". 25 Locke observed, however, 
that for some, it was 'a state of guilt, wherein not only [Adam], but all posterity 
was so involved, that every one descended of him deserved endless torment in 
Hell-fire'. 26 This was the view Locke had introduced at the outset of the 
Reasonableness as one of 'two Extreams' concerning Adam's Fall and which, 
according to Locke, 'shook the Foundations of all Religion'. Although Locke 
never formally labelled this group (or the other), this was likely a reference to 
the supporters of strict Calvinism in his day, who 'would have all Adam's 
Posterity doomed to Eternal Infinite Punishment for the Transgression of Adam, 
whom Millions had never heard of, and no one had authorized to transact for 
him, or be his Representative'. 27 
Against this imputationist interpretation, Locke questioned whether this 
could be consistent with the 'Justice and Goodness' of God. Locke objected that 
it was a 'strange way of understanding a Law', 'that by Death should be meant 
Eternal Life in Misery': 'Would any one think himself fairly dealt with', he 
24 Ibid., 6. 
25 Ibid., 6-7. 
26 Ibid., 7. 
27 Ibid., 5. The other 'extreme' view 'made Christianity almost nothing'. This was likely a reference to the Deists, who 'made Jesus Christ nothing but the Restorer and Preacher of pure Natural Religion'. For the Calvinism in Locke's day see 71e Confession of Faith, 3' ed. (London, 1688). For Locke's relation to Calvin, see Merwyn S. Johnson, Locke on Freedom (Austin, Texas: Best Printing, 1978), 1634. 
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asked rhetorically, if the word death was 'so used'? For Locke, the imputationist 
view was not a tenable position. 28 
Next and more relevant for my discussion about human freedom, Locke 
noted that death, for this group, also signified 'a state of necessary sinning'. 
29 
For Locke, this was an even 'harder sense of the word Death' than that of 
imputationism. Could the aforementioned punishment threatened to Adam really 
mean: 'thou and thy Posterity shall be ever after uncapable of doing any thing, 
but what shall be sinful and provoking to me, and shall justly deserve my wrath 
and indignation'? Locke argued that it was difficult to see how a 'Righteous 
God', who was already displeased by Adam's disobedience, could be supposed 
to 'put Man under a necessity of sinning continually', thereby 'multiplying the 
Provocation'. Furthermore, this view was not scripturally warranted, at least on 
a reasonable reading. According to Locke, one could attribute this 'strange 
interpretation' to 'some mistaken places of the New Testament' (although he 
never pointed out where these were in the Reasonableness). Again, if the death 
threatened to Adam connoted the 'Corruption of Humane Nature in his 
Posterity', it was 'strange', he contested, that 'the New Testament should not 
anywhere take notice of it, and tell us, that Corruption seized on all because of 
Adam's Transgression, as well as it tells is so of Death'. As far as he 
remembered, Locke argued, the Scripture indicated that 'every ones sin [was] 
charged upon himself only'. 30 
in the light of Locke's commitment to human freedom, we can see that 
he was consistent in rejecting the view of original sin which postulated a 
necessity of sinning. In opposition to this view, he advanced a minimalist 
account of original sin; that is, as we have seen, death solely as 'ceasing to be, 
the losing of all actions of Life and Sense'. 31 People were responsible for the 
care of their own souls, as they were to be judged by Christ according to their 
21 Ibid., 7-8. See ]an Harris, 'The Politics of Christianity', in Locke's Philosophy: Content and 
Context, ed. G. A. J. Rogers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 197-215, for an extensive account 
of Locke's rejection of the imputationist account of original sin. Harris's argument in a nutshell 
is this. Locke's political agenda to object to Sir Robert Filmer and his claim that absolute 
monarchical power was derived from Adam required Locke to adopt a view of Christianity that 
discredited the Augustinian theology of Adam as mankind's representative and the imputation of 
the first sin. 
29 RCh, 8. 
30 Ibid., 8-9. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
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own deeds. And it was assured by Christ himself, 'who knew for what he should 
condemn Men at the last day', that the 'Sentence of Condemnation passes only 
on the workers of Iniquity, such as neglected to fulfil the Law in acts of 
Charity' . 
32 There was no mentioning of being punished for Adam's sin here. The 
idea of being imputed for Adam's sin or being necessitated to sin because of his 
sin was on Locke's account incompatible with responsibility and free agency, 
and thus, morals and religion. 
When we turn to Locke's Paraphrase, we can see Locke basically 
reiterating the same views concerning the effect of Adam's Fall in this work as 
the Reasonableness. As it was in the Reasonableness, so the punishment for 
Adam's disobedience in the Paraphrase was natural death; although his 
offspring inherited his mortality, they were not guilty of his sin. For example, let 
us look at Romans 5: 12, the classic proof text of the doctrine of original sin: 
'Wherefore as by one man sin entred into the world, and death by sin; and so 
death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned'. Locke paraphrased this 
verse: 
by the act of one man Adam the father of us all, sin entcrd the world, and death, 
which was the punishment annexed to the offence of eating the forbidden fruit 
33 enterd by that sin for that Adams posterity thereby became mortal. 
In the annotation to this verse, Locke wrote that he had rendered 'have sinned' 
(original text) as 'became mortal' (Locke's paraphrase) because he believed that 
this brought out Paul's sense more accurately. 34 
It is clear from what we have seen hitherto that Locke rejected the 
doctrine of original sin in the traditional senses of imputed sin and corrupted 
human nature. However, it is important to register the point that Locke 
nevertheless believed in the universality of sin; that is to say, that all humanity 
had sinned and continues to sin. In the Reasonableness, Locke observed 'how 
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 paN, 523. 
3" Moreover, in this annotation, Locke sketched out Paul's logic as to how Adam's posterity inherited his mortality: 'A mortal father, infected now with death, being able to produce noe better than a mortal race'. Nonetheless, like the Reasonableness, Locke maintained that Adam's 
posterity did not inherit Adam's mortality on account of Adam's sin, and thus, rejected that imputationism accurately represented Paul's sense. Ibid., 524 (Rom 5: 12*f). 
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liable [people were] to mistakes, how apt to go astray, and how easily to be 
turned out of the paths of Virtue'. 35 Indeed, Locke cited Romans 3: 23, 'for all 
have sinned, and come short of the glory of God', as key scriptural proof of the 
universality of sin. 36 
Locke's assumption of human sinfulness was significant because it 
showed that mankind was in need of a saviour who would deliver them from this 
state - Jesus Christ. Indeed, as Locke maintained, Christ's coming was 'to 
reform the corrupt state of degenerate Man'. 37 One may wonder at this point 
why God had given 'so hard a Law to Mankind, that to the Apostles time no one 
of Adam's Issue had kept it'. To this query Locke replied: 'It was such a Law as 
the Purity of God's Nature required', and thus, 'must be the Law of such a 
Creature as Man, unless God would have made him a Rational Creature, and not 
required him to have lived by the Law of Reason'. 38 But the Lockean God was a 
compassionate God. Considering 
the frailty of Man, apt to run into corruption and misery, he promised a 
Deliverer, whom in his good time he sent; And then declared to all Mankind, 
that whoever would believe him to be the Saviour promised, and take him now 
raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all Men, to be their 
King and Ruler, should be saved. 39 
Locke's assumption of human sinfulness meant that mankind was in 
need of a saviour. This had wider implications. It suggested that Locke would 
have a view about how God's grace would be meted out and who would be the 
recipients of it. In theological terms, this connected to issues about free will and 
predestination. Thus, in the next section, we shall see how Locke's commitment 
to human freedom not only shaped the development of his views about original 
sin but also predestination. 
35 RCh, 163. 
36 Ibid., 13,18,117. 
37 Ibid., 119. 
38 Ibid., 13. CE ELN, 199. 
39 RCh, 169. 
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3. Locke and Predestination 
The previous section showed bow Locke's belief in human freedom was 
reflected in his account of original sin. In this section, we shall see bow human 
freedom also had implications in other areas of his revealed theology. Thus, I 
will show how Locke's belief in human freedom was reflected in his account of 
predestination. This will help us to see finiher how Locke's thought developed 
in a way that was centred upon the assumption of human freedom. More 
specifically, we shall see how the traditional Calvinistic doctrine of 
predestination threatened human freedom and how it was incompatible with 
Locke's thought. I will show how Locke's account of predestination in the 
Paraphrase developed in opposition to it. 
In Locke's day, there were four current views about predestination. The 
first view maintained that God had decreed the eternal fate of mankind from all 
etemity as fitted His glory. This was the view of the Supralapsarians. The 
second view maintained that God had pitied the fall of mankind and thus had 
provided the means to salvation for a great number of people. But for the others, 
God did not devise a plan concerning their salvation. This was the view of the 
Sublapsarians. Reformist theologians following Calvin usually embraced one of 
these two views. Against the Calvinist doctrines, there were two more views. 
The third view maintained that God created man free, but foreseeing how this 
freedom would be used, provided a way to salvation and sufficient assistance to 
obtain it. This was the views of Remonstrants and Arminians. The fourth view 
maintained that God had only decreed general facts about salvation and thus 
denied the predestination of individuals and the necessity of grace. This was the 
view of the Socinians. 40 We shall see that Locke's views developed in a way 
compatible with the third view and in opposition to the first two. 
Let us now look at the development of Locke's views on predestination. 
In the early 1690s, Locke was at a complete loss concerning human freedom and 
God's omniscience. In a letter to his friend William Molyneux, Locke confessed 
that he could not reconcile what he considered to be two undeniable truths; that 
is, reconciling human freedom with God's omniscient omnipotence. On this 
point, he acknowledged his weakness of his understanding: 'though it be 
40 Bumet, An Exposition, 146-7. 
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unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our maker, 
and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free', 'yet', he 
wrote, 'I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and 
omniscience in God, though I am fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most 
firmly assent to. That is, if Locke denied God's omniscient omnipotence, he 
would salvage human freedom and self-determination at the cost of the idea of a 
perfect God. On the other hand, if he defended God's omniscience, he would 
salvage the idea of a perfect God at the cost of human freedom and self- 
determination, and thus, morals and religion. If God foreknew or decided before 
the Creation who would or would not be saved, there would be little point in 
talking about people acting or not acting in accordance with His law. On this 
particular occasion, Locke did not inquire any further into the dilemma but 
resolved it thus: 'that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is 
free, though I see not the way of iti. 41 
By the mid 1690s, Locke had a clear view about predestination, and one 
which opposed the strict Calvinistic doctrine. In the 'Adversaria Theologica', he 
pursued the negative implications of the Calvinistic view under the title 'Electio'. 
it is worth quoting this in full: 
I cannot see of what use the Doctrine of Election & Pcrscverence is unlesse it 
be to lead men into praesumption &a neglect of their dutys being once 
perswaded that they are in a state of grace, which is a state they are told they 
can not fall from. For since noe body can know that he is Elected but by having 
true ffaith & noe body can know when he has such a faith that he can not fall 
from Common & Saving faith (as they are distinguished) being soe a like that 
he that has faith cannot distinguish whether it be such as he can fall from or noc. 
Vid. Calv: Inst. L. IcIsecl. 2 Who is elected or had faith from which he cannot 
fall can only be known by the event at the last day & therefor is in vain talked 
of now till the marks of such a faith be certainly given JL. 42 
41 Corr., 1592, vol. iv, 625-6. Cf. John Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall: On Liberty and Necessity, ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13. On the 
question 'how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God', Bramhall argued that 4we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain matter'. 42 John Locke, 'Adversaria Theologica', in John Locke: Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 32-3. 
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Here, Locke is noting how Calvinist predestination effectually falls into 
antinomianism and enthusiasm. 43 In a presumed state of grace, Locke saw that 
there could be no reason why people had to be bound by moral laws. So 
whatever the direction of the development of Locke's own doctrine about 
predestination was going to be, it was clear at this stage that it was not going to 
be a doctrine about the predetermined salvation of certain individuals or 
communities. 
When we turn to Locke's views on predestination in the Paraphrase, we 
can see how he tried to salvage human freedom and God's omniscience, while 
simultaneously eschewing the antinomian conclusions of Calvinism. Whereas 
the Calvinist doctrine of predestination concerned the salvation of individuals, 
Locke's predestination applied to the favour God showed to certain nations; it 
did not concern the individual's eternal fate. For example, Let us consider 
Locke's paraphrase of Romans 9: 13 - 'as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but 
Esau I have hated' - the classic text supporting the strict doctrine of election. 
Calvin, for one, adduced this verse in support of his interpretation that God 
'does not with indiscriminate grace effectually elect all'. For Calvin, God had 
'established by his eternal and unchangeable plan those whom he long before 
determined once for all to receive into salvation, and those whom, on the other 
hand, he would devote to destruction': 
For all arc not created in equal condition; rather, etcmal life is foreordained for 
some, eternal damnation for others. Thcrcforc, as any man has been created to 
one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to 
death. 44 
By contrast, Locke took Romans 9: 13 to have concerned the favour God showed 
to certain nations: 'as it is written Jacob have I loved so as to make his posterity 
43 Antinomianism was an extreme form of Calvinism. Antinomians were strong believers in the 
doctrine of free grace, and believed that 'faith and obedience were neither conditions nor 
evidence of divine grace'. They were often associated with lawlessness. Nuovo, 'Locke's 
Theology', 195n; Dewey Wallace Jr., Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant 
Theology, 1525-1695 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 113-20. 
" Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1960), 3.21.7; 3.21.5; 3.21.7. 
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my chosen people, and Esau I put so much behind him as to lay his mountains 
and his heritage wast', annotating to this: 
Jacob have I loved and Esau I have hated are to be taken in a national sense for 
the preference God gave to the posterity of one of them to be his people and 
possess the promised land before the other. 45 
For Locke, God bad in the first instance taken into favour the nation of the Jews, 
then the Gentiles (and a small remnant of the Jews) to be His people. 
In his summary of Romans 9, Locke argued that predestination 
concerned God's will for nations, and only in a way affecting their worldly state 
and not their eternal destination: 
What is said of gods exerciseing of an absolute power according to the good 
pleasure of his will, relates onely to nations or bodys politique of men 
incorporated in civil societies, which feel the effects of it onely in prosperity or 
calamity they meet with in this world, but extends not to their eternal state in an 
other world considerd as particular persons wherein they stand each man by 
himself upon his own bottom and shall so answer separately at the day of 
judgment. 46 
Moreover, the effects of God's will for nations had an effect on individuals only 
in a secondary sense. Locke remarked that individuals may be punished with 
their 'fellow citizens as a part of a sinful nation'; but this was, so to speak, only 
a 'temporal chastizement" intended for their own good, and did not in itself 
preclude them from eternal salvation. 47 
We can see that God's foreknowledge bore significantly different 
meanings for Locke and Calvin. For Calvin, foreknowledge was 'a reference to 
God's choice or adoption of the elect'; thus, all those who were foreknown by 
God 'will ultimately be saved' . 
48 By contrast, Locke's understanding of 
foreknowledge in the first instance referred to God's prescience, but also, to His 
'intention of kindeness' to the preordained ones. In this way, Gentiles were to be 
45 PaN, 565 (13*). 
46 Ibid., 560-1. 
47 Ibid., 561. 
48 Ibid., 791. 
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called and be His chosen people under Jesus the Messiah 'before the Law was', 
or 'even before the Foundation of the World' . 
49 But in relation to the 
individuals' salvation, foreknowledge was irrelevant, and did not guarantee their 
eternal dwelling in heaven. 
So far, we have seen how Locke's view about predestination developed 
in a way that would allow space for human freedom and self-determination 
concerning individual salvation. For Locke, God had knowledge of all future 
events and had pre-scripted or predetermined the general course of history, but 
this did not disable an individual's capacity to attain eternal salvation. As we 
shall see now, although the Paraphrase also presented a deeply pessimistic view 
of human sinfulness and Locke's strong sense of the need of divine grace, Locke 
secured the conceptual space needed to maintain human freedom. That is, in 
Locke's view, although individuals were deeply mired in sin without God's 
grace, they were nevertheless responsible for choosing to accept or resist this 
grace. To this extent, people could be seen as free agents responsible for their 
eternal fate. 
A sense of human sinfulness prevailed in the Paraphrase, and with it, the 
necessity of divine grace. For example, in an annotation to Romans 7: 24, where 
Paul wrote, '0 wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of 
this death! ', Locke inquired: 
What is it that St. Paul so pathetically desires to be delivered from? The state he 
had been describing was that of humane weakness, wherein notwithstanding the 
law [i. e. the Mosaic Law] even those who were under it and sincerely 
endeavoured to obey it were frequently carried by their carnal appetites into a 
breach of it. This state of frailty he knew men in this life could not be delivered 
from. 50 
Human frailty and sinfulness, Locke concluded, could only be remedied by 
God's grace: '[t]is the favour of God alone through Jesus Christ that delivers 
49 'intention of kindeness', Ibid., 5 58 (Rom 8: 29); 'before the Law was', Ibid., 614 (Eph 1: 4). 
50 Ibid., 546 (24*). 
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frail man from death; 'it is grace alone through Jesus Christ that accepting of 
what the frail man can do delivers from the body of death'. 51 
Similarly Locke's annotations to Ephesians 2: 5 to 8 reinforced this 
thought: 'it was all purely the Work of Grace, for they were all dead in 
Trespasses and Sins, and could do nothing, not make one Step or the least 
, 52 Motion towards it [i. e. the Kingdom of God] . 
Faith, 'which alone opened the 
Kingdom of Heaven to Believers, was the sole Gift of God; Men by their natural 
Faculties could not attain to it'. 53 '[Q]uickened' by the Spirit of God, people 
were 'made capable, if they would, to live to God, and not to obey Sin in the 
Lusts thereof, nor yield their Members Instruments of Sin unto Iniquity; but to 
give themselves to God, as Men alive from the Dead. 954 People's sinful desires 
and habits could only be removed by accepting God's assistance through the 
Holy Spirit. 
Thus we see that there was a strong sense of the need of God's grace 
present in Locke's thought. But nonetheless, Locke left room for human 
determination. Traditionally, grace was conceived in two ways: operative and 
55 co-operative. In the former case, God ensured that an agent wills to do good. 
This will was conferred by God to certain people who He had willed to be saved. 
By contrast, in the latter case, God provided an agent with a good will as a guide 
and the assistance of the Spirit, yet ultimately left it in the hands of the agent to 
cooperate with Him or not. This was the distinction separating the Calvinist 
theologians, who conceived grace in the former sense, and the counter- 
reformists such as the Remonstrants and the Arminians, who conceived it in the 
latter sense. As we shall see, Locke saw grace as co-operative activity, rather 
like his Remonstrant friend van Limborch, who maintained that faith was a 
4voluntary Act of Obedience', an 'Act of our Obedience proceeding from the 
Will, which is excited and assisted by the Divine Grace, and hence, not 'a 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 628 (8c). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 627-8 (5y). 
15 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2.2.6. Cf. E. J. Bicknell, A Theological 
Introduction to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England (London: Longmans, Green, 1932), 243-4. 
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Divine Gift as is wrought in us without our Co-operation', nor 'a Habit infus'd 
56 into us by God' . 
Locke believed that God had provided men and women with the light of 
reason. 57 Unless people deliberately resisted God's grace, they could accept it 
and be responsible for their decision. In an annotation to Romans 6: 14 and 15, 
Locke took Paul to be saying that unless people willfully and voluntarily chose 
to enthral themselves into the drudgery of sin, sin 'shall not be [their] absolute 
master to dispose of [their] members and faculties in its drudgery and services as 
it pleases', and they 'shall not be under its controle in absolute subjection to 
itq. 58 
Lockc's paraphrase of Romans 8: 30 also showed that it was up to the 
individual to accept God's calling or not: 'Many are called and few are chosen 
says our Saviour Mat XX. 16... therefore... Tis those who are chosen who he 
saith are justified: i. e., such as were called, obeyd, and consequently chosen' 
(emphasis added). 59 God's predestination did not automatically guarantee the 
individual's salvation; only if he obeyed and accepted God's grace would he be 
justified-60 
This was also consistent with Locke's Reasonableness. One of the 
advantages of a Saviour, on Locke's account, was 'the promise of assistance': 
Locke argued that 'if we do what we can, [Jesus Christ] will give us his Spirit to 
help us to do what, and how we should' . 
61 From what we have just seen above, 
the 'if we do what we can' clause suggests people's act of obedience, that is to 
say, to accept Jesus as their Saviour by submitting themselves to the law of faith. 
Again, people were called, obeyed, and then they were chosen and justified. The 
act of one's willingness to obey therefore preceded the acknowledgment of 
election. In other words, although people were mired in sin, people were free 
and thus ultimately responsible for their eternal destiny. 
56 Philippus van Limborch, 'Extracts from A Compleat System, or Body of Divinity', in John 
Locke and Christianity, ed. Victor Nuovo (Bristol: Thoernmes Press, 1997), 76,74. 
57 pajV, 153 (Gal 5: 16). 
5' Ibid., 534 (14*). 
59 Ibid., 559 (30*). 
60 Ibid., 791-2. 
61 RCh, 163. 'If we do what we can' is an allusion to the medieval theological phrase, 'Jacere 
quod in se' ('to do what one can'). See Ibid., 163n. Cf. E, 2.21.53. 
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In this section, we have thus seen how Locke's views on predestination 
developed upon the presupposition that people were free agents responsible for 
the care of their own souls and how it opposed the strict Calvinist doctrine of 
election. Locke's God did intervene in the world, but His power was directed 
towards nations rather than individuals; even then, it did not determine the final 
eternal destiny of nations or individuals. Locke however took into account the 
sinfulness of humanity and their continuing failure to meet God's holy standard. 
But grace was provided for all upon the act of acceptance. Thus, people were not 
necessitated to sin but could choose as free agents whether they would enslave 
themselves in sin or receive God's assistance to live a holy life. 
4. Locke and Human Sinfulness 
So far we have seen how Locke's revealed theology developed in a way that was 
consistent with his commitment to human freedom. However, commentators 
such as Wainwright and Marshall have questioned the consistency of Locke's 
views based upon their reading of the Paraphrase. In fact, as this section will 
show, Locke's theology is consistent with his philosophy on this issue. 
As we have seen, Locke postulated human freedom. However, in the 
Paraphrase, more than ever, Locke stressed humanity's sinfulness, and thus, put 
a limit to this freedom. Let us consider Locke's paraphrase of Romans 7: 14-17 
for example: 
[14] For we know that the law is spiritual requiring actions quite opposite to our 
carnal affections. But I am so carnal, as to be enslaved to them, and forced 
against my will to doe the drudgery of Sin as if I were a slave that had been 
sold into the hands of that my domineering enemie. [15] For what I doe is not 
of my own contrivance. For that which I have a mind to, I doe not; and what I 
have an aversion to, that I doe. [16] If then my transgresscing the law be what I 
in my mind am against, it is plain that consent of my mind goes with the law, 
that it is good. [17] If so then it is not Ia willing agent of my own free purpose, 
that do what is contrary to the law; but as a poor slave in captivity not able to 
follow my own understanding and choice forced by the prevalency of my own 
sinful affections, and sin that remains still in me notwithstanding the law. 62 
62 PaN, 545. 
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Wainwright and Marshall have argued that these statements in the 
Paraphrase 'conflict' or are 'difficult to reconcile' with the Essay. 63 The crucial 
statements were 'forced against my will' and 'not Ia willing agent of my own 
free purpose'. Wainwright notes that 'in normal circumstances', i. e. unless one 
is prevented by some physical disability, agents 'perform whatever actions they 
have willed'. Both Wainwright and Marshall suggest that Locke presented a 
grimmer - indeed, almost a Calvinistic - view of human sinfulness in the 
Paraphrase under the influence of St Paul. Marshall suggests that 
[t]here seems little doubt that in his study of Paul's thought Locke did come to 
place a heavier stress upon man's sinfulness, a stress that his substantial reading 
of Paul's thought helped to create, as it had helped to create that of Luther, 
Calvin and Nicole. 
Indeed, he claims that '[a]t this point of the Paraphrase a greater explicit stress 
had been laid upon the power of men's sinfulness than at any other point during 
Locke's thought'. 64 Given that Locke's thought had developed in support of 
human freedom and in opposition to the grim Calvinistic view of human 
sinfulness (indeed, as we have seen, in the Paraphrase itself), we are left with 
the impression that Locke had abandoned his earlier commitment and thus the 
coherence of his project. 
In what follows, I will show how the holistic perspective can cast a 
different light upon the controversial statements in the Paraphrase and suggest 
that Locke's thought was in fact consistent with his previous commitments. This 
will involve an examination of Locke's view of the origin of human sinftilness, a 
question that is rarely addressed in Locke scholarship. To this end, I will turn to 
Locke manuscript, 'Homo ante et post lapsum'. I will then show how this 
manuscript invites us to consider Locke's concept of 'uneasiness'. I will show 
how the concept of uneasiness helps us to make sense of what Locke thought the 
origin of human sinfulness was, and through this, make sense of the 
controversial statements in the Paraphrase. 
63 Wainwright, 'Introduction', 56-7; Marshall, John Locke, 432-3. 
64 Marshall, John Locke, 433. 
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5. 'Homo Ante et Post Lapsuml 
In a manuscript entry 'Homo ante et post lapsum', dated 1693, Locke reflected 
on Adam's condition before and after the Fall, and also, how corruption had 
come to prevail over mankind. Thus, this manuscript is an invaluable source 
(and perhaps the only one) for considering what Locke believed to be the origin 
of human sinfulness. 
In this manuscript, Locke maintained that 'Man was made mortal' and 
put into a possession of the whole world, where in the full use of the creatures 
there was scarce room for any irregular desires but instinct & reason caried him 
the same way & being neither capable of coviteousnesse or ambition when he 
had already the free use of all things he could scarce sin. 
God therefore introduced a 'probationary law', whereby man was 'restraind 
from one only fruit, good wholsom & tempting in it self'. The punishment 
annexed to the breach of this law was 'natural death'. Although man was made 
mortal, it was God's plan to make him immortal should he observe this law 'to a 
sufficient testimony of his obedience'. However, man sinned and was excluded 
from the tree of life. By this sin, man also came to know the difference between 
good and evil. Upon realizing the magnitude of their offence, Adam and Eve 
became afraid to face God. This 'lessened their love' for God and turned their 
minds towards worldly things. With the rise of private property and labour, 
which now the curse on the earth had made necessary, by degrees made a 
distinction of conditions, it gave roome for coviteousnesse pride & ambition, 
which by fashen & example spread the corruption which has soe prevailed over 
man kind. 63 
it is unclear whether Locke reconciled the view about Adam's mortality 
66 
in this manuscript and the Reasonableness. But what concems us here is 
something different. 'Homo ante et post lapsum, made clear that private 
property and social distinctions made room for sinful desires to grow. In a state 
" John Locke, 'Homo Ante et Post Lapsum', in John Locke: Writings on Religion, 23 1. 66See Victor Nuovo, 'Introduction', in John Locke: Writings on Religion, liv. 
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of perfect bliss, wherein Adam had free access to all the things necessary for life, 
he had no need to covet anything, and thus, to sin. But we see that as soon as 
God introduced a probationary law, Adam sinned. What this suggests about 
Adam's psychology is that he had what Jeremy Taylor suggested a 'natural 
tendency to forbidden things'. 67 This would explain why Adam's posterity, who 
shared this nature, and being exposed to much more temptation, would be mired 
in sin. 
in fact, Locke had been discussing the issue about the determination of 
the will in the Essay and in the second edition of the Essay, which he was 
preparing roughly at the same time as this manuscript, 68 and had suggested that 
6uneasiness' was what determined the will. The language of uneasiness is 
consistent with the manuscript. Locke could say that various temptations 
produced 'uneasiness' in an agent. Uneasiness, for Locke, explained how God 
had constituted human beings so that they could subsist. This natural tendency, 
or uneasiness, when exposed to temptation, could also explain why people were 
driven into sinning. In the same way that the concept of uneasiness helps to 
elucidate Locke's account of human sinfulness in 'Homo ante et post lapsum', it 
gives us a clue to how to read the account of human sinfiflness in the 
Paraphrase. Let us then consider the concept of uneasiness in detail. 
6. Uneasiness: the Essay 
I will now examine the concept of uneasiness in the Essay, and show how this 
can link up to a discussion of the origin of human sinfulness. This will help us to 
see that the Essay and the Paraphrase were in fact compatible. Before delving 
into Locke's concept of uneasiness, I will briefly go over some terms and 
distinctions Locke made in the Essay and his later correspondence relevant for 
the present discussion. 
67 Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity, 10 1. 'The soul was created simple and 
pure, but fell into vice by the evil combination with the flesh. But if at first the appetites, and 
necessities, and tendencies of the body, when it was at ease, and health, and blessed, did yet 
tempt the soul to forbidden instances; much more will this be done, when the body is miserable 
and afflicted, uneasy and dying'. Jeremy Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 4"' ed. (London, 1705), 
409. 
68 Locke was thinking about preparing a second edition of the Essay as early as late 1692 and had formulated an account of uneasiness by August 1693. Corr., 1583 and 1655, vol. iv, 609 and 722. 
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First, the 'will' is the 'power to begin, to stop, or to forbear' any action 
of the mind or body. The actual exercise of the will is called 'volition' or 
'willing'. 69 Next, an action is 'voluntary' if it is a consequent of the command of 
the mind; it is 'involuntary' if it is not performed 'without such a thought of the 
mind' . 
70 Not all voluntary actions are free actions, however. We may see this in 
the case of a man who is carried into jail while he was fast asleep. Thereafter 
when this man awakes, he voluntarily stays in jail being 'glad to find himself in 
so desirable Company'. However, Locke argued that the man is nevertheless 
unfree because he has no choice to leave, being locked in there. 
71 By contrast, 
all involuntary actions are necessary. Finally, a free agent is one who has the 
power to act or not act according to the preference of his or her mind. 72 Bearing 
these terms and distinctions in mind, let us now move on to consider the concept 
of uneasiness. 
The concept of uneasiness appeared for the first time in published form 
in the second edition of the Essay. In the second edition, Locke abandoned his 
previous view in the first edition that the 'greater good' alone determined the 
Will. 73 In the first edition, Locke was very close to Hobbes, who likewise 
endorsed the causal determination of the will and that the will was determined 
by what one conceived to be the greatest good. 74 In response to Locke's first 
edition of the Essay, William Molyneux suggested that Locke seemed 'to make 
all sins to proceed from our understandings, or to be against conscience; and not 
at all from the depravity of our wills', and went on to say, 'it seems harsh to say, 
that a man shall be damned, because he understands no better than he does'. 75 
The same concern was also raised by William King, bishop of Derry and a 
friend of Molyneux. He argued that Locke's argument ran into fatalism: 
Sect. 29 good then, greater good, is that alone determines the will. this good is 
from the idea impressed on the mind, and the idea is impressed on the mind by 
outward objects and outward objects ordered by God in an absolutely necessary 
" E, 2.21.5; Corr., 2979, vol. vii, 403. 
70 E, 2.21.5. 
71 Ibid., 2.2 1.10,11. 
72 Ibid., 2.21.8. 
73 E. I' ed., 2.21.29. 
74 Wolfgang von Leyden, Hobbes and Locke (Houndsmill: Macmillian Press, 1981), 56. 
75 Corr., 1579, vol. iv, 601. 
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chain and so God necessitates a man as much to kill his father as the sun to 
move. and this is the perfection of man that he is as necessarily damned as 
born. " 
Taking the advice of his 'judicious friend', Locke put his theory 'upon a stricter 
review'. 77 As a result of his renewed investigation, in the second edition of the 
Essay, Locke radically changed his case. He now argued that it was not the 
greatest good but always some 'uneasiness' that determined the Will. 78 Locke 
still maintained that the contemplation of the good and evil did work upon the 
mind. But that which 'immediately determines the Will, from time to time, to 
every voluntary Action' was the present uneasiness. The uneasiness a man is at 
present under produces a desire for an 'absent good'. This is 'the great motive 
that works on the Mind to put it upon Action', or in other words, this is what 
determines the will and 'sets us upon those Actions, we perform'. 79 
Uneasiness, Locke explained, included 'all pain of the body of what sort 
soever, and disquiet of the mind'. Uneasiness was always accompanied by a 
desire equal to the experienced pain. Hence, Locke claimed that desire was 
6scarce distinguishable' from uneasiness, desire being 'nothing but an 
uneasiness in the want of an absent good' . 
80 However, Locke maintained that 
desiring and willing were not to be confounded-8 I Although he admitted to using 
expressions such as 'choosing, preferring' and like terms to signify desiring and 
volition (willing), for him, they were two distinct acts. This was because while 
desiring was 'directed to the agreeable' (i. e., longing for something, not 
necessarily within the agent's power), willing was 'directed only to the action' 
(i. e., commanding that something must be done, thus implying something was 
within the agent's power). 82 
76 Corr., 1544, vol. iv, 541. 
77 E, 2.21.71. The 'judicious friend' was likely Molyneux. Locke believed that King had 
misunderstood him Corr., 1583, vol. iv, 608-9. '1 suppose that learned gentleman if he had had 
the leisure to read my Essay quite through would have found several of his objections might 
have been spared'. 
78 Ibid., 2.21.29,3 1. 
79 Ibid., 2.21.29,31,33. 
'0 Ibid., 2.21.31. Locke vacillates whether desire is uneasiness (2.21.32), or whether it is 
something that accompanies it (2.21.3 1). Vere Chappell, 'Locke on the Intellectual Basis of Sin', Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 32 (1994): 203. 
81 E, 2.21.30. 
82 Ibid., 2.21.15,30; Corr., 2925, vol. vii, 327. 
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According to Locke, there were two types of uneasinesses: 'natural' and 
'fantastical'. Natural uneasinesses included 'hunger, thirst, heat, cold, 
weariness' and 'sleepiness' and were implanted by God for the preservation of 
the human species. By contrast, fantastical uneasinesses included one's 'itch 
after honour, power, or riches, etc. ' and were 'acquired habits by fashion, 
example, and education'. 83 We can see that there was still a deterministic 
element present in Locke's moral psychology of the second edition of the Essay: 
people were driven to action by uneasinesses which were introduced outside 
their control. 84 But here, Locke introduced man's power to suspend the 
execution of his desires. Free will, or 'liberty' as Locke called it, was the ability 
to suspend the various desires that arose from our uneasiness and to 'examine, 
view, and judge, of the good or evil of what we are going to do'. By exerting 
this power of suspension and deliberation, an agent could 'stop' his desires from 
determining his will until he fully considered what made a real part of his 
greatest good. It was not a 'fault', but a 'perfection' of human nature 'to desire, 
will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination. 85 Insofar as this 
power could be wielded, Locke believed that people were free agents. 
Although people were free agents, they deviate into sin. How does the 
concept of uneasiness help us to make sense of this? Locke claimed that people 
could determine right from wrong by due examination. 86 However, the reason 
why people often chose wrongly was because the desire to ease their present 
uneasiness moved the will before due examination took place. To the question, 
'whence the various uneasinesses, that determine the will in the preference of 
each voluntary action, have their rise? ', Locke gave a twofold reply: one form of 
uneasiness arose 'from an absent good; which desires always bear proportion to, 
and depend on the judgement we make, and the relish we have of any absent 
good'. That desires bore proportion to the judgment we made suggested that this 
was an uneasiness of an intellectual kind. The other form of uneasiness was, 
however, prompted by causes beyond our power, 'often the pains of the Body 
from want, disease, or outward injuries, as the rack, etc. ' which 'when present, 
and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will, and turn the courses of 
83 E, 2.21.34; 2.21.45. 
84 Von Leyden, Hobbes and Locke, 57. 
85 E, 2.21.47,52. 
86 Ibid., 2.21.34,56-9,7 1. 
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Men's lives from Virtue, Piety, and Religion, and what before they judged to 
lead to happiness'. This was because people did not or could not contemplate the 
6remote, and future good, to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to 
counter-balance the uneasiness'. Therefore, Locke argued, when confronted 
with such uneasinesses, 'there is great reason for us to pray Lead us not into 
Temptation'. 87 
Thus, by forceful and present uneasiness, people often miscalculated the 
future greater good, and went astray from the path of virtue. This is crucial to 
understanding the controversial statements in the Paraphrase. 
7. Uneasiness: the Paraphrase 
Bearing in mind this account of the role of uneasiness in the Essay, let us return 
to the Paraphrase and see how the analysis sheds light on the coherence of 
Locke's account of human freedom in this work. As we have seen, Wainwright 
and Marshall focus upon Locke's paraphrase of Romans 7: 14 - 'But I am so 
carnal, as to be enslaved to [my carnal affections], and forced against my will to 
do the drudgery of sin as if I were a slave' - and 7: 17 - 'it is not Ia willing 
agent of my own free purpose, that do what is contrary to the law' - as evidence 
that in the Paraphrase, Locke came to believe that agents could not perform 
what they had willed, being utterly enthralled by sin. If Wainwright and 
Marshall are right, then we must suppose that at the end of his life, Locke came 
to believe that people were necessitated to sin, thus destroying everything he had 
argued until that point in support of human freedom and personal responsibility. 
However, I will argue that Wainwright and Marshall's account is based on a 
narrow understanding of Locke's statements, and show that in the light of 
Locke's concept of uneasiness and his revised views of free will in the fifth 
edition of the Essay, Locke's account of human freedom in the Paraphrase did 
not fall into a claim about necessary sinning. Thus, I will begin by unpacking 
Wainwright and Marshall's claim. 
According to Wainwright, in the Paraphrase, Locke presented a conflict 
between will and action. An agent wills to do good, but being enthralled by sin, 
87 Ibid., 2.21.57. Cf. Corr., 1798, vol. v, 159 (9 Oct 1694). 'Violent uncasinesse which the mindc cannot resist nor away with. These constantly determin the will without any maner of suspension where there is any view of a possibility of their rcmovcal'. 
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cannot perform the action according to what he had willed, and is forced to do 
evil against his will. Wainwright argues that one cannot make sense of this 
account in the vocabulary of the Essay. In the Essay, Lockean agents perform 
what they have willed unless they are prevented by physical handicaps. It is also 
possible that a 'present sense of uneasiness may lead people to will actions 
which they know will be to their disadvantage'. Wainwright implicitly rules this 
out as the explanation of the Paraphrase; whereas the Essay was addressing a 
conflict between will and understanding, the Paraphrase was addressing a 
conflict between will and action. 88 
Wainwright and Marshall's reading is warranted on a particular 
understanding of the word 'will'. Will, on their account, follows the 
determination of the last judgment and immediately precedes the action. 
Uneasiness has a role in determining the will which precedes the action. Indeed, 
it can work forcibly on the will to perform an action against one's understanding. 
But once the will is determined, it goes on to direct the operative faculties to 
perform that action it has determined to do. As far as the Essay was concerned, 
agents were not forced to perform actions against their will. Thus, on this strict 
reading, there is a clear conflict between Locke's account of human freedom in 
the Essay and the Paraphrase. 
Now that we have looked at the assumption underlying Wainwright and 
Marshall's narrow reading of the controversial statements in the Paraphrase, I 
will show how the holistic perspective can show, against their reading, that these 
statements are compatible with the language of uneasiness. In so doing, I will 
argue that Locke did not fall into a doctrine of necessary sinning. To this end, I 
will consider Locke's account of free will in the fifth edition of the Essay and 
the exchange with van Limborch which informed it. 89 
The significant change to Locke's fifth edition of the Essay was his 
acceptance of free volitions, that is to say that people were free to will. This 
change happened through a prolonged exchange over the issue of free will 
between van Limborch from the summer of 1701 to the autumn of 1702. For 
PaN, 788. 
My discussion of free volitions here exploits material which others have largely neglected. Most notably, Gideon Yaffe's Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), which is one of the most recent attempts at an extensive discussion of Locke's account of free volitions, contains no index entry for Limborch (or Van Limborch) nor the Paraphrase. 
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Locke, there were two separate questions concerning free will: whether people 
were free or not and whether people were free to will or not. 90 In response to the 
former question, as we have seen, Locke answered in the affirmative. For Locke, 
an agent was free insofar as he had the power 'of acting, or not acting, by the 
determination of his own thought preferring either'. In response to the latter 
question, however, until the fifth edition of the Essay, he had answered in the 
negative, thus making known his volitional determinism. 91 For Locke, people 
were not free to will because they could not forbear willing. 
In a letter to van Limborch, Locke insisted that 'liberty', that is, liberty 
of a man, consisted 'solely in the power to act or not to act consequent on, and 
according to, the determination of the Willi. 92 Van Limborch rejected this, 
stating: 'It seems to me, altogether to the contrary, that liberty consists solely in 
a power by which can determine, or not determine, an action of willing; and that 
if a man does not possess that power before the determination of the will he is 
not free, nor can any state be conceived in which he can be called free'. Thus, 
for van Limborch, the question whether people were free or not was not a 
separate question from whether people were free to will; people could only be 
free in the former sense if they were free to will. This was because 
the will is master of our actions, and governs them according to its choice, if 
the detennination of the will is not free neither will there be any liberty in our 
actions because actions necessarily follow the deterrnination of our Willq. 93 
Van Limborch wrote that this is what he thought Locke had been saying in 
2.21.47 of the Essay when he asserted that the liberty of man consisted in the 
power to suspend one's desires from determining the Will. 94 Locke's initial 
90 E, 2.21.14,21. On the issue of free will, Locke argued that the question 'whether our will is 
free or not' was 'unintelligible'. Both the will and liberty were different powers or abilities, and 
one power could not be an attribute of another. The faculty of freedom &can belong to nothing, 
but what has ... a power to act'. 2.21.15,16. This same point was made by Hobbes against 
Bramhall, and also, by Cudworth. Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall, 16. Ralph Cudworth, A 
Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality: with A Treatise of Freewill, ed. Sarah 
Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 170. For the possible influence of Cudworth on Locke, see John Passmore, Ralph Cudworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1951), 93-5. 
91 E, 2.21.14,16,20,21,23. 
92 Corr., 2925, vol. vii, 329. 
93 Corr., 2953, vol. vii, 368-9. 
94 Ibid., 370. 
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response was a refusal to capitulate to van Limborch's point. 
95 In the next letter, 
96 however, van Limborch pressed the issue again, and in response to this, Locke 
sent 'some explications' he planned to insert in chapter 21 by which he could 
make his meaning clearer. If Locke had not changed his mind at that point, it is 
clear that he did in a letter written a year later. The debate between the two men 
was put off for a while, but in September of 1702, Locke proposed to 'return to 
long discontinued studies'. 97 Here, he accepted that there were free volitions and 
thus by implication that his doctrine of suspension could be seen in this light: 
Generally, indeed, that in my opinion a man is free in every action, as well of 
willing as of understanding, if he was able to have abstain from that action of 
willing or understanding; if not, not. 
He went on: 
More particularly, as regards the will: there are some cases in which a man is 
unable not to will, and in all those acts of willing a man is not free because he is 
unable not to act. In the rest, where he was able to will or not to will, he is 
free. 98 
The posthumously published fifth edition of the Essay included this 
important admission. In 2.21.25, Locke inserted that 'in most cases [emphasis 
added] a Man is not at liberty, whether he will Will or no', thus suggesting that 
there were cases in which a man was free to will. 99 Indeed, in 2.21.56, Locke 
once again stated that 'in most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of 
volition; he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed, is made 
to exist, or not to exist'. 'But', he continued, 'yet there is a case wherein a Man 
is at Liberty in respect of willing, and that is the chusing of a remote Good as an 
end to be pursued': 
Corr., 2979, vol. vii. 
Corr., 3010, vol. vii. 
Corr., 3192, vol. vii, 680. 
98 Ibid., 680. 
99 Vere Chappell, 'Locke on Freedom of the Will', in Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context, 
ed. G. A. J. Rogers (OXfOTd: Clarendon Press, 1994); E, 5h ed., 2.21.25. 
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Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or 
against the thing proposed, till he has examined, whether it be really of a nature 
in it self and consequences to make him happy, or no. ' 00 
So, for example, an agent can choose to will to perform a morally good action in 
the future, and then go on to deliberate whether he will or will not will to 
perform it. 
According to Vere Chappell, the existence of free volitions implied that 
there were also 'second-order volitions', i. e., 'willings whose targets are other 
willings, these being volitions of the first order'. 101 So in other words, if an 
agent is free to will, then he is also able to will what to will. Thus, on this view, 
we may say that the determination of the will is itself an action of willing. This 
again was a point that Limborch pressed in his letter: 
It seems plain to me that a man determines his judgement because he wills to 
acquiesce in the reasons that he has pondered; again, that he suspends his 
judgement because he does not yet will to acquiesce, but wills either to ponder 
the reason more carefully or to inquire whether there are more reasons by 
which his judgement may be changed; and so it seems plain to me that the 
determination of the last judgement, by which a man decrees that this is to be 
chosen or done, is, if not wholly, at least very largely, an action of willing 
(emphasis added). 102 
So, for example, an agent can will to will to perform a morally good action in 
the futare, and then deliberate whether he will or will not will to perflonn it. As 
van Limborch intimated, Locke and van Limborch were not far from each other 
on this point, particularly given that Locke often used the word 'choose' to 
signify volition (although not synonymously). 103 
Let us now see how the above consideration on free will sheds light on 
the controversial statements in the Paraphrase and how it helps us to see these 
were consistent with Locke's concept of uneasiness. In the light of the above 
discussion, I believe that we can interpret Locke's paraphrase that one was 
`0 E, 50'ed. 2.21.56. 
101 Chappell, 'Locke on Freedom of the Will', 12 1. 
102 Corr., 3010, vol. vii, 459. 
103 E, 2.21.30. 
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'forced against [his] will to do the drudgery of sin' not as the will which 
immediately precedes the performance of an external action but the will which 
has a remote good as an end to be pursued. 
This is consistent with Locke's comments in the Paraphrase. A few 
verses after from the controversial statements in verse 19, Locke elaborated on 
them: 
[19] For the good that is my purpose and aim, that I doe not: But the evil that is 
contrary to my intention, that in my practise takes place. i. e. I purpose and aime 
at universal obedience, but cannot in fact attain it. " 
The key phrase is 'I purpose and aime at universal obedience'. This, in the 
language of the Essay, can be rendered: 'I choose to will actions in the future in 
accordance with the rule of morals'. In other words, it can be seen as a 
secondary volition. Verse 17 is also compatible with this reading. Locke started 
the verse by paraphrasing: 'It is not Ia willing agent of my own free purpose, 
that do what is contrary to the law'. But then, we see what the agent was unable 
to do was not acting upon his will, but following his 'own understanding and 
choice' (emphasis added). 105 Choice, again, can be seen as a will directed to a 
future good and not necessarily the will immediately preceding the act. Thus, if 
we construe 'will' as a will to will actions consistent with the rule of morals, and 
not (as Wainwright and Marshall narrowly interpret) as a will preceding the 
external action itself, there is no conflict between the Essay and the Paraphrase. 
The will to will actions in accordance with the rule of morals itself 
follows from an agent's understanding. The Paraphrase maintained that the 
agent could act against one's own understanding - in Romans 7: 15, 'For what I 
doe is not of my own contrivance', Locke commented: 'I doe not know, i. e. is 
not from my own understanding or forecast of mind'. So in this sense, the agent 
who was sinning was acting against his will not to will actions resulting in sin, 
which itself was informed by his understanding. But he was still free qua free 
agent to act according to his sinful will should he will so, despite his will not to 
"' PaN, 546. 
105 Ibid., 545. 
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will such actions. This is where the concept of uneasiness helps us to see how 
agents were sinning contrary to their understanding. 
The Essay was clear that a drunkard who was fully aware that the 
consequences of going to the tavern might lead to 'the loss of health and plenty, 
and perhaps of the joys of another life' would nevertheless go there and drink 
the glass of wine if he experienced an uneasiness in the absence of it. 106 People 
chose wrongly because they often yielded to the most pressing, present 
uneasiness by a hasty decision. We should recall that there were uneasinesses 
which 'when present, and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will, 
and turn the courses of Men's lives from Virtue, Piety, and Religion, and what 
before they judged to lead to happiness'. Locke maintained that this was because 
people did not or could not contemplate the 'remote, and future good, to raise in 
himself desires of them strong enough to counter-balance the uneasiness'. 
Therefore, it was possible for an agent to choose a remote good as an end to be 
pursued, and at the same time, when pressed forcibly by uneasiness, to act 
against this will, and will to act upon a sinful action. Moreover, there were 
fantastical uneasinesses exerting pressure on people. Indeed, the Paraphrase 
noted that 'because by prevailing custome and contrary habits this principle [i. e. 
the Spirit 'which dictates what is right and inclines to good'] was very much 
weakened and almost extinct in the Gentiles'. 107 Thus, for Locke, 'there is great 
reason for us to pray Lead us not into Temptation'. 
Let me summarize this section. Wainwright and Marshall have claimed 
that Locke's account of human freedom in the Paraphrase conflicts with the one 
in the Essay. The implication of their claim (although they did not seem to see 
it) was profound. If their reading of the Paraphrase was right, then it would 
mean that Locke would be committed to a doctrine of necessary sinning. There 
is no doubt that Locke was deeply convinced of human sinfulness. But adopting 
the doctrine of necessary sinning would mean that Locke suddenly reverted 
from his view until that point to reconcile his theology with human freedom. 
However, through a holistic analysis of Locke's account of free will in the fifth 
edition of the Essay, we saw how the Paraphrase could be seen in terms of the 
106 E, 2.21.35. 
107 paN. 153 (16,17+). 
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concept of uneasiness, and thus, compatible with the doctrine of suspension and 
human freedom. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Traditionally, Locke's revealed theology has been seen to occupy an obscure 
position in relation to his wider thought. It tends to be studied in isolation from 
the other areas of his thought, and when it is considered in relation to these, it is 
seen as incoherent. Against the supporters of this view, such as Wootton, the 
aim of this chapter was to show how - Locke's revealed theology not only 
connected to wider issues in his thought, but also, how it developed in a way 
that was consistent to these. 
Locke's account of human freedom in the Paraphrase is an ideal case for 
the argument of this chapter. Not only is a study of the often neglected 
Paraphrase invaluable for Locke scholarship in itself, but moreover, this 
particular puzzle presents a classic example of how one could postulate Locke's 
incoherence based on a narrow reading of a throwaway line and how one could 
see a different significance once this was put into a wider context., 08 
We saw how Locke's morals and natural jurisprudence had developed 
upon the assumption that people were free agents. Locke's views on original sin 
and predestination both reflected this commitment. Although Locke was 
convinced of humanity's sinful tendency, he adamantly rejected the Calvinistic 
doctrine of necessary sinning and absolute election. Locke maintained a strong 
sense of the need of a saviour and divine grace, but he also secured space for 
humanity's self-determination, and thus, responsibility. 
However, Wainwright and Marshall's reading of the Paraphrase 
suggested that at the very end of his life, Locke made a move to deny all his 
previous efforts to reconcile his theology with his philosophical commitment. 
118 Another classic example is the following. Peter Laslett famously argued that 'Locke is, 
perhaps, the least consistent of all the great philosophers, and pointing out the contradictions 
either within any of his works or between them is no difficult task'. Laslett's 'Introduction', in 
7TG, 82. Laslett identified Locke the political theorist and Locke the philosopher. Although as a 
philosopher, Locke had 'no room for natural law' (81), as a political theorist, he seemingly 
suggested there was an innate law of nature: when Cain murdered Abel, he was convinced that 
&every one had a Right to destroy such a criminal'; 'so plain was it writ in the Hearts of all 
Mankind'. TTG, II. 11. Yet a closer examination of the usage of the word 'heart' suggests that it 
was the effective reception of an idea, regardless of the mode of transmission'. Thus, Lockes, 
statement need not imply that he capitulated to innatism. Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 30-1. 
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By re-examining the controversial statements sustaining Wainwright and 
Marshall's interpretation in the light of Locke's concept of uneasiness and his 
revised views on free volition, I showed that Wainwright and Marshall's 
interpretation was based on a narrow reading of the text. In this chapter, 
therefore, I showed that a holistic examination can show that the Paraphrase 
was in fact reconcilable to the Essay, and more generally, with human freedom. 
More broadly, we have seen, against the portrait of an incoherent Locke 
depicted by Wootton, that Locke can be judged as a systematic thinker. 
Finally, I will say something about the further political significance of 
the portrait of Locke depicted in this chapter. By showing Locke's systematic 
defence of human freedom and opposition to determinism, this chapter helps us 
to see the ways in which his intellectual energy was exercised against the thrust 
of Hobbesian thought. In the first instance, Locke's rejection of deterministic 
sinning fitted into an opposition to Augustinian pastoral theology exemplified, 
for example, in the Anglican divine, Jonas Proast. 109 Proast had challenged 
Locke's political vision by advocating the use of force by the true church to the 
end of correcting non-conforming individuals. 
' 10 Underlying Proast's argument 
was the assumption of the 'depraved Nature of Man' and 'the Corruption and 
Pravity of Human Nature' and how 'Lusts and Passions" distracted people's 
judgement. "' This warranted the interference of the civil magistrate and 
superiors who had the right to use such force. ' 12 By contrast, Locke believed 
that people were capable of morals and religion, and rejected the traditional 
view of original sin which could be used in Proast's favour. In the same way that 
Locke's rejection of original sin in the traditional sense undermined the 
Augustinian justification of coercion, it also cut off the fuel from Hobbesian 
arguments. On a Hobbist account, people deten-nined their conduct according to 
109 Jonas Proast, The Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration; A Third Letter concerning 
Toleration; A Second Letter to the Author of Three Letters for Toleration (New York: Garland, 
[1690,1691,1704] 1984). For Augustinian theories of intolerance in seventeenth century 
England, see Mark Goldie, 'The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England', in 
From Persecution to Toleration, eds. Ole Peter Grell et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 
331-368. For a seventeenth century critique of Augustinian pastoral theology, see Pierre Bayle, 
A philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14: 23, 'Compel Them to 
Come in, That My House may be Full', ed. John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2005). 
110 Proast, The Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration. 
111 'Depraved', Proast, A Third Letter concerning Toleration, 9; 'Corruption', Ibid., 6,7; 'Lusts,, 
Proast, The Argument ofthe Letter concerning Toleration, 7,22. 
112 Proast, The Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration, 16. 
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the coercive power of the state. 113 If original sin was granted, people would be 
seen to lack moral capability, and thus, warrant the further interference of the 
state's coercive power to govern their conduct. Locke's political view did not 
square with this, and thus, original sin could not be construed as a corrupted 
human nature. The architecture of Locke"s thought was thus opposed to 
Hobbism. 
Narrow contextualist readings of Locke can seemingly expose tensions 
in his moral thought and natural law project, leading onto suggestions that 
Locke was a Hobbist, as Wootton has done. But a wider investigation of the 
character of Locke's thought showed that it in fact developed in conscious 
opposition to Hobbism. Thus, not only does this chapter tell a story about the 
coherence of Locke's thought, but also, a story about how this coherence 
showed his systematic anti-Hobbism. 
113 E, 1.3.5; Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 3 00. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis began with a general concern about the ways in which the history of 
political thought and intellectual history is being written and the implications 
this has had so far for understanding the ideas particularly of the seventeenth 
century thinker, John Locke. We have seen that there are two common 
approaches to the history of political thought and intellectual history which 
generate contrasting portraits of Locke. On the one hand, Straussians present a 
portrait of a prima facie incoherent Locke, who, once unmasked, emerges as a 
judicious follower of his predecessor Thomas Hobbes. Although Straussians still 
have a stronghold in North American academia, we have seen that its 
methodological reliability has been questioned by other commentators on Locke, 
who tend towards the other dominant approach, contextualism. Contextualists, 
on the other hand, present a portrait of a context-driven Locke, who, for his 
multifarious interests and agendas, emerges as a polemicist who lacked a 
systematic coherence and who had little or nothing to say about Hobbes. 
One aim of this thesis was to show that looking at Locke's thought 
through the lenses of these two perspectives unduly forecloses fruitful ways of 
exploring Locke's thought, and hence, what can be extracted from it. As a 
means of widening our horizon, therefore, the thesis has attempted to show how 
a holistic approach can cast a different light on Locke's thought by making clear 
his less explicit assumptions, and through this reconsideration, to offer a 
different estimation of his thought. To this end, the thesis examined a series of 
case studies or puzzles, which, reinterpreted through the holistic perspective, 
revealed an alternative account of Locke's development. 
The general narrative of the thesis is straightforward and can be 
summarized briefly. We have seen that Locke began his intellectual career by 
confronting a political question about the legitimate boundaries of civil authority 
and individual conscientious liberty concerning indifferent things. We have also 
observed how his solution to this problem led on to an investigation about 
natural jurisprudence, which in its own turn, led on to wider investigations 
ranging from epistemology to revealed theology. As each of the case studies 
showed, Locke's thought developed in a way that was consistent with his 
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previous commitments, centring on God and natural law, which itself supported 
his revised liberal politics. It showed, therefore, that Locke's thought developed 
systematically, and moreover, that it developed in a way which suggests that the 
whole fabric of this development was in opposition to Hobbism. 
In the remaining space of the concluding chapter, I will go on to explain 
the wider implications of this thesis. There are four significant implications I 
will point out here. First, the thesis shows that Locke was an unusually careful 
and systematic thinker. Secondly, the thesis shows that Locke's thought 
developed systematically in opposition to Hobbes and Hobbism. Thirdly, the 
thesis shows that Locke's political thought was more complex than modem 
Lockeans might be prepared to admit. Lastly, this thesis helps us to reflect on 
how the history of political thought and intellectual history should be done. I 
will suggest that because the holistic approach shows a revised portrait of Locke 
that we should indeed take seriously, we should also consider taking this 
approach more seriously than historians generally have done. 
1. Locke as a Systematic Thinker 
First, my analysis has revealed that Locke was a careful and systematic thinker. 
By 'systematic' thinker, I do not mean that at all points in his intellectual career 
and in all areas of thought Locke held a single coherent position. Ný%at I do 
mean here is that although Locke did change his mind on a number of issues, he 
did so with a view to intellectual coherence, and, equally importantly, with some 
success. Locke was a thinker who saw how an argument in one area of thought 
had implications in others, and also, one who worked diligently to reconcile his 
ideas with his previous commitments. 
As we have seen, making a political argument that could reconcile the 
tension between civil authority and private consciences was not simply about 
having a political view. For Locke, it implied a theological view about God's 
purposive activity. It also implied a view that God does not require people to 
perform conflicting duties. This also meant that God had made His will clear to 
mankind about how they should live. In this way, one could have a mea , suring 
stick by which mankind could judge whether certain actions were consistent 
with the divine will or whether they were self-fashioned. In this way, Locke 
could maintain with confidence that the power of the state concerned civil 
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matters while purely religious matters could be left to individuals. To sustain 
this political vision, Locke needed to say something about the extent of human 
knowledge and whether natural law was its proper subject. 
For his epistemology to be consistent with his political commitment, 
Locke could not adduce innate ideas. Locke believed that innatsim could be 
used arbitrarily to justify one's self-interest, and thus fall into enthusiasm. 
Moreover, innatism was inconsistent with Locke's idea of a purposive God. 
Locke believed that God would not do something redundant as to provide people 
with innate ideas when He had already bestowed them with natural faculties 
which were sufficient to attain the knowledge of His will. Locke thus took the 
naturalist route. But Locke's naturalism and empiricism created a further 
problem because he would now need to show the steps by which people could 
attain the knowledge of the divine will without adducing innate ideas. Hence, we 
saw the development of Locke's hedonistic ethics and how he integrated his 
empiricism with the divine purpose, that is, how God had created people to 
discover good and evil in relation to the pleasure and pain that He had annexed 
to certain actions. 
Given the centrality of God and His will in Locke's political system, 
people who did not acknowledge these facts could not be tolerated. But Locke's 
own denial of innate ideas required him to accept that people could be genuinely 
devoid of all knowledge of God and His will. Thus, we saw Locke developing 
views about education and the conduct of the understanding and how these 
could ensure that people would have the basic knowledge to conduct themselves 
in accordance with the divine will and law. 
Moreover, given that God was purposive and willed people to live 
according to His design, Locke believed that He would not only provide people 
with the capability to attain the relevant knowledge but also the will power to act 
according to it. Thus, the idea of human freedom was crucial for Locke. This 
required Locke to say something about revealed theology where the assumption 
of human freedom was seriously challenged by the traditional Augustinian and 
Calvinistic doctrines of original sin and predestination. 
This narrative shows clearly how Locke started with an investigation 
about politics and then went on to develop views about various other issues 
which he believed would help to consolidate his initial concern. We have seen 
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that this account can only surface with the examination of Locke's often 
neglected writings such as his later educational and religious writings. By 
tneglected', I do not mean that there have not been any discussion of them, but 
rather that there has not been any discussions of them in the wider context of 
Locke's account of God's organization of the world. 
Such a portrait of Locke as a systematic thinker is unlikely to emerge 
from a rigorous contextualist perspective. This is not least because contextualists 
encourage us to focus on the particular context in which a thinker's argument 
was articulated and to identify the particular tradition to which this argument 
belonged. This is a suitable approach to observe the ways in which a thinker's 
argument contributed to an existing discourse. But the advantage of this 
approach is also its disadvantage. By habitually framing the various writings of 
a thinker into particular contexts and debates, it forecloses the possibility of 
seeing the significance of the arguments in terms of the thinker's own broader 
intellectual development. Thus, while contextualism can offer invaluable 
insights into the context of a particular utterance, a strenuous application of the 
method can also be unhelpful to seeing the wider significance of a thinker's 
thought. 
Thus, as we have seen, on a traditional contextualist model, Locke 
emerges less as a philosopher who thinks in terms of deep structures and 
commitments than a polemicist addressing various issues motivated by historical 
conditions. We are encouraged to see certain interesting features in the context 
in which Locke operated, but beyond that, we are encouraged to see that there is 
little coherence and little philosophical value in the overall argument. In short, 
what this model effectively does is to restrict the significance of the study of 
Locke. By contrast, showing the coherence of Locke's efforts to build up that 
system, my account encourages us to take the systematic dimensions of his 
thought more seriously. 
The significance of identifying a systematic Locke is twofold and 
connects to the second and third points I will make. Firstly, the portrait of a 
systematic Locke opens up the possibility of seeing that Locke's philosophical 
and political concerns run deeper than the issues raised in particular contexts. 
Thus, while Locke's arguments may be directed to particular debates, we are 
encouraged to consider the wider intellectual preoccupations that may be lying 
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behind his responses. Indeed, we have seen that Locke's arguments fitted into a 
structural opposition to a Hobbesian framework. Although this aspect has been 
downplayed by recent contexualist scholars, as we have seen, Locke's silence 
does not necessarily imply indifference. Secondly, understanding the systematic 
dimensions of Locke's thought leads us to see that any attempt to divorce 
individual elements from the system runs the risk of compromising the force of 
the argument, and indeed, the integrity of the system. The force and coherence 
of the individual arguments is supported by presuppositions in other areas of 
thought, which, taken together, uphold the system. This becomes an important 
issue when we consider the modem implications of Lockean liberalism. 
2. Locke's Structural Anti-Hobbism 
The second significance of my narrative is that it shows, contra the 
contextualists, that Locke did have something substantial to say about Hobbes 
and Hobbism, and, pace the Straussians above all, that Locke's system of 
thought developed not towards but in direct opposition to Hobbes. We have seen 
that God and natural law played a pivotal role in the fabric of Locke's thought. 
My account shows that this reliance is better supposed genuine than spurious. It 
also shows that there was direction in the development of Locke's thought and 
that his assumption of a purposive God and the implications of that cut off the 
conceptual supply lines from Hobbesian arguments. 
The dilemma of the Locke of the Two Tracts on Government was that 
there was no objective measuring stick by which one could differentiate between 
genuine conscientious scruples and self-fashioned ones. In the absence of such a 
criterion, Locke, like many Anglican thinkers, opted for an authoritarian 
Hobbesian politics which prioritized civil order over religious conscience. Locke 
realized that his solution was unsatisfactory though, acknowledging that it 
would only create hypocritical worshippers. Locke thus adduced natural law as a 
criterion, but attached a different significance to it than Hobbes who likewise 
operated in this tradition. Although Hobbes operated within the natural law 
tradition, he had effectively reduced the formal, obliging content of natural law 
to the civil sovereign's commands. In this way, Hobbes could bypass the 
epistemological question of how one could know the content of the law and the 
moral question of how one could know that it was obligatory. Yet Hobbes's 
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politics had created the problem of the hypocritical worshipper whose eternal 
life was at stake. Thus, to distinguish his politics from Hobbes's, Locke needed 
to avoid the Hobbesian natural law route. Locke thus confronted the moral 
epistemological question and was led to a generic question about the extent of 
human understanding. 
Common to Hobbes and Locke was their rejection of innatism and their 
commitment to empiricism. Thus they also shared similar conceptual resources 
by which they could explain how people could attain knowledge of the divine 
will. Hedonism was one of them. However, here again, Locke categorically 
distinguished himself from Hobbes's hedonistic ethics by emphasizing the 
pleasure and pain of the afterlife against those of this present world. To 
complement his epistemological argument, Locke developed his views about the 
reasonableness of the Christian religion and how this could help less fortunate 
people to attain moral knowledge. For Locke, natural theology and revealed 
theology were both means by which God communicated His will to mankind. 
This last move which increased the role of revealed theology, however, 
gave cause to people to associate Locke with Hobbes and Socinian theology., 
The move was seen as one undermining the belief in a universal moral law and 
orthodox Anglican theological doctrines. Despite the overlap in certain 
theological doctrines with Hobbes - as 'Jesus is the Messiah' - Locke rejected 
traditional Augustinian and Calvinistic interpretation of the doctrines of original 
sin and predestination which could provide the resources to fuel an authoritarian 
politics of Hobbes's kind. 
On a contextualist model, the above narrative has not been recognized 
because of Locke's lack of direct engagement with Hobbes. On a Straussian 
model, Locke appears as a follower of Hobbes because of the presumed lineage 
of the modem project and the presumed futility of Locke's apparent deficient 
theistic argument. But as my narrative shows, there is a story at a deeper 
stiuctural level which can only be seen in the light of a broader intellectual 
context. 
Locke's 'Hobbism', Richard Willis, The Occasional Paper: Number I (London, 1697), 19; 
, Socinianism', John Edwards, Some Thoughts concerning the Several Causes and Occasions of Atheism (London, 1695); Socinianism Unmaskd (London, 1696); John Milner, An Account of Mr Lock's Religion (London, 1700). 
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One's understanding of the intellectual relationship between Hobbes and 
Locke has direct implications for how one understands the character and 
originality of Locke's thought. As we have seen, the question of the intellectual 
relationship between the two thinkers is as old as Locke's own publishing career. 
From the time Locke began publishing his works until this day, he has continued 
to be seen as one who operated on Hobbes's terms. Locke's contemporaneous 
commentators such as Tyrrell and Newton had suspected that beneath the 
surface Locke was a Hobbist. 2 Today, Straussians continue to reproduce this 
three hundred year old suspicion. Moreover, although contextualists have 
traditionally seen little historical value in a comparison between Hobbes and 
Locke, revisionists emerging from this camp have argued that the two thinkers 
shared more in common than what traditional contextualist views have allowed. 
Seen in this light, Locke comes out less as a distinct philosopher in his own right 
than a philosopher who struggled to escape the shadow of his predecessor 
Hobbes, if he had not capitulated to him. 
Not only does my narrative offer new insights into the relationship 
between Hobbes and Locke, but also, it shows what is distinctive and original 
about Locke's thought. It shows that Locke was not simply a follower of his 
predecessor but an imaginative philosopher in his own right. Locke and Hobbes 
did in fact share a common problem as well as conceptual resources. Both faced 
the Anglican epistemological crisis. In the absence of a presumed infallible 
interpreter of the Scripture, there was no criterion by which one could 
authoritatively distinguish between genuine and spurious consciences. Both 
thinkers had experienced the civil war and its aftermaths and were very much 
aware that an absolute liberty of conscience would lead to anarchy. We have 
seen that for both Locke and Hobbes, natural law provided the authoritative 
criterion. Yet we have seen how Locke and Hobbes used this to reach radically 
different conclusions. Whereas Hobbes showed that natural law was reducible to 
the civil sovereign's commands and advocated an authoritarian state, Locke 
showed that natural law was a divine law knowable to people in general and 
advocated a liberal state. 
' Respectively, Corr., 130 1, vol. iv, 10 1 -2 and 1659, vol. iv, 727. 
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My narrative shows that the character and originality of Locke's thought 
lies in the ways in which he systematically pursued the implications of his 
political vision, and closed off arguments that could be used in support of the 
antithesis of his vision, that is, of Hobbes. This reassures us that Locke is indeed 
an original thinker we should take seriously. And since we can be reassured that 
there is something distinctive about Locke's thought, we may also suppose that 
there was substantial arguments distinguishing Locke's liberalism from 
Hobbes's authoritarianism. 3 This will encourage us to investigate further what 
sets of assumptions distinguish liberalism from authoritarianism and what 
enables us to uphold the former. This leads to the third point I will make about 
the modem implications of Locke. 
3. The Scope of Politics and its Modern Implication 
The third significance of my narrative concerns its modem implications. My 
narrative shows how for Locke a political argument created a broader range of 
other commitments. It shows that a political argument cannot simply be seen as 
an isolated argument, but one that depends on various other arguments. This is 
important in the light of what is said against Locke by David Wootton for 
example. 
Wootton argues at the end of his article 'John Locke: Socinian or natural 
law theoristT that modem liberals have appropriated Locke's empiricism and 
language of natural rights, but at the same time, inherited the incoherence 
dogging Locke's theory itself .4 By contrast, my narrative shows that modem 
liberal use of human rights and toleration is unstable not because Locke9s 
project was incomplete, but contrariwise, because it was complete and it has 
been inherited divorced from the wider arguments supporting it. 5 The wider 
3 This distinction has been downplayed by Kraynak and Kelly, who argue that there was no fundamental philosophical change between the authoritarian and Hobbesian Locke of 1660 and 
the liberal Locke of the later 1660s. R. P. Kraynak, 'John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration', 
American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 53-69; P. J. Kelly, 'John Locke: Authority, 
Conscience and Religious Toleration', in John Locke: A Letter concerning Toleration in Focus, 
eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Routledge, 1991), 127. 
4 David Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist? ', in Religion, Secularization 
and Political Thought., Thomas Hobbes to J. S. Mill, ed. James E. Crimmins (London: Routledge, 
1989), 62-3. 
5 See amongst other works, John Dunn, 'From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break between John Locke and the Scottish Enfightenment', in Rethinking Modern political Theory 
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arguments supporting Locke's liberal politics was, as we have seen, God and 
natural jurisprudence. This is clear to Wootton as well: 'Take away the sanctions 
accompanying [the law of nature] and natural reason as a method of 
6 promulgating it, and there can be no universally valid natural rights'. Locke's 
reliance on God and natural law further created the commitment, perhaps most 
discomfiting for modem liberals, to exclude atheists from civil society. Thus, 
while it may be good news for modem liberals to know that we can see that the 
Lockean liberalism we aspire to is not incoherent, it may also be difficult 
(perhaps even more difficult) to accept what a coherent liberal theory would 
require us to hold. 7 
This may trigger a further investigation. Locke holds a place in the canon 
of political philosophy and is often seen as the 'father of liberalism'. Locke was 
perhaps the father of secular liberalism in the sense that he could be traced back 
as an ancestor of the tradition. But as my narrative shows, Locke himself was 
not a secular liberal but a theological one. On his account, people were not 
supposed autonomous but dependent on God .8 It is interesting to consider how 
Lockean liberalism was transformed from its original to a radically different 
form. It encourages us to investigate carefully the steps by which liberalism was 
secularized and consider whether these steps were based on a thorough 
understanding of Locke's system and the connections he had carefully laid out. 
If not, we may have to entertain the thought that modem political philosophy 
embodies a degree of self-deception about its own origins. 
We have observed that for Locke the connection between God, natural 
law and his liberal politics was fixed. For Locke, people owed obedience to God 
rightfully and rationally because He was their creator who sustained them and 
who had the supreme embodiments of the qualities that fit Him to direct them. 
God's authority was absolute and for this reason His law was too. God's law 
would provide a fixed criterion by which one could draw a line between the 
legitimate boundaries of civil authority, which upheld God's wish for civil order, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Prcss, 1985), 55-67; Timothy Stanton, 'Locke and the 
politics and Theology of Toleration', Political Studies 54 (2006): 84-102. 
6 Wootton, 'John Locke', 62-3. 
'Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
ch. 8. 
I Ian Harris, 'Locke's Political Theory', in British Philosophy and the Age OfEnlightenment, ed. Stuart Brown (London: Routledge, 1996), 96-7. 
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and individual conscientious liberty, which upheld God's wish for sincere 
worship. On this model, the state would be empowered to suppress that which 
infringed upon the laws of nature and disturbed civil order while individuals 
would have liberty over purely religious matters. Conflict between the two 
powers on this model cannot ex hypothesi arise (unless one supposes that God 
gave conflicting orders), but given the frail nature of man, Locke did admit that 
it could from time to time. But here, he had a God to appeal to. 9 
Modem liberalism aspires to this structure, yet strips away God and 
divine natural law from the equation. Liberalism, however, is not anarchy, so it 
does provide its own criterion to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
claims to conscience and what people may act upon. Instead of a divine natural 
law, liberalism introduces the concept of 'reasonableness' (or some variation of 
it). 10 The problem, however, is that in a plural society as ours, there are plenty of 
claims to reasonableness but no clear authority that can arbitrate between 
different claims and decide what exactly the content of reasonableness is to be, 
and hence, what we ought to obey. ' 1 As Locke and Hobbes did, modem liberals 
too face an epistemological crisis. 
Here, the comparison between Hobbes and Locke is illuminating. Both 
Locke and Hobbes agreed that a moral law and an authority that could enforce it 
were necessary to the solution of the crisis. Having stripped away God, liberals 
seem to drift towards the Hobbesian route. Thus, on this model, the state would 
ultimately define the scope of reasonableness and back its decision up with 
physical force. Those who sincerely cannot comply are forced to be hypocritical. 
For this model to work though, people would need to accept the state as a final 
authority, in the sense that it is a 'mortal god'. But what this suggests is that 
modem liberalism is perhaps less Lockean than Hobbesian, less liberal than 
authoritarian. Seeing the connections in Locke's thought force us to see a 
discomfiting reality. 
9 For Locke's 'appeal to Heaven', see for example, ITG, 11,20,2 1. 
10 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
tu ýf 
11 See for example, Jeremy Waldron, 'Toleration and Reasonableness', in The Cul re 0 Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance, eds. Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 13-37; Catriona McKinnon, 
Toleration: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 76-9. 
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What can modem liberals do then? One option is to bring back the 
familiar thought that Locke's political thought is dead, 12 and accept that we are 
essentially Hobbesian. This is perhaps easier said than done. We believe that we 
are building upon Locke's foundations and steadily progressing from his 
seventeenth century prejudices. Yet what has emerged from the present analysis 
is the thought that while we aspire to preserve and polish the liberal ideas we 
have inherited from Locke, we are pressed to admit that we are moving back to 
the views that Locke so painstakingly tried to escape. We may have to accept 
that we are perhaps not as tolerant as even the 'intolerant' Locke. 13 If, however, 
we trust our own intuitions and aspirations to be right, that is, that there is 
something discomfiting about being associated with Hobbism, then we may say 
that we have reached the point where Locke began his intellectual career in the 
early 1660s. A re-examination of the development of Locke's thought could 
hardly be more timely and relevant to us now. 
4. A Final Reflection 
Although this thesis has been an investigation of Locke's intellectual biography, 
or in other words, an example of intellectual history, it has also been an 
investigation of his politics and an example of history of political thought. I 
reflect on one last issue: how the history of political thought should be done. 
Through the example of Locke, we have seen how a political argument 
quickly developed into a wider range of intellectual investigations. As I have 
argued above, it suggests that when we consider Locke's political argument, we 
cannot fully grasp the significance of it without further considering the 
presuppositions supporting it. This has general implications for the ways in 
which we can study the history of political thought. it suggests that the scope of 
political thought is not limited to what we normally understand to be the 
(, political' but may extend to investigations that seem remote from it. It therefore 
points to the deficiency, in the first instance, of a pure textualist approach, which 
12 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), x. 'I simply cannot conceive of constructing an analysis of any issue in contemporary 
political theory around the affirmation or negation of anything which Locke says about political 
matters'. Cf John Dunn, 'What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John 
Locke? ', in Interpreting political responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
13 The expression is borrowed from Alex Tuckness, 'Rethinking the Intolerant Locke'. American 
Journal ofPolitical Science 46 (2002): 288-298. 
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considers a certain political text as self-contained and is all that is necessary to 
understand the particular argument in the text. While writers may publish a 
single tract hoping that this will be the case, what the study of the reception of 
texts shows us is how often writers are misunderstood and are forced to clarify 
their point (if they are still alive to do this). 14 My thesis shows that one reason 
for this can be attributed to the fact that what may be clear to the author himself 
may not be to a reader who has not re-enacted the thought process of the author, 
which, fortunately for the modem reader, may be available in the author's other 
works or manuscripts. -5 
Secondly, the idea that the scope of politics may extend beyond what is 
conventionally regarded as the political points to the deficiency of a rigorous 
contextualist approach. Pigeon-holing the arguments of authors into particular 
contexts and debates may result in the suppression of their imaginative force, 
that is to say, it may limit what the author could have said. This method assumes 
that thinkers operated within certain traditions and have the ability to manipulate 
it. But it forecloses the possibility of a thinker trying to transcend the tradition 
on a wider context. While contextualism may be helpful to shedding light on 
what an author's argument could do on a particular instance, it may not be able 
to show how their mind was operating and what they were trying to do on a 
larger scale without widening the context beyond the context of a particular text. 
My narrative shows that, seen holistically, we can see a wider project that was 
moving Locke, which is often overlooked by contextualist historians. 
The holistic approach may be more suitable for certain thinkers than 
others. It does not guarantee that all thinkers will have a similar kind of 
underlying structure. At the very least though, it may reveal the possibility that a 
philosopher has a coherent structure to these thinkers. But that is not its sole 
purpose. The more general significance of the holistic approach is that it 
encourages us to keep the doors open for fruitful possibilities we may rule out a 
priori on other approaches. As my thesis shows, in Locke's case, the holistic 
14 For example, although it is well-known that Locke denied toleration to Roman Catholics in the 
Letter concerning Toleration, he was accused of nothing short of being a secret papist himself. 
Thomas Long, The Letter for Toleration Decipher 'd (London, 1689). There is in addition to 
genuine misunderstanding the problem of willfully misunderstanding or cadcaturizing an 
opponent. 
" Consider how many times we have heard a scholar say: 'Good question. I didn't have time to 
talk about that in this presentation. But I've addressed it in another work. Please consult it'. 
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approach offers us a fresh account of what is distinctive about Locke's thought 
and why it matters for us today. There is not much more we can ask from an 
approach. There is therefore a compelling case always to keep the possibilities 
open for studying the history of political thought in terms of intellectual history. 
As I stated in the introduction, the holistic approach entails writing an 
intellectual biography, and writing an intellectual biography is, without doubt, 
an onerous task. Seeking any kind of truth is onerous, however, whether it be 
about life in general or about the mind of a great thinker. But we have the 
encouragement of Locke, a great thinker himself: 'I know there is truth opposite 
to falshood, that it may be found if people will, and is worth the seeking, and is 
not only the most valuable, but the pleasantest thing in the world'. 16 
16 Corr., 2376, vol. vi, 295. 
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